Robinson v. Wolfenbarger

Filing 41

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER Denying 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Denying Certificate of Appealability. Signed by District Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III. (CCoh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JOSEPH ROBINSON,
Petitioner,

Case No. 07-cv-14870

v.

HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III

HUGH WOLFENBARGER,
Respondent.
/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner Joseph Robinson, presently
incarcerated at the Macomb Correctional Facility in New Haven, Michigan, filed a pro se
application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges his
convictions for second-degree murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 730.317, felon in possession
of a firearm, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b, on the grounds that his right of
confrontation was violated; the prosecutor committed misconduct; the trial court improperly
excluded testimony regarding witness Jonathan Taylor's reputation for lying; and newly
discovered evidence that Taylor's testimony was false and induced by prosecutor and
police threats establishes Robinson's innocence. For the reasons stated below, the
application for writ of habeas corpus will be denied.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from the shooting death of Deborah Turner in 2001. A City of Detroit
police officer testified that he and his partner were dispatched to a vacant home on Artesian
Street in Detroit at approximately 5:00 p.m. on September 24, 2001. The officer previously

had been to that vacant home on several occasions for drug-related investigations. When
he and his partner entered the house, they found the body of a woman lying on the living
room floor. She had obviously been shot. They also found five .22 caliber spent shell
casings in the living room. The woman was later identified as Deborah Turner, and her
cause of death was five gunshot wounds to the head.
Dianne Price testified that she was the younger sister of Deborah Turner. Price
testified that Turner had a substance abuse problem. Price became concerned when, on
the evening of September 23, 2001, Turner left the home they shared wearing only a
nightgown and slippers. Price attempted to locate her sister that night, even driving past
the home where Turner's body was found the next day. Price knew the home to be a drug
house, but did not stop because she did not see her sister's vehicle outside the home.
Jonathan Taylor, Robinson's cousin, testified that he was selling drugs from the
Artesian Street house in September 2001. Deborah Turner had purchased drugs at the
house in the past. Taylor testified that, on September 23, 2001, he left the house at noon,
leaving Robinson there with a .22 caliber pistol that was kept at the house for protection.
Later that day, Robinson called Taylor and told him not to return to the Artesian Street
house. Taylor also testified that, one or two days after the murder, Robinson said that he
had shot someone who had been trying to rob him. Taylor was originally arrested for the
murder. On cross-examination, he admitted that he and Robinson were not on good terms
at the time of the murder.
Tanina Robinson, Robinson's cousin, testified that Robinson visited her home
between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. on September 23, 2001, and asked her to tell Jonathan
Taylor not to go to the Artesian Street house.
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Gwendolyn Suitt testified that she was Robinson's girlfriend until the summer of 2001,
when she told him she was pregnant and he ended the relationship. Although they were
no longer in a relationship, Robinson called Suitt on September 23, 2001, at 10:00 p.m.,
and asked whether he could come over to her house. Suitt initially declined, but agreed
after Robinson persisted. He arrived at her apartment at approximately midnight. He stayed
there for two days. At one point, he asked her if she would like to move to Montana with
him. When she asked why Montana, he responded, "nobody thinks of Montana." Tr.,
9/10/02 at 40. After Robinson left, Suitt learned that police had been in her home. They
returned and showed her papers that they had taken from the pockets of a pair of pants
that had been left in her home. She recognized the handwriting on the papers as
Robinson's. One paper bore a baby name that they had discussed for their unborn child.
On another paper, the words "Metro Airport" and "Amtrack" were written next to telephone
numbers.
City of Detroit police officer Ahmed Haidar testified that, on December 24, 2001, he
was part of a team that executed a search warrant at a known drug house in Detroit. Officer
Haidar testified that he was stationed outside the rear of the home. When officers entered
the front of the home, an individual he later identified as Robinson jumped through a closed
window at the back of the home, shattering the glass. Officer Haidar detained Robinson.
Robinson gave several false names and false birth dates. Officer Haidar ultimately
determined Robinson's actual identity and he was arrested.
Robinson was charged in Wayne County Circuit Court with first-degree premeditated
murder, first-degree felony murder, felon in possession of a firearm, and felony firearm. He
was tried before a jury. At the close of the prosecution's case, the trial court granted
3

