Nartron Corporation v. Schukra U. S. A., Incorporated et al
Filing
190
ORDER re 101 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Borg Indak, Incorporated, Schukra U. S. A., Incorporated, 95 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Defendant Borg Indak, Inc.'s Counterclaim Count III (Shop Right) and Count IV (License)< /I> MOTION for Summary Judgment on Defendant Borg Indak, Inc.'s Counterclaim Count III (Shop Right) and Count IV (License) MOTION for Summary Judgment on Defendant Borg Indak, Inc.'s Counterclaim Count III (Shop Right) and Count I V (License) MOTION for Summary Judgment on Defendant Borg Indak, Inc.'s Counterclaim Count III (Shop Right) and Count IV (License) filed by Nartron Corporation, 170 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by Borg Indak, Incorporated, 100 M OTION for Summary Judgment Of Infringement By Borg Indak (Brief Filed Under Seal) MOTION for Summary Judgment Of Infringement By Borg Indak (Brief Filed Under Seal) MOTION for Summary Judgment Of Infringement By Borg Indak (Brief Fil ed Under Seal) MOTION for Summary Judgment Of Infringement By Borg Indak (Brief Filed Under Seal) MOTION for Summary Judgment Of Infringement By Borg Indak (Brief Filed Under Seal) MOTION for Summary Judgment Of Infringement By B org Indak (Brief Filed Under Seal) filed by Nartron Corporation, 139 MOTION for Leave to File A Response To Defendant Borg Indak's Notice Of Correction (Dkt #137) MOTION for Leave to File A Response To Defendant Borg Indak's Notice Of Correction (Dkt #137) filed by Nartron Corporation, 97 MOTION for Summary Judgment On Defendant Borg Indak, Inc.'s Fourth Affirmative Defense filed by Nartron Corporation, 96 MOTION for Summary Judgment on the First Affirmative Defense (Patent Invalidity) And Counterclaim Count I (Declaratory Judgment of Patent Invalidity and Unenforceability) of Defendant Borg Indak, Inc. MOTION for Summary Judgment on the First Affirmative Defense (Patent Invalidity) An d Counterclaim Count I (Declaratory Judgment of Patent Invalidity and Unenforceability) of Defendant Borg Indak, Inc. MOTION for Summary Judgment on the First Affirmative Defense (Patent Invalidity) And Counterclaim Count I (Declaratory Judgme nt of Patent Invalidity and Unenforceability) of Defendant Borg Indak, Inc. filed by Nartron Corporation, 102 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Borg Indak, Incorporated, Schukra U. S. A., Incorporated, 127 MOTION to Strike 120 Response t o Motion,,,, 96 MOTION for Summary Judgment on the First Affirmative Defense (Patent Invalidity) And Counterclaim Count I (Declaratory Judgment of Patent Invalidity and Unenforceability) of Defendant Borg Indak MOTION to Strike 120 Response to Motion,,,, 96 MOTION for Summary Judgment on the First Affirmative Defense (Patent Invalidity) And Counterclaim Count I (Declaratory Judgment of Patent Invalidity and Unenforceability) of Defendant Borg Indak MOTION to Strike 120 Response to Motion,,,, 96 MOTION for Summary Judgment on the First Affirmative Defense (Patent Invalidity) And Counterclaim Count I (Declaratory Judgment of Patent Invalidity and Unenforceability) of Defendant Borg Indak MOTION to Strike 120 Response to M otion,,,, 96 MOTION for Summary Judgment on the First Affirmative Defense (Patent Invalidity) And Counterclaim Count I (Declaratory Judgment of Patent Invalidity and Unenforceability) of Defendant Borg Indak MOTION to Strike 120 Response to Mo tion,,,, 96 MOTION for Summary Judgment on the First Affirmative Defense (Patent Invalidity) And Counterclaim Count I (Declaratory Judgment of Patent Invalidity and Unenforceability) of Defendant Borg Indak MOTION to Strike 120 Response to Mot ion,,,, 96 MOTION for Summary Judgment on the First Affirmative Defense (Patent Invalidity) And Counterclaim Count I (Declaratory Judgment of Patent Invalidity and Unenforceability) of Defendant Borg Indak filed by Nartron Corporation. Signed by District Judge Lawrence P. Zatkoff. (MVer)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
NARTRON CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 06-10683
Hon. Lawrence P. Zatkoff
v.
BORG INDAK, INC.,
Defendant,
/
OPINION AND ORDER
AT A SESSION of said Court, held in the United States Courthouse,
in the City of Port Huron, State of Michigan, on January 26, 2012
PRESENT: THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on:
1.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant’s Counterclaims in
Count III (Shop Right) and Count IV (License) (Docket #95);
2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the First Affirmative Defense
(Patent Invalidity) and Counterclaim Count I (Declaratory Judgment of Patent
Invalidity and Unenforceability) (Docket #96);
3. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant’s Fourth Affirmative
Defense (Laches, Estoppel and Waiver) (Docket #97);
4. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Infringement by Defendant (Docket
#100);1
1
None of Plaintiff’s four summary judgment motions actually seeks judgment of the case (or the
couter-complaint) in toto; rather, each such motion seeks partial summary judgment. Notabley,
none of the four motions addresses damages or other requested relief in the event Defendant is
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5. Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Based on the Lack of
Infringement (Docket #101); and
6. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on Summary Judgment Based on Co-Inventorship
(Docket #102).
The parties fully briefed all six motions. The Court finds that the facts and legal arguments
material to all the motions have been adequately presented in the parties’ papers, and the
decision process will not be aided by oral arguments. Pursuant to E.D. Mich. Local R. 7.1(f) (2),
it is hereby ORDERED that the Motions be resolved on the briefs submitted.
II.
BACKGROUND
In the mid-1990s, non-party Schukra of North America, Ltd. (“Schukra”), a Windsor,
Ontario company, supplied automakers with lumbar support systems for power seats in
automobiles. Schukra also was working to enhance the lumbar support system to incorporate a
massage feature within the seat units it sold. In 1994, Schukra contracted with a company called
Therm-O-Disc to develop a prototype massage control module, or controller, for the seat
massage unit. On March 21, 1996, Schukra made a formal presentation of its prototype seat
massage units to Delphi Interior and Lighting Systems (“Delphi”), a tier one supplier to General
Motors. The prototype massage units were subsequently ride tested in Cadillac automobiles in
June 1996. Delphi and Cadillac shortly thereafter offered to purchase a number of seat massage
units for implementation into specific Cadillac models in the United States, provided said units
could be timely “productionized” (i.e., made fully functional and manufactured to meet desired
performance specifications). When Therm-O-Disc was unable to meet production demands
found to be liable for infringement of the patent-in-suit. As such, the Court will treat Plaintiff’s
four motions as motions for partial summary judgment.
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and/or deadlines, Schukra contracted with Plaintiff to productionize the massage control module
for Schukra. In the words of Kevin Cherry (“Cherry”), Schukra’s technical program manager for
the massage control module project: “Plaintiff was responsible for the engineering work, and the
manufacturing of the controller that was to control the massage unit” (emphasis added). One of
the conditions to “productionizing” the massage control module was that the controller had to be
transparent to the seat control mechanism already in place. As stated by Barry Jones (“Jones”),
an employee of Delphi in 1996 and now Schukra’s President:
[T]he massage control module must have NO impact on the
existing seat memory module. [Plaintiff] must develop both driver
(with memory) and passenger (no memory) massage modules.
(emphasis added).
Plaintiff successfully engineered a mechanism that satisfied Schukra’s requirements
when it designed a device it called the “transparency simulator,” which consisted of a massage
control module enhanced to not only maintain the higher priority of functions in the existing seat
control but also include the enhanced massage control modules without interfering with the
existing seat functions. Plaintiff also filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) a
patent application with respect to the massage control modules (“MCMs”) it designed and the
mechanistic implications this design had on an integrated seat massager unit. On April 11, 2000,
the PTO issued Patent Number 6,049,748 (hereinafter, “the ‘748 Patent”). Todd Newman
(“Newman”), David Shank (“Shank”) and John Washeleski (“Washeleski”), each of whom was
employed by Plaintiff and assigned his contribution or patent rights in the ‘748 Patent to
Plaintiff, were identified as the “Inventors” of the ‘748 Patent. In order to supply seat massager
units to Delphi and Cadillac, Schukra continued to contract with Plaintiff for the MCMs for a
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number of years. Schukra hired Defendant in 2002 to replace Plaintiff as the sole supplier of the
MCMs.
Plaintiff filed bankruptcy on December 19, 2002, and emerged from bankruptcy on
January 25, 2006. Plaintiff then filed this lawsuit on February 16, 2006, alleging that Defendant
infringed protected claims of the ‘748 Patent (namely claims 1 and 7) when Defendant began
manufacturing and supplying massage control modules to Schukra in Plaintiff’s stead. More
specifically, Plaintiff seeks to enforce intellectual property rights it believes cover the two types
of MCMs defined in the ‘748 Patent: (1) a memory MCM for power seats that record positioning
data into computer memory so the driver may recall his preferred seatback angle and distance
from the steering wheel, and (2) a non-memory MCM that provides massage functionality for
power seats that do not record or recall seat positioning.
