Stewart v. County of Saginaw

Filing 32

[CORRECTED] OPINION and ORDER Granting Defendant's 19 MOTION for Summary Judgment, Dismissing Plaintiff Complaint, and Denying Defendant's 29 MOTION to Adjourn 28 Scheduling Order, as MOOT 31 Memorandum Opinion & Order, Signed by District Judge Thomas L. Ludington. (TMcg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
JULIA STEWART,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 1:22-cv-10766
Honorable Thomas L. Ludington
United States District Judge

COUNTY OF SAGINAW,
Defendant.
__________________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT, AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO ADJOURN SCHEDULING ORDER AS MOOT
Plaintiff Julia Stewart—a white woman—worked as the 70th District Court of Saginaw
County Traffic Division Supervisor from 2017 until she resigned in early 2022. In January 2021,
Valerie Baker—a Black woman, who worked as a 70th District Court clerk—called Plaintiff’s
office. Although the exact language and underlying rationale are disputed, Plaintiff answered the
phone by referring to Baker as a “chocolate chip” or “chocolate chip cookie.” Baker filed an
internal complaint with Saginaw County’s Personnel Department, which referred the complaint to
external investigator and private attorney Tobin Dust, who in turn concluded Plaintiff violated
County racial discrimination and harassment policy. Plaintiff was suspended for three days without
pay, and was required to attend sensitivity training.
In April 2021, when Plaintiff returned to work after serving her three-day suspension, the
Traffic Division she oversaw was in turmoil. Several of her subordinates filed internal complaints
alleging Plaintiff created a toxic work environment and made additional racist comments towards
her Black subordinate employees, including telling one of her subordinates—a Black woman—to
“chop chop monkey” as the subordinate employee was leaving the office sometime in 2019.

Plaintiff disputes most allegations within her subordinates’ internal complaints, and alleges
they were prompted by her discipline for the chocolate chip cookie incident, which she believes
“branded her a racist” within the Traffic Division. Indeed, in addition to the harassment Plaintiff’s
subordinates complained of, Plaintiff complained she was harassed, too. In December 2021,
Plaintiff filed her own internal complaint alleging her subordinate employees referred to her as
“white devil” and “white trash.” One month after filing her internal complaint, though, Plaintiff
asked if she could withdraw it. And one month later, Plaintiff resigned.
In April 2022, two months after resigning, Plaintiff sued Defendant Saginaw County,
alleging it discriminated against her on the basis of her race, and unlawfully retaliated against her,
by constructively terminating her employment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, and Michigan’s Whistleblowers’ Protection Act.
Currently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, which, as explained
below, will be granted in full. Largely because Plaintiff has not shown a prima facie case of reverse
discrimination, nor an adverse employment action of constructive discharge, her Complaint will
be dismissed.
I.
A. Plaintiff’s Early Employment and Evaluations
Michigan’s 70th District Court, based in Saginaw County, is organized into a Civil
Division, a Criminal Division, a Probate Division, and a Traffic Division. ECF No. 19-3 at
PageID.199. This racial discrimination case involves the Traffic Division which, after what has
been referred to as the “chocolate chip cookie incident” in 2021, was described by its employees
as a “hostile,” “uncomfortable,” “stressful,” and “explosive” place to work. See, e.g., ECF Nos.
19-7 at PageID.271, 19-19 at PageID.339–40; 19-20 at PageID.353, 355; 19-21 at PageID.360;

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19-25 at PageID.383; 19-27 at PageID.388; 22-8 at PageID.761.
Before the chocolate chip cookie incident and the alleged hostility it produced, Plaintiff
Julia Stewart—a white woman—was hired as the Traffic Division’s assistant supervisor in
September 2017. ECF No. 22-3 at PageID.749. Nearly three months later, Plaintiff was promoted
to serve as Traffic Division Supervisor. ECF Nos. 19-2 at PageID.178; 19-3 at PageID.194. In this
role, Plaintiff directly reported to Court Administrator Linda James, who is also a white woman.
ECF No. 19-3 at pageID.199–200. As Supervisor, Plaintiff oversaw the work of Traffic Division
Assistant Supervisor Kelly Carroll—a white woman—id. at PageID.199, and numerous traffic
clerks including Michelle Boruszewski, Tammy Bieszke, Kanisha Jones, Ellie Hamme, Sue
Sawyer, Melissa Ray, and Linda Burgess. ECF No. 19-3 at PageID.199–201.
From her promotion to Supervisor in late 2017 through 2020, Plaintiff generally received
excellent performance reviews. In September 2018, Linda James reported Plaintiff achieved or
exceeded all expectations, “ha[d] quickly learned many aspects of the Traffic Division in the first
year of her employment,” was dependable and needed “limited supervision,” and “work[ed] well
wither her staff.” ECF No. 22-6 at PageID.756–57. In September 2019, Linda James again reported
that Plaintiff achieved or exceeded all expectations, “strive[d] to make her department a better
environment [and] improve the workflow.” Id. at PageID.754–55. Plaintiff’s annual evaluation in
September 2020 was no different. Linda James indicated Plaintiff achieved or exceeded all
expectations and “continue[d] to work well with her staff keeping them motivated.” Id. at
PageID.752–53.
B. The “Chocolate Chip Cookie Incident”
Then came the “chocolate chip cookie incident.” On January 14, 2021, Valerie Baker—a
clerk to District Court Judge Alfred Thomas Frank—called Plaintiff’s office phone. ECF No. 19-

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3 at PageID.202. What happened next is disputed, as reflected by the following recollections:
(1) Assistant Supervisor Kelly Carroll, who was in the room with Plaintiff when
Plaintiff answered Baker’s call, believes Plaintiff answered the phone by saying
“Hi, chocolate chip” or “[h]ey chocolate chip!” See ECF Nos. 19-7 at PageID.269–
71; 19-9 at PageID.344.
(2) Baker believes Plaintiff answered her phone call by exclaiming “What’s up[,]
[c]hocolate chip?” ECF No. 19-9 at PageID.299.
(3) Plaintiff first reported she answered the phone by saying “hello, Chocolate Chip
Cookie” and was referring to a joke in which Plaintiff would ask her colleagues for
cookies in exchange for helping them with favors. ECF No. 19-6 at PageID.266.
During her deposition, Plaintiff testified that she answered Baker’s call by saying
“it’ll be a chocolate chip cookie” but admitted her earlier report is more reliable.
ECF No. 19-3 at PageID.202–03, 207. Notably, although Plaintiff maintains she
was merely referencing an inside joke, Baker reported the two “did not have a
relationship where they would typically joke or engage in humor.” ECF No. 19-8
at PageID.286.
Although the precise language of Plaintiff’s remark is disputed, the fact that Plaintiff immediately
referenced a “chocolate chip” or “chocolate chip cookie” when answering Baker’s call is not
disputed. And it is not disputed that Baker—a Black woman—was offended by Plaintiff’s
comment and believed it to be racist. ECF No. 19-3 at PageID.201, 208; 19-9 at PageID.300.
On January 15, 2021, Baker went to Court Administrator Linda James’s office and
explained the incident to her. ECF No. 19-4 at PageID.236–37. Linda James then went to
Plaintiff’s office and told her that Baker was offended by her chocolate chip remark. Id. at
PageID.237. Plaintiff told Linda James that she did not intend to offend Baker and offered to
“immediately” apologize. Id. The wording of Plaintiff’s apology is also disputed, but the apology
indisputably made matters worse. Plaintiff recalls that she genuinely apologized for the remark,
explained it was in reference to her “ongoing joke” and thanked Baker for reporting the issue to
Linda “because [Plaintiff] felt like [Baker] and [Plaintiff] really built a good relationship” and
because Plaintiff wouldn’t have been able to remedy the situation if it was never brought to her

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attention. ECF No. 19-3 at PageID.203. Baker saw things differently. Although Baker noted
Plaintiff apologized for the remark, Baker recalls Plaintiff justified it by saying “she [frequently]
makes chocolate chip cookies for the Traffic Division” and “had chocolate chip cookies on her
mind.” ECF No. 19-9 at PageID.300. Baker reported that she felt Plaintiff was sarcastic and
insincere when “thanking” her for reporting the issue to Linda James and claims Plaintiff merely
said, as she was leaving Baker’s office, “[o]h and thanks for going to Linda.” Id. Notably, the only
other witness to this apology was Sheila Danley—a court reporter who sat five-to-six feet away
from Baker. ECF No. 19-8 at PageID.293–94. Danley shared Baker’s view that Plaintiff’s
“explanation was nonsense and that the so-called thank you” was sarcastic and insincere. Id. at
PageID.294.
Baker then filed a formal complaint with the Saginaw County Personnel Department,
which oversaw human resources for the 70th District Court. See ECF No. 19-9 at PageID.300; see
also ECF No. 19-11 at PageID.311. Baker’s complaint was received by Personnel Director
Jennifer Broadfoot and County Controller Robert Belleman. ECF No. 19-10 at PageID.302–04.
Broadfoot and Belleman reviewed Baker’s complaint and referred it to outside investigator and
private attorney Tobin Dust. ECF No. 19-3 at PageID.200.
Throughout his investigation, Dust reviewed Baker’s complaint, ECF No. 19-9; Plaintiff’s
written response, ECF No. 19-8 at PageID.297; and relevant Saginaw County policies, ECF No.
19-11. ECF No. 19-8 at PageID.282. Dust also interviewed Plaintiff, Linda James, Sheila Danley,
and Baker on two separate occasions.1 Id. Dust’s investigation reached two conclusions. First, Dust

