Dowdy et al v. Caruso, et al

Filing 80

Memorandum and Order Adopting 70 Report and Recommendation and Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' 55 Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' 57 Motion for Summary Judgment and Setting a Status Conference. Signed by District Judge Avern Cohn. (SCha)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ERIC DOWDY-EL, AVERIS X. WILSON,
AMIRA SALEM, TOM TRAINI, and
ROGER HUNT,
Case Number: 06-11765

Plaintiffs,

HON. AVERN COHN

v.
PATRICIA L. CARUSO, MICHAEL
MARTIN, and DAVE BURNETT,
Defendants.
______________________________/

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (Doc. 70)
AND
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 55)
AND
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 57)
AND
SETTING A STATUS CONFERENCE
I. Introduction
Plaintiffs are Muslim1 inmates housed by the Michigan Department of Corrections
(“MDOC”) who challenge the defendant prison officials’ alleged failure to accommodate
their requests to observe three distinct Islamic religious practices:

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The magistrate judge has recommended that the sole non-Muslim plaintiff’s
claims be dismissed for failure to respond to defendants’ motion. (Doc. 70 at 2, n. 1).
The Court agrees. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Roger Hunt is
GRANTED. Hunt is DISMISSED as a party to this case.

(1) attending Jum’ah prayer services;
(2) receiving a halal diet; and
(3) participating in the Eid ul-Fitr and Eid ul-Adha Feasts (the “Eid feasts”).
Plaintiffs challenge each alleged failure to accommodate under: (1) the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; (2)
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, (3)
the Michigan Constitution’s counterparts to the United States Constitution’s Equal
Protection and Free Exercise Clauses, Article 1 §§ 2 and 4, respectively; and (4) the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et
seq, “RLUIPA”). The matter has been referred to a magistrate judge, before whom the
parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. (Docs. 55, 57).2
The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (“MJRR”),
recommending that the motions be granted in part and denied in part. (Doc. 70).
Specifically, the magistrate judge recommends:
(1)

Plaintiffs’ state and federal constitutional claims under the Equal
Protection Clause relating to Jum’ah and halal diet be DISMISSED

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Plaintiffs also filed a motion for class certification. (Doc. 56). The magistrate
judge recommended that the motion be granted. (Doc. 73). Neither party objected to
the recommendation, which the Court adopted. (Doc. 77). Accordingly, the Court
certified a class with respect to the attendance at Jum’ah services, comprised of “all
current and future Michigan Muslim inmates who desire but have been denied …the
ability to participate in Jum’ah because of a conflicting work, school or similar detail.
With respect to the provision of a halal diet, the Court certified a class comprised of “all
current and future Michigan Muslim inmates who desire but have been denied …a halal
diet that is free of contamination by foods considered haram,” i.e., non-halal meats
and/or vegetarian foods that have been “contaminated” by coming into contact with
such meats. The Court did not certify a class with respect to the Eid feasts, as the
magistrate judge has recommended that judgment enter in favor of plaintiffs regarding
this religious practice.
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(2)

Plaintiffs state and federal constitutional claims under the Free Exercise
clause relating to Jum’ah prayer services be DISMISSED.

(3)

Plaintiffs’ state and federal constitutional claims under the Free Exercise
Clause relating to halal diet CONTINUE

(4)

Plaintiffs’ RLUIPA claims relating to Jum’ah prayer services and halal diet
CONTINUE

(5)

Judgment enter in favor of plaintiffs on all claims relating to the Eid feast

Stated differently, if the MJRR is adopted, the following claims will remain for
trial:
(1)

halal diet - Free Exercise Claim under state and federal constitutions and
RLUIPA

(2)

