Taylor v. Karazia/Spl/Sgt et al

Filing 5

OPINION and ORDER Summarily Dismissing the 1 Complaint and Certifying that an Appeal Could Not be Taken in Good Faith. Signed by District Judge Thomas L. Ludington. (KWin)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

PETER C. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 18-10610-BC
Hon. Thomas L. Ludington

v.
SGT. KARAZIA, et al,
Defendants.
________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND
CERTIFYING THAT AN APPEAL COULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH
Plaintiff Peter C. Taylor, a state inmate incarcerated at the Bellemy Creek Correctional
Facility, has filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court granted Plaintiff’s
application to proceed in forma pauperis, and he is proceeding without prepayment of the filing
fee in this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After careful consideration of the Complaint, the
Court summarily dismisses the case.
I.
Plaintiff is incarcerated as a result of his Wayne Circuit Court conviction for second-degree
murder and commission of a felony with a firearm. Petitioner was a police officer who shot to
death an individual outside a roller skating rink in Livonia, Michigan. Facts surrounding his
conviction can be found in the opinion denying his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See
Taylor v. McKee, 2007 WL 4171260 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2007).
The complaint names Sgt. Karazia, an employee of the Michigan State Police Crime Lab,
the Lab itself, and the “City of Detroit Prosecutor’s Office,” as Defendants. The complaint makes
allegations regarding the misconduct of the Defendants during the investigation and prosecution
of his state criminal trial. He asserts Karazia presented false or mislabeled evidence. He asserts

that the trial judge and prosecutor did not allow the jury to take notes during trial. He asserts that
the Crime Lab manufactured false evidence which the prosecutor presented to the jury knowing it
was false. He alleges throughout the Complaint that the misconduct of the Defendants resulted in
his unlawful conviction and imprisonment. The Complaint seeks monetary damages.
II.
Civil complaints filed by a pro se prisoner are subject to the screening requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 866 (6th Cir. 2000). Section 1915(e)(2)
requires district courts to screen and to dismiss complaints that are frivolous, fail to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); McGore v. Wigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir.
1997). A complaint is frivolous and subject to sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(e) if it lacks an
arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A plaintiff fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, when, construing the complaint in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff and accepting all the factual allegations as true, the plaintiff undoubtedly
can prove no set of facts in support if his claims that would entitle him to relief. Sistrunk v. City of
Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996); Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1996);
Wright v. MetroHealth Med. Ctr., 58 F.3d 1130, 1138 (6th Cir. 1995).
III.
Plaintiff alleges that the various actions by the Defendants resulted in his unlawful
conviction and sentence. Plaintiff’s complaint is barred by the favorable-termination requirement
set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck the Supreme Court held such claims
to be improper:

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[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be
dismissed unless plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has
already been invalidated.
Id., 512 U.S. at 486-87.
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus provides the appropriate vehicle for challenging the
fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement in federal court. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
486-87 (1973). Nevertheless, the Court cannot convert this matter into a (second) petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. When a suit that should have been brought under the habeas corpus statute
is prosecuted instead as a civil suit, it should not be “converted” into a habeas corpus suit and
decided on the merits. Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F. 3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1999). Instead, the matter
should be dismissed, leaving it to the prisoner to decide whether to re-file it as a petition for writ
of habeas corpus. Id. Moreover, Heck clearly directs a federal district court to dismiss a civil rights
complaint which raises claims that attack the validity of a conviction; it does not direct a court to
construe the civil rights complaint as a habeas petition. See Murphy v. Martin, 343 F. Supp. 2d
603, 610 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
Because Plaintiff has already been denied federal habeas relief, if he wishes to pursue such
relief again he is required to first obtain permission from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
IV.
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

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The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir.
1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith
basis for an appeal.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the complaint is summarily DISMISSED under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).
It is further ORDERED that an appeal from this decision would be frivolous and could not
be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445
(1962).
Dated: May 21, 2018

s/Thomas L. Ludington
THOMAS L. LUDINGTON
United States District Judge

PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served
upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first
class U.S. mail on May 21, 2018.
s/Kelly Winslow
KELLY WINSLOW, Case Manager

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