1

During an interview with Dust, Baker reported that, two weeks after Plaintiff apologized for the
chocolate chip remark, Plaintiff offered Baker a piece of white cake and “emphasized the word
white” when doing so. ECF No. 19-8 at PageID.287. Plaintiff acknowledged that she offered Baker
cake that day but “could not recall” whether she described the cake as “white” or emphasized the
word. Id. at PageID.291.
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concluded that, although Plaintiff “probably did not intend her statement to be injurious[,]” her
chocolate chip remark referred to Baker and likely referred to her race, in violation of Saginaw
County Personnel Policy which prohibits racial harassment and discrimination.2 Id. at
PageID.282–83. Notably, Dust explained this conclusion was based, in part, on Plaintiff’s
inconsistent and “bizarre” explanations about the remark. Id. at PageID.283, 290 (noting Plaintiff
“became flustered” and could not clearly answer Dust’s questions about Plaintiff’s intent). Second,
Dust concluded that Plaintiff’s subsequent apology to Baker was “likely not sincere” and also
violated Saginaw County Policy which prohibits retaliation against an employee for asserting a
discrimination or harassment claim. Id.
Accordingly, Dust recommended Plaintiff be disciplined by requiring sensitivity training.
Id. at PageID.283. Dust compiled his conclusions and recommendations in a report, which was
sent to Broadfoot and Belleman on February 15, 2021. See id. at PageID.282. Broadfoot and
Belleman then worked with 70th District Court Judge Elian Fichtner and Saginaw County Chief
Judge Darnell Jackson to determine the appropriate discipline Plaintiff should receive.3 See ECF
No. 19-13 at PageID.319–21. The group decided to take a “three-prong approach” to Plaintiff’s
discipline. Id. at PageID.321.

2

Dust concluded Plaintiff’s chocolate chip remark violated Saginaw County Personnel Policy
Nos. 321 and 322. ECF No. 19-8 at PageID.282. Policy No. 321, entitled “standards of conduct”
prohibits “[o]ffensive conduct and/or offensive language, including sexual and/or racial
harassment towards person(s) in the workplace[.]” ECF No. 19-12 at PageID.314–15. Policy No.
322 prohibits sexual harassment, racial discrimination, and retaliation. ECF No. 19-11 at
PageID.310. In pertinent part, Policy No. 322 warns “[a]ny employee found to have . . . unlawfully
discriminated against another employee or to have retaliated against an employee for making a
complaint of discrimination . . . will be subject to discipline[.]” Id. Dust concluded Plaintiff’s
apology violated this provision of Policy No. 322, too. ECF No. 19-8 at PageID.282.
3
Although Judge Jackson served as the Saginaw County Chief Judge at the time and was generally
responsible for employee discipline within the court, he “delegated the administration of [Baker’s]
complaint to . . . Judge Fichtner[.]” ECF No. 19 at PageID.154; see also ECF No. 19-13 at
PageID.320.
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On March 26, 2021, Judge Fichtner sent Plaintiff a letter informing her that, “[a]s a result
of [Dust’s] investigation,” Plaintiff was (1) suspended for three days; (2) required to read and
review the provisions of the Saginaw County Personnel Policy she violated; and (3) “required to
attend diversity training programs.” ECF No. 19-14 at PageID.326–27. Plaintiff served her threeday suspension, without pay, from March 29–31, 2021. See ECF No. 19-3 at PageID.206. While
suspended, Plaintiff voluntarily enrolled in and completed an unidentified online diversity-training
course. Id. at PageID.188. But the 70th District Court never directed Plaintiff to enroll in this
particular course, and “wouldn’t accept” her completion of it. Id. Plaintiff claims she “was never
given” specific training, despite requesting it “numerous times.” Id. at PageID.211.
On March 29, 2021, as she was serving her suspension, Plaintiff and her manager’s union
representatives filed a grievance challenging the suspension, arguing in part that Dust’s
investigation violated County Policy requiring two staff members to investigate discrimination
complaints.4 ECF No. 19-15 at PageID.329. In accordance with step one and two of the grievance
process established by the Plaintiff’s Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), ECF No. 19-36,
Plaintiff’s grievance was sent to Court Administrator Linda James. ECF No. 19-3 at PageID.209
(noting, at step one, Plaintiff had an in-person conversation with James and, at step two, formalized
her grievance in writing and sent it to James). Linda James received Plaintiff’s grievance on April
14, 2021 and denied it, noting Plaintiff’s discipline was “justified.” ECF No. 19-16 at PageID.332.
In accordance with step three of the grievance process, Plaintiff and her union representatives met
with 70th District Court officials on May, 20, 2021. ECF No. 19-17 at PageID.335. In attempt to

4

Saginaw County Personnel Policy No. 322 provides that the County Controller “shall designate
two (2) County staff persons, one male and one female, to receive, investigate, and resolve
complaints.” ECF No. 19-11 at PageID.311. Personnel Director Broadfoot maintains this policy
was followed in Plaintiff’s case because she and Robert Belleman oversaw Dust’s investigation
and were “involved in the processing” of Baker’s complaint. ECF No. 19-10 at PageID.303–04.
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settle the dispute, Plaintiff’s union representatives suggested that Plaintiff would accept a “written
reprimand” so long as the suspension was vacated. See id. But the 70th District Court rejected this
offer, noted Plaintiff’s discipline “was warranted as issued,” and denied Plaintiff’s grievance again
on June 3, 2021. Id.
C. Plaintiff’s Return to Work and Subordinate Complaints
Plaintiff alleges that things changed when she returned to the Traffic Division after serving
her suspension, and maintains that the discipline she received for her chocolate chip comment
“branded [her] a racist” and “completely compromised [her] ability to run” the Division. ECF No.
1 at PageID.5–6.
Plaintiff alleges that, when she returned to work on April 1, 2021, Court Administrator
Linda James immediately and sarcastically asked Plaintiff whether she “enjoy[ed]” her time off.
ECF No. 19-3 at PageID.231. Linda James notes she “may have made” this statement “just to
create small talk.” ECF No. 19-4 at PageID.242.
In addition to this one-off comment from her supervisor, several of Plaintiff’s subordinates
soon after filed internal complaints against Plaintiff, alleging that Plaintiff made additional
discriminatory remarks to Traffic Division employees throughout her time as Supervisor, and
generally created a hostile work environment. Plaintiff maintains these complaints were part of a
“concerted” effort by her subordinates to “paint Plaintiff as a racist” and force her resignation. See
ECF No. 22 at PageID.672, n. 2. Each complaint will be discussed in turn.
1. Kanisha Jones’s Fist Complaint
On March 24, 2021, traffic clerk Kanisha Jones filed a complaint with the Saginaw County
Personnel Department. ECF No. 22-13. Notably, this complaint was filed before Plaintiff was
suspended for her chocolate chip comment and did not concern Plaintiff directly. Instead, Jones

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complained that two other clerks—Ellie Hamme and Michelle Boruszewski—were unprofessional
and creating a negative work environment. Id. at PageID.788. But Jones noted Plaintiff was “fully
aware” of these issues and was addressing them. See id. at PageID.788–94 (noting Plaintiff “does
want everyone to get along at work”); see also ECF No. 19-5 at PageID.257.
Jones met with Personnel Specialist April Key, who determined Jones’s complaint did not
allege any violations of Saginaw County policy or procedure. ECF No. 19-18 at PagerID.337. Key
additionally concluded that the matter was “resolved” in part because Plaintiff “dealt with the
issues and put some new procedures in place.” Id.
2. Kelly Carroll’s First Complaint
Assistant Traffic Supervisor Kelly Carroll filed her first complaint on April 10, 2021. ECF
No. 19-19 at PageID.339. Carroll claimed the Traffic Division was “hostile, unprofessional,
uncomfortable, stressful, humiliating, and threatening.” Id. Carroll complained she was “stalked”
and “harassed” by Hamme and Boruszewski “on several occasions.” Id. Carroll alleged that
Plaintiff was friends with Hamme and Boruszewski, and favored them over other traffic division
employees. Id. at PageID.339 (“[Plaintiff] hangs out with Ellie Hamme and Michelle
Bor[u]szewski on the weekends . . . I believe that due to their friendship this is why [Plaintiff] will
not correct Ellie and Michelle and sides with them and bull[ies] myself and Kanish Jones and
Tammy Bieszke.”), PageID.340 (“[Plaintiff] will become loud and rude with her other employees
but will show such obvious favoritism with Ellie and Michelle.”), PageID.347 (“[Plaintiff] hangs
out with . . . Ellie and Michelle out[side] of work . . . I think this is why [Plaintiff] will not correct
them and protects [them]. . . . It is so obvious that it makes the rest of us feel very uncomfortable
and now it has turned into actual stalking and harassment.”). Aside from the alleged favoritism,
Carroll complained Plaintiff intentionally embarrassed her and “verbally attacked” her “so many

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times in front of the whole department” in a “rude, hostile, and down right nasty” manner. Id. at
PageID.341.
3. Tammy Bieszke’s Complaint
About three days after Carroll filed her first complaint, traffic clerk Tammy Bieszke filed
a complaint of her own. ECF No. 19-20; see also ECF No. 19-21 at PageID.359 (noting Bieszke’s
complaint was filed around April 13, 2021). Similar to Carroll’s complaint, Bieszke’s alleged
Hamme and Boruszewski were rude to, harassed, and stalked other Traffic Division employees.
Id. at PageID.350–53. Bieszke also complained, that Hamme, Boruszewski, and Plaintiff were
racist, especially towards Kanisha Jones. Id. at PageID.353.
Bieszke filed a “[p]art two” to her complaint sometime after April 15, 2021, and sometime
after the Traffic Division “me[t] and talked with” Court Administrator Linda James. Id. at
PageID.354; ECF No. 19-21 at PageID.260. Bieszke added allegations that Plaintiff slammed
doors throughout the office and created a hostile and uncomfortable work environment. ECF No.
19-20 at PageID.354–55.
4. Kelly Carroll’s Second Complaint
Assistant Traffic Supervisor Kelly Carroll filed a second complaint on April 17, 2021—
one week after she filed her first complaint. ECF No. 19-22 at PageID.364. Carroll’s second
complaint alleged Plaintiff retaliated against her for filing her first complaint and was becoming
“even more hostile, aggressive, [and] unprofessional” to the point that Carroll feared for her life.
Id. at PageID.364, 367 (“I fear that [Plaintiff will] bring[] a gun in here and mow us all down.”).
Notably, though, the only evidence supporting Carrol’s claim that Plaintiff was becoming more
hostile and aggressive was that Plaintiff would stomp her feet and slam doors throughout the office,
similar to the allegations within “part two” of Bieszke’s complaint. See id. at PageID.364–65.

