Stevenson v. Potter
Filing
121
OPINION AND ORDER denying 116 Motion for Reconsideration re 113 Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Paul D. Borman. (DTof)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JAMES STEVENSON III,
Case No. 06-15182
Plaintiff,
Paul D. Borman
United States District Judge
v.
MEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster
General of the United States,
David R. Grand
United States Magistrate Judge
Defendant.
______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION (ECF NO. 116)
In this Title VII case, Plaintiff James Stevenson III alleges that his employer,
the United States Postal Service,1 took various adverse employment actions against
him for discriminatory and retaliatory reasons over the course of several years.
On March 12, 2018, this Court granted in part and denied in part a motion for
partial summary judgment filed by Defendant. Plaintiff has moved for
reconsideration of that Opinion and Order, arguing that the Court erred in
determining that Plaintiff had not shown a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether there was a sufficient causal connection between his protected activity and
1
Nominally, the Defendant in this action is Megan J. Brennan, in her capacity as
Postmaster General of the United States. For practical purposes, however, the United
States Postal Service (“USPS”) was Plaintiff’s employer, and so references to
“Defendant” in this opinion are made with that fact in mind.
any adverse actions taken by Defendant against him. For the reasons that follow, the
Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.
I.
BACKGROUND
On March 12, 2018, this Court issued an Opinion and Order Granting in Part
and Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Referring the Matter to Facilitative Mediation. (ECF No. 113, Opinion and Order.)
There, the Court described the causation standard that governs Plaintiff’s Title VII
retaliation claim in the following way:
“Title VII retaliation claims ‘must be proved according to traditional
principles of but-for causation,’ which ‘requires proof that the unlawful
retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged
wrongful action or actions of the employer.’” Laster [v. City of
Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 731 (6th Cir. 2014)] (quoting Univ. of Tex.
Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013)); see also E.E.O.
C. v. New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d 1057, 1070 (6th Cir. 2015)
(“[U]nder Nassar, a Title VII claimant must show that his or her
protected activity was a but-for cause of the adverse action by the
employer.”).
(Opinion and Order at 34, Pg ID 4718.) Under that standard, the Court held (inter
alia) that Plaintiff had failed to meet his prima facie burden with respect to causation
on his retaliation claim, insofar as that claim was based on certain specific factual
grounds. (See id. at 34, 40, 43-44, 48-49, Pg ID 4718, 4724, 4727-28, 4732-33.)
Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration on March 26, 2018,
seeking reconsideration of the March 12, 2018 Opinion and Order generally, and the
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Court’s findings as to causation specifically. (ECF No. 116, Pl.’s Mot.) Under E.D.
Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(1), the Court determines that no hearing is necessary to rule on the
Motion for Reconsideration, and that the matter is otherwise ripe for adjudication.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Local Rule 7.1(h)(3) provides as follows:
Generally, and without restricting the court's discretion, the court will
not grant motions for rehearing or reconsideration that merely present
the same issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by
reasonable implication. The movant must not only demonstrate a
palpable defect by which the court and the parties and other persons
entitled to be heard on the motion have been misled but also show that
correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case.
E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3).
“A ‘palpable defect’ is a defect which is obvious, clear, unmistakable,
manifest, or plain.” Ososki v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 162 F. Supp. 2d 714,
718 (E.D. Mich. 2001). “A motion for reconsideration which presents the same
issues already ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable implication,
will not be granted.” Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d
628, 632 (E.D. Mich. 2001); see also Maiberger v. City of Livonia, 724 F. Supp. 2d
759, 780 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (“It is an exception to the norm for the Court to grant a
motion for reconsideration. . . . [A]bsent a significant error that changes the outcome
of a ruling on a motion, the Court will not provide a party with an opportunity to
relitigate issues already decided.”). “A motion for reconsideration should not be used
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liberally to get a second bite at the apple, but should be used sparingly to correct
actual defects in the court's opinion.” Oswald v. BAE Indus., Inc., No. 10-12660,
2010 WL 5464271, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2010) (emphasis in original) (citing
Maiberger, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 780), aff'd, 483 F. App'x 30 (6th Cir. 2012).
“To establish a ‘palpable defect,’ the moving party generally must point to
‘(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change
in controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice.’” In re Collins &
Aikman Corp., 417 B.R. 449, 454 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (quoting Henderson v. Walled
Lake Consolidated Schools, 469 F.3d 479, 496 (6th Cir. 2006)). “It is well-settled
that ‘parties cannot use a motion for reconsideration to raise new legal arguments
that could have been raised before a judgment was issued.’” Shah v. NXP
Semiconductors USA, Inc., 507 F. App’x 483, 495 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Roger
Miller Music, Inc. v. Sony/ATV Publ’g, 477 F.3d 383, 395 (6th Cir. 2007)). By the
same token, “a party may not introduce evidence for the first time in a motion for
reconsideration where that evidence could have been presented earlier.” Id. (citing
Sommer v. Davis, 317 F.3d 686, 691 (6th Cir. 2003) and CGH Transp., Inc. v.
Quebecor World, Inc., 261 F. App’x 817, 824 (6th Cir. 2008)); see also Arrowood
Indem. Co. v. Lubrizol Corp., 695 F. App’x 842, 849 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Motions for
reconsideration are not to be used as ‘an opportunity to re-argue a case’ or
to ‘introduce evidence for the first time ... where that evidence could have been
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presented earlier.’”) (quoting Shah, 507 F. App’x at 495).
III.
A.
DISCUSSION
The Court’s causation analysis in the March 12, 2018 Opinion and Order
was not based on a clear error of law.
