Suitor v. Charter Communications, LLC

Filing 20

ORDER Granting Defendant's 10 Motion for Summary Judgment, Denying Defendant's 17 Motion in Limine as Moot, and Overruling Defendant's 16 Objections to Pretrial Disclosures as Moot. Signed by District Judge Thomas L. Ludington. (KWin)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
RONALD SUITOR,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 17-cv-11137

v.

Honorable Thomas L. Ludington

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
Defendant.
__________________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE AS MOOT, AND
OVERRULING DEFENDANT’S OBJECTIONS TO PRETRIAL DISCLOSURES AS
MOOT
On April 11, 2017, Plaintiff Ronald Suitor filed a complaint against Defendant Charter
Communications, LLC. ECF No. 1. Suitor alleges that Charter fired him in retaliation for taking
medical leave, thus violating the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615. On January 9,
2018, Charter filed a motion for summary judgment. On March 27, 2018, Charter also filed a
motion in limine to exclude certain evidence at trial and objections to certain of Suitor’s pretrial
disclosures. ECF Nos. 16, 17. For the following reasons, Charter’s motion for summary judgment
will be granted, and Charter’s motion in limine will be denied as moot.
I.
A.
Plaintiff Ronald Suitor was hired by Defendant Charter Communications in July 2014 to
work as a direct sales representative in Charter’s Bay City branch. Suitor Dep. at 15–17, ECF No.
10. As a direct sales representative, Suitor was provided “address leads” (“houses that either didn’t
have Charter services or were existing internet-only customer[s]”) and was directed to persuade
those individuals to purchase Charter’s “triple-play” service, which bundles television, internet,

and phone services. Id. at 19. Direct sales representatives receive a yearly salary of $19,200.00.
Offer Letter at 1, ECF No. 12, Ex. 2. However, sales representatives also receive commission
compensation, and commissions typically represent a large majority of yearly compensation for
direct sales representatives. When Suitor was originally hired by Charter, he received an offer
letter which estimated that his “annual, variable commission target” would result in approximately
$54,195.48 in commissions. Id.
At Charter, that commission target works in conjunction with monthly sales quotas. Those
quotas consisted of two thresholds. The minimum threshold is 10 triple plays per month. Suitor
Dep. at 21.1 The monthly goal is twenty-three triple plays per month. Id. If a direct sales
representative fails to reach the minimum threshold, they do not receive a paycheck for that month.
Brackett Dep. at 5, ECF No. 10.
When a sales representative takes leave, their monthly quotas are reduced pursuant to an
undisclosed Charter algorithm. Id. at 5–8. Terry Brackett, a supervisor for the Suitor and other
sales representatives during the relevant period of time, indicated that the minimum sales threshold
would typically drop by two for every five business days the direct sales representative was on
leave. Id. Thus, if a sales representative takes two weeks of leave, their minimum sales threshold
for that month drops to six. Id. at 7–8. Because the adjustment to the minimum threshold is

1
The record contains contradictory information regarding the minimum threshold. Several Charter employees,
including Suitor, testified that the minimum monthly threshold was ten. See id.; Brackett Dep. at 5, ECF No. 10.
Charter cites to a June 26, 2015, Performance Improvement Plan which indicated that the “minimum quota” for the
next month was “12 Total Sales.” June 26, 2015, PIP, ECF No. 10, Ex. 7–4. However, other Charter records refer to
the “target threshold” as being ten triple plays. See Incident Invest. Rep. at 3, ECF No. 10, Ex. 14 (entry for May 25,
2016). The same incident investigation report contains multiple entries highlighting months where Suitor failed to
reach the “mid-month target of 12” sales. See, e.g., id. at 1 (entry for November 24, 2015). The disparity in the record
can perhaps be reconciled as follows: the minimum threshold for receiving a paycheck was ten triple play sales per
month. However, direct sales representatives met with their supervisor halfway through the month to provide an update
on their progress towards the overall goal of 23 sales. If the direct sales representative had not made 12 sales (and thus
was not on pace to meet the overall goal), the supervisor might prepare a performance improvement plan.
Alternatively, perhaps the monthly threshold changed over time. Regardless, the ambiguity in the record is not material
to the dispositive issues.

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calculated pursuant to an algorithm, Charter management is not involved in any modifications
based on leave. Id. at 8.
Supervisors like Terry Brackett also receive commission bonuses based on the number of
sales made by the employees they supervise. Id. at 11–12. Mr. Brackett indicated in his deposition
that the threshold for his bonus was not reduced when his employees took leave. Id. Thus, if a sales
representative takes leave, their supervisor is less likely to receive a commission bonus. Id.
B.
During his time with Charter, Suitor experienced certain recurring challenges in his
personal life. Suitor requested leave several times in response to those challenges.
1.
October 26, 2015, Suitor sent Shaun Harton (his then-supervisor) an email regarding a
possible leave of absence. Oct. 26, 2015, Email, ECF No. 10, Ex. 7. Suitor indicated his “desire
for a leave of absence for about 3 months of winter.” Id. He explained that his wife suffered from
a variety of medical conditions and that wintering in Florida was “an effective and proven
successful therapy.” Id. In his deposition, Suitor provided further detail. Suitor Dep. at 87. Suitor’s
wife experiences several “[p]hysical and mental disabilities” and, during the time in question, was
providing primary caregiving to Suitor’s aging father. Id. at 8, 87. In mid-November of 2015,
Suitor’s wife had “pretty much . . . wore out” and told Suitor that she would “leave if [he] didn’t
do something to relieve her.” Id. at 87. In response, Suitor submitted a formal leave request. Id.
After Suitor submitted the request, there was communication between Mr. Horton, Scott
Zybtowski (Mr. Horton’s supervisor), Mariaelena Cavazos (a human resources representative),
and Suitor. See Nov. 10, 2015, Email Chain, ECF No. 12, Ex. 4. Suitor reiterated that he needed
ninety days of leave to address his wife’s “documented medical issues and mental health issues