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Carroll also noted her belief that Plaintiff “is a racist person” and alleged Plaintiff bullied
Carroll and Bieszke—who are both white woman—solely because they were friends with Jones—
who is a Black woman. Id. at PageID.366. On this point, Carroll recalled the chocolate chip
incident and additionally alleged Plaintiff, at some point in the past, said “chop chop monkey” to
Kanisha Jones. Id.
Plaintiff concedes that, at some unidentified point, she said “chop chop monkey” to some
Traffic Division employee. ECF No. 19-3 at PageID.217–218. But Plaintiff does not believe she
said this to Jones, and does not believe she made this remark towards a Black employee. Id. at
PageID.218. Kanisha Jones recalls things differently, and claims Plaintiff directed the “chop chop
monkey” comment solely at her. ECF No. 19-5 at PageID.260. Indeed, Jones recalls Plaintiff said
“chop chop monkey” as Jones was getting ready to leave the office, and Jones expressly told
Plaintiff to stop. Id. at PageID.260–61. Kelly Carroll and Tammy Bieszke also recall hearing
Plaintiff say “chop chop monkey” to Jones, as Jones was preparing to leave the office, although
neither remember when the comment was made. ECF Nos. 19-7 at PageID.278–79. 19-21 at
PageID.362. Bieszke recalls Plaintiff made the comment “a few times” throughout “a few days.”
ECF No. 19-21 at PageID.362.
5. Kanisha Jones’s Second Complaint
Kanisha Jones filed her second complaint on November 15, 2021, more than six months
after the flurry of complaints discussed above. ECF No. 19-27. Unlike her first complaint, which
was primarily directed at Hamme and Boruszewski, Jones’s second complaint concerned Plaintiff.
Id. Jones complained that Plaintiff, likely sometime in 2019, “jokingly” told her, in front of the
Traffic Division, multiple times, “chop chop monkey let’s go.” Id. at PageID.388; ECF No. 19-5
at PageID.261. Jones also alleged Plaintiff racially harassed her by asking, at some unidentified

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point in time, whether Jones would be offended if Plaintiff asked her a question. ECF No. 19-27
at PageID.387. Jones responded “[o]kay . . . [d]epends on what the question is.” ECF No. 19-5 at
PageID.260. Plaintiff then asked Jones, in front of other Traffic Division employees, what products
she used to care for her hair, because Plaintiff’s granddaughter is Black, like Jones. Id.; ECF No.
19-3 at PageID.218. Jones was offended because she did not have children and did not understand
why Plaintiff would ask her this question in front other employees, especially when Plaintiff first
indicated the question may have been offensive. ECF Nos. 19-27 at PageID.387; 19-5 at
PageID.260.
On December 1, 2021, Court Administrator Linda James informed Plaintiff about Jones’s
complaint and told her it would be investigated by Tobin Dust. ECF No. 19-3 at PageID.225. On
this point, Plaintiff claims Linda James also told her that the environment at the Division was “not
going to get any better” and that Plaintiff would have to “fight the fight.” Id. Plaintiff filed a written
response to Jones’s complaint the next day, on December 2, 2021. ECF No. 19-29. In her written
response, Plaintiff admitted to asking Jones about her hair products, explained the division
frequently talked about hair, and noted that Jones “started the conversation about her hair and
curls” the day in question. Id. at PageID.400.
Jones’s second complaint was referred to Tobin Dust for investigation but he did not write
or file a final report because Plaintiff resigned during the investigation, as explained in greater
detail infra Section I.E. See ECF No. 19-28 at PageID.393–98.
D. Employee Meetings
In response to these and other formal and informal complaints, Court Administrator Linda
James and Judge Clark attended a Traffic Division meeting in November 2021. ECF No. 22-19 at
PageID.827. Abruptly, Traffic Division employees “open[ed] up and share[d] all their ill feelings

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and dislikes.” Id. So, Linda James and Judge Clark met with each employee individually
throughout the rest of the month. Id.
On November 4, 2021, Linda James and Judge Clark met with Assistant Supervisor Kelly
Carroll who noted that Plaintiff “doesn’t keep complaints confidential,” was a “tumor” within the
Division, and favors certain employees over others. Id.
On November 5, 2021, Linda James and Judge Clark met with clerk Sue Sawyer who
reported that Plaintiff’s subordinates referred to her as “evil” and often commented “evil people
walk in heels” when Plaintiff was wearing high heels in the office. See id.; see also ECF No. 1 at
PageID.6. Sawyer also shared the following Facebook post by Kelly Carroll:
The worst type of person is one who puts on a mask to everyone but behind that
mask is a manipulative conniving fake phony evil bitch that wants nothing more
than to feel empowered and relevant by sabotaging and destroying other people so
that everyone doesn’t figure out who they truly are. This is my life every damn day.
When does it stop. When does everyone see this person for what they are. The devil
is busy but never tired.
ECF No. 19-26; see also ECF No. 22-19 at PageID.827. Sawyer told Linda James and Judge Clark
that Carroll wanted to “kick [Plaintiff] out” and get Plaintiff “out of the picture” so Carroll could
become the Traffic Division Supervisor. Id. Also on November 5, Linda James met with Kanisha
Jones who “stated that [Plaintiff] is the problem” and that “Sawyer is being treated [by Plaintiff]
as if she is management.” Id. at PageID.828
On November 8, 2021, Linda James and Judge Clark met with traffic cashier Linda Burgess
who reported that Plaintiff favored certain employees, such as Sue Sawyer, and was generally
“harsh and demeaning.” Id.
On November 9, 2021, Linda James issued Kelly Carroll a written reprimand for her
Facebook post because Carroll admitted the post referred to Plaintiff and James concluded it

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violated the 70th District Court’s code of conduct.5 Id.; ECF No. 22-8 at PageID.773. Also on
November 9, 2021, Linda James and Judge Clark met with Traffic Clerk Tammy Bieszke who
noted Plaintiff “ma[de] nasty remarks” and “br[ought] a lot of personal matters to work which
affect[ed] her mood.” 22-19 at PageID.828. Linda James and Judge Clark also met with a woman
who worked in the Traffic Division, under Plaintiff’s supervision, for two months. Id. The former
employee recalled that she immediately noticed tension within the Department and stated Plaintiff
“talk[ed] down to people.” Id.
On November 10, 2021, Linda James and Judge Clark met with Kanisha Jones, who alleged
Plaintiff was harassing her and was not sufficiently addressing subordinate complaints. See id.
On November 15, 2021, Judge Clark and Linda James met with Plaintiff who denied playing
favorites, said her subordinates were “oversensitive,” and noted her fear that her subordinates were
going to “set [her] up” by making false accusations. Id. at PageID.828–29. Plaintiff also reported
Kanisha Jones referred to Plaintiff as “White Devil.” Id. at PageID.829.
After her written summary of these meetings, Linda James noted that she and Judge Clark
shared the conclusion that Plaintiff did not “have the necessary management style or personality
to continue” as Supervisor of the Traffic Division. Id. Linda James noted that Plaintiff’s
performance was declining and that, “due to her management style” the Division was not attracting
nor maintaining new employees. Id. Linda James concluded by noting, “[t]o avoid any more
damage . . . [Plaintiff] should not return to work.” Id. But nothing in the record suggests Linda
5

When asked during deposition why Carroll was only written up for her Facebook post while
Plaintiff was suspended for her chocolate chip comment, Court Administrator Linda James
explained the Court employed “progressive discipline” and Plaintiff was immediately suspended
because her conduct and comment were more severe than Carroll’s post. ECF No. 22-8 at
PageID.773. When asked why this post was not referred to Tobin Dust or another external
investigator, Linda James explained there was no need for an independent investigation because
Carroll’s post did not plausibly relate to race, unlike Plaintiff’s chocolate chip cookie comment.
Id.
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James acted in accordance with these conclusions, nor shared them with Plaintiff or other staff
members.
E. Plaintiff’s Complaint and Resignation
Plaintiff’s subordinate employees were not the only ones experiencing tension and
complaining about the environment within the Traffic Division. At the same time Plaintiff’s
subordinate employees claimed Plaintiff was harassing and discriminating against them, Plaintiff
maintains her subordinate employees harassed and discriminated against her. ECF No. 19 at
PageID.149; see also ECF No. 19-30.
On Sunday, November 7, 2021, Plaintiff wrote Linda James a letter explaining Plaintiff
did “not feel safe” “due to prior accusations made about [her] and unknown accusations that may
be made about [her] in the future.” ECF No. 19-25 at PageID.383. Plaintiff referenced Kelly
Carroll’s Facebook post and explained her opinion that Carroll was to blame for the Traffic
Division’s hostility. See id. (stating “information discussed in confidential settings was being
twisted and shared by a person in a management position” and that this “person” used this
“twisted” and “confidential” information to undermine and target Plaintiff).
On December 2, 2021, Plaintiff called in sick. ECF No. 22-19 at PageID.829. On December
3, 2021, Plaintiff was placed on FLMA leave due to her high blood pressure. See ECF No. 19-3 at
PageID.198
During her FMLA leave, Plaintiff applied and interviewed for other jobs. See ECF No. 193 at PageID.199. And, the same day she began her FMLA leave, Plaintiff filed a formal complaint
with the County Personnel Department. ECF No. 19-31 at PageID.411. Plaintiff’s internal
complaint alleged that Carroll, Jones, and Bieszke “harassed [her], reported false allegations,
retaliated against formal instructions, spread rumors, posted negative statements on social media