At the dispositive motion cut-off deadline, the parties filed the motions identified at the
outset of this Opinion. Previously, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
based on Plaintiff’s failure to name one of the alleged co-inventors of the ‘748 Patent on its
patent application (Docket #166). The alleged co-inventor was Joseph Benson (“Benson”), a
mechanical engineer for Schukra who claimed to have contributed to a number of claims in the
‘748 Patent, including claims 1, 2, 11, 12, 14 and 15. The Court held that Benson was a coinventor based on his contributions to claim 11 and dismissed Plaintiff’s cause of action. The
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals later reversed this Court’s ruling that Benson was a co-inventor
on claim 11 of the ‘748 Patent, and the Federal Circuit remanded the case to this Court. Nartron
Corp. v. Schukra U.S.A., Inc., 558 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
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The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“[T]he plain language of
Rule 56[] mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”). A party must support its assertions by:
(A)
citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for
purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers,
or other materials; or
(B)
showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot
produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider
other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine
dispute as to a material fact, and all inferences should be made in favor of the nonmoving party.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
The moving party discharges its burden by “‘showing’—that is,
pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party’s case.” Horton v. Potter, 369 F.3d 906, 909 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at
325)).
Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving
party, who “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
“[T]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party’s] position
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will be insufficient [to defeat a motion for summary judgment]; there must be evidence on which
the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
IV.
ANALYSIS REGARDING CO-INVENTORSHIP
A. Applicable Law
Where a patent has been issued, there is a presumption that the named inventors are the
true and only inventors. 35 U.S.C. § 282. The burden of showing misjoinder or nonjoinder of
inventors must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular
Systems, Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1997). “35 U.S.C. § 256 provides that a co-inventor
omitted from an issued patent may be added to the patent by a court ‘before which such matter is
called into question.’” Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1461 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
The only named co-inventors of the ‘748 Patent are Newman, Shank and
Washeleski. As noted above, Defendant has asserted that Benson was a co-inventor as to claims
1, 2, 11, 12, 14 and 15. In order to prevail on that argument, Defendant must, by clear and
convincing evidence, overcome the presumption that Benson is not a co-inventor.
To date, only Defendant’s assertion regarding claim 11 has been decided on the merits.
As noted above, the Federal Circuit held that Benson was not a co-inventor as to claim 11. Like
this Court, however, the Federal Circuit did not express any opinion as to the other claims of the
‘748 for which Defendant asserted Benson was a co-inventor. Nartron, 558 F.3d at 1359 n.*.
Therefore, the Court now must analyze Benson’s alleged contribution to claims 1, 2, 12, 14 and
15, as well as the ‘748 Patent as a whole.
B. Federal Circuit Ruling and Law
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The Court’s analysis shall be conducted in light of the following law set forth by the
Federal Circuit in this case:
Inventorship is a question of law[.] Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “The inventors as named in an issued
patent are presumed to be correct.” Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,
106 F.3d 976, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, a party
alleging non-joinder “must meet the heavy burden of proving its case by clear and
convincing evidence.” Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1358
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
*****
In Hess, we held that Hess was not a co-inventor, when he had explained
the state of the art to the inventors and had suggested that the inventors use a
particular material in their product. 106 F.3d at 980-81. In this case, as in Hess,
Benson’s contribution to the extender amounted to “nothing more than explaining
to the inventors what the then state of the art was and supplying a product for
them for use in their invention.” Id. at 981. Also, like the situation in Hess, the
“extensive research and development work that produced” the claimed control
module was done by [Plaintiff]’s employees. Id. Although Benson claims to have
researched and developed a particular extender, [Defendant] admits that the basic
concept of an extender, which is all that is disclosed in the ‘748 patent concerning
the extender, was in part prior art. Similarly to Hess, therefore, Benson cannot be
considered a co-inventor of claim 11. See id. Thus, in a factually similar case, we
have held a putative inventor’s contribution not to rise to the level of coinventorship. This is not a case in which a person claims to be an inventor
because he has suggested a non-obvious combination of prior art elements to the
named inventors. Such an infidel may be a co-inventor. There is not, and could
not be, any claim that the addition of the extender here was anything but obvious.
Benson’s contribution therefore does not make him a co-inventor of the subject
matter of claim 11.
One further point should be made. [Defendant] asserts that Benson was
the inventor of the sole feature added by claim 11. However, a dependent claim
adding one claim limitation to a parent claim is still a claim to the invention of the
parent claim, albeit with the added feature; it is not a claim to the added feature
alone. Even if Benson did suggest the addition of the prior art extender to what
[Plaintiff] had invented, the invention of claim 11 was not the extender, but
included all of the features of claims 1, 5, and 6, from which it depends. It has not
yet been determined whether Benson contributed to claim 1 (although he does not
claim to be a co-inventor with respect to claims 5 and 6). If Benson did not make
those inventions, he does not necessarily attain the status of co-inventor by
providing the sole feature of the dependent claim. See id. (holding that Hess was
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not a co-inventor, even though he supplied “heat-shrinkable plastic,” which was
the only additional limitation recited in dependent claim 12 of the patent in suit).
[Defendant] also asserts that Benson was a co-inventor of the ‘748 patent
because he realized that a control module with certain specifications would be
useful, and he gave [Plaintiff] a description detailing the ultimate functions of the
control module. [Plaintiff], according to [Defendant], simply carried out the
invention by building that control module. However, “[o]ne who merely suggests
an idea of a result to be accomplished, rather than means of accomplishing it, is
not a joint inventor.” Garrett Corp. v. United States, 422 F.2d 874, 881 (Ct. Cl.
1970); see also Eli Lilly, 376 F.3d at 1359 (stating that one who is “too far
removed from the real-world realization of an invention” is not a co-inventor);
Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 937 F.Supp. 1015, 1035 (D. Conn. 1996)
(“An entrepreneur’s request to another to create a product that will fulfill a certain
function is not conception—even if the entrepreneur supplies continuous input on
the acceptability of offered products.” (quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 135 F.3d
1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Thus, Benson is not entitled to co-inventorship by simply
posing the result to [Plaintiff] and leaving it to [Plaintiff] to figure out how to
accomplish it.
Nartron, 558 F.3d at 1356, 1358-59.
C. Analysis
As set forth in footnote 1 of this Court’s March 31, 2008, Opinion and Order:
At various times, and with varying degrees of vigor and support,
Defendant also asserts that Benson [and/or others] contributed to
claims 1, 2, 12, 14 and 15 of the ‘748 Patent. Defendant has not,
however, offered the name(s) of any other such co-inventor(s).
In other words, Defendant has set forth little argument, to say nothing of evidence, to
demonstrate that Benson contributed to claims 1, 2, 12, 14 and 15. In fact, as Benson admitted:
1.
He had “very little” working knowledge of the software logic
within the Plaintiff’s massage control module,
2.
He did not have the electronic skills to do the circuitry or the
programmable logic required to realize the transparency simulator
of claim 1 of the ‘748 Patent.
3.
The lumbar support adjustor recited in claim 12 was not his
contribution because it pre-dated his employment with Schukra,
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4.
The extender element described in claim...14 was a “conventional
mechanical connection,” and
5.
The multiple adjustors recited in claim 15 also were conventional
technology.
Benson also admitted he had no skill set in electronics engineering, as evidenced by the
following exchange at this deposition:
Q.
You have never designed a driver circuit, correct, implemented
electronically, correct?
A.
That’s correct.
Q.
And through your education and work experience you don’t have
the skill set to design electrical circuits, correct?
A.
That’s correct.
In addition, Benson has admitted on multiple occasions that he was not involved in the
design or development of the MCMs that included the transparency simulator. For example, as
Benson stated in his affidavit: “Nartron was involved in this project to add a transparency
circuit feature to the controller in order to make it transparent to the automotive computer as
we conceived it and presented it to Nartron.” (emphasis added). Likewise, as Benson stated at
his deposition, “Again, my role in this is to pass along the specifications we receive from Delphi
to get this to work. The circuitry and the packaging was [sic] Nartron’s responsibility.”
(emphasis added). The testimony of Schukra personnel reinforces Benson’s statements. See,
e.g., Cherry Dep., p 12, ll. 18-24 (“Q. What did you understand Nartron’s assignment to be in
relation to the technical development of the massage control module? A. They were responsible
for engineering work, and manufacturing of the controller that was to control the massage
unit.”). See also Jones Declaration (“the massage control module must have NO impact on the
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existing seat memory module. Nartron must develop both driver (with memory) and passenger
(no memory) massage modules.”).
D. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Benson did not make any contribution
to the engineering of the massage control module claimed in the ‘748 Patent.
Benson’s
assertions of contributions in claims 1, 2, 12, 14 and 15 of the ‘748 Patent (as well as claim 11,
as previously determined) ring hollow because Benson did not exercise any skill beyond what
would have been conventional in the art.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Benson (and
Schukra) “simply pos[ed] the result to [Plaintiff] and le[ft] it to [Plaintiff] to figure out how to
accomplish it.” As the Federal Circuit held when considering the appeal in this case, such
involvement does not entitle a person to co-inventorship. See Nartron, 558 F.3d at 1359. The
Court therefore concludes that Defendant cannot show, by clear and convincing evidence, that:
(1) Benson conceived of the contribution of any element, or (2) Benson’s contribution to the
claimed invention is “not insignificant in quality.” As such, the Court holds that Benson was not
a co-inventor of the ‘748 Patent. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
on Summary Judgment Based on Co-Inventorship.
