Seals v. Bridgeport Spaulding School District et al

Filing 27

ORDER granting 18 defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge George Caram Steeh. (MBea)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
EUGENE SEALS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 17-CV-13514
vs.
HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH
BRIDGEPORT SPAULDING SCHOOL
DISTRICT, JOHN RHINES, PAT
NELSON, and ROBERT LANGE,
Defendants.
_____________________________/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF DOC. 18]
Plaintiff Eugene Seals filed this race discrimination action against
defendant Bridgeport-Spaulding School District (“District”) under 42 U.S.C.
1983 (Count I), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count II), and the
Michigan Elliot Larsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”) (Count III). His
complaint also asserts that the District’s Board of Education’s (“Board”)
vote not to extend a new contract was retaliation for his engagement in
protected activity under ELCRA (Count IV).
The matter is before the court on defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. The court heard oral argument on the motion on September 18,

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2018. For the reasons stated below, defendants’ motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In October 2016, the Bridgeport Spaulding School District’s Board of
Education voted unanimously to grant plaintiff Eugene Seals a one year
Contracted Services Personnel Agreement (“Agreement”) as Athletic
Director (“AD”) for the District. Plaintiff is African American. Plaintiff was
previously the high school boys’ basketball coach in the District, a position
he continued to maintain while he was AD.1 The Agreement provided the
term of service as October 11, 2016 to June 30, 2017. Plaintiff signed the
Agreement on October 10, 2016. The Agreement was also signed by
acting Board President Patrick Nelson, acting Secretary Theodora Morris,
and Superintendent Carol Selby.
The Agreement did not contain any language regarding renewal or
extension. When plaintiff started as the AD, Al Feldman, the former AD,
overlapped with him for approximately three weeks. According to Feldman,
he offered to help plaintiff learn the job, even setting up three appointments

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At oral argument defendant’s counsel stated that he did not believe plaintiff coached
while he was AD, but plaintiff’s deposition testimony is clear that he did coach while he
was AD and evidence from Superintendent Carol Selby is in accord. (Seals dep., pp
23, 25; Selby email to Patrick Nelson, March 15, 2017)
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at the middle school, but plaintiff did not show up for the appointments and
never followed up on his offer for training. (Rehmann Investigation, p. 10)
Seals agrees that Feldman offered to help him learn the job and answer
any questions, but he testified there was no time for training and Feldman
never followed up on his offer to help. (Seals dep., pp. 123-26)
Superintendent Selby acknowledged that plaintiff was not provided any
training or guidance as to his job duties and responsibilities or the District’s
expectations. (Selby email to Patrick Nelson, March 15, 2017)
When Feldman was AD, the District had a procedure in place for
handling ticket and concession sales during the basketball season. Linda
Rodrigues, secretary to the AD, described that she would prepare the bank
deposit slip prior to each basketball game and give Feldman the deposit
slip and a sealable deposit bag provided by First Merit Bank. Feldman
gave the deposit slip and bag to the ticket salespeople. (Rehmann
Investigation, p. 4) Game Manager Andrew Betka stated there were two
adults assigned the task of selling tickets. At the end of each game, Betka
would observe one of the individuals count the proceeds from ticket sales.
The second individual also observed the count, and the two individuals had
to agree with the count and compete the deposit slip which would be