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directed at [her], called [her] names and taunted [her].” Id. at PageID.409. Plaintiff’s complaint
specifically referenced Carroll’s Facebook post, and alleged that Jones’s second complaint was
retaliatory and filed solely because Plaintiff had informally complained about Jones’s “behavior
and work ethic.” Id. at PageID.410. Plaintiff further alleged that Kanisha Jones openly referred to
herself, Kelly Carroll, and Tammy Bieszke as a “gang” and referred to Plaintiff as “[t]he White
Devil” or white “trash.” Id. at PageID.410–11. But, notably, Jones, Carroll, and Bieszke all deny
referring to themselves as a “gang” and deny calling Plaintiff “white devil” or “white trash.” ECF
Nos. 19-5 at PageID.256–57, 259; 19-7 at PageID.274, 276; 19-21 at PageID.359, 361.
On December 22, 2021, Personnel Specialist April Key emailed Court Administrator
Linda James a copy of Plaintiff’s complaint. ECF No. 22–26. Key indicated that most of the
complaint concerns “general personnel” issues but that Plaintiff’s allegation that her subordinates
called her the “white devil” would be referred to Tobin Dust, id. at PageID.857, because the County
“recognized that [it] was an inappropriate comment, and . . . needed to be referred out for an
investigation.” ECF No. 19-10 at PageID.305.
But, on December 27, 2021, Plaintiff emailed April Key asking if she could “pull” her
complaint because she thought withdrawing her complaint would be “best.” ECF No. 19-33 at
PageID.415. Key responded that Plaintiff could pull her complaint but, if she did, her allegations
would not be investigated. Id. Plaintiff did not respond. ECF No. 19-3 at PageID.222. Although
Plaintiff argues she only was asking if she had the ability to withdraw her complaint, ECF No. 222 at PageID.737, the County interpreted Plaintiff’s initial email and lack of further communication
as a request to withdraw her complaint. See ECF No. 19-10 at PageID.305.
Nevertheless, on January 10, 2022, Plaintiff extended her FMLA leave to February 3, 2022.
See ECF No. 20 at PageID.655. But, on January 20, 2022, Plaintiff emailed Linda James that she

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was resigning her employment, effective on February 3, 2022. ECF No. 19-35 at PageID.644.
F. Procedural Posture
In April 2022, two months after she resigned, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging that
Defendant Saginaw County discriminated against her on the basis of her race in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I); discriminated against her on the basis of
her race in violation of Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 37.2202(1)(a) (Count II); retaliated against her in violation of the ELCRA (Count III); and
violated the Michigan Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.361, et
seq. (Count IV). See generally ECF No. 1. Currently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. ECF No. 19.
II.
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The moving party has the initial burden of identifying where to look
in the record for evidence “which it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the
opposing party, who must set out specific facts showing “a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (citation omitted). The court must view the evidence
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant and determine “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251–52.
When the moving party “also bears the burden of persuasion at trial, [its] ‘initial summary

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judgment burden is “higher in that it must show that the record contains evidence satisfying the
burden of persuasion and that the evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to
disbelieve it.’” Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 452, 455–56 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Cockrel v. Shelby
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1056 (6th Cir. 2001)); Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254,
259 (6th Cir. 1986) (“[W]here the moving party has the burden—the plaintiff on a claim for relief
or the defendant on an affirmative defense—his showing must be sufficient for the court to hold
that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.”) (quoting W. Schwarzer,
Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D.
465, 487–88 (1984) (emphasis omitted))).
III.
Defendant seeks summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. Each of Plaintiff’s claims
and Defendant’s arguments will be addressed in turn.
A. Plaintiff’s Employer
Plaintiff worked for the Michigan’s 70th District Court of Saginaw County. So who was
Plaintiff’s employer? The 70th District Court, the State of Michigan, Defendant Saginaw County,
or some combination? More than mere semantics, this distinction may be dispositive. Plaintiff’s
employment discrimination claims against Defendant Saginaw County can only succeed if
Defendant was, in fact, Plaintiff’s employer. Defendant contends Plaintiff was employed by the
State of Michigan, not Saginaw County, and, thus, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on
all claims. ECF No. 19 at PageID.160–63, 166–69. But Saginaw County paid Plaintiff, was
identified as Plaintiff’s employer on federal tax documents, and established and oversaw all
personnel policies Plaintiff was subject to. Thus, a genuine question of material fact exists as to
whether Defendant was, at least, Plaintiff’s “co-employer,” and Defendant is not entitled to

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summary judgment on this ground.
1.
For most plaintiffs pursing employment discrimination claims, identifying their employer
is a relatively simple task. But, for Michigan state court staff, the task is complicated by “the
relationship between the state’s trial courts and the local government units that fund their
operation.” Turppa v. Cnty. of Montmorency, 710 F. Supp. 2d 619, 620 (E.D. Mich. 2010)
[hereinafter Turppa I]. As explained below, Michigan precedent emphasizes that its trial courts are
creatures of the state rather than the counties or cities where each court is located. At the same
time, Michigan trial courts depend on their respective municipalities for funding and staff support.
This issue has confounded Michigan appellate courts and courts within the Sixth Circuit
for decades. See Maat v. Cnty. of Ottawa, No. 1:12-CV-1194, 2014 WL 1255981, at *11 (W.D.
Mich. Mar. 26, 2014), aff'd sub nom. Maat v. Cnty. of Ottawa, 657 F. App'x 404 (6th Cir. 2016)
(“There appears to be no settled law or legal framework to resolve this issue, and the courts that
have addressed this issue have reached conflicting outcomes with little or no analysis.”); Jud. Att'ys
Ass'n v. State, 586 N.W.2d 894, 897 (Mich. 1998) (“There is no public environment in the state of
Michigan more complex than the trial court [system]. [T]he Michigan Supreme Court has general
supervisory control over . . . and is constitutionally responsible for the efficient and effective
operation of all courts within the state court system, but the day-to-day operation of the state's trial
courts is . . . dependent on over 150 separate local governmental units for the bulk of the
operational funding for their courts.”).
At bedrock, Michigan’s constitution envisions “one court of justice” throughout all
divisions and authorizes the state legislature to establish trial courts. Judges of 74th Jud. Dist. v.
Bay Cnty., 190 N.W.2d 219, 224 (Mich. 1971); MICH. CONST. art. XI, § 1. Accordingly, the

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Michigan legislature divided the state into judicial districts consisting of smaller municipalities
such as counties or cities, and placed one trial court within each district. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.8101(1). In 1996, the Michigan Legislature passed Public Act 374 which “restructured the
Michigan judiciary and reorganized the statutes governing” the state court system. Turppa I at 623.
Among other provisions, the Act classified judicial staff—other than judges—as employees of the
local government unit that funded their employment, rather than the state. Id.
But, in 1998, the Michigan Supreme Court held that these provisions violated the state
constitution and the separation of powers doctrine. Jud. Att'ys Ass'n, 586 N.W.2d 894, 897–99
(Mich. 1998) (noting “the case law . . . has come to strongly affirm that the fundamental and
ultimate responsibility for all aspects of court administration, including operations and personnel
matters within the trial courts, resides within the inherent authority of the judicial branch” and,
that “[t]he judicial branch is constitutionally accountable for the operation of the courts and for
those who provide court services, and must therefore be the employer of court employees”); see
also MICH. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The powers of government are divided into three branches:
legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise
powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.”).
Notably, the Michigan Supreme Court did not discount the practical reality that state courts
depend on the municipalities they are located in for funding, and personnel and administrative
oversight.6 See Jud. Att'ys Ass'n, 586 N.W.2d 894, 899 (Mich. 1998). But the Michigan Supreme
6

Currently, nearly 45% of Michigan’s state court system is funded by the local government entities
where each court sits, whereas the state itself only contributes 25%. MICHIGAN JUDICIAL
COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE FUNDING FOR TRIAL COURTS WORKGROUP REPORT AND RECOMMENDA
TIONS 8–9 (Nov. 2023), https://www. courts.michigan.gov/4929ac/siteassets/committees,-boardsspecial-initiatves/michigan-judicial-council/alt-trial-court-funding-final-report.pdf [https://perma
.cc/NES6-QK6J] [hereinafter MJC Report]. Additionally, nearly 1/3 of Michigan’s state court
system ($418 million, annually) is funded by costs imposed on convicted criminal defendants. Id.
This funding model has been widely criticized for “perpetuat[ing] inefficient, inconsistent, and
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Court stressed that this dependency “cannot, as a constitutional matter, be used as an excuse to
diminish the judiciary’s essential authority over its own personnel.” Id. (emphasis added).
Yet, simultaneous to this decision, the Michigan Supreme Court promulgated
Administrative Order 1998-5 which seemingly minimized the state courts’ “essential” authority
over its personnel. The Order “emphasize[d] that funding trial courts is primarily the responsibility
of the local government entity where the court is located, and set[] limits on the ability of chief
judges to create new positions, promote employees, and enter into long term” wage and benefit
agreements. Turppa I at 627. The Order also created local court-management councils comprised
of representatives both from the judiciary and the funding municipality to set and enforce policies
for state court staff. Id. In the absence of a management council, the chief judge was empowered
to establish personnel policies, so long as the funding municipality was consulted in the process
and any promulgated policy was consistent with similar policies of the municipality. Id.
This Court has recognized “[t]wo important themes” from this convoluted background: (1)
“Michigan’s constitutional provisions guaranteeing three separate and independent branches of
government mean that the legislative branch cannot constitutionally mandate” that state court staff
“become employees of the local government unit that funds their position[;]” and (2) despite this
limitation on the state legislature, “individual judges may delegate some of the managerial and
administrative duties relating to hiring, firing, and compensating judicial workers to local

