Lewis v. Palmer
Filing
10
OPINION AND ORDER Denying and Dismissing with Prejudice 1 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Denying Certificate of Appealability, and Denying Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on Appeal. Signed by District Judge Thomas L. Ludington. (Sian, M)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
MILTON LEWIS, #830791,
Petitioner,
Case No. 15-cv-12261
v.
Honorable Thomas L. Ludington
CARMEN PALMER,
Respondent.
__________________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING AND DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, DENYING CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY, AND DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON
APPEAL
Petitioner Milton Lewis filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 on June 19, 2015. Petitioner is serving a sentence of life imprisonment, as well as
lesser terms, for his Wayne Circuit Court convictions of two counts of first-degree murder, Mich.
Comp. Laws § 750.316; one count of assault with intent to commit murder, Mich. Comp. Laws §
750.83; three counts of armed robbery, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.529; and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.224b. The petition raises a
single claim: insufficient evidence was presented at trial to sustain Petitioner’s conviction for
first-degree murder. The petition will be denied because Petitioner’s claims are without merit. A
certificate of appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal will also be denied.
I.
This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts relied upon by the Michigan Court of
Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See
Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009):
On April 25, 2011, defendant entered the St. John Eastwood Clinic Connor
House, a drug and alcohol rehabilitation facility in Detroit, Michigan. Inside,
defendant fatally shot Milford Reed, robbed and fatally shot Ricky Charles,
robbed and assaulted Terence Ross, and robbed Gregory Walton. Several hours
before the murders, defendant sent a series of text messages to Gus Mills, who
lives adjacent to the Connor House, instructing Mills to leave town, that Mills
would be “the last one standing,” and that defendant was going to “deal” with the
residents of Connor House on their “own terms.”
People v. Lewis, No. 310295, 2013 WL 5762994, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2013).
Following his conviction and sentence, Petitioner filed a claim of appeal in the Michigan
Court of Appeals, which raised the following claim:
I. The United States Constitution requires that Appellant’s convictions for first
degree murder premeditated be vacated since there was legally insufficient
evidence to support a guilty verdict.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction in an unpublished
opinion. Lewis, 2013 WL 5762994, at *1, 3. Petitioner subsequently filed an application for
leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, which raised the same claim as in the Michigan
Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court denied the application because it was not
persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by the court. People v. Lewis, 843
N.W.2d 907 (Mich. 2014) (unpublished table decision).
II.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) curtails a federal court’s review of constitutional claims
raised by a state prisoner in a habeas action if the claims were adjudicated on the merits by the
state courts. Relief is barred under this section unless the state court adjudication was “contrary
to” or resulted in an “unreasonable application of” clearly established Supreme Court law.
“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law if it ‘applies a rule
that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]’ or if it ‘confronts a set of
facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and
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nevertheless arrives at a result different from [this] precedent.’” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S.
12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam), quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).
“[T]he ‘unreasonable application’ prong of the statute permits a federal habeas court to
‘grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the
Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts’ of petitioner’s case.”
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.
“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so
long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.”
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.86, 101 (2011), quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652,
664 (2004). “Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme
malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction
through appeal.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103 (internal quotation marks omitted). “As a condition
for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s
ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was
an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement.” Id.
III.
Petitioner claims that insufficient evidence was presented at his jury trial to sustain his
conviction for first degree murder. Specifically, he argues that the prosecutor failed to prove that
the murders were premeditated. This claim was presented to the Michigan Court of Appeals
during Petitioner’s direct appeal, and the state court found that it lacked merit. Respondent
argues that the state court reasonably rejected the claim on the merits, and therefore habeas relief
is barred under § 2254(d).
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A “daunting, doubly deferential standard of review” applies to a sufficiency-of-theevidence inquiry on habeas review. Keys v. Booker, 798 F.3d 442, 450 (6th Cir. 2015). First, a
reviewing court “must determine whether, viewing the trial testimony and exhibits in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 205 (6th Cir.
2009) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Second, even if the reviewing court
concludes that a rational trier of fact could not have found the petitioner guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, it “must still defer to the state appellate court’s sufficiency determination as
long as it is not unreasonable.” Id.
The Jackson standard “must be applied with explicit reference to the substantive elements
of the criminal offense as defined by state law.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16. “To establish
first-degree premeditated murder [in Michigan], the prosecution must prove that the defendant
intentionally killed the victim and the act of killing was deliberate and premeditated.” People v.