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that require[d] her to a [sic] warmer climate in the winter months.” Nov. 10, 2015, Email Chain at
1. Initially, Suitor requested personal, non-medical leave. Id. at 2–3. The leave request form Suitor
submitted included a space requesting FMLA leave, but Suitor indicated that he intentionally
decided against requesting FMLA leave because his wife was uncomfortable disclosing the nature
of her medical issues. Id. at 1. Ms. Cavazos asked whether Suitor was “possibly requesting FMLA”
and informed Suitor that Charter “seldom authorize[s]” personal leaves of absence and that such
leaves are limited to thirty days. Nov. 10, 2015, Email Chain at 1–2. In response, Suitor indicated
that he would speak to his wife about the leave policy and consider requesting FMLA leave. Id. at
1.
On December 10 and 11, 2015, Suitor submitted two additional leave requests. In the first
leave request, submitted on December 10, Suitor sought personal, non-medical leave from January
11, 2016, to February 9, 2016. See Dec. 10, 2015, Leave Request at 1, ECF No. 12, Ex. 6. In the
December 11, 2015, leave request, Suitor sought FMLA leave from January 11, 2016, to March
21, 2016. See Dec. 11, 2016, Leave Request, ECF No. 12, Ex. 9. One of the reasons that Suitor
was seeking FMLA leave was because his father was scheduled for cancer-related surgery on
January 11, 2016. Suitor Dep. at 96–97.
It is less than clear why Suitor requested both personal leave and FMLA leave. The topic
was discussed at his deposition:
Q All right. But for the one in November and the one in December you didn’t ask
for FMLA leave; you asked for personal leave?
A Well, I already had an FMLA leave in process.
Q So if you already had an FMLA in process, why did you request a personal leave?
A I didn’t know – I thought it was going to take some time for my wife – because
I had two people that were ill that were going to get medical certifications –

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Id. at 92.
It seems that Suitor believed that his request for FMLA leave would take more time to process
(since he needed medical documentation),2 and so he thought he “would have a 30-day leave and
then an FMLA.” Id. at 95. When asked why the both leave requests covered January 11, 2016,
through February 9, 2016, Suitor indicated that he might have made a clerical error. Id. at 97.
In response to the leave requests, Mr. Zybtowski and Ms. Cavazos scheduled a meeting
with Suitor. Suitor Dep. at 90–91. Suitor believes that Mr. Zybtowski “crossed some boundaries”
during the meeting. Id. at 101. In particular, Suitor was troubled by Mr. Zybtowski’s questions
about Suitor’s personal issues with his wife. Id. Mr. Zybtowksi recommended that Suitor call a
Charter helpline. Id. at 103–04. According to Suitor, Mr. Zybtowksi also told Suitor that he was
“a marginal employee and [needed] to resign.” Id. at 104. In his deposition, Suitor characterized
the conversation as follows:
And Scott indicated again, well – he said, “You’re marginal at best.” “This is
affecting my bottom-line,” is what he said. “I’ll have to carry you on the roster.”
Well, that tells me this is money moti –that’s his focus, and I understand he’s got a
department to run, but, you know, we’re not here about that. We’re here to discuss
my leave, and this – he said exactly, “You’re a marginal employee at best. This is
affecting my bottom-line,” that, “I’ll have to carry you on the roster,” and, “You
need to resign.”
Id. at 105. See also id. at 107 (“[H]e asked for my resignation on – two times during that meeting”).
Suitor’s discussions with Ms. Cavazos during the meeting were less confrontational. Suitor
and Ms. Cavazos discussed other Charter employees who had received FMLA leave, and Ms.
Cavazos suggested that Suitor might be eligible. Id. at 102, 106.
Suitor’s request for personal, non-medical leave was denied, but his request for FMLA
leave was granted. See Notations to Req. Leave Absence, ECF No. 12, Ex. 6; Designation Notice,

2

This documentation was provided to Charter between December 18 and 23, 2015. Suitor Dep. at 109.

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ECF No. 12, Ex. 11. Both of Suitor’s leave requests specified the requested start date as January
11, 2016. However, Suitor was scheduled to take vacation from December 23, 2015, to January 4,
2016. Suitor Dep. at 110. Suitor also had four floating holidays available, and he wished to use
those holidays to cover the week between his vacation and the beginning of his FMLA leave. Id.
at 111–12. Mr. Harton refused to allow Suitor to use those floating vacation days, and instructed
Suitor to contact Ms. Cavazos if he had questions. Id. at 112. When Suitor contacted Ms. Cavazos,
she suggested that his FMLA leave begin on January 5, 2016. Id. at 113. Suitor accepted that
proposal. Id. at 113–14.
2.
Suitor contends that Charter employees retaliated against him for taking FMLA leave in
several ways. First, he indicates that he received a warning in January 2016, for failing to meet his
sales thresholds for the preceding sales month. See Suitor Dep. at 115. The sales cycle in question
ran from December 22, 2015, to January 21, 2016. Between Suitor’s vacation days and FMLA
leave, he only worked December 22 and 23 of that sales period. Id. In those two days, he sold five
triple plays (with one more sale pending). See 1/7/16 Incident Log, ECF No. 12, Ex. 12. See also
Suitor Dep. at 115. Despite the fact that Suitor was on pace to easily surpass his monthly thresholds
(if he had worked the entire month), Mr. Horton faulted Suitor for failing to meet the overall
monthly threshold.3 Mr. Horton forwarded the incident log to Suitor, which included an action
plan for Suitor to meet his monthly threshold.
Based in part upon that email, Suitor believed that Charter expected him to work during
his FMLA leave. In his deposition, he was asked whether he believed that Mr. Horton’s “message

3

Despite the existence of the incident log, there is no evidence that the sales totals for this month were considered by
Charter in any employment decisions. The investigation report which summarized Suitor’s history with Charter did
not identify December 2015 as one of the months where Suitor did not meet his sales thresholds.

