Benjamin, Trustee et al v. Stemple et al

Filing 18

ORDER Denying 16 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by District Judge Thomas L. Ludington. (KWin)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
JAMES BENJAMIN, as Trustee of the
REBEKAH C BENJAMIN TRUST,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 18-cv-10849
Honorable Thomas L. Ludington

v.
JOHN STEMPLE AND JANET SANTOS,
in their official and individual capacities,
Defendants.
_______________________________________/

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
On March 14, 2018, Plaintiff James Benjamin, trustee for the Rebekah C. Benjamin Trust,
filed suit against Defendant John Stemple and Janet Santos, employees of the City of Saginaw.
ECF No. 1. In the suit, Benjamin alleges that the City of Saginaw’s practice of requiring owners
of “vacant, but maintained, properties to ‘register’ their property in order to obtain licensing
compliance” and, as part of that registration, consent to warrantless entries of those properties for
administrative protections violates the United States Constitution. On May 15, 2018, Defendants
filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 9. Two days later, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. ECF
No. 10. Defendants promptly moved to dismiss, and a hearing on that motion has been scheduled
for September 11, 2018, at 4:00 p.m. ECF No. 13.
On June 11, 2018, Benjamin filed a motion for a preliminary injunction wherein he requests
relief by June 22, 2018. Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 16. In the motion, Benjamin seeks “[a]
preliminary injunction order in favor of the putative class.” Id. at PageID.238. Importantly,

Benjamin does not seek relief for himself in the motion. A review of the allegations in the amended
complaint and motion for a preliminary injunction makes this clear.
I.
Benjamin alleges that “[o]n January 11, 2018, Defendant JOHN STEMPLE issued two
municipal citations (i.e. tickets) on Plaintiff TRUST.” Am. Compl. at PageID.113. Plaintiff further
alleges that “[a]t the time of filing, Defendant JOHN STEMPLE . . . is actively seeking to impose
penalties on Plaintiff TRUST and Class members for not waiving the Fourth Amendment rights
of Plaintiff TRUST and Class members.” Id. at PageID.115. The amended complaint cites to
Exhibits C and D in support of that allegation. Those exhibits are composed of two “Uniform
Municipal Civil Infraction Citation[s]” issued to Benjamin for “Failure to register vacant
dwelling[s].” Citations, ECF No. 10, Exs. C, D. Exhibits F and G of the amended complaint
indicate that hearings on the citations were scheduled for March 22, 2018. ECF No. 10, Exs. F, G.
The current status of the enforcement proceedings, including the outcome of the March 22, 2018,
hearings, is unclear.
In the motion for a preliminary injunction, Benjamin requests that the Court “preliminarily
enjoin Defendant Stemple . . . from initiating and continuing quasi-criminal prosecutions for
failing to register in the manner disputed in this case.” Mot. Prelim. Inj. at PageID.245. As
examples of the harm which Benjamin seeks to prevent, he provides copies of civil infraction
tickets and summons issued to other land owners in Saginaw. For example, Exhibit A to the motion
for a preliminary injunction is a notice of a hearing issued to the Jones Family Trust/Bobby Jones.
Jones Notice, ECF No. 16, Ex. A. The hearing on the citation is currently set for June 22, 2018.
Benjamin’s request for a preliminary injunction prior to that date confirms that the injury he seeks
to prevent is the continuation of enforcement proceedings regarding the Jones Family Trust

-2-

citation. Benjamin also cites to a citation and notice of hearing issued to Clara Cooper on January
12, 2018. Cooper Notice, ECF No. 17, Ex. B. The hearing on Cooper’s citation was scheduled for
April 12, 2018, but Plaintiff’s counsel indicates that Cooper’s action has been stayed by the state
court. Mot. Prelim. Inj. at PageID.237 n.1.
II.
A.
“Threshold individual standing is a prerequisite for all actions, including class actions.”
Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir. 1998). “A potential class
representative must demonstrate individual standing vis-as-vis the defendant; he cannot acquire
such standing merely by virtue of bringing a class action.” Id. “However, once an individual has
alleged a distinct and palpable injury to himself he has standing to challenge a practice even if the
injury is of a sort shared by a large class of possible litigants.” Senter v. Gen. Motors Corp., 532
F.2d 511, 517 (6th Cir. 1976). “To seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show that he is under
threat of suffering “injury in fact” that is concrete and particularized; the threat must be actual and
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; it must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of
the defendant; and it must be likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or redress the
injury.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009). “‘[W]hen the plaintiff is not
himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded,
but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.’” Id. (quoting Defendants of Wildlife,
504 U.S. at 562). In Summers, the Supreme Court explained that standing existed only “if
application of the [challenged] regulations by the Government will affect them.” Id. (emphasis in
original).