Robinson's motion for a directed verdict on the first-degree premeditated murder charge
and reduced that charge to second-degree murder. Robinson was convicted of seconddegree murder, felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony. Robinson was sentenced on October 3, 2002, as a fourth habitual
offender to 50 to 100 years' in prison for the second-degree murder conviction, 2 to 5 years'
in prison for the felon-in-possession conviction, to be served concurrently with one another
and consecutively to 2 years' in prison for the felony-firearm conviction.
Robinson filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals, raising these
claims:
I. Defendant's constitutional rights of confrontation and due process were
circumscribed when the court prevented the defense from arguing in
closing that the chief prosecution witness had a motive to lie when such
argument was based on trial evidence.
II. The prosecution's repeated vouching for its key witness's truthfulness
constitutes misconduct warranting reversal of these convictions.
III. The court abused its discretion when it precluded testimony concerning
Jonathan Taylor's character for untruthfuless.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. People v. Robinson, No.
246708, 2004 WL 1292613 (Mich. Ct. App. June 10, 2004).
Robinson filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court,
raising the same claims raised in the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme
Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Robinson, 472 Mich. 852 (2005). Robinson also
filed a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment pursuant to M.C.R. 6.500, et. seq.,
which was denied. People v. Robinson, No. 02-001497 (Third Circuit Court, Criminal
Division, June 6, 2006). The Michigan appellate courts denied Robinson leave to appeal.
People v. Robinson, No. 273666 (Mich. Ct. App. May 7, 2007); lv. den. 480 Mich. 858
4

(2007).
Robinson then filed a habeas corpus petition in this Court, raising the claims raised
on direct review in state court. He later filed a request to hold this proceeding in abeyance
so he could return to state court to present newly discovered evidence. The Court granted
the motion. Robinson returned to state court and filed a motion for relief from judgment,
raising claims that Jonathan Taylor's recantation testimony established Robinson's actual
innocence and should allow Robinson a new trial. The trial court denied the motion. People
v. Robinson, No. 02-001497-01 (Wayne County Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 2009). Both state
appellate courts denied Robinson's applications for leave to appeal. People v. Robinson,
No. 296131 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2010); People v. Robinson, 488 Mich. 911 (Oct. 26,
2010). The Court then granted Robinson's motion to reopen this proceeding and amend
his petition to include his newly-exhausted clams.
LEGAL STANDARDS
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., governs this case because Robinson filed the petition after the
AEDPA's date of effect. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). This law restricts
when a federal court may grant a petition for habeas corpus:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect
to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim–
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
5

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996).
"A state court's decision is 'contrary to' . . . clearly established law if it 'applies a rule
that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]' or if it 'confronts a set
of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and
nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.'" Mitchell v. Esparza, 540
U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06
(2000)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "[T]he 'unreasonable application'
prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to 'grant the writ if the state court
identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably
applies that principle to the facts of petitioner's case.'" Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520
(2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. But, "[i]n order
for a federal court to find a state court's application of [Supreme Court] precedent
'unreasonable,' the state court's decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous.
The state court's application must have been 'objectively unreasonable.'" Wiggins, 539 U.S.
at 520-21 (citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. The "AEDPA thus
imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and 'demands that
state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773
(2010) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333, n.7; Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)
(per curiam)).
"[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief
so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's
decision." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado,
541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court emphasized "that even a strong case for
6

relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). Under Section 2254(d), "a habeas court must
determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state
court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could
disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior
decision" of the Supreme Court. Id. Thus, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court,
a state prisoner must show that the state court's rejection of his claim "was so lacking in
justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id.
Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal habeas court's review to a determination of
whether the state court's decision comports with clearly established federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court at the time the state court rendered its decision. See
Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; see also Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009)
(noting that the Supreme Court "has held on numerous occasions that it is not 'an
unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law' for a state court to decline to
apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court") (quoting
Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2008) (per curiam)); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 7172 (2003). Section 2254(d) "does not require a state court to give reasons before its
decision can be deemed to have been 'adjudicated on the merits.'" Harrington, 131 S. Ct.
at 785. Furthermore, it "does not require citation of [Supreme Court] cases – indeed, it does
not even require awareness of [Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning
nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8
(2002); see also Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 16. While the requirements of "clearly established
7

law" are to be determined solely by Supreme Court precedent, the decisions of lower
federal courts may be useful in assessing the reasonableness of the state court's resolution
of an issue. See Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Williams v.
Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 2003)); Dickens v. Jones, 203 F. Supp. 2d 354, 359
(E.D. Mich. 2002).
A state court's factual findings are presumed correct on federal habeas review, see
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and may be rebutted only with clear and convincing evidence. See
Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, habeas review is
limited by statute to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim
on the merits. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).
DISCUSSION
Robinson raises these claims for habeas relief:
I.

Petitioner's constitutional rights of confrontation and due process were
circumscribed when the court prevented defense from arguing in closing
that chief prosecution witness had motive to lie when argument was
based on evidence.