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placed into the sealable deposit bag. The cash amount was then written on
the bag. (Rehmann Investigation, p. 7)
When plaintiff became AD, Rodrigues continued to prepare the ticket
summary sheet and dated deposit slip, but she did not receive the
completed summary sheet at the end of each game. Betka explained that
at the direction of plaintiff, the bag was not sealed because plaintiff said he
would take care of sealing the bag. The bank deposit bags remained in
plaintiff’s office and in March 2017, plaintiff approached Rodrigues with a
plastic grocery bag which contained seven or eight unsealed First Merit
bank deposit bags. (Rehmann Investigation, p. 5)
Plaintiff alleges he received disparate treatment that he perceived as
racial discrimination. Specifically, plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, Principal
John Lagalo, harassed him daily and told him on a weekly basis that he
was on the School Board’s “shit list.” (Seals dep., pp. 71-72) Another
incident plaintiff cites as evidence of racial discrimination was when Board
member/defendant Rhines told plaintiff he did not like the color of the
basketball warmups because they reminded him of Saginaw High. Plaintiff
took this to be a racial comment because Saginaw High School is “an allblack school”. (Seals dep., pp. 111-113) Rhines denies making this
statement. (Rhines dep., pp. 45-46) Plaintiff contends that he reported his
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claims of discrimination to Superintendent Selby. (Seals dep., pp. 115-17)
Selby remembers plaintiff coming to her with his concerns that Board
members were asking him a lot of questions, but she does not remember
plaintiff voicing concerns that he was treated differently because of his
race. (Selby dep., p. 13)
Near the end of the basketball season, Board members became
concerned with the mishandling of proceeds and the missing summary
sheets. The President first raised the matter with the Superintendent, and
then asked the Board’s Vice-President to handle the matter. On March 20,
2017, an ad hoc committee of the Board was convened to investigate if the
AD violated any District policies. The committee was made up of the Board
President, Robert Lange; Personnel Committee, Dempsey Allen; and
Treasurer, John Rhines. On the request of the District’s legal counsel,
Rehmann Group was hired on April 21, 2017 to investigate the
management of funds for the 2016-2017 basketball season.
Rehmann conducted interviews of seven individuals: Linda
Rodrigues, secretary to the AD; Andrew Betka, Game Manager; Gabriel
Rodriguez, Dean of Students; Kevin Marshall, Coach; Al Feldman, Former
AD; John Lagalo, Principal; Carol Selby, Superintendent; and Pete Basile,

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CFO. Plaintiff was invited to participate in the investigation on several
occasions but declined to participate.
The Rehmann investigation reviewed the summary sheets and bank
transactional history, and interviewed everyone other than plaintiff who
played a role in handling the concession and ticket proceeds. The
investigation revealed that all proceeds appeared to be accounted for.
However, the summary sheets for five basketball games were not
identified. No cash deposits could be directly tied to two of those games
and there was no way to confirm the accuracy of the recorded deposits
made for the other three games. (Rehmann Investigation, p. 2)
The Rehmann investigation concluded on May 9, 2017. On May 15
acting Board President Robert Lange emailed plaintiff requesting that he
meet with the Rehmann investigator. On May 18, plaintiff’s attorney
responded by letter to the District’s legal counsel, informing him that
plaintiff would not participate in the investigation. Plaintiff’s attorney
compared the investigation to a witch hunt and stated that certain Board
Members appeared to have a racist agenda. The attorney cited to Mr.
Rhines’ statement regarding the colors of the basketball warm ups and the
Board’s undertaking of the Rehmann investigation to support his
accusations of a racist agenda: “Furthermore, it would appear that the
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board is treating Mr. Seals differently than other persons within the
Bridegeport Spaulding School Community. As such, I believe that there
are racist overtones and a racist agenda at work.” Rehmann issued its final
report on June 2, 2018, which found there was no “direct evidence that AD
Seals misappropriated any gate or concession receipts.” However, the
report concluded that “[w]ithout any supporting documentation identifying
concession receipts for each game, there is no way to confirm what was
actually collected for each game.”
Plaintiff’s Agreement expired on June 30, 2017. At the
recommendation of Superintendent Selby, plaintiff’s new contract was
placed on the Board’s agenda for the June 26, 2017 meeting. The Board
voted four to two against issuing a new contract to plaintiff. The four Board
members voting against a new contract were Caucasian, while the two
Board members voting for a new contract were African American. The
Board members who voted against offering plaintiff a new contract
explained that they did so on the advice of the District’s counsel, as well as
on the findings of the Rehmann investigation. Nelson testified that he
voted for non-renewal because he was unsatisfied with Seals’ lack of
cooperation with the investigation into his handling of money. (Nelson
dep., pp. 37-38) Rhines testified he relied on the Board’s attorney.
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(Rhines dep., p. 29) Lange stated that he relied on the Rehmann
investigation and the Board’s attorney. (Lange dep., p. 15)
There is some discrepancy regarding who became the AD after
plaintiff’s contract ended. According to Superintendent Selby, Gabe
Rodriguez became the new AD. (Selby dep., pp. 21-22) The individual
defendant Board members testified that some of the AD duties were shared
by others already employed by the District. Gabe Rodriguez is not African
American. Only one of the several individuals identified as possibly helping
Rodriguez perform AD duties is African American.
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) empowers the court to render
summary judgment "forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Redding v. St.
Eward, 241 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has
affirmed the court's use of summary judgment as an integral part of the fair
and efficient administration of justice. The procedure is not a disfavored
procedural shortcut. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986);