Haywood, 530 N.W.2d 497, 503 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
The elements in dispute here are premeditation and deliberation. Under state law, “[t]o
premeditate is to think about beforehand; to deliberate is to measure and evaluate the major
facets of a choice or problem.” People v. Morrin, 187 N.W.2d 434, 449 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971)
(footnote omitted). “Premeditation and deliberation require sufficient time to allow the defendant
to take a second look at his actions. This time interval may be minimal.” People v. Gonzalez, 444
N.W.2d 228, 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (internal citation omitted). “[P]remeditation and
deliberation may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident,
including the parties’ prior relationship, the actions of the accused both before and after the
crime, and the circumstances of the killing itself.” Haywood, 530 N.W.2d at 503 (internal
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citations omitted). Premeditation may also be inferred from “the type of weapon used and the
location of the wounds inflicted.” People v. Berry, 497 N.W.2d 202, 204 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
Review of the trial record supports the state court of appeals’ conclusion. Notably, one of
the prosecution witnesses, Gus Mills, testified that hours before the murders, he received a text
message from Petitioner indicating that he wanted Mills to leave the area of Conner House, leave
a door unlocked, that Petitioner would deal with the residents at Conner House on their terms,
and that Mills would be the last one standing. See Dkt. 9-7, pp. 86-89. If the text message was at
all unclear about what Petitioner intended to do, he resolved any ambiguities by his actions the
next day.
Terrence Ross testified that Petitioner arrived at Conner House on the day of the incident
and seemed agitated and paranoid. Id. at 34. Petitioner said he was there to pick up a check from
the program manager. Ross tried to convince Petitioner to reenter the program, but it seemed to
Ross that Petitioner was not listening to anything he said.
Meanwhile, Gregory Walton and Ricky Charles were in the pool room in the basement,
and Milford Reed was in the basement television room. Walton testified that he heard shots, and
then he saw Petitioner enter the pool room wearing gloves and brandishing a handgun. Id. at 67.
Petitioner demanded that Walton and Charles turn over their money. Id. at 68. Charles put less
than a dollar’s worth of change on the pool table, and so Petitioner immediately shot Charles in
the face, telling him “that ain’t shit.” Id. at 69. Walton had four twenty-dollar bills to give
Petitioner. Petitioner took the money and told Walton to “keep his mouth shut, and get out of
town.” Id. at 70. Walton fled the building and called for help. Id. at 71. The shots Walton initially
heard most likely came from the television room, where the other murder victim, Reed, was
found. Reed was shot at close range directly into his left eye. Id. at 122.
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At some point during the incident, Petitioner went upstairs and approached Ross in his
bedroom and demanded money. Ross scrambled around his room but could not locate his money.
As he scrambled, Petitioner shot him multiple times in the hand, arm, and head. Id. at 39.
Eventually, Petitioner took Ross’s pack of cigarettes and left. Ross then went outside where he
and Charles, bleeding from their wounds, tried to wave motorists down for help.
Given this record evidence, even on direct review Petitioner’s claim bordered on
frivolous. Viewed most favorably to the prosecution, as the Jackson standard requires,
Petitioner’s texts the night before the shooting indicated that he planned to return to Conner
House to rob and murder the residents. He warned Ross that he would be last man standing, and
then hours later he shot three people in the head in an episode that must have lasted several
minutes. The evidence presented at trial therefore easily allowed a rational fact-finder to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner acted with premeditation and deliberation
when he killed the two deceased victims. Without question, the adjudication of this claim by the
state courts did not involve an unreasonable application of the clearly established Supreme Court
standard. The petition will therefore be denied.
IV.
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be denied. Petitioner will also be denied a
certificate of appealability. In order to obtain a certificate of appealability, a prisoner must make
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To
demonstrate this denial, the applicant is required to show that reasonable jurists could debate
whether, or agree that, the petition should have been resolved in a different manner, or that the
issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). When a district court rejects a habeas petitioner’s constitutional
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claims on the merits, the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the
district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims to be debatable or wrong. Id. at 484. A
federal district court may grant or deny a certificate of appealability when the court issues a
ruling on the habeas petition. Castro v. United States, 310 F.3d 900, 901 (6th Cir. 2002).
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the Court will deny Petitioner a certificate of
appealability because he has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal
constitutional right. Dell v. Straub, 194 F. Supp. 2d 629, 659 (E.D. Mich. 2002). Because Lewis
has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right he is not entitled to the
issuance of a certificate of appealability on this claim. See Heidelberg v. Illinois Prisoner Review
Bd., 163 F.3d 1025, 1025-1027 (7th Cir. 1998). The Court will also deny Petitioner leave to
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal because the appeal would be frivolous. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3).
V.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED, that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED
and DISMISSED with prejudice.
It is further ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is DENIED.
Dated: March 16, 2016
s/Thomas L. Ludington
THOMAS L. LUDINGTON
United States District Judge
PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served
upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first
class U.S. mail on March 16, 2016.
s/Michael A. Sian
MICHAEL A. SIAN, Case Manager
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