International Technologies Consultants, Incorporated v. Stewart et al

Filing 116

ORDER DISMISSING CASE Signed by District Judge Julian Abele Cook. (KDoa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGIES
CONSULTANTS, INC.,
Plaintiff/ Counter- Defendant
Case No. 07-13391
Honorable Julian Abele Cook, Jr.

v.
LESLIE T. STEWART and STEWART ENGINEERS
AND ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Defendant/ Counter-Claimant
v.
DEAN WILEY,
Third-Party Defendant

ORDER
The Plaintiff, International Technologies Consultants, Inc. (“International Consultants”), is
a Michigan corporation which oversees the construction of float glass plants. In its complaint, filed
on August 14, 2007, International Consultants contends that the Defendants, Leslie T. Stewart and
Stewart Engineers and Associates1 (“Stewart Engineers”) have (1) engaged in acts of unfair
competition in violation of §43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B), (2) participated
in common law unfair competition, (3) intentionally interfered with its contractual relations with
other companies, (4) purposefully interfered with a business relationship or expectancy, and (5)

1

Leslie T. Stewart is the president, director, and sole shareholder of Stewart Engineers &
Associates, Inc.

libeled it within their trade circles.
In particular, the Plaintiff accused the Defendants of wrongfully communicating misleading
statements to its customers and business associates in the float glass industry which, in turn,
substantially damaged its reputation within this business community. On September 4, 2007, the
Defendants counterclaimed, alleging (1) breach of contract, (2) interference with a business
relationship or expectancy, and (3) violations of Michigan’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act.
On August 23, 2007, International Consultants filed a motion seeking to obtain a preliminary
injunction that would prevent the Defendants from engaging in conduct which had allegedly caused
it to suffer irreparable damages to its business interests. On September 20, 2007, the Court entered
an order that directed the Defendants “to refrain from communicating, or attempting to communicate
- directly or indirectly - with any non-parties whom they know, or have reason to know, have or may
have an actual or prospective business relationship with the Plaintiff relating to matters which
pertain to the float glass technology.” On September 23, 2008, the Court entered preliminary
injunction enjoining “the Defendants from communicating with any non-parties to this litigation
who have, or may have, an actual or prospective business relationship with the Plaintiff regarding
the ownership of the float glass technology during the pendency of this case.”
On December 14, 2010, the Plaintiff filed a motion in which it waived any and all claims to
legal remedies arising from the claims of its complaint. The Court noted that since the Plaintiff
waived all legal remedies, leaving it only to pursue equitable relief, the Court had cause to reexamine whether the parties had standing in federal court.
In the Court’s order of September 9, 2011 the Court directed the Plaintiff “to indicate in
writing and otherwise show good cause as to why its claims against Stewart Engineers should not

2

be dismissed for lack of standing under Article III to the United States Constitution, in light of its
waiver of any and all legal remedies which it acknowledges only leaves it to pursue equitable relief.”
I.
A challenge to standing may be brought at any time in the form of a motion to dismiss.
Fieger v. Terry, 471 F.3d 637, 643. If the plaintiff loses standing at any time during the pendency
of the proceedings, the matter becomes moot, and the court loses jurisdiction. 15 J. Moore et al.,
Moore’s Federal Practice § 101.90 (3d ed. 2011). An action or complaint may be dismissed on the
grounds that the case has become moot. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). Standing must
be present at all stages of the litigation, including on appeal. See, e.g. Parvati Corp. v. City of Oak
Forest, Ill., 630 F.3d 412 (7th Cir.2010). If a claim has become moot prior to the entry of a final
judgment, the district court generally should dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Detroit, Toledo and Ironton R. Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 767 F.2d 274 (6th Cir.1985)
(affirming dismissal for mootness). Further, the Court has an independent obligation to assure itself
that standing exists, regardless of whether it is challenged by any of the parties. Summers v. Earth
Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
One element of the constitutional requirement of standing is that the plaintiff must
demonstrate a distinct and palpable injury that is likely to be redressed if the requested relief is
granted. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). Standing requires that a plaintiff allege a personal injury that is
fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
requested relief. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991); Steel Co. v. Citizens for
a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).

3

II.
In the case at bar, the plaintiff has waived all legal remedies leaving only an equitable claim
for a permanent injunction. International Consultants seeks an permanent injunction remedying
Stewart Engineer’s allegedly deceptive past marketplace practices. A party seeking injunctive relief
must make a showing of concrete and particularized allegations of a threat of a future injury as the
result of the defendant’s actions. Friends of Tims Ford v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 585 F.3d 955
(970-71) (6th Cir.2009) (insufficient basis for plaintiff to only demonstrate past injury when
pursuing declaratory and injunctive relief); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment 523 U.S.
83, 109 (1998) (since plaintiff alleged “only past infractions . . .and not a continuing violation or the
likelihood of a future violation, injunctive relief will not redress its injury.”).
A review of the complaint demonstrates that International Consultants has failed to allege
any continuing threat of future injury that could be redressed by the issuance of a permanent
injunction. Rather, the complaint alleges past injuries sustained by the mailing of letters by the
Defendants in 2007. A forward looking permanent injunction could not redress damages sustained
by the Plaintiff in the past. For whatever reason, International Consultants has affirmatively waived
its right to pursue any legal remedies in this case, including money damages. Therefore, this claim
must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
III.
Plaintiff urges the Court to grant it leave to amend its complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)
states that leave to amend should be granted “when justice so requires.” The Supreme Court set forth
the following standard to determine whether leave to amend should be granted:
If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper
subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the
4

merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason- such as undue delay, bad
faith or dilatory motive on the party of the movant, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. – the
leave sought should, as the rules require, be ‘freely given.’ Foman v Davis 371 U.S.
178, 182-83 (1962).
Additionally, once the scheduling order’s deadline has passed, a plaintiff seeking leave to amend
must show good cause under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 909 (6th
Cir.2003).
In this case, the deadline for discovery passed on October 16, 2009. The deadline for
dispositive motions passed on October 30, 2009. It would be prejudicial to the Defendants to allow
International Consultants to amend its complaint and recast the claims at this late stage in the
proceedings. Additionally, International Consultants has failed to demonstrate good cause for their
failure to adequately assert the continuing threat of a future injury.
The only claims remaining before the Court are state law claims. Under 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3), a court may decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction if all claims over which it
had original jurisdiction are dismissed. Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350
(1988) (internal citations omitted). However, “[i]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are
eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered . . . will point toward declining to
exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484
U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). Therefore, the court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the pending state law claims.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses the remaining state law claims without
prejudice. International Consultants’s motion to reconsider is therefore moot. (ECF 108).
5

The preliminary injunction that was entered on September 23, 2008 is dissolved immediately. The
case is closed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: March 8, 2012

s/Julian Abele Cook, Jr.
JULIAN ABELE COOK, JR.
U.S. District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing Order was served upon counsel of record via the Court's ECF System to their respective
email addresses or First Class U.S. mail to the non-ECF participants on March 8, 2012.
s/ Kay Doaks
Case Manager

6