Eggelston v. Nexteer Automotive Corp. et al

Filing 47

ORDER Denying 43 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Thomas L. Ludington. (KWin)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
ERIC EGGELSTON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 16-cv-13368
Honorable Thomas L. Ludington

NEXTEER AUTOMOTIVE CORP,
Defendant.
__________________________________________/
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
On September 16, 2016, Plaintiff Eric Eggelston initiated the above-captioned action by
filing his complaint against his former employer, Defendant Nexteer Automotive Corporation,
and his former local union, United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America, Local 699 (“Local 699” or “the Union”).1 In his complaint Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Nexteer wrongfully terminated him from his A-bucket position in retaliation for his
exercise of his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq,
because of his race in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), the Michigan’s ElliottLarsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”), M.C.L. 37.2202, and in retaliation for opposing a violation
of ELCRA in violation of MCL 37.201(a). Defendant Nexteer (hereinafter “Defendant”) moved
for summary judgment on December 21, 2017. On April 4, 2018, the Court entered an opinion
and order denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 39.
The Court found that there was a question of fact as to whether Defendant terminated and
then failed to rehire Plaintiff because of his race and not because he stole food from a market.

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On November 3, 2016 Defendant Local 699 filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against it pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court entered an order on January 20, 2017, granting the motion and
dismissing Defendant Local 699.

Specifically, the Court noted that Mr. Pruitt decided to rehire Mr. Leger (Plaintiff’s Caucasian
counterpart) because Mr. Pruitt determined that Mr. Leger did not commit theft. Id. at 19-23.
However, Mr. Pruitt could not explain how this determination was made. Id. Furthermore, Mr.
Pruitt’s testimony that he concluded Mr. Leger did not commit theft was undermined by the fact
that Mr. Leger was reinstated pursuant to a “last chance agreement,” which was inconsistent with
the notion that Mr. Leger was innocent of the theft accusation.
Defendant now moves for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b). ECF No. 43. Defendant obtained additional evidence from Plaintiff in response to
supplemental discovery requests served on April 18. Defendant sought supplemental responses
to certain requests for production, including request number 5 which sought “all documents that
support or refute [Plaintiff’s] allegations that Nexteer retaliated against [Plaintiff] in any way.”
Id. Ex. C, ECF No. 43-4. In response to the supplemental request, Plaintiff produced a number of
affidavits, including an affidavit from Greg Leger, which contained some additional information
concerning the circumstances surrounding Mr. Leger’s termination and reinstatement. Defendant
contends that this affidavit, dated December 11, 2017, should have been produced earlier, and
that Plaintiff wrongfully withheld it in an attempt to manufacture a fact issue for trial.
I.
A.
Defendant titles its motion as a motion for reconsideration, yet moves pursuant to Rule
60(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b)(2) provides that “on motion and just
terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding” based on “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under rule 59(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2)

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(emphasis added). Notably, rule 60(b) applies to final judgments and orders, and not to
interlocutory judgments or orders. State National Insurance Company v. County of Camden, 824
F.3d 399, 406 (3d Cir. 2016) (Rule 60(b) improperly invoked when judgment in question was
interlocutory). Denial of summary judgment is generally not appealable and is not considered a
final judgment or order. Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180 (2011); Hearring v. Sliwowski, 712 F.3d
275, 279 (6th Cir. 2013). There are limited exceptions to this general rule which are not
applicable here, such as an appeal of an order denying summary judgment based on qualified
immunity in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hearring v. Sliwowski, 712 F.3d
275, 279 (6th Cir. 2013).
Here, the Court’s order denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is not a final
order or judgment, and rule 60(b)(2) is therefore inapplicable. Indeed, no decision has been
rendered in this case which would prohibit Defendant from supporting its defense at trial with
this newly discovered evidence.
B.
Local Rule 7.1(h), on the other hand, governs motions for reconsideration. A party can
file a motion for reconsideration of a previous order, but must do so within fourteen days. A
motion for reconsideration will be granted if the moving party shows: “(1) a palpable defect, (2)
the defect misled the court and the parties, and (3) that correcting the defect will result in a
different disposition of the case.” Michigan Dept. of Treasury v. Michalec, 181 F. Supp. 2d 731,
733-34 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (quoting E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(g)(3)). A “palpable defect” is “obvious,
clear, unmistakable, manifest, or plain.” Id. at 734 (citing Marketing Displays, Inc. v. Traffix
Devices, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 262, 278 (E.D. Mich. 1997)). “[T]he Court will not grant motions
for rehearing or reconsideration that merely present the same issues ruled upon by the Court,