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was a communication to you that you had to work while on FMLA leave?” Id. at 121. Suitor
indicated: “That’s exactly that, yes.” Id. Suitor was troubled by the email, and so he contacted his
brother, Don Suitor, who also worked for Charter:
I said, “Don, they want me to work while on FMLA.” You know – I said, “I don’t
know how I’m going to perform all these sales and that,” and I said, “They didn’t
take my tablet and my phone. Will you contact Shaun and –” “Don will you pick
up my tablet and phone and go bring it into Shaun and see if he will take it?” . . .
So Don did go out . . . and contacted Shaun, and he called me back, and he said,
“No, Shaun said you’re going to need – “No, he’s going to need that for making
sales and calling customers,” and that told me, well, I guess Shaun’s expecting me
to keep working.”
Id. at 123–24.
Accordingly, Suitor made a number of phone calls to prospective customers while on FMLA leave.
Id.
Finally, after Suitor returned to work, he received a written warning for failing to meet his
sales thresholds in May 2016. Suitor believes that he should have merely received a verbal warning
because, prior to taking FMLA leave, he had met his sales targets for three successive months.
Suitor Dep. at 135. In his deposition, Suitor explained that when a direct sales representative
reaches their sales thresholds for three consecutive months, their “step penalty is rolled back.” Id.
In other words, discipline related to failure to meet sales thresholds is less severe for salespeople
who have met those thresholds for the three immediately consecutive months. Id. at 135–36. Suitor
further indicated that, when a salesperson takes vacation, that time counts toward the “rollback.”
Id. at 136. Thus, if a salesperson takes “three months’ worth of vacation,” he or she “get a
rollback.” Id. When Suitor did not reach his sales threshold in May 2016, he received a written
warning instead of the verbal warning he would have otherwise received.
3.

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Suitor returned from his FMLA leave on March 22, 2016. On April 12, 2016, Suitor sent
Ms. Cavazos an email broaching the topic of additional FMLA leave: “Can you kindly advise how
many days are remaining banked on my FMLA? I was informed my elderly father I provide care
for will have to undergo a couple more surgeries coming up and I would like to plan ahead
accordingly.” See April 12, 2016 at 2, Email, ECF No. 10, Ex. 12. Ms. Cavazos responded (and
carbon copied Mr. Brackett, Suitor’s new supervisor): “You used 78 days from 1/6/2016 until your
return date on 3/22/16. That leaves you with 6 days or 48 hours that you may use until January 4,
2017. On January 4, 2017, you will be eligible for more FMLA days.” Id.
In late June of 2016, Suitor asked his supervisor, Mr. Brackett, about the possibility of
taking FMLA leave. Brackett Dep. at 13–14. Mr. Brackett referred Suitor to Ms. Cavazos, who
told Suitor that he had exhausted his FMLA leave. Id. In response, Suitor forwarded Ms. Cavazos
prior email (wherein she told Suitor that he had six days of FMLA leave remaining) back to her.
April 12, 2016 at 2. Ms. Cavazos informed Suitor that her prior calculation had included a thirty
day personal leave of absence.4 Id. at 1. However, she told Suitor: “I know how difficult it can be
with elderly parents and if you have vacation time, you may use that.” Id.5 Approximately five
weeks later, Suitor was terminated.
C.
Suitor attributes his termination (and his periodic struggles to meet monthly sales
thresholds) to the personal difficulties he was experiencing and the FMLA leave which he took as
a result. Charter identifies another reason for Suitor’s termination.

4
As discussed above, Suitor did request a thirty-day personal leave of absence in December 2015, but that request
was denied. All parties agree that Ms. Cavazos miscalculated Suitor’s remaining FMLA leave. See Def. Mot. Summ.
J. at 10; Pl. Resp. Br. at 11.
5

Suitor had vacation time, but opted to spend that time with his (also ailing) wife, rather than his father. Suitor Dep.
at 161–162.

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1.
Suitor’s personnel file reflects several entries of note, including two investigations by
Charter into reported ethical violations. The first ethical investigation stemmed from events that
occurred on November 19, 2014 (several months after Suitor was hired by Charter). Nov. 24, 2014,
Incident Rep., ECF No. 1, Ex. 6. On that evening, Ronald Suitor and his nephew, Adam Suitor,
were working in the same neighborhood. Id. at 2. Adam Suitor was a Charter direct sales
representative from the Saginaw, Michigan, branch.
Ronald Suitor described the events of that evening as follows. He had “doubled up” with
Adam Suitor because sales representatives were encouraged to do so periodically and because they
were canvassing a rough neighborhood. Suitor Dep. at 50. The pair were trying to quickly finish
because it was dark. Adam Suitor knocked on several of Ronald Suitor’s houses in an attempt to
speed things along. Id. at 52. At one of those houses, Adam convinced a customer to sign up for a
triple play. Id. Adam informed Ronald of the potential sale, but Ronald was engaged with a
customer of his own. Id. For that reason, Ronald logged into the Charter system with his own
information and allowed Adam to complete the deal on his behalf. Id. According to Ronald, this
procedure was “a common practice [known by] the supervisors.” Id. at 53.
After Adam finished “running” the deal, Ronald reviewed the information and his notes.
Id. Ronald determined that he had previously signed someone up at the same address earlier in the
month. Signing up the same household twice in a month was a violation of Charter polices. Id. at
61. As Ronald Suitor explained in his deposition:
Charter’s concern would be there were some people – some [Direct Sales
Representatives] that were purposely doing this. Like, they would run somebody,
they would get declined, and then they were going and running them again on a
purposeful – to be able to earn commission. . . . [A]nd some people got terminated.

