Rouse et al v. Caruso, et al

Filing 280

ORDER Adopting 273 Report and Recommendation: Denying 270 Motion to Certify Class filed by Michael Kanipe, Claude Hoffman, Richard Boone, II, Hilton Evans, Michael Lake, William Taylor, and Overruling Objections. Signed by District Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III. (CCoh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ARTHUR ROUSE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 06-cv-10961

v.

HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III

PATRICIA CARUSO, et al.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS AND ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (document no. 273), AND
DENYING RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION (document no. 270)
This is a prisoner civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 over conditions at state
prison facilities in St. Louis, Michigan. Plaintiffs are all former inmates at the St. Louis,
Michigan correctional facilities; Defendants are officers and supervisors working for the
Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC"). The Court referred the case to a U.S.
Magistrate Judge for all pretrial proceedings. On August 14, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a motion
for class certification, which the Court subsequently denied without prejudice pursuant to
a Report and Recommendation ("Report") from the magistrate judge. See ECF No. 269.
On March 11, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for class certification. ECF No.
270. In their motion, Plaintiffs seek to certify classes of current and former prisoners
housed at the St. Louis facilities on or after February 14, 2005, and two subclasses of
current and former prisoners at the same facility after November 1, 2002, who were
subject to certain MDOC policies and practices.
On May 31, 2013, the magistrate judge issued a Report suggesting denyial of
Plaintiffs' motion. Report, ECF No. 273. Plaintiffs filed a timely objection to the Report,
arguing the magistrate judge erred in his conclusion that Plaintiffs could not meet the

requirements of Civil Rule 23(b)(3) based on his analysis of Plaintiffs' common questions
of fact and law compared to individual questions. Obj., ECF No. 276.
A report and recommendation for dispositive motions issued by a magistrate judge
is reviewed pursuant to Civil Rule 72(b). The district judge referring the motion is only
required to perform a de novo review of the magistrate judge’s findings if the parties "serve
and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Civil Rule 72 does not require the Court to hold a hearing when
reviewing a magistrate judge's findings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; U.S. v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667,
674 (1980) (holding 28 U.S.C. § 636 does not require a hearing for de novo review of a
magistrate's findings). After examining the record and considering Plaintiffs' objection de
novo, the Court concludes that their objection does not have merit. Accordingly, the Court
will adopt the Report and deny Plaintiffs' renewed motion for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
I.

The Report
After examining Plaintiffs' motion, the Report concluded Plaintiffs could not establish

that the issues in the proposed class subject to generalized proof predominated over the
issues subject only to individualized proof, as required by Civil Rule 23(b)(3). Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23. The Report further concluded it was unnecessary to determine whether the proposed
class could meet any of the four requirements of Civil Rule 23(a) because of this deficiency.
Report 8. The Report noted that the prior orders in this case had narrowed the Plaintiffs'
claims from a wide range of claims to just two issues: the state of medical care and the
hygiene policy. For both claims, the Report observed that Plaintiffs' had not demonstrated
that common issues would predominate over individual issues.
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With respect to the medical care issue, the Report noted that claims for deficient
medical care under the Eighth Amendment may only be met by making a showing of
deliberate indifference to a prisoner's medical needs. Report 10 (citing Perez v. Oakland
County, 466 F.3d 416, 423-24 (6th Cir. 2006)). Such a showing would require proof of a
serious medical need, denied or delayed treatment of that need, as the result of deliberate
indifference, and damages. The Report concluded that although "the alleged inadequacies
in the medical facilities may provide some (although not total) common proof with respect
to the [deliberate indifference] issue, each of the other three requires individualized proof
for each proposed class member." Id.
With respect to the hygiene issue, the Report first concluded that the hygiene policy
was not unconstitutional on its face. Thus, Plaintiffs' would be required to demonstrate that
their removal from indigent status resulting in a loss of hygiene items was deliberate
indifference, that they subsequently did not have the ability to obtain hygiene items, and
that such a loss resulted in extreme discomfort or a complete denial of hygiene. Report 11
(citing Flavory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 255 n.1 (6th Cir. 2010)). The Report concluded that
"individual issues would predominate over any issues common to the class." Id. The Report
thus concluded the motion for class certification should be denied.1

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The Court also agrees with the Report's conclusion that a class action is not required
to vindicate individual claims. This is not a case "[w]here it is not economically feasible to
obtain relief [via individual suits] . . . [such that plaintiffs have no] effective redress unless
they may employ the class-action device." Deposit Guar. Nat. Bank, Jackson, Miss. v.
Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). Eighth Amendment claims are commonly brought by
individuals and can result in substantial damages awards. See Report at 10 (citing Ford v.
County of Grand Traverse, 535 F.3d 483, 489 (6th Cir. 2008)). A class action is not
required for Plaintiffs to vindicate their claims.
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II.