V.
ANALYSIS REGARDING THE INFRINGEMENT MOTIONS
In its Motion for Summary Judgment on Infringement, Plaintiff argues this Court should
grant summary judgment in its favor based on: (1) Defendant’s direct infringement of claim 1 of
the ‘748 Patent, and (2) Defendant’s contributory infringement of claim 7 of the ‘748 Patent. In
its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Based on Lack of Infringement, Defendant counters
that its MCM for non-memory systems cannot directly infringe (and therefore cannot
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contributorily infringe) the protected claims of the ‘748 Patent because Defendant’s device is
missing an entire aspect detailed within the claim limitations.
A. Patent Infringement
Plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the asserted
claims are infringed. See, e.g., S.R.I. Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Amer., 775 F.2d 1107,
1123 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
1. Direct Infringement
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) defines patent infringement:
“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
makes, issues, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention
during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent.”
“To prove direct infringement, the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that one or more claims of the patent read on the accused device literally or under the doctrine of
equivalents.” Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1310
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “Literal infringement requires that each and every limitation
set forth in a claim appear in an accused product.” Id. (quoting Franks Casing Crew & Rental
Tools, Inc. v. Weatherford Int’l, Inc., 389 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). See also Builders
Concrete, Inc. v. Bremerton Concrete Products Co., 757 F.2d 255 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations
omitted). Establishing direct infringement by arguing there is no evidence that the accused
device would be noninfringing may be tested first by determination of the scope of the claim at
issue, and second “by an examination of the evidence before the court to ascertain whether,
under § 271(c), use of the [accused device] would infringe the claim as interpreted.” C.R. Bard,
Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 911 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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However, “[t]he scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead embraces
all equivalents to the claims described.” Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002) (citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 347 (1854)).
In other words, “[i]nfringement may be found under the doctrine of equivalents if an accused
product ‘performs substantially the same overall function or work, in substantially the same way,
to obtain substantially the same overall result as the claimed invention.’” Wilson Sporting Goods
Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates, 904 F.2d 677, 683 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quoting Pennwalt
Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir.1987) (citations omitted) (emphasis
in original)). The doctrine of equivalents may be limited through prosecution history estoppel2
by restricting the patentee from “contending later in an infringement action that his claims should
be interpreted as if limitations added by amendment were not present or that claims abandoned
are still present.” Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 720 F.2d 1572, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(citing Square Liner 360°, Inc. v. Chisum, 691 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1982)). Therefore, if “the
patentee originally claimed the subject matter alleged to infringe but then narrowed the claim in
response to a rejection [a rejection indicates the examiner did not believe the original claim could
be patented], he may not argue that the surrendered territory comprised unforeseen subject matter
that should be deemed equivalent to the literal claims of the issued patent.” Id. at 733-34.
2. Contributory Infringement
In addition to direct infringement of a patent pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), a patent can
be contributorily infringed, as set forth in U.S.C. § 271(c):
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United
States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination, or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
2
Prosecution history estoppel is a rule that ensures a patent’s claims are interpreted in light of the
proceedings with the PTO during the patent application process. Festo, 535 U.S. at 733.
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constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
A plaintiff claiming contributory infringement must prove the following elements:
(1)
the defendant sold a component or apparatus for use in practicing
the patented process;
(2)
the component or apparatus constitutes a material part of the
invention;
(3)
the defendant knew the component or apparatus was especially
made or adapted for use in infringing the patent; and
(4)
the component or apparatus sold is not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.
C.R. Bard, Inc., 911 F.2d at 673. Preemption Devices, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining Mfg. Co., 803
F.2d 1170, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1986), aff’d, 824 F.2d 977 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
830 (1987) (contributory infringement requires knowledge of the patent, as well as of the alleged
infringement). Contributory infringement requires knowledge of the patent, as well as of the
alleged infringement. Preemption Devices, Inc., 803 F.2d at 1174. “[I]f there is no direct
infringement of a patent[, however,] there can be no contributory infringement.” Aro Mfg. Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 483 (1964). See also Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v.
Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
B.
Claim Construction
In a patent infringement case, the Court construes all disputed terms. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd.
v. Beyond Innovation Technology Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “[C]laim
interpretation . . . is an issue of law, and a dispute regarding that legal issue does not preclude
summary judgment.” Molinaro v. Fannon/Courier Corp., 745 F.2d 651, 654 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original). “A disputed issue of fact may, of course, arise in
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connection with interpretation of a term in a claim if there is a genuine evidentiary conflict
created by the underlying probative evidence pertinent to the claim’s interpretation,” thus
precluding a court from ruling on summary judgment. Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574,
1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Absent such evidentiary conflict, “claim interpretation may be resolved
as an issue of law by the court on summary judgment taking into account the specification,
prosecution history, or other [extrinsic] evidence.” Id. “Conflicting opinions on the meaning of a
term which are merely conclusory do not create such evidentiary conflict.” Id.
The Court’s task when assessing infringement requires a two-step analysis: (1) the claims
must be properly construed to determine the meaning and scope of claim limitations; and (2) the
accused device must be compared to the properly interpreted language in the claims. Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d 517 U.S. 370
(1996). In construing the terms of a patent claim, the Court first examines “the words of the
claims themselves, both asserted and nonasserted, to define the scope of the patented invention.”
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
The Court generally must give the words of a claim their “ordinary and customary meaning,”
which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question
at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips
v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
The Court then must review “the specifications3 to determine whether the inventor had
used any terms in a manner inconsistent with their ordinary meaning.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at
3
“The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out
his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112.
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1582. The specification “is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it
is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Id. A specification
also potentially may reveal an intent of the inventor to disclaim, or disavow, the scope of the
particular claim. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316.
The third type of intrinsic evidence the Court must consider for proper claim construction
is the prosecution history of the patent before the PTO. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. “Statements
about a claim term made by an examiner during prosecution of an application may be evidence
of how one of skill in the art understood the term at the time the application was filed.” Salazar
v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 414 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). As with the
specification, the patent applicant may “provide[] evidence of how the PTO and the inventor
understood the patent . . . Yet because the prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation
between the PTO and the applicant, . . . it often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is
less useful for claim construction purposes.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. Moreover, “[t]he
examiner’s unilateral remarks alone do not affect the scope of the claim, let alone show a
surrender of claimed subject matter that cannot be recaptured under the doctrine of equivalents.”
Salazar, 414 F.3d at 1347 (emphasis added).
The Court also may use extrinsic evidence to elicit proper claim construction. Phillips,
415 F.3d at 1317. Extrinsic evidence “consists of all evidence external to the patent and
prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.”
Markman, 52 F.3d at 980 (citations omitted). This extrinsic evidence is “less significant than the
intrinsic record” and is not likely “to result in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope
unless considered in the context of intrinsic evidence.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317-19.
C. Proper Claim Construction of the Term “Transparency Simulator”
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Plaintiff states that:
Properly construed, the term “transparency simulator” means a
component of the massage control module that allows functions of
the massage control module to be transparent to the operation of
the existing seat control system.
Plaintiff’s assertion is consistent with, and supported by, the specification of the ‘748 Patent,
which states:
References to the transparency simulator refer to the feature that
the seat control module is transparent in function to the existing
seat control mechanism, regardless of whether it enhances the
system function, monitors the system function, or guides the
system function through virtual signals.
‘748 Patent, col. 2, ll. 23-27. This definition, chosen by the patentee,4 reveals multiple scenarios
that bring about said transparency. It accurately portrays what is detailed in later specifications;
namely, that virtual signals: (1) are not the only means by which transparency can be achieved,
(2) can be used to at least “guide system function,” and (3) are not of necessity to “enhancing” or
“monitoring” system function (variable or continuous voltage signals and other analog outputs
may also accomplish this).
Defendant contends that, for purposes of proper claim construction, the term
“transparency simulator” must be construed as a device that outputs “virtual signals” to: (1) the
seat controller in memory type seat systems, or (2) the MCM itself in non-memory seat systems.
The Court notes that Defendant (intentionally or otherwise) relies on an erroneous recitation of a
statement within the ‘748 Patent to support its contention regarding the transparency simulator.
Specifically, when quoting the specification describing the transparency simulator, Defendant’s
briefs repeatedly and consistently have included a comma between “function” and “through” in
4
The patentee may act as his own lexicographer if the disputed term(s) are defined within the
patent claims and specifications. Phillips, 417 F.3d at 1319.
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the last line of the quoted language in the preceding paragraph (i.e., ‘748 Patent, col. 2, ll. 2327). The comma added by Defendant completely modifies the meaning of the sentence, perhaps
explaining why Defendant erroneously argues that sending “virtual signals” is the only desired
manner to achieve system transparency.
For the reasons set forth below, including the language found in the claims and
specifications of the ‘748 Patent, as well as its prosecution history, the Court concludes that the
proper construction of “transparency simulator” is not limited to a device which only sends a
“virtual signal” output for an existing seat controller to receive (i.e., a memory MCM).