II.

The prosecution's repeated vouching for its key witness' truthfulness
constitutes misconduct warranting reversal of these convictions.

III.

The court abused its discretion when it precluded testimony concerning
Jonathan Taylor's character for untruthfulness.

IV.

Petitioner was denied due process and his sentence is invalid where
trial court granted motion for directed verdict on charge of first degree
murder, constituting grant of acquittal such that jeopardy attached.

V.

Prosecution witness Jonathan Taylor's recantation establishes newly
discovered evidence requiring evidentiary hearing and appointment of
counsel.

VI.

Petitioner is actually innocent of the crime of which his is currently
convicted and rightfully asserts his claim.
8

VII.

Prosecution witness Jonathan Taylor signed a sworn statement averring
that his testimony was false, and induced by threats from the
prosecution's office and Detroit police department establishing newly
discovered evidence.

Respondent has filed an answer in opposition, arguing that the claims are meritless
and the final three claims are procedurally defaulted.
I.

Limitations on Closing Arguments
Robinson argues that he was denied his right to due process and confrontation when

the trial court limited the scope of defense counsel's closing argument. Robinson argues
that the trial court refused to allow defense counsel to argue based upon testimony
presented at trial that Jonathan Taylor's testimony was false and motivated by allegations
that Taylor had beaten up Robinson's sister, who was also Taylor's girlfriend.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The right of confrontation encompasses the right of
cross-examination. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) ("The main and
essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of crossexamination."). The right of cross-examination is not absolute. Trial judges "retain wide
latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on
such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment,
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or
only marginally relevant." Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). But the
exclusion of evidence is unconstitutional where it "infringe[s] upon a weighty interest of the
accused." Id. (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 58 (1987)).
In this case, the trial court did not limit the scope of defense counsel's cross9

examination of Taylor. Instead, the trial court limited the scope of closing argument, finding
that defense counsel was attempting to make an improper propensity argument. The
Michigan Court of Appeals found no violation:
Defendant first argues that, during closing argument, the trial court
"circumscribed" his "right of confrontation and due process" by precluding
defense counsel from using evidence elicited during her cross-examination of
defendant's cousin, Jonathan Taylor, to argue that Taylor had a motive to lie
about defendant. We disagree.
At trial, Taylor testified that defendant told him "not to go home," and that he
"shot someone for trying to rob him." During defense counsel's
cross-examination of Taylor, counsel elicited testimony that Taylor and
defendant were "not on good terms," that defendant did not "like" Taylor
"beating up on his sister," and that defendant had threatened Taylor. Later,
during closing argument, defense counsel stated:
We also, ladies and gentlemen, know something else about Jonathan
Taylor. He admitted to you that he had an assaultive history. Remember
he admitted to you that he had assaulted–
The prosecutor objected, noting that the argument was "inappropriate." The trial
court sustained the objection. Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court
concluded that defense counsel sought to make an improper M.R.E. 404(b)
argument, and that the evidence was not admitted for that purpose. The court
noted that "the evidence came in during a discussion with the witness about any
possible bias or motive that Mr. Taylor may have had to lie on his cousin," but
that defense counsel was not allowed "to make the argument that because
[Taylor] has an assaultive history that somehow makes him more of a person
that assaults someone else or words to that effect: That's a propensity
argument which is inappropriate. That's precisely what the rules do not allow
anyone to do."
The purpose of closing argument is to allow the attorneys to comment on the
evidence and to argue their theories of the law to the jury. People v. Finley, 161
Mich. App. 1, 9; 410 N.W.2d 282 (1987). The trial court has broad power and
wide discretion to control closing arguments, People v. Green, 34 Mich.App.
149, 152; 190 N.W.2d 686 (1971), and a duty to limit the arguments of counsel
to relevant and proper matters, see M.C.L. 768.29 and M.C.R. 6.414(A).
We agree with the trial court that defense counsel attempted to use evidence
that was admissible to show bias to make, instead, an improper M.R.E. 404(b)
argument. Although defendant argues on appeal that the precluded argument
would have demonstrated Taylor's motive to lie, nothing in the challenged
10