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either expressly or by reasonable implication.” E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h)(3). See also Bowens v.
Terris, 2015 WL 3441531, at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 28, 2015). A party may seek reconsideration
based on: 1) a clear error of law, 2) newly discovered evidence that was not previously available
to the parties, or 3) an intervening change in the controlling law. White v. Mortg. Elec.
Registration Sys., Inc., 2006 WL 2130507, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 28, 2006).
Although the instant motion was not filed until 30 days after the entry of the order in
question, the motion is nonetheless timely as the new evidence was not discovered until Plaintiff
produced it on April 30, 2018. Defendant filed the instant motion five days later. Nevertheless,
the motion will be denied for two reasons.
First, although the affidavit of Mr. Leger is technically “newly discovered evidence,”
Defendant has not explained why this evidence was not previously available to it. Irrespective of
whether Plaintiff was under a duty to produce this document when it came into Plaintiff’s
possession, there does not appear to be any reason why Defendant could not have obtained this
information from Mr. Leger. To the extent Defendant believes Mr. Leger’s explanation for his
termination and reinstatement is material to its defense, it could have sought this information
from Mr. Leger. Defendant has never apprised the Court of any unsuccessful attempt at obtaining
this information from Mr. Leger.
Secondly, Mr. Leger’s affidavit would not have changed the outcome of the Court’s order
denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Mr. Leger explains as follows in the
affidavit:
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this affidavit and if called
upon to testify to these facts, I would do so truthfully
2. I was tasked with changing the deep fryer filters at the plant 3 facility in all
the cafeterias. I did this job for eight to nine years.
3. I was told I could take a drink anytime I was performing this job.
4. I would, on occasion, take one of the offered drinks.
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5. I was fired for theft and brought back on a last chance agreement
approximately 20 months later.
6. I took the last chance agreement because I needed to provide for my family.
7. It was Mr. Pruitt and the bargaining chair, Robert Glasser, that made the last
chance agreement with me.
8. Further, Affiant sayeth not.
Leger Aff. Mot. Ex. C. Defendant contends that this “substantiates” Mr. Pruitt’s testimony that
he concluded Mr. Leger did not steal because “he gets fountain pop whenever he is in [the
cafeteria] working.” Simply put, Mr. Leger’s justification for his conduct does not clarify or
substantiate Mr. Pruitt’s testimony. That is, it does not explain how Mr. Pruitt made his
determination that Mr. Leger did not steal and was therefore entitled to more preferential
treatment than Plaintiff. The affidavit does not provide any information regarding whether Mr.
Leger’s justification (that he was authorized by an undisclosed person to drink soft drinks
without payment) was ever shared with Mr. Pruitt.
A frequently quoted articulation of the honest belief rule provides that an employer may
“reasonably and honestly rel[y] on a particularized set of facts in making an employment
decision” even if it is “later shown to be mistaken, foolish, trivial, or baseless.” Chen v. Dow
Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 2009). The inverse, however, is not true. That is, if a
decision maker relies merely on conjecture in making its decision, that decision is not entitled to
deference simply because the decision maker’s assumptions ultimately turn out to be correct. As
explained in the Court’s previous order, whether Plaintiff or Mr. Leger stole property is largely
irrelevant, as are their explanations for their conduct. Their explanations are only relevant to the
extent they were shared with Mr. Pruitt (the decision maker who rehired Mr. Leger). The
relevant issue is what information Mr. Pruitt relied upon in making his determination that Mr.
Leger did not commit theft, and whether that information justified treating Mr. Leger more

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preferentially than Plaintiff. Neither Mr. Pruitt’s testimony nor the newly discovered affidavit of
Mr. Leger explains what information Mr. Pruitt relied upon in making this determination.
Mr. Pruitt’s inability during his deposition to explain how he determined Mr. Leger did
not steal was particularly notable given the substantial evidence that Mr. Leger did in fact steal.
Indeed, Mr. Leger was initially terminated for stealing. Mr. Leger’s affidavit does not explain
what caused the misunderstanding that resulted in him being terminated for allegedly stealing
pop when in fact he was entitled to complimentary pop while working. Nor does Mr. Leger’s
testimony explain why he had to be reinstated pursuant to a last chance agreement if Mr. Pruitt
concluded he did nothing wrong. Mr. Leger simply explains that he took the last chance
agreement because he “needed to provide for [his] family.” The affidavit also indicates that he
was reinstated 20 months after his termination, which raises the additional question of why it
took 20 months for Mr. Pruitt to determine Mr. Leger had not committed any wrongdoing.
II.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration, ECF No. 43, is
DENIED.
s/Thomas L. Ludington
THOMAS L. LUDINGTON
United States District Judge
Dated: May 8, 2018

PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served
upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first
class U.S. mail on May 8, 2018.
s/Kelly Winslow
KELLY WINSLOW, Case Manager

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