1. Claim Language
The ‘748 Patent application states that what is claimed is: (a) for claim 1 (the memory
MCM), a seat control module that includes, among other components, “a transparency simulator
for maintaining full function of said seat control and removing indications of repeatedly
adjusting said lumbar support position;” and (b) for claim 7 (the non-memory MCM), a seat
control mechanism that includes a massage control module with “a transparency simulator for
maintaining original movement and inducing said enhanced movement of said lumbar support.”
‘748 patent, col. 19-20. Accordingly, the Court finds that the language of the claims expressly
provides that a transparency simulator is a component of both the memory MCMs and nonmemory MCMs.
2. Specifications
“Infringement, literal or by equivalence, is determined by comparing an accused product
not with a preferred embodiment described in the specification, or with a commercialized
embodiment of the patentee, but with the properly and previously construed claims in suit.” SRI
Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
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In addition, disputed claim terms must be read in light of the specification(s) of which they are a
part. Environmental Instruments v. Sutron Corp., 877 F.2d 1561, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
According to: (a) the specifications of the ‘748 Patent, and (b) the type of seat system the
MCM is meant to provide with functionality, several methods may be employed to achieve the
necessary transparency. As detailed in a description of the preferred embodiment of the device
in the ‘748 Patent:
The [massage control] module may simulate a transparent connection, for
example, by installation as an in-line complement to or a replacement of an
existing memory type seat controller (36) or as a complement to an existing nonmemory type seat control (23).
‘748 patent, col. 4, ll. 49-54. See also Washeleski Dep., pp. 23, ll. 16-25, pp. 24, ll. 1-9.
Furthermore, “[the non-memory MCM (23)] will not interfere with any other motor controller
and will function in low priority dependent operation to provide the lumbar massage feature for
that seat mechanism.” ‘748 Patent, at col. 5, ll. 50-53. A specification exists for achieving
transparency simulation to maintain original movement in the non-memory seats:
In the case of a non-memory type seat control system 22 … the lumbar support
position can alternatively be analytically derived in various ways such as an
absolute encoder on the motor where added expense can be accommodated. A
resolver on the motor or a simple incremental encoder on the lumbar support
drive motor may be used in less expensive embodiments.
Id. at col. 4, ll. 58-65.
The specifications also include methodologies that can be utilized to make the massager
in motion appear static and therefore transparent to the system. For example, one preferred
embodiment that does not necessarily require a virtual output from the massage control module
to a positioning sensor is:
Alternative to determining lumbar support position by direct measurement of
some physically sensed variable is the option of empirically measuring the
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relative amounts of time, under ambient conditions of temperature, voltage, and
lumbar load, to drive the lumbar support from either end of travel (EOT).
Id. at col. 5, ll. 3-9.
The Court further finds that the specifications of the ‘748 Patent contemplate that a
“transparency simulator” includes such potential analog outputs as power, current, or voltage.
As such, generating various types of output signals (in order to maintain original functionality
and system priority) is an aspect of the massage control module transparency simulator protected
by the claims of the ‘748 Patent.
3. Prosecution History
The examination of the prosecution history of a disputed patent may enable a court to
limit claim scope through disavowal or acquiescence. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319.
The
prosecution history “contains the complete record of all the proceedings before the Patent and
Trademark Office.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. In the Reasons for Allowance of the ‘748 Patent,
the Patent Examiner in the PTO stated (in relation to the memory MCMs only):
The prior art if record [sic] does not teach or suggest a seat control module for
introducing massage to a seat control with an adjustable lumbar support, and
control actuators. Wherein the control module includes an intercept interface, and
a driver. In particular, the prior art does not teach or suggest a transparency
simulator which provides for the massage control module to be transparent to the
higher priority of all functions of existing seat control. The massage control
module, through the transparency simulator, intercepts the true lumbar support
position signal from a sensor and provides a simulated virtual lumbar support
position signal to the seat controller.
‘748 patent, Reasons for Allowance, V. Lissi Mojica, 3/28/1999.
Defendant argues that this language indicates a transparency circuit in any allowed claim
must “provide a simulated virtual lumbar support position signal to the seat controller.” As
Plaintiff did not respond to the Patent Examiner’s statement, Defendant argues that Plaintiff
agreed with the Patent Examiner and is bound by Defendant’s interpretation.
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The Court
disagrees with Defendant’s arguments for several reasons. First, the Patent Examiner did not
reject Plaintiff’s claims. Second, Plaintiff was not ordered to relinquish any claim language.
Rather, the Patent Examiner’s statement merely detailed the primary reason why the Plaintiff’s
devices with a transparency simulator component were sufficiently different from, and would not
be suggested by, any prior art. Third, a disavowal of claim limitations is not established simply
because Plaintiff did not object when it received the Patent Examiner’s Reasons for Allowance.
An uncontested statement made by the Patent Examiner does not alter the scope of the claims.
See Salazar, 414 F.3d at 1347 (“the examiner’s unilateral remarks alone do not affect the scope
of the claim, let alone show a surrender of claimed subject matter.”). Finally, Plaintiff did not
affirmatively acquiesce in the Patent Examiner’s statement.
4. Conclusion
Defendant has presented no probative evidence pertinent to the claim interpretation of
“transparency simulator” that creates a genuine dispute of fact. Accordingly, it is appropriate for
the Court to determine the meaning of transparency simulator on summary judgment. Johnston,
885 F.2d at 1580. Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, including the plain language of
claims, the specifications of the ‘748 Patent and its prosecution history, the Court concludes that
a proper interpretation of “transparency simulator” means a component of a MCM that enables
lumbar massage application and simultaneously “[prioritizes] original functions,” making the
controller operate transparently to the existing seat control mechanism and electrical system in
the vehicle.
D. Defendants MCMs were Sold in, and/or Imported into, the United States
Defendant argues Plaintiff has not provided proof that Defendant’s allegedly infringing
activity occurred in the United States, as required for direct infringement pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §
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271(a) and/or contributory infringement pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Defendant argues that
“[i]f the goods are shipped out of the country and the sales transaction takes place completely
outside the United States, then the patent statute does not reach the transaction.” Robotic Vision
Systems v. View Engineering Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1117, 1119, 1995 WL 867456 (C.D.
Cal. 1995) (citing Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915));
John Hopkins University v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The Court finds
Defendant’s argument unavailing under the circumstances of this case, a case where Defendant
manufactured the allegedly infringing MCMs in the United States.
Defendant’s reliance on Robotic, Dowagiac and Cellpro is misplaced. In those cases, the
allegedly infringing items: (1) were determined not to be infringing items because they were
manufactured in the United States prior to the issuance of the patent (Robotic); (2) were made in
the United States but not by the defendant, whose only activity related to the infringing items
was to sell the items in Canada after the items passed out of the makers’ hands, thus making the
place of sale (rather than the place of manufacture) the controlling factor (Dowagiac); and (3)
were manufactured by the defendant in another country (Canada), and were “for use in products
to be sold outside the United States” (Cellpro). Moreover, each of those three cases makes it
clear that if a party “makes” the infringing product in the United States during the term of the
applicable patent, the manufacturing party has violated Section 271(a).
Here, the undisputed evidence is that Defendant, with a principal place of business in
Michigan, produced and manufactured the memory and non-memory MCMs exclusively within
the United States. As Section 271(a) states, in part: “whoever without authority makes, issues,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States . . . during the term of the
patent therefore, infringes the patent.” Accordingly, as Defendant manufactured the MCMs
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exclusively within the United States during the term of the ‘748 Patent, the Court concludes that,
to the extent that either of Defendant’s MCMs directly infringe on the ‘748 Patent, such direct
infringement occurred in the United States and in violation of Section 271(a).
Defendant argues that it “shipped the control modules to Canada and has no knowledge
of how they were used or if they were used.” The Court finds this argument disingenuous. First,
as Defendant has admitted, Defendant sold its product from within Michigan to Schukra in
Windsor, Ontario. The very purpose of Defendant’s arrangement with Schukra was to produce
memory MCMs and non-memory MCMs that Schukra would incorporate into seats produced by
Schukra in Windsor. In addition, it is undisputed that Schukra’s seats would be and were
installed in Cadillac’s “E/K/Ksp” vehicles, vehicles that were assembled at a General Motors
plant in Hamtramck, Michigan, United States of America. Thus, Defendant’s suggestion that it
did not know how or if its control modules were used is misleading, at best. Therefore, even if
the MCMs produced by Defendant could be considered component parts of the MCMs covered
by the ‘748 Patent, the infringing activity associated with the MCMs also satisfied the “within
the United States” element of contributory infringement under Section 271(c).
E. Infringement of the ‘748 Patent by Defendant’s Memory MCMs
Claim 1 of the ‘748 Patent is as follows:
1. A seat control module for introducing massage to a seat control
with an adjustable lumbar support, and control actuators, the
control module comprising:
a modular housing including in-line connectors for coupling
said module to a seat control harness connector;
an intercept interface for receiving inputs from said control
actuators;
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a driver for repeatedly adjusting said lumbar support position
through a predetermined range of movement in response to one
of said control actuators; and
a transparency simulator for maintaining full function of said
seat control and removing indications of repeatedly adjusting
said lumbar support position.