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Id. at 53.6
Upon realizing the problem, Ronald Suitor immediately notified his supervisor (at the time,
Ryan Wolverton). Id. Suitor testified at his deposition that this was the only time he ever ran the
same house twice. Id. He further insisted that “[t]here was no intent to do anything wrong, defraud
or whatever.” Id. at 55. Nevertheless, Charter took the violation of its policies seriously.
The incident report prepared by Charter corroborates much of Suitor’s testimony. Upon
being informed of the incident, Mr. Wolverton told Suitor that “rerunning the same address and
using a different name at the same address violated the Prepayment Policy.” Nov. 24, 2014,
Incident Rep. at 2. Mr. Wolverton also reminded Suitor that “another Direct Sales Representative
cannot create and run a sales order using a Sales ID that does not belong to them.” Id. The next
day, Mr. Wolverton discussed the issue with several Charter supervisors. The incident report
summarized Charter’s findings as follows:
Ronald Suitor violated Charter’s Business Ethics and Integrity Policy and Charter’s
Acceptable Use of Technology Policy when he allowed Adam Suitor to make a sale
for him and allowed him to use his Network login, password, and Sales ID’s to
make this transaction. Ronald Suitor completed the Information Security and
Privacy training as a new hire and is responsible for knowing that Charter Policy
prohibits anyone else use [sic] of their username or password to log onto the
Network or any application. . . . [A] Written Warning is recommended.
Id. at 5.
Suitor does not contest the underlying facts or dispute that Charter gave him a written
warning. He simply asserts that Charter supervisors openly tolerated the practice of having another
direct sales representative complete sales under another sales representative’s login information.

6
The original sale was declined because someone at the address had an existing debt to Charter. Nov. 24, 2014,
Incident Rep. at 3. When an individual has an outstanding obligation, Charter policies require them to pay their debt
and prepay the first month’s fee for the triple play service before signing up for services again. Suitor Dep. at 29, 61.
If a direct sales representative convinces another person in the household sign up for the service, the system does not
necessarily identify the outstanding debt. See id. at 69–72. For obvious reasons, Charter policies prohibit this end-run
around the prepayment requirements.

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Suitor Dep. at 52. He likewise emphasizes that there was no intention to circumvent Charter’s
prepayment policies. He contends that, if he were trying to obtain an illegitimate commission, he
would not have immediately and voluntarily reported the improper sale.
2.
The second ethical investigation occurred in July of 2016. See July 29, 2016, Incident Rep.,
ECF No. 10, Ex. 14. The investigation was spurred by a customer interaction at the Saginaw,
Michigan, Charter store. The incident report indicates that, on July 26, 2016, a couple entered the
store and asked to speak with the Charter supervisor, Katrina Findley. Id. at 4. The customers
indicated that “Ronald Suitor told them they wouldn’t have to pay their bill; to let it get
disconnected; and that they would get new customer rates if they signed up with a fictitious name.”
Id. According to the customers, “Ronald Suitor wrote up the service agreement with [a fake] name
on it and scheduled the install.” Id. When the customers searched the fake name “in Facebook,”
they could not find anyone with that name. Id. The customers asserted that “Ronald Suitor told
them not to come to the local store and to only pay by money order.” Id.
According to Supervisor Findley, a similar incident had also recently occurred. Ms. Findley
reported that “a young customer came into the store” and attempted to make a payment, but was
unable to do so because his name was not on the account. Id. at 4–5. “The customer told the store
staff that the name of the person on that account does not exist.” Id. at 5.
Ms. Findley sent an email to the Bay City Charter store supervisor to advise him of the two
incidents. In response, Terry Brackett informed his supervisor, Scott Zybtowski. Mr. Zybtowski
directed Mr. Brackett to “audit the last three months of Ronald J. Suitor’s sales including cancels
and installs.” Id.
i.

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The next day, Mr. Brackett began his audit. He discovered several anomalous accounts.
Mr. Brackett “noticed . . . a sale made on 7/26/2016 by Ronald J. Suitor” where “the original
customer . . . was signed up with the name of [redacted] and without an apartment number.” Id.
When Mr. Brackett called the phone number listed, he received “a message that this was a wrong
number.” Id. Mr. Brackett also noticed anomalies related to a sale Suitor made on April 26, 2016.
When the service technician arrived at the address to install the services, “the customer claimed
they did not order Charter services [and] that the order had a name on the account . . . that was not
his name.” Id. When Mr. Brackett attempted to call the customer, he did not receive an answer and
determined that the number listed by Suitor “appears to be a wrong number on the account.” Id.
Further investigation revealed a pattern. Mr. Brackett determined that a customer whom
Suitor sold to on April 22, 2016, called Charter on May 5 to correct the order. Charter records
indicated that the customer stated that “Ronald Suitor put the order at her address under a made up
name and that she didn’t want the service that way. The order was cancelled and her sister put the
service in her name.” Id. Mr. Brackett called the customer in question, who corroborated Charter’s
records. Id. She indicated that she was not home when Suitor arrived, but that Suitor sold the triple
play to the customer’s sister. Id. Even though the customer was not home at the time, Suitor put
the order in her name (not the sister’s name) but with an incorrect last name. Id. Similarly, a
customer Suitor sold to on May 23, 2016, called several weeks later to request a name change. Id.
The customer indicated that her name had been misspelled on the account. Id.
Mr. Brackett also contacted several customers whom Suitor had sold to in the last few
weeks, but who had not reported any problems. When Mr. Brackett asked one such customer to
verify the correct spelling of her last name, the customer indicated that Suitor had signed her up
with an incorrect last name (using, instead, the name of the street on which she lived). Id. Mr.