unstable court operations;” “reduc[ing] public trust in the courts;” and “disproportionately
affect[ing] vulnerable populations.” MJC Report at 8–9. Indeed, the ACLU of Michigan and other
community groups have challenged Michigan’s funding model as unconstitutional. See
Funding Michigan’s Court System, ACLU OF MICH., https://www.aclumich.org/en/cases/
funding-michigans-court-system (last visited May 14, 2024) [https://perma.cc/D77J-5WCU]. And
the Michigan Judicial Counsel—established by the Michigan Supreme Court to make
recommendations on improving state courts—recognizing the merits of these claims, has
recommended a complete “rebalancing” of state and local funding sources to ensure the state
contributes “proportional” funds. MJC Report at 12–14.
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administrators” and are even “encouraged by the Michigan Supreme Court to adopt counties’
personnel policies . . . unless there is a good reason to deviate.” Id. at 628.
2.
The undersigned’s 2010 decisions in Turppa v. Montmorency County illustrate how
Michigan’s “hybrid” Court system muddles employment discrimination claims brought by state
court staff, and largely control the analysis here, on analogous facts.
In Turppa I, a Montmorency County Probate Court register sued Montmorency County
alleging it discriminated against her on the basis of her age by terminating her employment, in
violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Michigan’s ELCRA. Id. at
620. Montmorency County filed a motion to dismiss arguing—like Defendant Saginaw County
here—that the plaintiff was a state employee and, thus, the County should be dismissed. Id. This
Court, after thoroughly explaining the “hybrid” nature of Michigan’s state court system,
recognized that, in certain employment discrimination cases, the county in which a Michigan trial
or probate court is located in can act as a plaintiff’s “co-employer,” alongside the court and state
itself.7 Id. at 621, 629.
7

Turppa’s “co-employer” holding has not been uniformly adopted. In Housey v. Macomb County,
another judge in this Court noted that Turppa “appears to depart from Michigan Supreme Court
precedent,” and accordingly dismissed a county defendant in a suit brought by a state probate court
employee, concluding the county was an improper defendant. Est. of Housey ex rel. Housey v.
Macomb Cnty., No. 10-11445, 2012 WL 1694629, at *9 (E.D. Mich. May 15, 2012), aff'd sub
nom. Housey v. Macomb Cnty., 534 F. App'x 316 (6th Cir. 2013). The undersigned maintains
Turppa is consistent with Michigan Supreme Court precedent, which—as discussed supra Section
III.A.1, only invalidates legislative efforts to classify state court staff as municipal employees.
Regardless, when reviewing Housey on appeal, the Sixth Circuit did not assess Turppa’s validity,
and held that county defendant’s dismissal was not an abuse of discretion because, in that case, the
employee plaintiff did not “bring forth any evidence” that the state probate court delegated hiring
and firing power to the county defendant. Housey v. Macomb Cnty., 534 F. App'x 316, 325–26
(6th Cir. 2013). The Western District of Michigan seemingly agrees with Turppa’s co-employer
holding, recognizing that the analysis of whether a Michigan court staff member is a court or
municipal employee “likely must take into account the specific facts and circumstances of the
case.” Maat v. Cnty. of Ottawa, No. 1:12-CV-1194, 2014 WL 1255981, at *15 (W.D. Mich. Mar.
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After receiving supplemental briefing, this Court converted Montmorency County’s
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and denied it, finding the former probate
register plaintiff “advanced enough evidence” to substantiate that Montmorency County may have
been her co-employer, alongside the probate court—an arm of the state itself. 8 Turppa v. County
of Montmorency, 724 F. Supp. 2d 783, 785–86 (E.D. Mich. 2010) [hereinafter Turppa II]. This
evidence included: (1) Montmorency County’s “personnel policies” were adopted by the probate
court; (2) Montmorency County was involved in decisions concerning the plaintiff’s
compensation; (3) Montmorency County funded the plaintiff’s employment and was identified as
the plaintiff’s employer on her W-2 forms; and (4) Montmorency County responded as the
plaintiff’s employer to unemployment inquiries. Id. at 788; see also Turppa I at 628–29.

26, 2014), aff'd sub nom. Maat v. Cnty. of Ottawa, 657 F. App'x 404 (6th Cir. 2016). Indeed, the
Western District of Michigan has rejected a county-defendant’s argument that it was an improper
defendant because it did not meet “its burden in proving the absence of a material issue of fact as
to whether the county [was] [p]laintiff’s employer or co-employer.” Id. On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit seemingly agreed with Turppa’s holding and rationale, noting:
even though [the county-defendant] lacks unilateral authority to dismiss [state trial
court staff] under state law, [the county] is responsible for many functions
traditionally undertaken by an employer by virtue of authority delegated by the
[state] District Court. For example, [state] District Court [staff] receive their
paychecks . . . from [the county], which is listed as their employer on federal IRS
Form W–2. When applying for jobs with the [state] District Court, applicants must
complete and sign an [county] application form that affirms their interest in future
“employment with [the] [c]ounty,” acknowledges that [the] [c]ounty may terminate
the[ir] employment . . . at any time, and requires prospective employees to “agree
to [the county’s] rules and regulations[.]” Although it appears that all humanresources decisions ultimately rest with the relevant . . . District Court department
heads, those department heads regularly consult with [the] [c]ounty's humanresources specialists.
Maat v. Cnty. of Ottawa, 657 F. App'x 404, 406 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). In sum
Turppa has not been overruled, has received favorable treatment in the Sixth Circuit, and is the
best precedent to guide the analogous analysis here.
8
This Court also concluded that the Turppa plaintiff did not run afoul of Rule 19 by pursuing her
claims only against Montmorency County, and not against the probate court or state itself. Turppa
II at 792-93 (noting that, because plaintiff sought only money damages and not reinstatement,
“complete relief can be afforded” without the present of the court as a party).
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The same result here. The record is flush with facts which suggest Defendant Saginaw
County operated as Plaintiff’s “co-employer” alongside the 70th District Court. Plaintiff’s newhire paperwork, as well the change-of-employment forms she was given when she was promoted
were both issued by Saginaw County, not the 70th District Court. ECF Nos. 22-3;. 22-5 at
PageID.751. Plaintiff’s W-4 identified Saginaw County as her employer, and contained Saginaw
County’s employer identification number. ECF No. 22-4 at PageID.750. When Plaintiff was
notified of her discipline for her chocolate-chip comment, the notice was on Saginaw County
letterhead and identified “the County,” rather than the court, as the disciplining party. ECF No.
22-11 at PageID.785. The March 2021 Grievance filed by Plaintiff and her union, contesting
Plaintiff’s discipline, also identified Saginaw County as Plaintiff’s employer. ECF No. 22-7 at
PageID.758. Plaintiff, Kanisha Jones, Tammy Bieszke, and Kelly Carroll all identify Saginaw
County as their employer throughout internal complaints. ECF Nos. 22-13 at PageID.788; 22-15
at PageID.805; 22-17 at PageID.811; 22-20 at PageID.830. Most importantly, Plaintiff and the
entire Traffic Division were subject to Saginaw County’s personnel policies. See ECF Nos. 22-10;
19-3 at PageID.229; 19-4 at PageID.242; 19-13 at PageID.320;19-10 at PageID.303. And April
Key, Jennifer Broadfoot, and Robert Belleman—who oversaw all internal district-court complaints
and investigations—were Saginaw County Personnel Department staff. See ECF Nos. 22-9 at
PageID.778; 22-26 at PageID.857.
Defendant ignores these facts and focuses on Plaintiff’s collective bargaining agreement,
which identifies the 70th District Court as Plaintiff’s “exclusive employer,” ECF Nos. 19 at
PageID.163; 19-36 at PageID.650, 652/ But a collective bargaining agreement does not govern an
employer-employee relationship for the purposes of ELCRA, WPA, and § 1983 claims.9 Turppa
Defendant additionally argues it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity on
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim. Not so. True, the 70th District Court is an arm of the state entitled to
9

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II at 790 (noting “even if” plaintiff was not a county employee under their applicable collective
bargaining agreement, “[p]laintiff may well be an employee of [the] [c]ounty for the purposes of
a civil action authorized by the . . . ELCRA”). And one needle suggesting the 70th District Court
was Plaintiff’s exclusive employer within a haystack of evidence to the contrary does not warrant
summary judgment.
Notably, the same conclusion would be reached applying common-law principles of
agency or the economic-reality test, both of which are normally applied by courts to determine
employer-employee relationships outside the specific, complicated context of Michigan’s state
court system. See Turppa II at 789; see also Shah v. Deaconess Hosp., 355 F.3d 496, 499 (6th Cir.
2004) (noting the differences between these two tests “are minimal”).
In the Sixth Circuit, factors guiding these analyses include: (1) the degree of control
exercised by the alleged employer over the individual’s work product; (2) the skill required to
perform the individual’s duties; (3) the duration of the parties’ relationship; (4) the alleged
employer’s ability to assign additional tasks; (5) the individual’s role in in retaining assistants; (6)
whether the work is part of the alleged employer’s regular business; (7) the individual’s benefits;
(8) and the tax treatment of the individual’s compensation. Id. (citing Shah, 355 F.3d at 499–500).
Under Michigan law, factors include (1) the alleged employer’s degree of control over the
individual’s duties; (2) compensation; (3) authority to hire and fire; and (4) performance of duties
as an integral part of the employer’s business toward accomplishing a common goal. Rakowski v.
Sarb, 713 N.W.2d 787, 793 (Mich. App. Ct. 2006). Courts view the totality of the circumstances