‘748 patent, col. 19, ll. 13-26 (emphasis added). Although only a product specification of the
function of Defendant’s devices is on record, sufficient technical insight exists enabling the
Court to compare the accused devices and find them both to infringe the above claims. These
product specifications suffice because Defendant offers no other design requirements
distinguishing its devices from those claimed in the ‘748 Patent.
For the following reasons, the Court finds that Defendant’s memory MCM embodies all
of the elements of claim 1, including a transparency simulator. First, Larry Krueger, Defendant’s
President, acknowledged that all of the limitations of claim 1 of the ‘748 Patent were met by
Defendant’s memory MCM, except that he believed Defendant’s modules lacked the
“transparency simulator” limitation, as he understood the meaning of the term. As set forth
above, however, Defendant’s interpretation of “transparency simulator” (i.e., a device that must
output “virtual signals”) is flawed.
Second, Defendant’s MCMs do contain transparency simulators, albeit not by name. As
the following pertinent quotations from the Product Specifications utilized by Defendant
demonstrate, each element of claim 1 of the ‘748 Patent exists in Defendant’s MCMs:
-
The module shall be connected to the seat harness by means of a 16-way
header connector. (the equivalent of ‘748 Patent’s modular housing)
-
Lumbar massage operation will begin with a lumbar up switch input of no
more than 390 ms. Up Switch and Down Switch Inputs. (the equivalent
of ‘748 Patent’s intercept interface)
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-
The massage module controls the vertical adjustment reversible DC motor.
Massage motion will be accomplished by energizing the up/down lumbar
motor continuously in one direction, causing the lumbar to move up and
down 50 mm in each direction. (the equivalent of ‘748’s Patent driver)
-
The massage function will operate for 10 minutes +/- 10 seconds and
return to the position it was at before the massage began. The massage
module shall neither alter nor inhibit the function or performance of any
other electrical system on the vehicle except as specified in this document.
(the equivalent of ‘748 Patent’s transparency simulator)
Product Spec., pp. 7-11 (emphasis added). As such, the Court finds that Defendant’s Product
Specification discloses each limitation of claim 1. In addition to the foregoing, the Court finds
that Defendant’s Product Specification tracks how the transparency simulator: (a) functions in
Plaintiff’s memory MCM, and (b) is protected by the claims and specifications of the ‘748
Patent. Specifically, the Product Specification states that “during a lumbar massage, the massage
module must output a simulated stationary lumbar vertical position signal to the memory seat
module. This prevents the memory seat module from seeing the lumbar up/down in motion.” Id.
at 10.
Defendant argues that the term driver, as used in claim 1, is in some way external to the
massage controller or control module, but its argument is unsubstantiated. In fact, Defendant’s
President (Krueger) has admitted that both Defendant’s memory MCMs and Defendant’s nonmemory MCMs include the driver of claim 1 and driver circuit of claim 7. Moreover, the plain
language of the patent claim, as corroborated by the common definition and use of an electronic
driver,5 indicates clearly how such a driver would operate as a function of the MCM:
a driver for repeatedly adjusting said lumbar support position through a
predetermined range of movement in response to one of said control
actuators; and
5
The common definition of an electrical driver is “an electronic circuit that supplies input to
another electronic circuit.” See Modern Dictionary of Electronics, R. Graf (1999).
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In other words, the driver is a part of the MCM (just as the modular housing intercept interface
and transparency simulator are), and there is no requirement that the driver be peripherally
external to the MCM itself. The “driver” in the control module of claim 1 receives electrical
inputs from control actuators and relays electrical signals to the motor that drives the lumbar
support position, imitating massage function. Significantly, Defendant’s Product Specifications
reveal that its MCMs do not establish this massage movement through any substantially different
means:
[T]he massage module controls the vertical adjustment reversible
DC motor. Massage motion will be accomplished by energizing
the up/down lumbar motor continuously in one direction, causing
the motor to move up and down 50 mm in each direction.
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant has presented the Court with: (1) no
information that creates a genuine issue of material fact as it relates to Defendant’s literal
infringement of Plaintiff’s memory MCM, and (2) no support for a finding of non-infringement
with respect to claim 1.
Thus, the Court finds that the undisputed evidence repudiates
Defendant’s assertion that its memory MCMs do not exploit the transparency simulator of claim
1. The Court also finds that the memory MCM manufactured and sold by Defendant: (a)
embodies all the elements of claim 1, as properly construed, including a transparency simulator,
and (b) literally infringes claim 1 of the ‘748 Patent. Builders Concrete, Inc., 757 F.2d at 255.
Accordingly, the Court holds that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
Defendant’s direct infringement of Plaintiff’s patented memory MCM (claim 1).
F. Infringement of the ‘748 Patent by Defendant’s Non-Memory MCMs
Claim 7 of the ‘748 Patent states:
7. A seat control mechanism comprising:
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a vehicle seat having a position adjustment mechanism, wherein
said mechanism includes a lumbar support, at least one motor, and
an adjustor responsive to said motor for displacing said lumbar
support;
a motor control including at least one actuator for actuating said
motor and said adjustor; and
a massage control module including an intercept interface for
receiving an output from said at least one actuator, a driver circuit
for signaling said motor to repeatedly adjust said lumbar support as
an enhanced movement, and a transparency simulator for
maintaining original movement and inducing said enhanced
movement of said lumbar supports, said driver discriminating
between a first predetermined movement of said at least one actuator and a second movement of said at least one actuator before
signaling an enhanced movement of said lumbar support or
maintaining original movement.
‘748 patent, col. 20, ll. 1-19 (emphasis added).
Defendant’s President, Larry Krueger, admitted during his deposition that Defendant’s
non-memory MCM was part of a system that met the “vehicle seat” and “motor control”
limitations of claim 7. Krueger also conceded that Defendant’s non-memory MCMs included
the “intercept interface for receiving an output from . . . at least one actuator” and the “driver
circuit for signaling said motor to repeatedly adjust said lumbar support as an enhanced
movement.” Krueger opined, however, that Defendant’s non-memory MCM lacked one of the
elements of Plaintiff’s non-memory MCM, specifically a “transparency simulator” that sends
“simulated virtual signals to the seat controller.” Defendant’s argument fails for several reasons.
First, as discussed above, Defendant’s Product Specifications designate that Defendant’s
non-memory MCMs are transparent to the existing seat system (i.e., there is a transparency
simulator):
The massage module shall neither alter nor inhibit the function or
performance of any other electrical system on the vehicle except as
specified in this document.
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Defendant’s Product Spec. at 9.
Second, Defendant erroneously concludes that its MCMs for non-memory power seats do
not infringe a single claim of the ‘748 Patent because its “non-memory massage control modules
do not intercept signals or send virtual signals,” a “the hallmark of the ‘748 Patent” (i.e., the
“transparency simulator” is necessarily present in each claim). As discussed above, however,
Defendant’s argument is based on its erroneous reading of the meaning of “transparency
simulator” set forth in the ‘748 Patent specifications. Likewise, a reading of the specifications
does not support Defendant’s argument that “the absence of an external virtual signal sent to
achieve transparency with the original seat system is sufficient to conclude no transparency
simulator is found whatsoever.” Rather, as the Court has determined, neither the plain language
of the claims, nor the specifications within the ‘748 Patent, mandate that the controller send
virtual signals to a positioning sensor for establishing the desired transparency.
In other words, Defendant’s transparency simulator construction impermissibly reads
non-memory module embodiments out of the claims of the ‘748 Patent. “A claim interpretation
that reads out a preferred embodiment ‘is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly
persuasive evidentiary support.’” Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313,
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583). As set forth above, the technical
specifications in the ‘748 Patent describe how transparency is achieved through different means
in non-memory controllers. Specifically, the descriptions about how to accomplish vertical
lumbar functionality are illustrative of how schematically diverse the transparency simulator can
be.
Third, Defendant misinterprets the phrase “a transparency simulator for maintaining
original movement.”
Defendant would have the Court interpret “original movement” as
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“reverting to the original position stored by memory seat position controllers.” Defendant’s
interpretation does not reflect the correct meaning of “original movement.” The plain and
ordinary language of claim 7, especially when read in conjunction with the proper definition of
the transparency simulator in the specification in the patent, establishes why Defendant’s
interpretation is erroneous.
The correct interpretation of “original movement” is the manually-controlled power seat
movement available before adding the MCM controls that are unimpeded by addition of the
MCM. See ‘748 Patent, col. 2, ll. 53-58 (“The existing seat controller module can be replaced
with an alternative massage control module (MCM) offering current control features plus
increased functionality upgrades, especially to include the new and improved feature of
automatic lumbar massage without affecting the original functions.”).
In fact, the same
transparency simulator for “maintaining original movement” is covered in both claims 1 and 7 of
the ‘748 Patent, as set forth in the following specification:
This method of functional control modification is based upon the in-line modular
massage control module 34 intercepting real signals and/or power and
transparently substituting simulated signals and/or power between the seat
controller 21 and the external devices of sensor 40, motor 18, and switches 46.
The case of the non-memory system 14 is simpler by virtue of not having to
interface sensor signals to the seat control.
‘748 Patent, col. 8, ll. 33-41 (emphasis added). As the language reproduced in italics above
clearly illustrates, Plaintiff’s non-memory MCMs do not need to communicate exclusively with
seat control to achieve transparency. Rather, for non-memory seat systems, the MCM acts as the
seat controller found in memory position systems; it is the controller which runs the motor and
enables massage functionality within the seat. See Washeleski Dep., pp.123 ll. 13-24, pp. 124 ll.