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Brackett also discovered that another customer whom Suitor had recently sold to had been signed
up with an incorrect last name. Id. at 6.
ii.
After informing Mr. Zybtowski of the results of his audit, Mr. Brackett scheduled Suitor
for a meeting on July 29, 2016. At the meeting, Mr. Brackett and Mr. Zybtowski confronted Suitor
regarding the apparent pattern of using false names to sign up customers. Id. Suitor denied any
fraudulent intent. Id. Rather, he stated that “he could only go off the information that the customer
gave him.” Id. When he was asked whether he checked a customer’s identification before running
a sale (as Charter policy required), Suitor “stated he generally did check ID’s but not every person.”
Id. And Suitor further admitted that he did not check identification for the customer whose original
complaint triggered the investigation. Id. When Suitor was asked why he did not check
identification for that customer, Suitor stated that “he signed the order up but had notes written
down to go back and check identification.” Id. The order was canceled (by Ms. Findley) before
Suitor did so. Id. at 5–6. “Scott Zybtowski asked Ronald Suitor why a customer would say that
they were told by him not to go into the store and that they were to pay with a money order. Ronald
Suitor stated he was advising the customer of different payment methods and that customer’s [sic]
could pay at the store or online.” Id. at 6.
According to the incident report, the meeting concluded with a conversation on the
following topics.
Ronald Suitor stated that he tried to write good deals and if the customer lied to him
that’s on them. Scott Zybtowski stated that controls are in place so these things
don’t happen and if Ronald Suitor was not following the process of checking
identification then when a deal falls through, the Direct Sales Representative is
responsible. Ronald Suitor stated if they don’t have identification he generally tries
to get other forms of identification. Scott Zybtowski stated that there was a pattern
to these customer interactions, including misspelled names; different last name; and
incorrect phone numbers that didn’t belong to the customer signed up. . . . Ronald
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Suitor stated that he verified identification, as a rule, and that he did make typos,
yet it happens and that his background was spotless. . . . Scott Zybtowski stated that
until further investigation, and audits completed [sic], he was going to be placed on
a paid suspension.
Id. at 7.
iii.
After the meeting, Mr. Brackett called several customers, including the customer who
originally informed Ms. Findley about the situation. According to the incident report, that customer
described her interaction with Suitor as follows:
[S]he told Ronald Suitor 2 to 3 times that she already had Charter Services. . . .
Ronald Suitor continued to try to sell her and sat down on her porch. Ronald Suitor
told her that he could lock her in for 3 years with a price lock. . . . [S]he stated she
already had Charter Service. . . . Ronald Suitor told her that if she cancelled her
current services and signed up with a name that didn’t exist, . . . she could get the
new promotions and she didn’t need to provide identification. . . . [S]he didn’t feel
right about this but felt pressured by Ronald Suitor. . . and finally caved.
Id.
Mr. Brackett also talked with another customer. That customer described her interaction
with Suitor as follows:
Ronald Suitor knocked on her door and said he was selling Charter packages. . .
[She] told Ronald Suitor that she owed Charter money because she left her
equipment at her previous home and the landlord threw it out. . . . Ronald Suitor
offered to sign her up and to put the order in under a random name or he could put
her sister’s name and use a different last name. [The customer] did not agree to this.
. . . Ronald Suitor continued to state he could get her signed up. [She] finally caved
and let him sign her up. . . . Ronald Suitor signed her up under [redacted] which
was not the correct last name; and was not the name that was given to Ronald Suitor.
On Thursday, 5/5/16 [she] called into cancel the order and stated that it was because
the order was place [sic] with an incorrect name by Ronald Suitor.
Id. at 8.
The incident report concluded with the following summary and recommendation:
Ronald J Suitor was issued a written warning for violating Charter’s ethics
standards on November 2014; was issued a Verbal Warning with PIP for failing to
meet June 2015’s sales goals; was issued a Verbal Warning with PIP for failing to
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meet July 2015’s sales goals; was issued a written warning with PIP for failing to
meet Sept 2015’s and May 2016’s sales goals. Ronald Suitor failed to meet
Charter’s Business Ethics and Integrity Standards when he knowingly signed up
customers by falsifying information to make sure they qualified for services for
which they were not entitled for personal gain and at Charter Communication’s
expense, and because this is his second Business Ethics and Integrity violation, a
termination is requested.
Id. at 9.
In his deposition, Scott Zybtowski explained that employees who commit two ethical
violations are typically terminated. Zybtowksi Dep. at 25–26, ECF No. 10 (“Being that it was the
second ethical violation, we submitted it as a termination. . . . With it being an ethical issue, it
would have went to a termination.”). According to Mr. Zybtowski, Terry Brackett prepared the
termination paperwork and submitted it to a local Charter Human Resources representative. After
approval by the local human resources representative, Mr. Zybtowksi received and approved the
termination request. He forwarded the paperwork to his supervisor, who approved it and then
forwarded it to Charter’s corporate human resources for processing. Id. at 25. See also Termination
Email Chain, ECF No. 10, Ex. 15.
iv.
Suitor’s description of the meeting in question is largely consistent with the summary
provided in the incident report. In his deposition, Suitor indicated that the meeting began with
Scott Zybtowski accusing Suitor of forging a customer’s signature. Suitor Dep. at 171. Suitor
denied the allegation. Id.7 The questioning then turned to Suitor’s sale to the customer who
originally complained. According to Suitor, that customer “never indicated to me that there was
any Charter in this house, and she ordered Charter triple play.” Id. at 173. Suitor contends that he

7

At his deposition, Mr. Zybtowski admitted that he asked Suitor whether he had forged the customer’s signature on a
work order. Zybtowski Dep. at 21. Suitor denied the allegation. Id. The incident report focuses on the pattern of
incorrect names on sales orders, not on the allegation of forgery, so it appears that the termination recommendation
was not based on alleged forgery.

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“did ask her” for identification, but the customer was unable to find her identification. Id. at 173–
74. At that point, Suitor had already processed the transaction, and direct sales representatives are
unable to cancel transactions once entered. Id. at 174. Suitor told the lady that he would come back
to check identification. Id. at 174. When he attempted to do so the next day, no one answered the
door. Id. And before he could return, the order was cancelled. Id.
In his deposition, Suitor also indicated that Mr. Zybtowski told him during the meeting
that, if he had falsified customer order forms, he could be subject to criminal liability. Id. at 175.
In response, Suitor asked if he should retain a lawyer. Id. at 184.
3.
As the July 29, 2016, incident report indicates, Suitor also received a number of warnings
for failing to meet monthly sales thresholds during his time with Charter. Suitor was hired on July
21, 2014. July 29, 2016, Incident Rep. at 1. In September 2014, Suitor was coached after selling
only four triple plays in August 2014. Id. For the better part of a year after that coaching, Suitor
met his sales thresholds. In mid-May 2015, Suitor was coached “for failing to meet the May 2015
mid-month target of 12.” Id. Despite the coaching, Suitor sold only twelve triple plays in May
2015. Id. While discussing the month with his supervisor, Suitor indicated that a number of
potential customers had changed their minds after the sale was written. Id. In June 2015, Suitor
only sold one triple play, and received a verbal warning and a performance improvement program.
Id. at 2. Suitor told his supervisor that he had lost focus that month because of personal problems
he was experiencing. Id. In July 2015, Suitor sold only four triple plays and again received a verbal
warning. Id. Suitor met his sales thresholds in August 2015, but sold only four triple plays in
September 2015. Id. He received a written warning and another performance improvement
program. Id.