sovereign immunity from some constitutional claims. ECF No. 19 at PageID.161–64; Laborers'
Int'l Union of N. Am., Loc. 860 v. Neff, 29 F.4th 325 (6th Cir. 2022); Pucci v. Nineteenth Dist. Ct.,
628 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2010)). But Plaintiff did not sue the 70th District Court. Plaintiff sued
Defendant County of Saginaw, which does not enjoy Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 811 (6th Cir.2003).
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and do not weigh any one factor different than another. Turppa II at 789.
Here, this multifactor analysis suggests a division of responsibility over Plaintiff’s
employment. Although the record before the Court suggests Plaintiff’s duties were established and
overseen by the 70th District Court, which also controlled and monitored her work product, see
ECF No. 22-6; Saginaw County seemingly compensated Plaintiff and taxed her income. ECF No.
22-4 at PageID.750. And although the 70th District Court likely has the exclusive authority to hire
and fire its staff, Saginaw County’s Personnel Department plays a significant role in informing
these decisions. The County’s Personnel Department received and oversaw every internal
complaint filed by and against Plaintiff in this case. Indeed, the County—and its retained
investigator—investigated Plaintiff’s chocolate chip comment, concluded the comment and
Plaintiff’s subsequent apology violated Saginaw County Personnel Policy, and recommended
Plaintiff’s discipline accordingly. See ECF Nos. 19-8 at PageID.282–83; 19-14 at PageID.326.
In sum, despite Michigan Supreme Court precedent that the state legislature cannot classify
state court staff as employees of the county or city the court is located in, such municipalities, in
certain factual circumstances, may properly be considered a “co-employer” of a plaintiff pursuing
employment discrimination claims. Turppa I at 628–29; see also Turppa II at 787 (“[T]he inquiry
into whether the county, the court, or both were Plaintiff's employers depends more on how the
county and court were actually managed than on conclusory statements by the state legislature, the
county board, or even the Michigan Supreme Court.”) Such is the case here. There is a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether Defendant Saginaw County employed Plaintiff and, thus,
Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on this threshold issue alone.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Discrimination—42 U.S.C. § 1983
Onto the merits. In Count I, Plaintiff alleges Defendant discriminated against her on the

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basis of her race by constructively discharging her, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1 at PageID.10–15. But this Count will
be dismissed because Plaintiff has not shown a prima facie case of discrimination necessary to
establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation and has not satisfied her obligations to assert
municipal § 1983 liability under Monell.
1. Underlying Constitutional Violation
The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause prohibits public employers from
discriminating against their employees on the basis of race. Blick v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch. Dist.,
516 F. Supp. 3d 711, 721 (E.D. Mich. 2021). Importantly, “a plaintiff asserting a Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must prove the same elements required
to establish a disparate treatment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Perry v.
McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 601 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Blick, 516 F. Supp. 3d at 721–22.
Under the first stage of the applicable McDonnel Douglas burden shifting framework,
Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). But the Parties dispute the specific elements Plaintiff must
show to establish her prima facie case.
In most discrimination claims brought by employees who are members of a racial minority,
a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination by showing she (1) was a member of a
protected class; (2) was qualified for the job she had; (3) suffered an adverse employment action;
and (4) was treated differently than similarly-situated non-minority employees. See White v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 391 (6th Cir. 2008)
But these elements are modified when the plaintiff is a member of a racial majority. Leavey
v. City of Detroit, 467 F. App'x 420, 424 (6th Cir. 2012); Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc.,

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770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Hahn v. Gasper, No. 1:20-CV-403, 2021 WL 9666846,
at *8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 27, 2021), aff'd sub nom. Caldwell v. Gasper, No. 22-1031, 2022 WL
16629161 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2022). In these circumstances, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
of “reverse” racial discrimination by showing (1) “background circumstances exist to support the
suspicion that the defendant is the unusual employer that discriminates against the majority;” (2)
that she was qualified for the job she had; (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and
(4) she was treated differently than similarly situated employees of a different race. Leavey, 467
F. App’x at 424; Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 603 (6th Cir. 2008); Toth v. City of
Toledo, 480 F. App'x 827, 832 (6th Cir. 2012).
Defendant argues the modified “reverse discrimination” framework applies. ECF No. 19
at PageID.164. Plaintiff disagrees. ECF No. 22 at PageID.681–83. Although Plaintiff recognizes
relevant elements are modified in reverse discrimination claims brought under Title VII, she argues
the elements should not be modified in the context of a § 1983 claim. ECF No. 22 at PageID.681–
82.
But binding Sixth Circuit precedent compels the opposite conclusion. Golden v. Town of
Collierville, 167 F. App'x 474, 479 (6th Cir. 2006) (“We analyze § 1983 equal protection claims
under the framework governing Title VII discrimination claims.”); Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d
597, 601 (6th Cir. 2000). Indeed, the Sixth Circuit routinely applies the modified “reverse”
discrimination framework when analyzing discrimination claims brought by majority plaintiffs
alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment couched in § 1983 claims. See, e.g., Toth v. City
of Toledo, 480 F. App'x 827, 832 (6th Cir. 2012); Leavey v. City of Detroit, 467 F. App'x 420, 424
(6th Cir. 2012); Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 603 (6th Cir. 2008); Golden, 167 F.
App'x at 479; Sutherland v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 614 (6th Cir. 2003). True,

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as Plaintiff notes, the Sixth Circuit has suggested “serious misgivings” about imposing more
onerous standards on claims brought by one race than another. ECF No. 22 at PageID.682 (citing
Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 801, n. 7 (6th Cir. 1994) and Zambetti v.
Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 257 (6th Cir. 2002)). But, regardless of the “misgivings” the
Sixth Circuit may have had over twenty years ago, it continues to analyze reverse discrimination
claims using the modified framework discussed above. This Court will do the same.
a. Saginaw County’s Background Circumstances
To establish a prima facie case of reverse discrimination, Plaintiff must first show
“background circumstances to support the suspicion that [Saginaw County] is the unusual
employer that discriminates against the majority.” Toth v. City of Toledo, 480 F. App'x 827, 832
(6th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff has not done so, here.
The Sixth Circuit has explained that “background circumstances” supporting a suspicion
that an employer discriminates against the majority may include: (1) an employer’s “history of
improperly considering race as a factor in employment-related decisions;” (2) a “workforce []
predominantly comprised of minorities;” or (3) that “the person in charge of making employment
decisions is a [racial] minority.” Id. at 832–33.
Plaintiff has not alleged—and has not presented any supporting evidence to demonstrate
an issue of fact—that Saginaw County had a history of improperly considering race as a factor in
employment. Plaintiff—a white woman—worked within a predominantly white workforce.
Kanisha Jones and Valerie Baker—both of whom filed internal complaints against Plaintiff—are
both Black women. ECF No. 19-3 at PageID.201, 230; 19-27 at PageID.387. Judge Clark is a
Black man. ECF No. 19-3 at PageID.200. But Plaintiff and Kelly Carroll are both white. ECF No.
19-3 at PageID.200, 218, 231. And, importantly, Linda James, Judge Fichtner, Tobin Dust,

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Jennifer Broadfoot, and Robert Belleman—the individuals responsible for investigating and
disciplining Plaintiff for her chocolate-chip comment and apology—are white, as well. ECF No.
19-3 at PageID.200, 218, 231.
The only “background circumstance” Plaintiff identifies and alleges might suggest
Defendant Saginaw County discriminates against white employees is the general “societal context”
at the time Plaintiff was disciplined for her chocolate-chip comment. ECF No. 22 at PageID.684.
Plaintiff notes that the “‘chocolate chip cookie’ investigation occurred after the George Floyd
murder . . . and the Black Lives Matter protests across the country.” Id. This Court recognizes the
significant societal and racial reckoning prompted by the murder of George Floyd. See Bryan
Borodkin, Officer-Created Jeopardy and Reasonableness Reform: Rebuttable Presumption of
Unreasonableness Within 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Police Use of Force Claims, 55 U. Mich. J.L. Reform
919, 932 (2022) (discussing how George Floyd’s murder and the Black Lives Matter movement
shifted societal perceptions on race and accountability). But how does this national movement,
acknowledging the history of racism and oppression felt by Black Americans, support a suspicion
that Saginaw County discriminates against white employees? Plaintiff points to two facts in attempt
to connect these dots.
First, Plaintiff points to a webinar on racism that Judge Clark required her to attend and
argues this “depict[ed] and insinuate[ed] Plaintiff was like the various white police officers
responsible for countless African Americans’ deaths, specifically those who kneel at the necks of
individuals.” ECF No. 22 at PageID.684. But this argument misstates the factual record. True,
Judge Clark required Plaintiff to attend a webinar and Plaintiff noted it depicted “people kneeling
on people’s necks.” ECF No. 19-3 at PageID.212. But Plaintiff admits her attendance at the
webinar was “prompted by” and “came right after” her suspension for harassing Black coworkers

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on the basis of their race. ECF No. 19-3 at PageID.231. Nothing in the record suggests Judge
Clark’s request that Plaintiff’s attend the racism webinar was discriminatory.
Second, Plaintiff points to the fact that her internal complaint was not fully investigated
but complaints filed by Black employees were. ECF No. 22 at PageID.684. But the record on this
point is clear: Plaintiff’s internal complaint was not fully investigated because (1) Plaintiff emailed
Saginaw County’s Personnel Department asking if she could withdraw her complaint, ECF No.
19-13 at PageID.415; and (2) voluntarily resigned less than one month later. ECF No. 22-28; see
also ECF No. 19-10 at PageID.305 (“[W]e had wanted to investigate the complaint. But [Plaintiff]
pulled the complaint.”). Indeed, before Plaintiff asked if she could withdraw her complaint,
Saginaw County Personnel Specialist April Key referred the complaint to Tobin Dust, just like she
had done for all complaints filed by Black employees. See ECF No. 19-32.
Thus, even when the record is viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff and considered
in the broad societal context at the time, no facts support a suspicion that Saginaw County
discriminates against its white employees. Although Plaintiff has not established the first element
of prima facie reverse discrimination required for her § 1983 claim, this Court will continue to
address the other elements for completeness and because the proceeding analysis applies to
Plaintiff’s ELCRA and WPA claims discussed infra Sections III.C–E.
b. Plaintiff’s Qualification
Turning to the second element of prima facie reverse racial discrimination, the Parties do
not dispute that Plaintiff was well-qualified for her position as Traffic Supervisor. Nor could they.
Plaintiff received excellent reviews in her early annual evaluations and was generally considered
to be a competent employee. ECF No. 22-6 at PageID.752–57.