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see also Cox v. Kentucky Dept. of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 149 (6th Cir.
1995).
The standard for determining whether summary judgment is
appropriate is "'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law.'" Amway Distributors Benefits Ass’n v.
Northfield Ins. Co., 323 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). The evidence and all
reasonable inferences must be construed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Redding, 241 F.3d at 532 (6th Cir. 2001). "[T]he
mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original);
see also National Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907
(6th Cir. 2001).
If the movant establishes by use of the material specified in Rule
56(c) that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party must come forward with
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"specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." First Nat'l
Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 270 (1968); see also McLean v.
988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). Mere allegations
or denials in the non-movant's pleadings will not meet this burden, nor will
a mere scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248, 252. Rather, there must be evidence on which a jury
could reasonably find for the non-movant. McLean, 224 F.3d at 800 (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
ANALYSIS
I.

Count I Race Discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
Count II Race Discrimination, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; and
Count III Race Discrimination, ELCRA

Discrimination claims brought under Section 1983 and ELCRA are
analyzed under the same framework as Title VII. Perry v. McGinnis, 209
F.3d 597, 601-02 (6th Cir. 2000); Ondricko v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC.,
689 F.3d 642, 648-49 (6th Cir. 2012). A plaintiff may establish a claim of
discrimination either by introducing direct evidence of discrimination or by
presenting circumstantial evidence that would support an inference of
discrimination. Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 348 (6th
Cir.1997). Where, as here, the claim is based on circumstantial evidence,

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the court employs the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973).2
Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff carries the burden of
establishing a prima facie case. Id. at 802. To establish a prima facie case
of discrimination, plaintiff must show that 1) he is a member of a protected
class; 2) he was qualified for the job and performed it satisfactorily; 3)
despite his qualifications and performance, he suffered an adverse
employment action; and 4) he was replaced by a person outside the
protected class or was treated less favorably than a similarly situated
individual outside of his protected class. See Logan, 259 F.3d 558, 567
(6th Cir. 2001); Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir.1992).
In this case, the parties agree that plaintiff has satisfied the first two
elements, but dispute whether plaintiff has met the third and fourth
elements. The adverse employment action alleged by plaintiff is that his
employment relationship was not continued by defendant. Plaintiff argues