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As discussed below, Suitor took three months of FMLA leave from January of 2016 to
March 2016. Suitor met his sales thresholds in April 2016. At Suitor’s mid-May 2016 performance
review, however, he had sold only two triple plays. Id. at 3. Suitor and his supervisor discussed
the fact that the low numbers were due to a high number of cancelled sales. Several days later,
Suitor’s supervisor advised Suitor that he was still seeing a large number of Suitor’s sales being
canceled. Id. On May 17, 2016, “Terry Brackett and Ronald Suitor had a face-to-face meeting
about the large number of cancels.” Id. Mr. Brackett told Suitor to “make sure the customers were
on board with the sale.” Id. He also cautioned Suitor “not to use the sales order forms unless they
were sales that the customer agreed to.” Id. Despite the coaching, Suitor sold only nine triple plays
in May 2016. Suitor received a written warning with a performance improvement program. Id.
Suitor received no written or verbal warnings in June or July 2016, which suggests that his
sales were on pace to satisfy the thresholds. On August 5, 2016, Suitor was terminated. Suitor Dep.
at 188. He contends that he was terminated in retaliation for taking FMLA leave. Id. at 190.
II.
Defendant has moved for summary judgment. A motion for summary judgment should be
granted if the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the initial
burden of identifying where to look in the record for evidence “which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
The burden then shifts to the opposing party who must set out specific facts showing “a genuine
issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (citation omitted). The
Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant and

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determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury
or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251–52.
III.
Suitor’s complaint alleges that Charter retaliated against him for taking FMLA leave. The
FMLA entitles employees to an annual total of twelve workweeks of leave for a number of reasons
including “[i]n order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such
spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). The
FMLA makes it unlawful for any employer “to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or
the attempt to exercise, any right provided [by the Act],” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), or to “discharge
or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made
unlawful by [the Act].” Id. at § 2615(a)(2).
The Sixth Circuit recognizes two discrete theories of recovery under the FMLA: (1) the
“interference” theory arising under § 2615(a)(1), and (2) the “retaliation” theory arising from §
2615(a)(2). Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co., LLC, 681 F.3d 274, 282 (6th Cir. 2012). The
main distinction between the two theories is the employer’s intent. The interference theory has its
roots in the FMLA’s creation of substantive rights, and “[i]f an employer interferes with the
FMLA-created right to medical leave or to reinstatement following the leave, a violation has
occurred,” regardless of the intent of the employer. Id. (quoting Arban v. West Pub. Co., 345 F.3d
390, 401 (6th Cir. 2003)). In contrast, the central issue raised by the retaliation theory is “whether
the employer took the adverse action because of a prohibited reason or for a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason.” Id. (quoting Edgar v. JAC Prods., Inc., 443 F.3d 501, 508 (6th Cir.
2006)). In other words, an employer’s intent is relevant only in retaliation claims because those

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claims “impose liability on employers that act against employees specifically because those
employees invoked their FMLA rights.” Id. (citing Edgar, 443 F.3d at 508) (emphasis original).
As indicated above, Suitor did not plead an interference claim in his complaint. And in his
response brief opposing summary judgment, Suitor emphasizes that he is asserting only a
retaliation claim. See Pl. Resp. Br. at 13 (providing legal citations and authority which govern
retaliation claims); id. at 22–23 (arguing that “Defendant has a pattern of violating the FMLA”
and citing several examples of conduct which might buttress an interference claim, but arguing
that “Defendant’s serial violations of Plaintiff’s FMLA rights further raise a question of
Defendant’s motivation”); id. at 23 (“Defendant’s attempts to dissuade Plaintiff from exercising
his FMLA rights and to resign his employment, Defendant’s punishing Plaintiff when exercising
his FMLA rights, and Defendant’s denying Plaintiff from further exercising his FMLA rights form
a pattern that leads to an inference that Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff for exercising his
FMLA rights.”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the sole question before the Court is whether
Charter retaliated against Suitor for taking FMLA leave.
In its motion for summary judgment, Charter argues, first, that Suitor has not established a
prima facie case of FMLA retaliation. Second, Charter argues that, even if Suitor has established
a prima facie case, Plaintiff’s suit must be dismissed because Suitor was terminated for a legitimate
non-retaliatory reason (specifically, signing up customers under fictitious names).
A.
To establish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation through circumstantial evidence,8 the
familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is applied. 411 U.S. 792. Under that
framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation by

8

Charter argues, and Suitor does not contest, that his retaliation claim relies upon circumstantial evidence of intent.

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showing: (1) he was engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) the defendant knew that he was
exercising his FMLA rights; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal
connection existed between the protected FMLA activity and the adverse employment action.
Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir.2012). The primary focus of FMLA retaliation
claims is “the motive of the employer.” Id. at 512. That is, the question is whether “the action was
taken because the employee exercised, or complained about the denial of, FMLA-protected
rights.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Charter argues that Suitor has not established the fourth element of a prima facie case: a
causal connection between a protected activity and the adverse employment action. The parties
primarily dispute whether the temporal proximity between Suitor’s protected activity and his
termination is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact regarding causation.
Cases in this circuit have expressed inconsistent statements regarding whether “temporal
proximity, standing alone” is sufficient to establish a causal connection for a retaliation claim. See
Tuttle v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 474 F.3d 307, 321 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[T]emporal proximity,
standing alone, is insufficient to establish a causal connection for a retaliation claim.”); Asmo v.
Keane, Inc., 471 F.3d 588, 593 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Temporal proximity can establish a causal
connection between the protected activity and the unlawful employment action in the retaliation
context.”). In Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., the Sixth Circuit assured district courts that “the
two lines of cases are fully reconcilable”:
Where an adverse employment action occurs very close in time after an employer
learns of a protected activity, such temporal proximity between the events is
significant enough to constitute evidence of a causal connection for the purposes of
satisfying a prima facie case of retaliation. But where some time elapses between
when the employer learns of a protected activity and the subsequent adverse
employment action, the employee must couple temporal proximity with other
evidence of retaliatory conduct to establish causality.