Plaintiff argues that this Court’s causation analysis in the March 12, 2018
Opinion and Order was erroneous. Specifically, Plaintiff takes issue with the Court’s
determination that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim “‘must be proved according to
traditional principles of but-for causation,’ which ‘requires proof that the unlawful
retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or
actions of the employer.’” (ECF No. 113 at 34, Pg ID 4718 (quoting Laster v. City
of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 719 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med.
Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013)).)
Plaintiff’s position is that “but-for” causation is not the correct legal standard
because Title VII retaliation actions against federal agencies like USPS are governed
by a different statutory provision than that which governs such actions against
private employers: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (hereinafter the “federal-sector
provision”), instead of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. And although “but-for” causation is
the proper causation standard for Title VII retaliation actions against private
employers under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, Plaintiff argues, Title VII retaliation actions
against federal agencies brought pursuant to the federal-sector provision are subject
to a substantially lower “motivating factor” causation standard.
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The Sixth Circuit has consistently applied a “but-for” causation standard to
Title VII retaliation claims brought against federal agencies. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Geithner, 703 F.3d 328, 339 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding, as to an Internal Revenue
Service employee’s Title VII retaliation claim against the U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury, that “[i]n order to establish a causal connection, [the plaintiff must
evidence] that the employer would not have taken the adverse action against the
plaintiff had the plaintiff not engaged in activity that Title VII protects”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Dean-Lis v. McHugh, 598 F. App’x 412, 414 (6th Cir.
2015) (holding, as to a civilian Army employee’s Title VII retaliation claim against
the U.S. Secretary of the Army, that the causation prong of the plaintiff’s prima facie
case required a showing that “the Army would not have taken [the adverse] action
but for the [plaintiff’s] protected activity”) (citing Laster, 746 F.3d at 730, and
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533); Philbrick v. Holder, 583 F. App’x 478, 489 (6th Cir.
2014) (holding, as to a U.S. Marshal’s Title VII retaliation claim against the U.S.
Attorney General, that “[w]ith respect to the ‘causal connection,’ the plaintiff must
establish that ‘but for’ the protected activity, the materially adverse action would not
have occurred”) (citing Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2532–33).
In support of his argument, Plaintiff cites a 2016 Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) Guidance document explaining that the
EEOC’s position is that the textual differences between the federal-sector provision
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and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 require that a less exacting standard be applied to Title VII
retaliation claims brought against federal agencies under the federal-sector
provision. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON RETALIATION AND
RELATED ISSUES, 2016 WL 4688886, at *22 (“The federal sector provisions
contain a broad prohibition of ‘discrimination’ rather than a list of specific prohibited
practices, requiring that employment ‘be made free from any discrimination,’
including retaliation. Therefore, in Title VII and ADEA cases against a federal
employer, retaliation is prohibited if it was a motivating factor.”) (internal quotation
marks and footnote omitted).
The EEOC Guidance that Plaintiff has cited does not bind this Court. The
Sixth Circuit precedent discussed supra, however, does, and that precedent makes
clear that the “but-for” causation standard discussed in Laster and Nasser was
properly applied in this case. Because Plaintiff has cited no binding authority
indicating that a different causation standard should have been applied, the Court
rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the Court’s failure to do so was a palpable defect
that now requires reconsideration of the March 12, 2018 Opinion and Order.
B.
Plaintiff’s remaining arguments for reconsideration of the March 12,
2018 Opinion and Order do not demonstrate a palpable defect.
The remainder of the arguments presented in Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration have to do with whether Plaintiff demonstrated a genuine issue of
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material fact regarding causation as to the various grounds for his retaliation claim.
To the extent that these arguments depend on a finding by this Court that a lower
standard than “but-for” causation applies to that claim, the arguments fail because
the Court declines to make such a finding for the reasons discussed above.
Insofar as Plaintiff presents these arguments under the “but-for” causation
standard that does govern his retaliation claim, the arguments lack merit for a
different reason. Local Rule 7.1 provides that to prevail on a motion for
reconsideration, the movant must “demonstrate a palpable defect by which the court
and the parties and other persons entitled to be heard on the motion have been
misled.” E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h)(3). “To establish a ‘palpable defect,’ the moving
party generally must point to ‘(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence;
(3) an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest
injustice.’” In re Collins & Aikman Corp., 417 B.R. 449, 454 (E.D. Mich. 2009)
(quoting Henderson v. Walled Lake Consolidated Schools, 469 F.3d 479, 496 (6th
Cir. 2006)). Sixth Circuit precedent also establishes that “parties cannot use a motion
for reconsideration to raise new legal arguments that could have been raised before
a judgment was issued,” or “introduce evidence for the first time in a motion for
reconsideration where that evidence could have been presented earlier.” Shah, 507
F. App’x at 495.
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With regard to the arguments in Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
besides those that concern the applicable causation standard, Plaintiff has failed to
show that those arguments point to a clear error of law, newly discovered evidence,
an intervening change in controlling law, or a need to prevent manifest injustice; that
they could not have been raised earlier, or are premised on evidence that was
unavailable earlier; or indeed that they amount to anything more than an
impermissible attempt to use the instant Motion for Reconsideration as “an
opportunity to re-argue [the] case.” Arrowood Indem. Co. v. Lubrizol Corp., 695 F.
App’x 842, 849 (6th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Shah,
507 F. App’x at 495). Accordingly, the Court rejects those arguments as well.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 29, 2018
s/Paul D. Borman
Paul D. Borman
United States District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served upon
each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first class U.S. mail
on May 29, 2018.
s/D. Tofil
Deborah Tofil, Case Manager
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