2

When alleging discrimination, a plaintiff may proceed on a mixed-motive claim by
demonstrating that his protected status was a motivating factor in his adverse
employment action, even though other factors also motivated such action. To proceed
on a mixed-motive analysis, a plaintiff must give notice of bringing such claims in the
complaint or responsive pleadings. Ondricko, 689 F.3d at 649 (citation omitted).
Plaintiff Seals has not given any notice that he is bringing a mixed-motive claim in either
his amended complaint nor in his response to defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. Where no notice is given of a mixed-motive claim, plaintiff’s claim will be
analyzed as a single-motive claim, utilizing the McDonnell Douglas framework. Id.
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that he had a statutory right to notice and a hearing regarding non-renewal
of his contract under the Michigan Revised School Code, MCL § 380.1229,
because he was an administrator under the statute. The court finds that
plaintiff did not qualify as an administrator under the Michigan statute
because he did not possess, nor was he seeking, an administrator’s
certificate. See MCL § 380.1536. In addition, plaintiff’s Agreement was
clearly a contract service agreement for a defined term of service without
any provision for renewal. The absence of an administrator’s certificate,
along with the express terms of the Agreement, clearly support the
conclusion that the parties did not intend for plaintiff to be hired as an
administrator. See also Reisman v. Regents of Wayne State Univ., 188
Mich. App. 526, 531 (1991)
While plaintiff did not have a statutory right to notice and a hearing,
the issue of his contract renewal was still put to a Board vote. Plaintiff’s
contract was not renewed by a vote of four to two. An adverse employment
action has been defined as “a materially adverse change in the terms and
conditions of [a plaintiff's] employment.” Spees v. James Marine, Inc., 617
F.3d 380, 391 (6th Cir. 2010) (White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
364 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir.2004) (en banc)). Adverse employment actions
are typically marked by a “significant change in employment status,”
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including “hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits.” Id. (citations omitted). While failing to renew a contract is not
listed as an example in this definition of adverse employment action,
plaintiff was subjected to a significant change in his employment status as
a result of the Board’s vote. The court finds that plaintiff suffered an
adverse employment action for purposes of his prima facie case.
With regard to the fourth element, there is some dispute over who
replaced plaintiff as AD. It appears that Gabe Rodriguez is the primary
individual who took over the AD duties, though there is some evidence that
Rodriguez shared the position with Matt Smith, John Lagalo, or possibly
Kevin Marshall. Of these individuals, only Kevin Marshall is African
American. To satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie case of
discrimination, plaintiff must put forth some evidence that he was replaced
by a person outside the protected class or was treated less favorably than
a similarly situated individual outside of his protected class. The evidence
supports that Gabe Rodriguez was plaintiff’s primary replacement,
supporting plaintiff’s burden of showing he was replaced by someone
outside his protected class.

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The legitimate non-discriminatory reasons relied upon by defendants
for their decision not to renew plaintiff as AD are: (1) plaintiff took it upon
himself to change the procedure in which ticket and concession proceeds
were counted and deposited; (2) summary sheets were missing; (3) reports
were not submitted in an accurate, timely fashion resulting in added
expense and effort for the District; (4) plaintiff failed to follow the facility
rental policy; and (5) plaintiff refused to cooperate with Rehmann’s
investigation.
Plaintiff contends that none of the above-listed reasons were given as
reasons for voting to not renew his contract when the individual Board
members were deposed. Rather, defendants Nelson, Rhines and Lange
each testified that they voted for non-renewal on the advice of the District’s
counsel or on the findings of the Rehmann investigation. Nelson testified
that he voted for non-renewal because he was unsatisfied by plaintiff’s lack
of cooperation with the investigation into his handling of athletic department
money. (Nelson dep., pp. 37-38) Rhines testified that his vote was based
upon the advice of the District’s counsel. (Rhines dep. p. 29) Lange
testified that he relied on the results of the Rehmann investigation as well
as on the advice of counsel. (Lange dep., p. 15)