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516 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2008)
In Mickey, the Sixth Circuit held that the fourth element of the prima facie case was satisfied
because the employee was terminated on the same day that the employer learned of the employee’s
protected activity. Id.
There is, of course, no bright line test for determining what temporal proximity is
sufficiently close to satisfy the causation prong of the prima facie case. However, the Sixth Circuit
has found that termination three months after returning from leave was “sufficient evidence of a
causal connection between the two.” Clark v. Walgreen Co., 424 F. App’x 467, 473 (6th Cir.
2011). See also Parnell v. West, 114 F.3d 1188 (6th Cir. 1997) (“A time lag of seven months does
not necessarily support an inference of a causal link; previous cases that have permitted a prima
facie case to be made based on the proximity of time have all been short periods of time, usually
less than six months.”) (and collecting cases).
In this case, Suitor returned from FMLA leave on March 22, 2016. On April 12, 2016,
Suitor initiated discussions about possibly taking additional FMLA leave during the summer.
Suitor returned to that discussion in late June of 2016. And, although he was (incorrectly) told he
had no FMLA time left, the email exchange clearly indicates that Suitor would have requested
FMLA leave if possible. Suitor was placed on paid suspension on July 29, 2016, and terminated
on August 5, 2016. Accordingly, Suitor was terminated approximately four and one-half months
after returning from FMLA leave and approximately a month and one-half after unsuccessfully
seeking additional FMLA leave.
As Suitor argues, both asking for and taking FMLA leave are protected activities. See
Demyanovich v. Cadon Plating & Coatings, L.L.C., 747 F.3d 419, 433 (6th Cir. 2014) (“By asking
Ensign for FMLA leave, Demyanovich both engaged in protected activity and made his employer

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aware of it.”). “A plaintiff’s burden in establishing a prima facie case is not intended to be an
onerous one.” Skrjanc v. Great Lakes Power Serv. Co., 272 F.3d 309, 315 (6th Cir. 2001).
Accordingly, and because the temporal nexus between the protected activity and termination falls
well within the six month rule-of-thumb identified in Parnell, Suitor has identified sufficient
evidence of a causal connection between his taking and requesting leave and his termination to
establish the fourth element of the prima facie case. And, for good measure, there is other evidence
in the record which would permit a reasonable jury to draw an inference of a causal connection.
Charter supervisors possessed a financial incentive to discourage leave because it impacted their
commission bonuses. And Suitor contends that he was told by Mr. Zybtowksi, who contributed to
the decision to terminate Suitor, that Suitor was “a marginal employee and [needed] to resign”
during a meeting discussing his leave requests. Suitor Dep. at 104.
Given the evidence which would permit a reasonable jury to draw an inference of a causal
connection and Defendant’s decision to challenge only the fourth element of the prima facie case,
Suitor has met his burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation.
B.
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See Donald v.
Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2012). To do so, the employer must “prove it had a
legitimate reason unrelated to the exercise of FMLA rights for terminating the employee.” Id.
Charter contends that it fired Suitor because of direct customer complaints and Charter’s resulting
investigation which revealed that Suitor had repeatedly violated Charter ethical policies. If true,
Charter’s decision to fire Suitor was based on a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.

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At this stage, the question becomes whether Charter’s proffered reason is in fact a pretext
for discrimination. At the pretext stage, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing “that the
employer’s explanation was fabricated to conceal an illegal motive.” Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580
F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009). A “plaintiff can show pretext in three interrelated ways: (1) that the
proffered reasons had no basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate the
employer’s action, or (3) that they were insufficient to motivate the employer’s action.” Id. In other
words, “plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence from which the jury could ‘reasonably reject
[the defendant’s] explanation” and infer that the defendants ‘intentionally discriminated’ against
him.” Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Woythal v. Tex-Tenn
Corp., 112 F.3d 243, 246–47 (6th Cir. 1997)). “[A]s long as an employer has an honest belief in
its proffered nondiscriminatory reason for discharging an employee, the employee cannot establish
that the reason was pretextual simply because it is ultimately shown to be incorrect.” Majewski v.
Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 274 F.3d 1106, 1117 (6th Cir. 2001).
The plaintiff may discredit the employer’s allegedly honest belief, but the plaintiff “must
do more than just disagree with a fact that led to her [or his] termination.” Hartman v. Dow Chem.
Co., 657 F. App’x 448, 453 (6th Cir. 2016). “Instead, [the plaintiff] must focus on the investigatory
process and the resulting decision.” Id. In particular, the plaintiff must make “a specific showing
that the employer’s decision-making process was not ‘reasonably informed and considered’ and is
thus not worthy of belief.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 1998)).
Importantly, the employer’s decisional process does not need to “be optimal” nor must the
employer leave “no stone unturned.” Chrsyler, 155 F.3d at 807. “If there is no material dispute
that the employer made a “reasonably informed and considered decision” that demonstrates an

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“honest belief” in the proffered reason for the adverse employment action, the case should be
dismissed.” Braithwaite, 258 F.3d at 494.
1.
Suitor attempts to meet his burden of pretext by arguing that Charter’s investigation and
ultimate decision to terminate him was based entirely on inadmissible hearsay. See Pl. Resp. Mot.
Summ. J. at 17 (“Each account providing that Plaintiff knowingly signed up customers by
falsifying information is based upon inadmissible hearsay of five (5) customers.”). Suitor argues
that, when the hearsay is disregarded, the factual basis for Charter’s conclusion that he violated
ethical rules disappears. Because Suitor denied any wrongdoing during the initial meeting and
during his deposition, Suitor argues that a question of fact exists.
If the decision to terminate Suitor was based only on unsupported personal beliefs by
Charter employees, the company’s employment decision would be suspect. See Hartman, 657 Fed.
App’x at 452 (“Courts have accepted employment decisions based on other types of evidence,
such as records, eyewitness accounts, and information provided by the employee, but they have
rejected decisions based entirely on unsupported personal opinions.”). However, as Charter argues,
the customer statements on which Charter based its decision are admissible.
The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as “a statement that: . . . a party offers in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). That
definition makes clear that when an out-of-court statements is not offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted therein, it is not hearsay. The customer statements at issue here are relied upon by
Charter “to demonstrate the state of mind and motive of Defendant’s managers in discharging
Plaintiff.” Haughton v. Orchid Automation, 206 F. App’x 524, 532 (6th Cir. 2006). See also
Michael v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 496 F.3d 584, 598 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[W]itness statements