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c. Adverse Employment Action
The third element Plaintiff must prove to establish a prima facie case of reverse
discrimination is that she suffered an adverse employment action. Plaintiff—who resigned as
Traffic Division Supervisor effective February 3, 2022—alleges that Defendant took adverse
employment action against her by “constructively terminating” or discharging her employment.
ECF No. 1 at PageID.9, 12, 16, 19, 22. But constructive discharge is a demanding standard, and
the factual record presented by the Parties does not plausibly satisfy it.
An adverse employment action is “defined as a materially adverse change in the terms or
conditions of employment.” Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 727 (6th Cir. 2014)
(internal quotations omitted). Examples include “a significant change in employment status,” such
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, or reassigning an employee to a position with significantly
different responsibilities; a decision causing a significant change in the employee’s benefits; or
constructive discharge or termination. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998);
Laster, 746 F.3d at 727 (6th Cir. 2014).
“A constructive discharge occurs when the employer, rather than acting directly,
deliberately makes an employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced
into an involuntary resignation.” Laster, 746 F.3d at 727 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis
added). “To establish a claim for constructive discharge, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the employer
deliberately created working conditions that a reasonable person would perceive as intolerable, (2)
the employer did so to force the employee to quit, and (3) the employee quit.” Cooper v.
Dolgencorp, LLC, 93 F.4th 360, 373 (6th Cir. 2024).10
10

Plaintiff, citing 2014 Sixth Circuit precedent, argues she can establish constructive discharge by
merely showing she resigned after Defendant “act[ed] in a manner so as to have communicated”
to Plaintiff that she would have been terminated regardless. ECF No. 22 at PageID.685 (citing
Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 728 (6th Cir. 2014)). To the extent this test remains
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Plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim fails at the first step, as she has presented no
evidence that Defendant deliberately created reasonably intolerable working conditions. Whether
a reasonable person would consider a plaintiff’s working conditions “intolerable” is a fact-specific
inquiry, to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 728 (citing Logan v. Denny's, Inc., 259 F.3d
558, 569 (6th Cir. 2001)). But “intolerability is a demanding standard.” Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail
Grp., Inc., 951 F.3d 805, 815 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Our job is to confirm that the plaintiff’s working
conditions were hellish, or at least close to it.”). Factors relevant to intolerability include: (a)
demotion; (b) reduction in salary; (c) reduction in job responsibilities; (d) reassignment to menial
or degrading work; (e) reassignment to work under a younger supervisor; (f) badgering,
harassment, or humiliation “by the employer calculated to encourage the employee’s resignation;”
(g) offers of early retirement or continued employment on terms less favorable than the employee’s
former status, Logan, 259 F.3d at 569 (quoting Brown v. Bunge Corp., 207 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir.
2000)); and (h) sexual assault. Tchankpa, 951 at 815.
Plaintiff was not demoted. Her salary was not reduced. Defendant never degraded her
duties or assigned her meaningless work. Defendant never offered Plaintiff early retirement nor
good law, Plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim fares no better applying it, because nothing in
the record would have reasonably communicated to Plaintiff that she would be terminated if she
did not resign. See also Burks v. Oklahoma Publ'g Co., 81 F.3d 975, 978 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting
this test is satisfied only when upon a “showing that [the plaintiff] was faced with a choice between
resigning or being fired.”) True, as Plaintiff emphasizes, Linda James wrote in December 2021
that she and Judge Clark concluded “Plaintiff d[id]n’t have the necessary management style or
personality to continue as Supervisor” and that she was no longer “a good fit.” ECF No. 22-19 at
PageID.829. But these notes were internal and nothing suggests they were shared with Plaintiff or
any other staff member. Plaintiff also argues Defendant reasonably communicated that she would
be terminated when, (1) Linda James told her things “did not look good” in light of Kanisha Jones’s
“chop chop monkey” complaint and (2) Plaintiff would need to “fight the fight” within the
Division. ECF No. 22 at PageID.685. But even assuming Linda James made these statements,
assuming they were related to Plaintiff’s employment, and assuming Plaintiff interpreted these
statements to foreshadow her termination, an “employee’s . . . discontent” with “a few isolated”
statements does not suffice to show a constructive discharge. Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc.,
951 F.3d 805, 814 (6th Cir. 2020).
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offered to continue her employment only on unfavorable terms. Plaintiff was not reassigned to
work under a younger supervisor and, on the contrary, remained Supervisor of the Traffic Division
until the moment she resigned. ECF No. 19-3 at PageID.195. The only factor even questionably
present is harassment.
Plaintiff points to Kelly Carrol’s Facebook Post and the remarks allegedly made by her
subordinate employees referring to Plaintiff as “evil, white devil, trash, battle-axe, and bitch” as
evidence of harassment and intolerable conditions.11 See ECF No. 22 at PageID.685; see also ECF
No. 1 at 9. But even if Plaintiff’s subordinates referred to her using terms—which her subordinates
notably all deny—the comments alone, in this case, are insufficient to create a fact issue as to
intolerability. See Cleveland v. S. Disposal Waste Connections, 491 F. App'x 698, 708 (6th Cir.
2012) (holding plaintiff did not establish constructive discharge because alleged harassment and
disparaging comments from coworkers was “isolated to only a few incidents and by a few
individuals and were not pervasive enough to significantly alter her working conditions”).
Defendant then argues that Defendant’s “failure to investigate or take any action” in
response to Plaintiff’s complaint about these comments constitutes harassment and evidences
intolerable working conditions. ECF No. 22 at PageID.685. True, Sixth Circuit precedent suggests
that isolated comments made by employees which “clearly concern” the plaintiff’s race and
national origin may satisfy the constructive discharge inquiry if the record reflects the employer
failed to investigate or mitigate. See Lee v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 676 F. App'x 488, 495 (6th
Plaintiff also argues her conditions were intolerable because the discipline she received for her
chocolate-chip comment “branded her a racist” within her department. ECF No. 1 at PageID.9.
But Defendant’s discipline—after Defendant investigated and concluded Plaintiff violated County
Personnel Policy—cannot reasonably be considered harassment in the first instance. Defendant
followed County procedure in investigating and disciplining Plaintiff for her “chocolate chip”
comment and subsequent “apology,” see ECF Nos. 19-11; 19-12, and nothing in the record
suggests Defendant did so with an intent to “brand Plaintiff a racist” or encourage her resignation,
which did not occur until eleven months later.
11

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Cir. 2017) (finding question of fact as to intolerability because plaintiff, a Chinese nurse, alleged
coworkers made racially-charged comments and that, “[w]hile management did not make those
comments, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff requires the finding that
management failed to investigate the comments when [p]laintiff informed them of such, thus
unreasonably failing to respond to coworker harassment”); Logan v. Denny's, Inc., 259 F.3d 558,
573 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding question of fact as to intolerability when plaintiff, a Black Denny’s
employee, alleged coworkers told her “we don’t serve grits here” and made other racially-charged
comments, plaintiff reported the comments to management, and no investigation or meaningful
corrective action was taken). But, unlike this precedent, Defendant did investigate Plaintiff’s
complaint. When Plaintiff filed her internal complaint concerning the “white devil” comments,
ECF No. 19-31, her complaint was promptly forwarded to the Saginaw County Personnel
Department, who in turn forwarded the allegation for investigation by Tobin Dust, in the exact
same manner as Valerie Baker’s “chocolate chip” complaint and Kanisha Jones’s “chop chop
monkey” complaint. See ECF Nos. 19-10 at PageID.303, 305; 19-28 at PageID.33.19-32 at
PageID.413. And although the investigation was not completed, Plaintiff asked if she could
withdraw her complaint less than one month after submitting it, ECF Nos. 19-10 at PageID.305;
19-33, and thereafter resigned. See ECF Nos. 19-28 at PageID.393; 22-28.
In sum, nothing in the record suggests Defendant Saginaw County harassed or humiliated
Plaintiff in a manner “calculated to encourage [Plaintiff’s] resignation. Logan v. Denny's, Inc., 259
F.3d 558, 571 (6th Cir. 2001). And even if Plaintiff had demonstrated a fact issue on whether she
was harassed in this manner, “[t]he occurrence of one” factor “in isolation generally is insufficient
to support” a finding of intolerable working conditions to satisfy the first prong of the constructive
discharge inquiry. Gosbin v. Jefferson Cnty. Commissioners, No. 2:14-CV-2640, 2017 WL