1-15.
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Accordingly, the Court finds that “maintaining original movement” means preserving the
ability to adjust the power seat controls as if no massage controller had ever been installed. Both
of the MCMs manufactured by Defendant achieve transparency between the control module and
the existing seat system while preserving the ability to control the seat-forward and seat-back
positioning. Defendant’s Product Spec., pp. 7-10 (“After massage, the module returns to its
original position” and “If a massage operation is not in progress, and a lumbar down switch input
of greater than 20 ms occurs, the lumbar will begin traveling downward. If the lumbar down
switch is released after less than 390 ms, the lumbar will return to the position it was at before
the lumbar down switch input occurred.”).
Finally, Defendant has not supplied the Court with any evidence that would indicate that
the accused device is noninfringing. Moreover, as set forth above, nothing in the record shows
that Defendant’s non-memory MCM operates in a manner inconsistent with Plaintiff’s protected
non-memory MCM. To the contrary, the drawings and specifications governing the MCMs
manufactured by Defendant reflect that:
The lumbar vertical position sensor provides an analog voltage
which varies directly with the seat lumbar vertical position … The
non-memory massage module will provide a supply voltage for the
lumbar vertical sensor … [and] the module shall activate the sensor
feed output whenever the module is awake; otherwise, the sensor
feed output shall remain inactive.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that: (1) Defendant’s non-memory MCM
includes a transparency simulator, and (2) that transparency simulator sends a signal (voltage)
that influences system positioning sensors to believe the displacement of the moving lumbar
support remains constant, thereby maintaining original movement and higher system priority.
The Court also finds that the non-memory MCM manufactured and sold by Defendant: (a)
embodies all the elements of claim 7, as properly construed, including a “transparency simulator
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for maintaining original movement,” and (b) literally infringes claim 7 of the ‘748 Patent.
Builders Concrete, Inc., 757 F.2d at 255.
Accordingly, the Court holds that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
Defendant’s direct infringement of Plaintiff’s patented non-memory MCM (claim 7).6 For the
same reasons, Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment based on lack of infringement
(based on the non-memory MCMs produced by Defendant) must be denied.
VI.
ANALYSIS REGARDING EQUITABLE DEFENSES
Defendant has asserted the affirmative equitable defenses of laches, estoppel, and waiver.
Plaintiff maintains that these defenses should be dismissed as a matter of law. Plaintiff asserts
that the proof elements of each defense are not supported by the pretrial evidentiary record, as
Plaintiff did not: (1) unreasonably or inexcusably delay filing suit on any basis that would invoke
equity, (2) intentionally mislead Defendant to its own detriment, or (3) intentionally relinquish or
abandon a known right.
A. Laches Defense
6
A finding of contributory infringement of claim 7 of the ‘748 Patent by Defendant’s non-
memory MCM is also substantiated. The device literally infringes the first two limitations of
claim 7 (vehicle seat and motor control), and infringes through the doctrine of equivalents the
control module limitation, specifically the transparency simulator limitation. As discussed
above, Defendant’s non-memory MCM achieves substantially the same transparency function
through substantially similar means to attain a result that is substantially similar to the claimed
device in the ‘748 Patent. Wilson Sporting Goods Co, 904 F.2d at 683. For example,
Defendant’s non-memory MCM is: (1) is a component sold by Defendant for use in practicing
the patented massage functionality process; (2) in and of itself, a material part of the patented
invention; and (3) not a staple article of commerce suitable for noninfringing use. Defendant
knew from correspondence from Schukra (and, later, Plaintiff) that the non-memory MCMs it
manufactured could be infringing a patent (namely, the ‘748 Patent). Upon examination of all
the evidence, this Court finds, under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), that use of Defendant’s non-memory
MCMs infringes the proper construction of claim 7 of the ‘748 Patent. C.R. Bard, Inc., 911 F.2d
at 673.
- 30 -
In order to invoke the laches defense, a defendant must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, the following factors:
(1)
That the plaintiff delayed filing suit for an unreasonable and
inexcusable length of time from the time the plaintiff knew or
reasonably should have known of its claim against the defendant,
and
(2)
That the delay operated to the prejudice or injury of the defendant.
See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282, 81 S. Ct. 534, 543, 5 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1961);
Meyers v. Brooks Shoe Inc., 912 F.2w 1459, 1461, 16 USPQ2d 1055, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
Hottel Corp. v. Seaman Corp., 833 F.2d 1570, 1572, 4 USPQ2d 1939, 1940 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
“Where a patentee delays bringing suit for more than six years after the date the patentee knew
or should have known of the alleged infringer’s activity,” a presumption of laches will arise. A.C.
Aukerman Co. v. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1992). If, however,
the time period is less than six years, there is no presumption of laches. Id. at 1038. The period of
delay is measured from the time the patentee knew or reasonably should have known of the
alleged infringement by the accused to the date the suit was filed. See Bott v. Four Star, 807 F.2d
1567, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1210, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315, 1326, 206 USPQ 577, 587 (5th Cir. 1980).
The prejudice suffered by a defendant in the application of a laches defense “may be
either economic or evidentiary.” A.C. Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1033.
“Evidentiary or
‘defense’ prejudice may arise by reason of a defendant’s inability to present a full and fair
defense on the merits due to a loss of records, the death of a witness, or the unreliability of
memories of long past events, thereby undermining the court’s ability to judge the facts.” Id.; see
also Cornetta v. United States, 851 F.2d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1988). When the consequences of
an untimely filed or delayed complaint cause a defendant to suffer monetary loss, e.g.,
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“incur[ring] damages which likely would have been prevented by earlier suit,” a finding of
economic prejudice may be warranted. A.C. Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1033.
In this case, Defendant argues that Plaintiff unreasonably delayed filing its lawsuit and
the delay resulted in prejudice suffered by Defendant. Defendant contends the delay between
when Plaintiff became reasonably aware of potential infringement and when the complaint was
filed prejudiced Defendant’s evidentiary defense of this patent infringement action because of
Plaintiff’s document destruction program. See TWM Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Dura Corp, 592 F.2d 346,
349 (6th Cir. 1979). Plaintiff’s document destruction program about which Defendant complains
is instituted once every three years and allegedly destroyed accounting documentation
“necessary [for Defendant] to challenge Plaintiff’s allegations of damages.” Defendant contends
further that, because Plaintiff delayed in filing a complaint, the fact that Therm-O-Disc had
implemented its own record destruction policy, Defendant was prejudiced since Defendant was
unable to introduce into evidence a sample control module made by Therm-O-Disc while that
company was under contract with Schukra. The Court concludes otherwise.
In a light most favorable to Defendant, Plaintiff became knowledgeable of potentially
infringing conduct by Defendant on or about May 8, 2002, when Plaintiff sent a letter to Schukra
indicating that there was a possibility that Plaintiff might have to bring an infringement action. It
was only seven months later, on December 19, 2002, when Plaintiff filed its petition for
protection under Chapter 11.
The petition in bankruptcy was, therefore, filed long before
Schukra responded to the May 8, 2002 letter (in 2004). Plaintiff remained in bankruptcy until
January 25, 2006, and Plaintiff commenced with its lawsuit on February 16, 2006. In other
words, Plaintiff filed this action only 22 days after emerging from bankruptcy. Accordingly, the
Court concludes that there is no evidence that such “delay” was unreasonable or inexcusable.
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The Court also finds that Defendant has submitted no evidence that Defendant has been
prejudiced or injured by Plaintiff’s “delay” in filing this action. First, in compliance with Rule
26, Plaintiff disclosed ample records for Defendant to use to challenge allegations of damages
via potential infringement. See Bates No. N 1 – N 3156. Second, the information was timely
produced by Plaintiff and was sufficient because these records included the necessary financial
information for Defendant to challenge any damages amounts. Third, the Court finds that
Defendant suffered no evidentiary prejudice due to Therm-O-Disc’s record destruction policy.
There is no evidence on record suggesting Plaintiff was ever aware of this internal company
policy used by Therm-O-Disc either before or after the ‘748 Patent was issued, or, even if
Plaintiff was aware that policy existed, that such awareness influenced Plaintiff’s decision when
to file its complaint. Moreover, Defendant never explicitly asked for a sample or schematic of
Therm-O-Disc’s control module.7
Rather, Plaintiff is the party that originally subpoenaed
Therm-O-Disc, and the answer received provided no indication of when the records were being
destroyed (i.e., Therm-O-Disc’s records may have been destroyed even before 2002, which was
at least five years after Therm-O-Disc’s ceased its involvement in this project). Accordingly, the
Court concludes that, even if Plaintiff did delay in filing suit, such “delay” did not unduly
prejudice Defendant.
For the above stated reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for dismissal of the
equitable defense of laches is granted.
B. Equitable Estoppel Defense
7
The Court also notes that the Court’s grant of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
based on Co-Inventorship was reversed and remanded back to this Court. Accordingly, it is not
material to include schematics from the Therm-O-Disc module for the resolution of this matter.
Thus, the unavailability of information from Therm-O-Disc because of any delay in the timing of
Plaintiff’s complaint does not unduly prejudice the Defendant.