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contained in an investigative report may be considered on summary judgment ‘not to prove their
truth, ... but to demonstrate the state of mind and motive of Defendant’s managers in discharging
Plaintiff.’”) (quoting Haughton, 206 F. App’x at 532).
Suitor could potentially show pretext by demonstrating that the customer statements on
which Charter relied were false. See Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009).
But Suitor must do more than simply proffer a personal denial of the alleged misconduct. See
Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 585 (6th Cir. 1992) (“Courts have repeatedly held that the
plaintiff’s denial of the defendant’s articulated legitimate reason without producing substantiation
for the denial is insufficient for a race discrimination claim to withstand a motion for summary
judgment.”); Haughton, 206 F. App’x at 532 (same). Suitor has not identified any evidence which
substantiates his denial of misconduct. In fact, Suitor admitted both at the initial meeting and in
his deposition that he sometimes did not check customer identification. If Suitor had checked
customer identification every time, no errors regarding customer names could have occurred. Thus,
Suitor admitted to one violation of Charter policies (failing to always check identification) and
relies only upon his own denial of misconduct when charged with another (falsifying customer
information when signing them up). Suitor has not met his burden of identifying some evidence
which calls into question the factual basis for Charter’s decision to terminate him. Accordingly,
his retaliation claim is without merit.
2.
But, importantly, even if Suitor had identified evidence suggesting that the customer
statements were false, he would still be required to demonstrate a genuine question as to whether
Charter honestly believed the truthfulness of the customer statements. “When an employer
reasonably and honestly relies on particularized facts in making an employment decision, it is

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entitled to summary judgment on pretext even if its conclusion is later shown to be ‘mistaken,
foolish, trivial, or baseless.’” Chen, 580 F.3d at 401 (quoting Clay v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 501
F.3d 695, 714–15 (6th Cir. 2007).
In his response brief, Suitor makes much of the fact that “Mr. Brackett admitted that he
had no way of knowing whether the unidentified customers were telling the truth.” Pl. Resp. Mot.
Summ. J. at 20 (citing Brackett Dep. at 43). In his deposition, Suitor likewise contends that his
purported ethical violations were ordinary occurrences among Charter sales representatives. The
implication of these arguments is that Suitor’s technical violations of Charter’s ethical standards
should be excused because those standards were not uniformly enforced. But both of these
arguments miss the mark: “[T]he question is never whether the employer was mistaken, cruel,
unethical, out of his head, or downright irrational in taking the action for the stated reason, but
simply whether the stated reason was his reason: not a good reason, but the true reason.” Forrester
v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
Suitor has simply identified no evidence which suggests that Charter’s investigation
resulted in something less than a “reasonably informed and considered decision” to terminate his
employment. Braithwaite, 258 F.3d at 494. The investigation was originally triggered by a
customer who reported misconduct by Suitor. Charter management did not sua sponte initiate the
investigation in order to find a reason to terminate Suitor. The audit of Suitor’s sales revealed six
sales where the order form contained incorrect information. Even after investigation revealed this
pattern, Charter merely held a meeting, asked Suitor to provide an investigation, and suspended
him pending further investigation. After that meeting, Suitor’s supervisor contacted two customers
identified in the original investigation. He questioned them regarding their encounter with Suitor.
Both customers expressly testified that Suitor was aware they were existing Charter customers and

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convinced them to allow him to sign them up for services under a false name. At this point, there
was significant evidence of intentional wrongdoing which had been corroborated by several
independent sources. It is true, as Suitor emphasizes, that the customers could have been lying.
But Charter was not required to conduct an “optimal” investigation which “left no stone unturned.”
Chrsyler, 155 F.3d at 807. And, in the absence of any evidence supporting the theory that multiple
customers independently decided to accuse Suitor of falsifying information, that speculative theory
does not undermine Charter’s assertion that it honestly believed the customers.
Additionally, Suitor admitted at his deposition that he committed two technical violations
of Charter’s ethical guidelines. On November 19, 2014, Suitor permitted another sales
representative to complete a sales using his login information. Suitor Dep. at 52. Suitor argued that
this practice was commonplace, but admitted that the violation occurred. Likewise, during the
investigation into the potential falsification of customer information, Suitor admitted that he did
not always check customer identification. Mr. Zybtowski testified that when an employee commits
two ethical violations, the default remedy is termination. Zybtowksi Dep. at 25–26. Suitor does
not contest that assertion. These admissions thus form an alternative basis for Charter’s
termination.
In summary, Suitor has not identified evidence which contradicts or undermines Charter’s
proffered factual basis for terminating him. Suitor has likewise presented no evidence which
suggests that Charter did not honestly believe that Suitor was falsifying customer information.
And, finally, Suitor’s own testimony establishes that he committed two violations of Charter’s
procedures, which forms an independent basis for termination. Suitor’s retaliation claim will be
dismissed. Because the complaint will be dismissed, the pending motion in limine and objections
to pretrial disclosures are moot. They will be denied and overruled accordingly.

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IV.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendant Charter’s motion for summary judgment,
ECF No. 10, is GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that Defendant Charter’s motion in limine, ECF No. 17, is
DENIED as moot.
It is further ORDERED that Defendant Charter’s objections to pretrial disclosures, ECF
No. 16, are OVERRULED as moot.
It is further ORDERED that the complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED.

Dated: May 2, 2018

s/Thomas L. Ludington
THOMAS L. LUDINGTON
United States District Judge

PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served
upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first
class U.S. mail on May 2, 2018.
s/Kelly Winslow
KELLY WINSLOW, Case Manager

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