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5653503, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2017), aff'd, 725 F. App'x 377 (6th Cir. 2018).
In sum, even viewing the record in Plaintiff’s favor, she has not shown a fact question on
the issue of whether Defendant constructively discharged her by “deliberately create[ing] working
conditions that a reasonable person would perceive as intolerable,” let alone in a manner intended
to force Plaintiff to resign. Cooper v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 93 F.4th 360, 373 (6th Cir. 2024). Thus,
Plaintiff has not established an adverse employment action—the third element to establish a prima
facie case of reverse discrimination.
d. Treated Differently than Similarly Situated Employees
To satisfy the fourth and final element of prima facie case of reverse discrimination,
Plaintiff must show that she was treated differently than similarly situated employees of a different
race. Leavey, 467 F. App’x at 424; Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 603 (6th Cir. 2008);
Toth v. City of Toledo, 480 F. App'x 827, 832 (6th Cir. 2012). She has not done so.
Plaintiff attempts to establish this element by arguing her complaint of racial
discrimination—that her subordinates referred to her as a “white devil”—was not investigated in
the same manner as the complaints filed by Valerie Baker and Kanisha Jones. ECF No. 22 at
PageID.686. But even if the complaints were not handled in the same manner, a conclusion that
lacks factual support in the record,12 Plaintiff is not similarly situated to Baker and Jones.
To be sufficiently “similarly-situated,” “the individuals with whom the plaintiff seeks to

12

As explained supra Section III.B.1.c, the record reflects Defendant treated all complaints
similarly. Plaintiff argues the to the contrary because Jones and Baker did not file their complaints
using the official form appended to County Policy, ECF No. 19-11 at PageID.312. ECF No. 22 at
PageID.686. But all complaints were similarly received by Defendant’s Personnel Department.
See ECF Nos. 19-10 at PageID.302–04; 19-28 at PageID.397; 22–26. The Personnel Department
referred Baker and Jones’s complaint to external investigator Tobin Dust. ECF Nos. 19-3 at
PageID.200; 19-28 at PageID.397. And the Personnel Department was in the process of referring
Plaintiff’s complaint to Tobin Dust when Plaintiff resigned. See ECF Nos. 22–26 at PageID.857,
19-10 at PageID.305; 19-28 at PageID.393; 19-35 at PageID.644.
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compare his/her treatment must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same
standards and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating
circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them for it.”
Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992). But Plaintiff’s complaint was
surrounded by mitigating circumstances, which distinguish any difference in how Defendant
treated it. Jones and Baker did not ask if their complaints could be withdrawn one month after
filing them. Plaintiff did. ECF No. 19-33 (“Can I pull my formal complaint? I think it would be
best.”). Jones and Baker did not resign their employment prior to the conclusion of the internal
investigation related to their complaints. Plaintiff did. ECF No. 19-35. Even assuming Baker and
Jones were subject to the same standards and ultimate supervisor, they are not similarly situated
to Plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of reverse discrimination.
In sum, although Plaintiff was undoubtedly qualified to serve as Traffic Division
Supervisor, she has not shown (1) “background circumstances” supporting the suspicion that
Defendant discriminated against white employees; (2) that she was constructively discharged—a
form of adverse employment action; and (3) that she was treated differently than similarly-situated
employees of a different race. Thus, she has not shown a prima facie case of reverse discrimination
and this Court need not proceed to the rest of the McDonnel Douglas framework. Defendant is
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment claim.
2. Plaintiff’s Monell Obligations
Before turning to Count II, it is important to take a step back from the intricate, multifactored analysis inherent within the underlying Fourteenth Amendment constitutional analysis,
and discuss another, more “big picture” reason why Plaintiff’s first claim fails as a matter of law.
Recall Plaintiff’s claim is couched in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil remedy for those

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who have had their constitutional rights deprived by a “person” acting “under the color of law.”
In Monell, the Supreme Court held that municipalities—like Defendant Saginaw County—
can be treated as “persons” and subject to § 1983 liability. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). But a municipality cannot be liable for § 1983 deprivations
merely because they employ someone who deprives someone else of their constitutional rights.
Monell, 326 U.S. at 691. (“[A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondent
superior theory.”). Instead, municipalities are only liable if their “official policies” cause an
employee to violate another’s constitutional rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692; see also Arendale v.
City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 600 (6th Cir. 2008) (analyzing Monell requirements when plaintiff
pursued a § 1983 race discrimination claim against a city)
Generally, there are four “avenues a plaintiff may take to prove the existence of a
[defendant’s] illegal policy or custom. The plaintiff can look to (1) the [defendant’s] legislative
enactments or official agency policies; (2) single actions taken by officials with final decisionmaking authority; (3) a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) a custom of tolerance
or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429
(6th Cir. 2005); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986).
Plaintiff opted for the second avenue, and alleged in her Complaint that “the discriminatory
actions in question were taken by officials with final decision-making authority[.]” ECF No. 1 at
PageID.14. But Plaintiff has not supported this allegation whatsoever throughout discovery or
pleadings. To sufficiently show action taken by a final decisionmaker evidences a county “policy”
for Monell purposes, Plaintiff must show a “deliberate choice to follow a course of action [was]
made from among various alternatives by” a specific official “responsible for establishing final
policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 479 (6th

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Cir. 2013) (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483). But which “discriminatory actions” are at issue?
Who are the officials? And what final decision-making authority did they possess? Plaintiff does
not say, and nothing in the record provides clarity.
Although this issue was not argued in either Parties’ summary-judgment briefing,
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim because there is no genuine
issue of material fact that Plaintiff has not attempted to satisfy its Monell obligations. See Hunley
v. DuPont Auto., 341 F.3d 491, 501 (6th Cir. 2003) (“A district court may properly grant summary
judgment on grounds not argued in the motion by the parties.”); Hines v. Joy Mfg. Co., 850 F.2d
1146, 1150 (6th Cir.1988) (“Where it is clear there is no genuine issue of material fact, a court
may properly grant summary judgment on a ground other than that assigned in the motion.”).
C. Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act Discrimination
In Count II, Plaintiff alleges Defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her race,
in violation of Michigan’s ELCRA. ECF No. 1 at PageID.15–19. Generally, ELCRA
discrimination claims are analyzed using the same elements as those claims brought under Title
VII or § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. See Ondricko v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC, 689
F.3d 642, 652 (6th Cir. 2012); Deleon v. Kalamazoo Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 739 F.3d 914, 917 (6th
Cir. 2014); Blick v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch. Dist., 516 F. Supp. 3d 711, 721 (E.D. Mich. 2021) (“The
court’s analysis in determining the merit of [plaintiff]’s disparate treatment claims under Title VII,
§ 1983, and the ELCRA is the same.”). However, a plaintiff alleging reverse discrimination in
violation of the ELCRA, “does not have to satisfy the ‘background circumstances’ prong.” Leavey
v. City of Detroit, 467 F. App’x 420, 425, n. 1 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Lind v. City of Battle Creek,
681 N.W.2d 334 (Mich. 2004)). Under Michigan law, “Plaintiff must only demonstrate that she
was qualified for the position, suffered adverse employment action, and was treated differently

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than a similarly situated non-Caucasian.” Id.
Here, as discussed, Plaintiff has not shown a constructive discharge or other adverse
employment action, nor that she was treated differently than similarly situated employees of a
different race. See supra Section III.B.II. Thus, Plaintiff’s ELCRA discrimination claim fails as a
matter of law, and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Count II.
D. Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act Retaliation
In Count III, Plaintiff alleges Defendant retaliated against her by constructively terminating
her employment after she submitted her internal complaint alleging her subordinates called her a
“white devil.” ECF No. 1 at PageID.19-20.
Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, to succeed on this claim,
Plaintiff must first demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation by showing (1) she engaged in
protected activity; (2) Defendant was aware of Plaintiff’s protected activity; (3) Defendant took
materially adverse employment action against Plaintiff; and (4) this action was causally connected
to Plaintiff’s protected activity. Jackson v. Genesee Cnty. Rd. Comm'n, 999 F.3d 333, 343–44 (6th
Cir. 2021). If Plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, the burden shifts to Defendant to proffer a
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its alleged adverse action. Id. at 344 (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). If proffered, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to
show Defendant’s proffered reasoning is pretextual. Id.
Similar to her discrimination claim, Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of
retaliation. Although she likely engaged in a protected activity by filing her internal discrimination
complaint, which Defendant was indisputably aware of, Plaintiff did not suffer any materially
adverse employment action. Again, the only “adverse employment action” Plaintiff asserts is that
she was constructively discharged due to intolerable working conditions. ECF No. 22 at

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PageID.690. But, as explained supra Section III.B.1, Plaintiff’s constructive-discharge argument
falls flat. For the same reasons Plaintiff could not establish constructive discharge sufficient for
her discrimination claims, see infra Sections III.B.1, she cannot establish that she was
constructively discharged for her retaliation claims.
Because Plaintiff has not shown a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of the ELCRA,
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Count III.
E. Whistleblowers’ Protection Act Retaliation
Lastly, in Count IV, Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated Michigan’s WPA, MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 15.362, by constructively terminating her employment after she complained about her
subordinate employees calling her a “white devil.” See ECF No. 1 at PageID.21–24. To succeed
on this Claim, Plaintiff must prove (1) she was engaged in a protected activity as defined by the
act; (2) she was discharged or suffered another adverse employment action; and (3) the discharge
or adverse action was causally connected to the protected activity. Truel v. City of Dearborn, 804
N.W.2d 744, 753 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010); see also Dorchy v. Fifth Third Bank, 585 F. Supp. 3d
1021, 1024 (E.D. Mich. 2021).
But, again, Plaintiff was not discharged, has not established that she was constructively
discharged, and has not argued she was subject to any other form of adverse employment action.
See supra Section III.B.1. Thus, even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff was engaged in a protected
activity when she submitted her internal complaint, her WPA claim fails as a matter of law. Count
IV will be accordingly dismissed.
IV.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF
No. 19, is GRANTED.

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Further, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
Further, it is ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Adjourn the Scheduling Order, ECF
No. 29, is DENIED AS MOOT.
This is a final order and closes the above-captioned case.
Dated: June 5, 2024

s/Thomas L. Ludington
THOMAS L. LUDINGTON

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