Jum’ah prayer services - RLUIPA Claim

Both parties have filed objections. (Docs. 71, 72). For the reasons that follow,
the MJRR will be adopted and the parties cross motions for summary judgment will be
granted in part and denied in part.
II. Legal Standards
A. Review of MJRR
A district court must conduct a de novo review of the parts of a magistrate
judge's report and recommendation to which a party objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The
district “court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate" judge. Id. The requirement of de novo
review “is a statutory recognition that Article III of the United States Constitution
mandates that the judicial power of the United States be vested in judges with life
tenure.” United States v. Shami, 754 F.2d 670, 672 (6th Cir. 1985).
A general objection, or one that merely restates the arguments previously
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presented, is not sufficient to alert the court to alleged errors on the part of the
magistrate judge. An “objection” that does nothing more than state a disagreement with
a magistrate judge's suggested resolution, or simply summarizes what has been
presented before, is not an objection as that term is used in this context. Howard v.
Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508 (6th Cir. 1991) (“It is arguable in
this case that Howard’s counsel did not file objections at all.... [I]t is hard to see how a
district court reading [the ‘objections’] would know what Howard thought the magistrate
had done wrong.”).
B. Summary Judgment
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A moving party may meet that burden “by
‘showing’ – that is, pointing out to the district court -- that there is an absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 325 (1986). Revised Rule 56 expressly provides that:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must
support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion
only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The revised Rule also provides the consequences of failing to
properly support or address a fact:
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If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly
address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the
court may:
(1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact;
(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion;
(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials –
including the facts considered undisputed – show that the movant is
entitled to it; or
(4) issue any other appropriate order.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may
consider other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
When the moving party has met its burden under Rule 56, “its opponent must do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Electric Industries Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Ultimately a district court must determine whether the record as a whole presents a
genuine issue of material fact, id. at 587, drawing “all justifiable inferences in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party,” Hager v. Pike County Bd. Of Education, 286
F.3d 366, 370 (6th Cir. 2002).
III. Discussion
A. The MJRR
The Court has carefully reviewed the objections. The parties essentially repeat
the arguments considered and rejected by the magistrate judge. The Court is satisfied
that the recommendations of the magistrate judge should be adopted. What follows is a
brief discussion of each religious practice and the Court’s findings, consistent with the

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MJRR.
1. Eid Feasts
The magistrate judge recommends that judgment enter in favor of plaintiffs on all
claims relating to participation in the Eid feasts. The MDOC objects, contending as it
did before the magistrate judge, that the issue is moot because a December 10, 2010
MDOC Memo specifically permits participation. Plaintiffs disagree, arguing, correctly,
that the Memo is not official MDOC policy, can be reversed at any time, and does not
address whether inmates may observe the Eid feasts when they have conflicting work
detail. Significantly, defendants have not contended that plaintiffs have a right to
participate in the Eid feasts, i.e. they have not challenged the substantive merit of
plaintiffs’ claims as to the Eid feasts. As such, a judgment shall enter in favor of
plaintiffs as to participation in the Eid feasts. Plaintiffs shall submit a proposed
judgment, to which defendants may respond, as set forth below.
B. Halal Diet
The heart of the dispute over this religious practice appears to surround whether
the current systems which provides a non-meat diet, i.e. selecting a vegetarian and
protein substitute, is sufficient to meet the plaintiffs’ dietary needs. There is also an
issue of cross contamination. The there are genuine issues of material fact as to (1)
whether plaintiffs receive a halal diet under the current system and as to defendants’
ability to provide halal meals, (2) whether defendants’ cost concerns constitute a
compelling governmental interest, and (3) whether the current system is the least
restrictive means of advancing that interest. In light of these disputes, plaintiffs’ claims

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under the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA regarding the provision of a halal diet must
proceed to trial.
C. Jum’ah Prayer Services
The parties disagree on whether the MDOC’s work release policy is sufficient to
permit plaintiffs to attend weekly Friday afternoon Jum’ah prayer services when the
prayer conflicts with a work or school detail.
The Court concludes that (1) attendance at Jum’ah prayer services is a protected
religious exercise under RLUIPA, (2) the current work release policy substantially
burdens plaintiffs’ ability to participate in Jum’ah prayer services, and (3) defendants’
have identified a compelling interest of prison security justifying the work release policy.
However, and significantly, that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the work release policy is the least restrictive means of enforcing the MDOC’s
compelling interest in prison security. As a result, plaintiffs’ claims under RLUIPA
regarding participation in Jum’ah prayer services must proceed to trial.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the MJRR is ADOPTED as the findings and
conclusions of the Court, as supplemented above. The parties cross motions for
summary judgment are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
Plaintiffs are granted judgment regarding the Eid feats. Plaintiffs shall submit a
proposed judgment on or before Monday, June 3, 2013. Defendants may file a
response to the proposed judgment on or before Monday, June 10, 2013.

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Plaintiffs’ claims regarding halal diet and Jum’ah prayer services shall proceed to
trial as described above.
The Court will hold a status conference on Tuesday, June 18 at 2:00 p.m. to
chart the future course of the case.
SO ORDERED.

S/Avern Cohn
AVERN COHN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: May 24, 2013

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to the attorneys of
record on this date, May 24, 2013, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

S/Sakne Chami
Case Manager, [phone]

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