Legal Standards
When applying for class certification, a party must demonstrate affirmative compliance

with Civil Rule 23's requirements. It is the plaintiff's burden to "establish his right" to class
certification. "A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his
compliance with the Rule.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
A "class may only be certified if, after a rigorous analysis, the district court is satisfied that
[the Rule 23] prerequisites have been met." Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 560
(6th Cir. 2007).
A proposed class must also "fall within one of the three types of class actions listed
in Rule 23(b)." Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir.1998) (en banc).
Here, Plaintiffs moved to certify under Civil Rule 23(b)(3). The Rule "requires a
demonstration that questions of law or fact common to the class predominate over
individual questions and that the class action is superior to other available methods to
adjudicate the controversy fairly and efficiently." In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069,
1084 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23).
For a court to find that common questions predominate over individual questions, "a
plaintiff must establish that ‘the issues in the class action that are subject to generalized
proof, and thus applicable to the class as a whole, ... predominate over those issues that
are subject only to individualized proof.'" Beattie, 511 F.3d at 564 (quoting In re Visa
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 2001)). And “[c]ommon
issues may predominate when liability can be determined on a class-wide basis, even when
there are some individualized damage issues.” Id. But a court must still conduct a "rigorous
analysis" to ensure Rule 23's "prerequisites have been met." Id. at 560.
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III.

Analysis
The Objection first argues that the Report incorrectly applied Civil Rule 23(b)(3)'s

standards when discussing whether Plaintiffs met the standard. The Objection notes that
Civil Rule 23 "does not mandate that all claims be identical in fact and theory," but rather
only that common issues predominate. Obj. 3.
Overall, the Objection essentially argues that because Plaintiffs' claims do have a
"causal nexus" — the inadequacies of the medical care facilities and the hygiene policy —
the Report erred by concluding that class certification was inappropriate. The Objection
argues that the fact these common policies resulted in unconstitutionally inadequate
medical care and hygiene levels makes the suit amenable to class certification. Finally, the
Objection notes that the Court could bifurcate questions of liability and damages to ensure
the action is centered on common questions. Obj. 4 (citing Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 203
F.R.D. 254, 271 (E.D. Mich. 2001)).
The Objection is certainly correct that "[t]he mere existence of individualized defenses
does not bar class certification." Id. (quoting Olden, 203 F.R.D. at 271). But the Report did
not claim that class certification should be denied solely because individual questions of
fact existed. Rather, the Report concluded that the individual questions both existed and
predominated over common questions. There may well be questions about the medical
care and the hygiene policy common to the class. But just as the existence of individual
facts is not dispositive for denying class certification, the existence of common questions
of fact and law does not automatically transform an action into a class action. Plaintiffs
must still show that, under Civil Rule 23(b)(3), the common questions predominate over
individual ones. See Beattie, 511 F.3d at 564. The Report concluded they did not.
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On de novo review, the Court reaches the same conclusion. Even accounting for the
common question of the medical care facilities and hygiene policy, the individual questions
are not merely the extent of damages. Individualized and highly fact-specific questions of
deliberate indifference, plaintiffs' specific medical needs and whether treatment was
delayed or denied, whether indigent-status was properly revoked, and the effect of that loss
also exist, and are in fact, specific to each individual plaintiff. For example, Plaintiffs'
medical care claims encompass claims for denial of care, disagreements about the level
of care actually rendered, and claims where the medical care policies were actually
violated, which are all distinct questions. And where the claims of an individual are
individualized to the point where proving liability for an individual does not necessarily prove
liability for the class, the claims should not be brought in a class action. See Sprague, 133
F.3d at 399 ("A named plaintiff who proved his own claim would not necessarily have
proved anybody else's claim.").
Based on the record, Plaintiffs' claims carry with them so many individual questions
of law and fact and liability that the common questions do not predominate over the
individual questions. See, e.g., Turner v. Grant Cnty. Det. Ctr., CIV.A. 05-148-DLB, 2008
WL 821895, at *20 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 26, 2008) ("[T]here may be common issues of fact and
law as to the existence and legality of [prison's] policies and practices. But these policies
and practices are alleged so broadly and so generally that these fact and legal questions
are too numerous and too common to be of practical benefit for discerning a common
thread for each class. . . . [And] the individual aspects of both claims and defenses for each
of the two proposed classes would be extensive. Thus, the predominance of common
versus individual issues simply has not been established by Plaintiffs."); see also Schilling
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v. Kenton Cnty., Ky., CIV.A. 10-143-DLB, 2011 WL 293759, at *9-10 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 27,
2011) (holding that prisoners' claims of denial of medical care were too individualized to
meet the "typicality" requirement of Civil Rule 23). Plaintiffs' have not met their burden
under Civil Rule 23(b)(3). Accordingly, the Court will overrule the objections, adopt the
Report, and deny the renewed motion for class certification.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation
(document no. 273) is ADOPTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' Renewed Class Certification
(document no. 270) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

s/Stephen J. Murphy, III
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
United States District Judge
Dated: October 25, 2013
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or
counsel of record on October 25, 2013, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Carol Cohron
Case Manager

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