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“Equitable estoppel is cognizable under 35 U.S.C. § 282 as an equitable defense to a
claim for patent infringement.” A.C. Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1028. An equitable estoppel
defense has three elements that a defendant must prove:
(1) The [patentee], who usually must have knowledge of the true facts,
communicates something in a misleading way, either by words,
conduct or silence.
(2) The [alleged infringer] relies on that conduct.
(3) And the [alleged infringer] would be harmed materially if the
[patentee] is later permitted to assert any claim inconsistent with
his earlier conduct.
Id. at 1041.
Defendant asserts that: (1) Plaintiff sent correspondence to Schukra warning of potential
infringement action in 2002; (2) counsel for Defendant (but, at that time, representing Schukra)
provided opposing counsel with “the background leading to Schukra’s initial contact with
Nartron” in October 2004 and an offer to consider a licensing agreement regarding the MCMs;
and (3) Plaintiff responded with silence to the October 2004 letter until filing the current action
in 2006. Defendant contends it reasonably relied on Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the 2004
letter, thereby incurring tooling and other overhead costs in manufacturing the controllers and, as
such, is entitled to an equitable estoppel defense. The Court disagrees, however, as Defendant
has failed to satisfy at least the first two equitable estoppel elements.
First, the fact that Plaintiff did not file suit after receiving the response letter from
Schukra’s legal counsel in October 2004 does not constitute a misleading communication by
Plaintiff such that the failure to respond reasonably suggested that Plaintiff had abandoned any
infringement claims. Second, the uncontroverted evidence reflects that Defendant could not
have relied on Plaintiff’s silence following the 2004 letter because Defendant had no actual
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knowledge of the 2002 and 2004 correspondence between Schukra and Plaintiff’s counsel until
months after the commencement of this cause of action. As Defendant’s President, Larry
Krueger, admitted at his deposition, neither he nor any other Defendant employee was aware of
the 2004 letter until “late 2006.”
In addition, the record in this case demonstrates that Defendant and Schukra began
collaborating as early as September of 2000 without notifying Plaintiff of these activities. In
September 2000, Schukra sent a letter to Defendant, wherein Schukra stated:
(1) “Schukra acknowledge[d] advising [Defendant] of at least one patent and a
continuation patent application off that patent relating to a portion of these subject
controls acquired by its current supplier with whom the current generation of controls
was jointly developed”; and
(2) “Schukra agrees to indemnify and hold harmless [Defendant] for any claims of
infringement for this particular patent and others that may issue from Nartron
relating to this control module if they may occur prior to our challenge of the
Nartron patent” (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the Court further finds that Defendant cannot rely on an equitable estoppel defense
when Defendant knowingly engaged in clandestine actions with Schukra to replace Plaintiff as
Schukra’s supplier of the MCMs, especially since such replacement involved supplying
“controls” that likely would be subject to claims of infringement.
C. Waiver
The Supreme Court has recognized the definition of “waiver” to be “the intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733
(1993) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). Defendant has offered no evidence
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to show that Plaintiff waived its intellectual property rights vis a vis Defendant (or anyone else).
In fact, Defendant did not even address this issue in its response to Plaintiff’s motion. Moreover,
as Plaintiff filed this cause of action within a reasonable period of time (as discussed above), the
Court finds that Plaintiff did not intentionally relinquish or abandon its intellectual property
rights in the ‘748 Patent. Accordingly, the Court holds that Defendant’s waiver defense fails as a
matter of law.
VII.
ANALYSIS REGARDING PATENT INVALIDITY
In Count I of its Counterclaim, Defendant seeks declaratory judgment of patent invalidity
and unenforceability, as set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112, 115, 116, 132 and/or 282.
Similarly, as its first affirmative defense to Plaintiff’s cause of action, Defendant has pled patent
invalidity on the same bases. In addition, in Defendant’s third affirmative defense to Plaintiff’s
cause of action, Defendant has pled unenforceability.
Plaintiff has filed motions for summary
judgment with respect to Count I of the Counterclaim and Defendant’s first and third affirmative
defenses.
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 282, a patent issued by the PTO is presumed valid. As the PTO
issued the ‘748 Patent to Plaintiff, Defendant has the burden of proof to demonstrate, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the patent is invalid. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership,
131 S.Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (invalidity defenses in a patent infringement case must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence).
A. 35 U.S.C. § 101
Defendant states that a “genuine invention” inquiry must be made, which intrinsically
involves factual inquiry and determination, thus precluding the grant of summary judgment.
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Defendant contends that the ‘748 Patent violates 35 U.S.C. § 101 because Plaintiff was simply
hired by Schukra to “productionize” a MCM that had already been conceived of and prototyped
by Schukra and Therm-O-Disc. As discussed above, the Court has concluded that: (1) the ‘748
Patent was invented by Plaintiff’s employees, (2) there are no co-inventors, and (3) Plaintiff did
not simply productionize the MCMs for which the ‘748 patent was issued but, instead, was
solely responsible for the design, engineering and development of such MCMs.
The ‘748 Patent itself describes a MCM and mechanism for implementation into seat
controllers, something the Patent Examiner determined did not exist in prior art. The Court also
finds that Defendant has not proffered evidence which would satisfy its burden of showing, by a
clear and convincing standard, that the ‘748 Patent lacked the necessary “utility” component or
that it lacked novelty. The Court therefore holds, as a matter of law, that the MCMs cannot be
deemed invalid for lack of utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
B. 35 U.S.C. § 102
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless: (1) “the invention was known or used by
others in this country . . . before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent,” or (2) the
applicant “did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented.” 35 U.S.C. § 102. For
a patent to be invalidated based on anticipation, there must be a prior art that contains all of the
elements in the claim limitations. Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed.
Cir. 1989). Based on record before the Court, there has been no evidence submitted that a
transparency circuit was in the prior art of this case.
To the contrary, the only evidence
regarding the prior art suggests that such prior art did not include a transparency simulator. As
discussed above, according to Schukra’s employees (Cherry and Jones), the very reason Schukra
hired Plaintiff was to design and engineer a controller with this innovation.
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Therefore, the Court concludes that Defendant’s repeated argument that there were ridetested prototypes of massage controllers that were used by Schukra and developed by Therm-ODisc before Plaintiff was hired are just that – arguments. There is no evidence on the record that
the prototypes included a transparency simulator or transparency circuit for maintaining original
movement and prioritizing system functions. The Patent Examiner’s Reasons for Allowance
indicate that the inclusion of the transparency simulator was of paramount importance in
distinguishing the limitations found in the claims of the ‘748 Patent from the prior art.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds, as a matter of law, that the ‘748 Patent
cannot be ruled invalid pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 102.
C. 35 U.S.C § 103
In support of its belief that the ‘748 Patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103
(obviousness), Defendant again relies on the argument that the named inventors did only what
they were instructed to do and that what they did was only to productionize the functioning seat
massager prototyped and ride-tested by Schukra. As discussed above, this argument is futile.
Defendant also contends that prior art had defined what needed to be done in order to make a
circuit transparent to a controller in the vehicle (or the vehicle computer), and Defendant cites
U.S. Patent No. 6,145,494 (the “‘494 Patent”) as evidence of such prior art. Defendant does not,
however, offer evidence that shows how the ‘494 Patent defined what needed to be done in order
to create an operable transparency simulator.
Moreover, the Patent Examiner expressly
addressed the prior art. Accordingly, the Court concludes that an invalidity defense pursuant to
35 U.S.C. § 103 is not viable, as a matter of law, because Defendant cannot satisfy its burden by
clear and convincing evidence.
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D. 35 U.S.C § 112
Defendant’s entire argument in support of its claim of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 112 was:
35 U.S.C. § 112 has requirements that are placed into effect so that
the specification and drawings of a patent are set forth “in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled
in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”
35 U.S.C. § 113 has similar requirements and indicates that
drawings cannot be supplemented. In a patent [such] as the one in
the present litigation, a claim can only cover elements that are
sufficiently disclosed in the drawings and specification. See United
Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 237 (1942) (“an
invention must be capable of accurate definition and it must be
accurately defined, to be patentable”).
This defense is contingent on how Plaintiff interprets its
claims and interprets its specification in light of Defendant[‘s]
defenses. Certain claim terms, such as “complimentary” [sic]
which are definite in dictionaries and not found in the patent
specification are impacted by 35 U.S.C. § 112, and at least Claim 2
is invalid due to lack of specificity under this statute. The terms
“driver,” “transparency simulator,” and other terms in the claims
need to be defined by the Court under Markman determinations.
35 U.S.C. § 112 acts as a constraint in that determination, but also
would invalidate anything that is argued contrary to the dictates of
those sections. Thus, the bulk of the arguments relating to those
sections await Plaintiff’s claim construction arguments and
responses to Defendant’s Motions for Summary Judgment, and
deference is requested until that time to determine which specific
arguments need to be addressed, if any, beyond claim 2, which is
clearly invalid.
As noted above, however, the ‘748 Patent is presumed valid and a party’s burden to overcome
that presumption is by clear and convincing evidence. As the foregoing reflects, Defendant has
offered no evidence regarding the manner in which the ‘748 Patent is invalid pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 112. Accordingly, the Court concludes that, as a matter of law, Defendant has not met
its burden, and Defendant’s defense of invalidity pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112 is therefore denied.