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While plaintiff is correct that the defendants, other than Nelson, did
not articulate the specific reasons they voted not to renew plaintiff’s
contract, they did point generally to the conclusion of the investigation into
the matter of plaintiff’s role in the athletic department’s handling of cash
receipts. The investigation ultimately determined that plaintiff changed the
procedure in which ticket and concession proceeds were counted and
deposited; several summary sheets were missing; reports were not
submitted in an accurate, timely fashion; plaintiff failed to follow the facility
rental policy; and plaintiff refused to cooperate with the investigation. The
court finds that defendants have articulated several legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for voting not to renew plaintiff’s contract.
Once a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for non-renewal has been
shown by the employer, the burden shifts to plaintiff to demonstrate that the
reason was pretextual. A plaintiff may establish pretext by showing that the
employer's proffered reasons (1) have no basis in fact; (2) did not actually
motivate the action; or (3) were insufficient to warrant the action. Seeger v.
Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., LLC, 681 F.3d 274, 285 (6th Cir. 2012). “In
deciding whether an employer reasonably relied on the particularized facts
then before it, we do not require that the decisional process used by the
employer be optimal or that it left no stone unturned. Rather, the key
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inquiry is whether the employer made a reasonably informed and
considered decision before taking an adverse employment action.” Smith
v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 1998).
Defendants point to the fact that plaintiff’s deficient performance
prompted an investigation into the basketball ticket sales and concessions.
After an investigation by an ad hoc committee of the Board, the District’s
counsel initiated the Rehmann investigation to determine whether there
was any negligence or falsification in the handling of the proceeds. While
the investigation revealed no direct evidence of theft, there were several
missing sales reports which prevented an accurate accounting. In addition,
the changes plaintiff made to the procedure of handling money and his
refusal to participate in the investigation are legitimate reasons for
defendants to have voted not to renew his contract.
Plaintiff attempts to establish pretext by pointing to his testimony that
he was discriminated based on his race. However, plaintiff has provided no
evidenced to contradict the conclusions of the Rehmann investigation, to
explain his own failure to participate in the investigation or to directly
address the investigator’s findings regarding his handling of cash receipts
and deposits. A school district’s interest in safeguarding its financial
resources is certainly sufficient to support the Board’s decision not to renew
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plaintiff’s contract. The court finds that defendants’ legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for voting against renewal of plaintiff’s contract are
not pretext for discrimination.
For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motion for summary
judgment as to Counts I, II and III is GRANTED.
II. Count IV, Retaliation, ELCRA
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under ELCRA, a plaintiff
must show that: (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) the protected
activity was known by defendants; (3) the defendants took employment
action adverse to plaintiff; and (4) there was a causal connection between
the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Garg v.
Macomb Co. Comm. Mental Health Svcs, 196 Mich. App. 263, 273 (2005).
An employer is prohibited from retaliating against an employee for making
a charge, filing a complaint, testifying, assisting, or participating in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing. This is referred to as the participation
clause. An employer is also prohibited from retaliating when an employee
opposes a violation of ELCRA. This is the opposition clause. MCL §
37.2701(a).
Plaintiff invokes the opposition clause and states that he engaged in
protected activity by opposing defendants’ racial discrimination when he
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had his counsel write a letter to the District’s counsel claiming
discrimination and asking that it cease. (Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 69-71)
The opposition clause does not protect all opposition activity. “Courts are
required ‘to balance the purpose of the Act to protect persons engaging
reasonably in activities opposing ... discrimination, against Congress'
equally manifest desire not to tie the hands of employers in the objective
selection and control of personnel.... The requirements of the job and the
tolerable limits of conduct in a particular setting must be explored.’”
Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir.
1989) (citation omitted).
The discrimination identified in the May 18, 2017 letter is the
comment by Mr. Rhines about not liking the warm ups purchased by
plaintiff because he believed the colors of the warm ups made the players
look like they were from Saginaw High. The comment attributed to Rhines
as described in the letter is not an allegation that defendants engaged in an
unlawful employment practice. On the surface it is a statement of
disagreement about uniform choice. Giving credence to plaintiff’s
interpretation, the statement might be seen as a reference to the racial
makeup of the Saginaw High basketball team. The letter, however, does
not indicate how the alleged statement discriminated against plaintiff. An
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employee may not invoke the protections of ELCRA by making a vague
charge of discrimination. See id., at 1313.
The other incident discussed in the letter is the contract the Board
entered with Rehmann Investigations to investigate plaintiff. The letter
refers to the investigation as a “defamatory witch hunt,” “seeking to defame
and create innuendos that Mr. Seals is guilty of some crime.” In accusing
the Board of taking an unauthorized action in engaging Rehmann in order
to defame plaintiff, the letter takes issue with the procedures employed by
the Board. The letter falls short of rising to the level of protected activity as
opposition to racial discrimination.
Plaintiff fails to support a finding that he engaged in protected activity
under ELCRA. For this reason, defendants’ motion for summary judgment
as to Count IV is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED.
Dated: October 4, 2018
s/George Caram Steeh
GEORGE CARAM STEEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
October 4, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Marcia Beauchemin
Deputy Clerk

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