portion of defense counsel's argument inferred Taylor's motive or intent to lie
because of the "bad blood" between defendant and Taylor. To the contrary, the
only inference the "assaultive history" argument would have suggested is that
Taylor had a propensity for assaulting women and acted in conformity with his
character in murdering the victim. Because use of other acts evidence for the
purpose of suggesting a propensity for similar conduct is prohibited, M.R.E.
404(b), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding defense counsel
from making the argument.
Furthermore, the record indicates that defense counsel was not precluded from
arguing that Taylor was biased or had a motive to lie. In fact, defense counsel,
without interference, fully explained her theory that Taylor was unbelievable. As
such, contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court's ruling did not preclude
defense counsel from arguing that Taylor was biased or had a motive to lie.
Robinson, 2004 WL 1292613 at *1-2.
It was not improper for the trial court to ensure that defense counsel refrained from
arguing to the jurors that Taylor's assaultive history made him, not Robinson, the likely
perpetrator in this case. The ruling was, in fact, in line with the common-law tradition that
a prior crime is inadmissible to show a defendant's propensity to commit present charges.
See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181–82 (1997). Defense counsel was
permitted in closing argument to attack Taylor's credibility and motives for testifying in a
variety of ways. The trial court's ruling, therefore, did not violat Robinson's rights to due
process or confrontation.
II.

Prosecutorial Misconduct
Robinson argues that habeas relief should be granted because the prosecutor

committed misconduct. Robinson contends that the prosecutor vouched for the credibility
of prosecution witness Taylor when he made these two statements: "He's told the truth and
said what the defendant told him." And: "This is about the Defendant attempting to frame
an innocent man, Jonathan Taylor." Robinson, 2004 WL 1292613 at *2. The Michigan
Court of Appeals held that the first comment may have been improper, but it did not
11

prejudice Robinson, and that the second argument was a fair response to defense
counsel's arguments that Taylor was not credible and that Taylor was the "prime suspect."
Id.
The "clearly established Federal law" relevant to a habeas court's review of a
prosecutorial misconduct claim is the Supreme Court's decision in Darden v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 168 (1986). Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2153 (June 11, 2012). In
Darden, the Supreme Court held that a "prosecutor's improper comments will be held to
violate the Constitution only if they 'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the
resulting conviction a denial of due process.'" Id. at 181 (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,
416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). This Court must ask whether the Michigan Court of Appeals'
decision denying King's prosecutorial misconduct claim "'was so lacking in justification that
there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.'" Parker, 132 S. Ct. at 2155, (quoting Harrington,
131 S. Ct. at 786-87).
Prosecutors may not vouch for a witness's credibility. Prosecutorial vouching and an
expression of personal opinion regarding the accused's guilt "pose two dangers: such
comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known
to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant and can thus jeopardize the
defendant's right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury; and
the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce
the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of the evidence."
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985).
"[T]he Darden standard is a very general one, leaving courts 'more leeway . . . in
12

reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.'" Parker, 132 S.Ct. at 2155, (quoting
Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664). The Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably disposed of
Robinson's prosecutorial misconduct claim. It was not improper for the prosecutor to
characterize Robinson's defense as one attempting to point the finger of guilt at Taylor
rather than himself. And, although the prosecutor's comment that Taylor was being truthful
could be construed as improper, the statement was brief, not inflammatory, and, in light of
the strength of the evidence against Robinson and the instruction advising the jurors that
they alone were charged with determining the witnesses' credibility, did not prejudice
Robinson. Even if the court of appeals erred in its holding, habeas relief would be denied
because the court of appeals' decision was not "so lacking in justification that there was an
error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement." Harrington, 131 S. Ct., at 786-787. Habeas relief, therefore, is
denied.
III.

Right to Present a Defense
Next, Robinson argues that his right to present a defense was violated because the

trial court would not allow him to present testimony concerning prosecution witness
Jonathan Taylor's credibility. Specifically, the trial court would not allow Shalvase
Chambers to testify that he believed Taylor was involved in the murder and that Taylor was
not telling the truth when he blamed Robinson for the murder.
The right of a defendant to present a defense has long been recognized as "a
fundamental element of due process of law." Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
It is one of the "minimum essentials of a fair trial." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
294 (1973). The Supreme Court has described the "most basic ingredients of due process
13

of law" as follows:
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an
opportunity to be heard in his defense – a right to his day in court – are basic
in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right
to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented
by counsel."
Washington, 388 U.S. at 18 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)).
Further, the Supreme Court described the right to present a defense as follows:
The right to offer testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if
necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present
the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so
it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront
the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he
has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is
a fundamental element of due process of law.
Id. at 19.
While the right to present a defense is a fundamental tenet of due process, "a
defendant's right to present evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable
restrictions." United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). Indeed, "[a] defendant's
interest in presenting . . . evidence may thus bow to accommodate other legitimate
interests in the criminal trial process." Id. (internal quotations omitted). The exclusion of
evidence is unconstitutional, though, where it "infringe[s] upon a weighty interest of the
accused." Id. (citing Rock, 483 U.S. at 58). Because criminal defendants are guaranteed
a "meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense," courts cannot exclude defense
evidence under evidentiary rules that "serve no legitimate purpose or that are
disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote." Holmes v. South Carolina,
547 U.S. 319, 325-26 (2006).
The Michigan Court of Appeals denied this claim because it was impermissible under
14