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E. 35 U.S.C. §§ 115 and 116 (and 256)
Sections 115, 116 and 256 (which was not pled by Defendant but is argued by Defendant
in response to Plaintiff’s motion) pertain to co-inventorship/joint inventorship. As it did to
support many of its other motions/responses, Defendant bases its argument that the ‘748 Patent is
invalid pursuant to Sections 115, 116 and 256 on the belief that Benson is a co-inventor. As the
Court has determined, however, Benson is not a co-inventor. Accordingly, the Court holds, as
matter of law, that the invalidity defenses pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 115 and 116 (and 256) are
not viable.
F. Inequitable Conduct
Inequitable conduct by a patentee may serve as evidence to support the equitable defense of
unenforceability of a patent.
Inequitable conduct includes affirmative misrepresentations of a
material fact, failure to disclose material information, or
submission of false material information, couple with an intent to
deceive.
Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995). As evidence of Plaintiff’s
inequitable conduct, Defendant cites: (1) the fact that the patent application failed to
acknowledge the contributions/co-inventorship of Benson, Schukra, Therm-O-Disc and/or
Delphi; and (2) Plaintiff’s claimed responsibility for inventorship even though Plaintiff did
nothing other than do what it was requested to do by Schukra. As set forth above, the Court has
considered and rejected those arguments in numerous contexts. The Court also does not find
such arguments persuasive to demonstrate inequitable conduct by Plaintiff. Accordingly, the
Court concludes that Defendant’s defense of unenforceability is not sustainable, as a matter of
law.
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VIII. ANALYSIS REGARDING SHOP RIGHT AND LICENSE
Plaintiff also seeks summary judgment on Defendant’s Counterclaims in Counts III
(Shop Right) and Count IV (License).
A. Shop Right
A “shop right” is generally accepted as being a right that is created
at common law, when the circumstances demand it, under
principles of equity and fairness, entitling an employer to use
without charge an invention patented by one or more of its
employees without liability for infringement.
McElmurry v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 995 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (footnote
omitted). Whether an employer has acquired a shop right is determined by examining a totality
of the circumstances to determine if the facts of the case demand a finding of the same. Id. at
1581-82. The shop right is personal to the employer and cannot be licensed or assigned.
Francklyn v. Guilford Packing Co., 695 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1983).
Plaintiff first asserts that Defendant can have no shop right because there is no employeremployee relationship between them. Plaintiff also argues that, because Schukra never paid
Plaintiff for resources expended by Plaintiff in development of the patented MCMs, Defendant
(and Schukra) are foreclosed from asserting a shop right. Finally, Plaintiff notes that the “Terms
and Conditions” set forth on Plaintiff’s standard quotation forms clearly provide (emphasis in
original):
Notwithstanding any term in Buyer’s purchase order or other
documents of Buyer to the contrary, Buyer should acquire no
interest in any proprietary design or other intellectual property of
Seller evident in the goods applied by Seller pursuant to Buyer’s
order.
Defendant cites two Ninth Circuit cases to support its contention that a shop right “is not
restricted alone to the case of an employer.” Kierulff v. Metropolitan Stevedore Co., 315 F.2d
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839, 842 (9th Cir. 1963); Francklyn, 695 F.2d at 1160 (“the full nature of the parties’
relationship must be examined to determine whether a shop right exists, not merely whether that
relationship is characterized as an employment or as an independent contractual arrangement”).
Defendant argues that Schukra: (1) hired Plaintiff to develop the MCMs, (2) paid Plaintiff to
develop them, (3) directed Plaintiff as to the manner and method of developing the MCMs, and
(4) at least in part, afforded Plaintiff a facility, tools and equipment to develop the MCMs.
Under applicable law, if Schukra has shop rights to the ‘748 Patent, Schukra would be legally
entitled to request that Defendant supply it with MCMs without the possibility of infringement.
McElmurry, 995 F2d at 1584.
The Court finds Defendant’s argument unpersuasive. First, this Court is not bound by the
Ninth Circuit and, particularly in this patent action, shall adhere to the law of the Federal Circuit,
a court that exists to, among other things, create national uniformity in patent law. As such, the
Court relies on the McElmurry decision for the definition of shop right and concludes that an
employer-employee relationship is necessary.
Second, the contract between Plaintiff and
Schukra is the best evidence of the agreement between them (and their relationship).
The
contract expressly states: “Buyer [Schukra] should acquire no interest in any proprietary design
or other intellectual property of Seller evident in the goods applied by Seller [Nartron] pursuant
to Buyer’s [Schukra’s] order.”
The language is not ambiguous or susceptible to multiple
interpretations—Schukra was not entitled to any rights (co-inventor, shop rights or otherwise) as
a result of its order from Nartron regarding products to be supplied by Nartron. Accordingly, the
Court finds that Defendant’s shop right counterclaim (Count III of its counter-complaint) fails as
a matter of law.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Count III of
Defendant’s counter-complaint is granted.
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B. License
According to Defendant, Count IV of its counter-complaint alleges, in relevant part:
20.
Upon information and belief, as a result of the
contract between Plaintiff and third parties for the development,
design and manufacture of the Seat Controls, the third parties are
the rightful owners of the technology described in the ‘748 patent,
including the Seat Controls, in all or in part. As owners or coinventor’s assignees, these third parties have the full right,
royalty-free license and/or shop right to make, use, sell or offer to
sell all technology described or claimed in the ‘748 patent, which
includes the right to make, use and sell the Seat Controls at issue in
this case, and have them made by [Defendant] or anyone else
who relates back to the third party owners, assignees or license
holders, via license.
21.
As the technology described in the ‘748 patent is
co-owned by Plaintiff and these third parties, Plaintiff has no right
to seek claims against Schukra or [Defendant] for patent
infringement.
22.
[Defendant], therefore, respectfully seeks judgment
as herein set forth.
As the foregoing allegations (and the entirety of Defendant’s arguments in its response) make
clear, Defendant again relies on the belief that Benson/Schukra were co-inventors of the ‘748
Patent and/or that Schukra had a shop right to the ‘748 Patent. As set forth above, both of those
arguments are unavailing. In addition, the Court notes that it is undisputed that Plaintiff did not
grant Defendant (or Schukra) an express license to use the ‘748 Patent.
Finally, the Court concludes that there is no implied license between Plaintiff and
Schukra/Defendant. In order to find that an “implied license” exists, the Federal Circuit has
stated:
A patentee grants an implied license to a purchaser when (1) the
patentee sells an article that has no noninfringing uses and (2) the
circumstances of the sale plainly indicate that the grant of the
license should be inferred. Met-Coil, 803 F.[2]d at 686, 231
U.S.P.Q. at 476.
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Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. Pag, Ltd., 329 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003). “An implied license
signifies a patentee's waiver of the statutory right to exclude others from making, using, selling,
offering to sell, or importing, the patented invention.” Winbond Electronics Corp. v.
International Trade Com’n, 262 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2001).
The defense has three
elements that closely resemble those of equitable estoppel: “(1) the patentee, through statements
or conduct, gave an affirmative grant of consent or permission to make, use, or sell to the alleged
infringer; (2) the alleged infringer relied on that statement or conduct; and (3) the alleged
infringer would, therefore, be materially prejudiced if the patentee is allowed to proceed with its
claim.” Id. at 1374. For the reasons set forth above, especially in Section VI.B., the Court
concludes that, as a matter of law, there is no implied license to the ‘748 Patent that extends from
Plaintiff to Schukra/Defendant.
Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Count IV of
Defendant’s counter-complaint fails as a matter of law and, therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment on Defendant’s license claim under Count IV of the counter-complaint must
be granted.
IX.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby ORDERS that:
1.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant’s Counterclaims in
Count III (Shop Right) and Count IV (License) (Docket #95) is GRANTED;
2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the First Affirmative Defense
(Patent Invalidity) and Counterclaim Count I (Declaratory Judgment of Patent
Invalidity and Unenforceability) (Docket #96) is GRANTED;
3. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant’s Fourth Affirmative
Defense (Laches, Estoppel and Waiver) (Docket #97) is GRANTED;
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4. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Infringement by Defendant (Docket
#100) is GRANTED;
5. Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Based on the Lack of
Infringement (Docket #101) is DENIED; and
6. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on Summary Judgment Based on Co-Inventorship
(Docket #102) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
A. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Docket #127) is DENIED;
B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Response to Defendant’s Notice of
Correction (Docket #139) is DENIED; and
C. Defendant’s Motion for Attorney Fees (Docket #170) is DENIED, in that the
motion was based on this Court’s ruling granting Defendant summary
judgment in this cause of action (Docket #166), a ruling that was reversed by
the Federal Circuit.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for the parties appear for a Final Pre-trial
Conference on April 5, 2012, at 11:30 A.M., 526 Water Street, Port Huron, MI. All counsel
must be present, as well as the clients and/or those with full settlement authority. The proposed
pretrial order, along with joint-agreed upon jury instructions, shall be submitted to the Judge’s
Chambers at the Final Pretrial/Settlement Conference. If necessary, the case will be scheduled
for a trial date at the conference.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Lawrence P. Zatkoff
LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: January 26, 2012
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