-3-

Defendants are challenging Benjamin’s standing to bring this suit as a whole, ECF No. 16,
but that question is currently not framed before the Court. Indeed, for the purposes of this motion,
the Court will assume without deciding that Benjamin has standing to bring this complaint.
However, the question of whether Benjamin has standing to request a preliminary injunction on
behalf of putative class members is distinct from the question of whether Benjamin may litigate
this suit on behalf of putative class members. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974)
(“Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding
injunctive relief, however, if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.”);
Buchwald v. Univ. of New Mexico Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487, 493 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[P]laintiff’s
standing to seek an injunction ordering her admission to the school based solely on her allegations
of past misconduct does not entail standing to seek an injunction prohibiting future use of the
disputed preference.”) (emphasis in original).
B.
The motion for a preliminary injunction does not identify any imminent injury to Benjamin.
Rather, Benjamin contends that he is requesting the preliminary injunction on behalf of the putative
class, not himself. See Mot. Prelim. Inj. at PageID.238–239 (explaining that, since issuing a
citation to Benjamin, the City of Saginaw “has instituted numerous criminal civil infraction actions
in the local state court for persons and entities who refuse to register” and that “others have
approached the undersigned counsel with identical prosecutions” in the interim); id. at PageID.238
(“A preliminary injunction order in favor of the putative class would remedy this harm by
maintaining the status quo.”) (emphasis added); id. (“As such, Plaintiff, as the putative class
representative, is seeking to stop the imminent and ongoing constitutional violations to the class
until this case is resolved.”) (emphasis added); id. at PageID.242 (“Plaintiff would assert that not

-4-

entering the injunction is causing substantial harm to the putative class.”); id. at PageID.245 (“The
Court is requested to take action before June 22, 2018 (see Exhibit A) and preliminarily enjoin
Defendant Stemple, in both his official and personal capacities, from initiating and continuing
quasi-criminal prosecutions for failing to register in the manner disputed in this case unless and
until this Court rules on the merits of this legal challenge.”).
The amended complaint indicates that the hearing on Benjamin’s citation occurred on
March 22, 2018, and Benjamin does not contend that the requested preliminary injunction will
benefit him in any way. The unavoidable conclusion, then, is that the enforcement proceedings
against Benjamin have concluded. That fact is not necessarily fatal to Benjamin’s challenge to the
City of Saginaw’s practice of requiring owners of vacant, but maintained, properties to ‘register’
their property in order to obtain licensing compliance, but it does demonstrate that Benjamin lacks
standing to seek a preliminary injunction against the initiation of such enforcement proceedings.
Senter confirms that a putative class representative can advance claims on behalf of the putative
class only insofar as he possesses standing to advance the claim himself. 532 F.2d at 517. See also
Big Elk v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Osage Cty., 3 F. App’x 802, 806–07 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive relief on behalf of a class against the
continuance of a sheriff’s department policy because the plaintiff’s had not shown a sufficient
likelihood that they would be subject to the policy a second time). The injury Benjamin identifies
in the motion for a preliminary injunction (the potential initiation and prosecution of civil
enforcement actions) is not one he shares with the putative class because the enforcement
proceedings against him have run their course. As such, and per Senter, Benjamin lacks the
standing to seek the preliminary injunctive relief. The motion for a preliminary injunction will be
denied.

-5-

III.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 16,
is DENIED.

Dated: June 12, 2018

s/Thomas L. Ludington
THOMAS L. LUDINGTON
United States District Judge

PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served
upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first
class U.S. mail on June 12, 2018.
s/Kelly Winslow
KELLY WINSLOW, Case Manager

-6-