Michigan law for a witness to comment on or provide an opinion on the credibility of another
witness. Robinson, 2004 WL 1292613, at *4. This holding is in concert with Sixth Circuit
precedent holding that "credibility determinations are meant for the jury, not witnesses."
Arnold v. Wilder, 657 F.3d 353, 367-68 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The limitations
placed on Robinson's presentation of evidence, therefore, did not violate Robinson's right
to present a defense.
IV.

Claims Related to Jonathan Taylor Affidavit
Robinson's remaining claims for habeas relief rely upon a single affidavit, that of

Jonathan Taylor. In the affidavit, Taylor states that he wishes to recant his trial testimony
because he "has not been truthful regarding the circumstances relating to Deborah Ann
Turner's Death." Taylor Aff. ¶ 3, ECF No. 33. He further states that, contrary to his trial
testimony, he did not have a conversation with Robinson in September 2001. Robinson
argues that Taylor's affidavit demonstrates Robinson's actual innocence.
It is well-settled that claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence
"have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent
constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding." Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993). "[F]ederal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals
are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution – not to correct errors of fact." Id. In
House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006), the Supreme Court declined to answer the question
left open in Herrera – whether a habeas petitioner may bring a freestanding claim of actual
innocence. Id. at 555 (noting that "in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of
'actual innocence' made after trial would render the execution of a defendant
unconstitutional and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to
15

process such a claim").
Citing Herrera and House, the Sixth Circuit has ruled that a free-standing claim of
actual innocence based upon newly-discovered evidence does not warrant federal habeas
relief. See Muntaser v. Bradshaw, 429 F. App'x 515, 521 (6th Cir. 2011) ("[A]n actual
innocence claim operates only to excuse a procedural default so that a petitioner may bring
an independent constitutional challenge, . . . Given that [petitioner] alleges only a freestanding claim to relief on the grounds of actual innocence, his claim is not cognizable . .
. and, accordingly, does not serve as a ground for habeas relief."). Consequently,
Robinson's claim that he is actually innocent and has newly-discovered evidence to prove
his innocence fails to state a claim upon which habeas relief can be granted. Habeas relief
is therefore not warranted on this basis.
Additionally, even if such a claim were viable upon habeas review, Robinson is not
entitled to relief on such a basis. "'[A]ctual innocence' means factual innocence, not mere
legal insufficiency." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). "[A] credible claim
of actual innocence is extremely rare," Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 600 (6th Cir. 2012),
and so "[t]he actual innocence exception should 'remain rare' and 'only be applied in the
extraordinary case.'" Id. at 590 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)).
In his undated affidavit, Taylor recants his trial testimony in a conclusory fashion,
stating that he was pressured into testifying against Robinson. In Freeman v. Trombley,
483 F. App'x 51, 63 (6th Cir. 2012), the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed the rule that affidavits
recanting sworn testimony are viewed with extreme suspicion. See also McCray v.
Vasbinder, 499 F.3d 568, 574 (6th Cir. 2007). Other than Taylor's affidavit, Robinson
provides no other support for his actual innocence claim. The affidavit is devoid of any
16

supporting details or explanation for Taylor's recantation. It also does not clearly
demonstrate Robinson's innocence. The bare-bones affidavit, which Robinson states was
executed approximately seven years after the murder, is insufficient to establish Robinson's
actual innocence or to make a credible allegation of police or prosecutorial misconduct.
Habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.
V.

Certificate of Appealability
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 provides that an appeal may not proceed

unless a certificate of appealability ("COA") is issued under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Rule 11 of
the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings now requires that the Court "must issue
or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant."
A COA may be issued "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The substantial showing threshold
is satisfied when a petitioner demonstrates "that reasonable jurists would find the district
court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000). In this case, the Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not
debate the Court's conclusion that none of the claims in the habeas petition warrant relief.
Therefore, the Court denies a certificate of appealability.

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ORDER
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that Robinson's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus (document no. 1) is DENIED. This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

s/Stephen J. Murphy, III
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
United States District Judge
Dated: August 7, 2014
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or
counsel of record on August 7, 2014, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Carol Cohron
Case Manager

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