Ratajczak v. Romanowski
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER denying 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Granting in Part a Certificate of Appealability. Signed by District Judge Arthur J Tarnow. (ATee)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION JAMES RATAJCZAK, Petitioner, v. KENNETH ROMANOWSKI, Respondent. / OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND GRANTING IN PART A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY Petitioner James Ratajczak has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner, who is currently incarcerated at the Mound Correctional Facility in Detroit, Michigan, challenges his convictions for second-degree murder, felonious assault, and two counts of felony firearm. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the petition. I. Petitioner's convictions arise from the shooting death of Fitz (Mike) Evans at Petitioner's home in Portsmouth Township, Bay County, Michigan on February 8, 2000. The prosecution alleged that Petitioner, with premeditation and deliberation, killed Evans because the two were involved in a landlord-tenant-related dispute. The defense theory was that Petitioner retrieved a gun in an attempt to defend his girlfriend, Anita Breitner Stone, fired warning shots, and that the gun then accidentally discharged in Evans' direction. Evans' girlfriend, Lolita McCall, testified that she and Evans moved into Petitioner's home in September 1999. They lived in the basement of the home. On February 8, 2000, she was in the living area of the basement watching television and Petitioner, Evans and Stone were Case Number: 2:08-cv-10102 HONORABLE ARTHUR J. TARNOW
talking in the laundry room. She heard their discussion become heated, but did not know what they were arguing about. She joined them in the laundry room. Petitioner then left the laundry room and went upstairs. McCall testified that Petitioner returned with a gun less than a minute later. She heard gunshots before she saw Petitioner. Then, he came downstairs to the doorway of the laundry room. McCall testified that Petitioner shouldered a rifle, aimed it at Evans, and fired a shot. He then pointed the gun at her. She rolled up into a ball on the floor. Petitioner then ran up the stairs. Anita Breitner Stone testified that she and her son Sujan, then six years old, moved into Petitioner's home at the end of December 1999. Within a month of her moving in, tensions developed with Evans. Evans was unhappy that Stone smoked in the house, that her son made noise, and that, since his arrival, he had been relegated to the basement, rather than enjoying full run of the house as he had before she moved in. A week before the shooting, Evans chased her up the basement stairs after an argument. Petitioner intervened and defused the situation. She also testified that Evans had threatened her, Petitioner, and her son. Stone testified that she and Petitioner decided that Evans should be asked to move out of the house. They decided they would confront Evans on February 8, 2000. At approximately 3:00 p.m., on that day, Petitioner brought two guns into the house, a rifle and a handgun. A few hours later, Petitioner's brother came to pick up Stone's son because they anticipated that Evans might become violent when they confronted him and she did not want her child to witness that. At approximately 8:00 p.m., she and Petitioner went downstairs to confront Evans. Unbeknownst to Petitioner, Stone placed the handgun in the waistband of her pants before going downstairs. She testified she did so because she feared Evans.
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Petitioner and Evans got into a heated argument that lasted fifteen to twenty minutes. Petitioner then left the basement. In his absence, Stone continued arguing with Evans. Two to five minutes later, she heard gunshots coming from upstairs. She then saw Petitioner standing in the doorway to the laundry room. Stone saw Petitioner point the gun at Evans. She testified that she did not remember seeing Petitioner shoot Stone. She just remembered that at some point Evans was on the floor, having been shot. Stone remembered Petitioner also pointing the gun at McCall and threatening to shoot her. After Evans was shot, Petitioner left the basement. She followed him and found him in his bedroom where he was on the phone, apparently with a 911 operator. Dr. Kanu Virani, a forensic pathologist, testified that he performed an autopsy on the victim. The victim died of a gunshot would to the chest. The wound was 46½ inches above the ground if Evans were standing. Petitioner testified in his own defense. He testified that he and Evans were good friends and he permitted Evans to stay in his home beginning in September 1999. He knew Evans owned guns, that Evans had been violent toward women, and Evans once told Petitioner he had killed someone. Petitioner testified that he called the Bay City Police Department and Michigan State Police prior to the shooting. Petitioner then went to the basement to talk to Evans. He told Evans that he had called the police because Evans had been threatening him and Stone. Stone followed Petitioner downstairs and began arguing loudly with Evans. Petitioner testified that Evans then punched him on the chin and threatened to beat him to death. Petitioner left the basement. He continued to hear Evans and Stone arguing. He testified that he wanted to return to the basement because he feared for Stone's safety, but he was afraid
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to return. He went into his bedroom and grabbed a rifle. Petitioner testified that he grabbed the rifle because he was afraid Evans would hurt or kill him. He reached the landing of the basement stairs and decided to fire warning shots in an attempt to get Evans to stop arguing with Stone. Petitioner fired four shots. It was then very quiet in the basement. Petitioner walked down the basement stairs and approached the laundry room. He saw Evans standing in the laundry room. Evans' arm moved and Petitioner flinched. Petitioner testified that, when he flinched, the gun accidentally discharged. Petitioner ran upstairs and called 911. II. Following a jury trial in Bay County Circuit Court, Petitioner was convicted of seconddegree murder, felonious assault, and two counts of felony firearm. On June 12, 2002, he was sentenced to 20 to 35 years' imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction, 23 months to four years for the felonious assault conviction, and two terms of two years for the felonyfirearm conviction. Petitioner's appellate counsel filed a motion for new trial in the trial court seeking an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Petitioner argued that counsel was ineffective in failing to elicit testimony that Petitioner had a cut on his chin, failing to request a self-defense instruction, failing to object to the judge taking judicial notice of the landlord-tenant law, failing to ask the judge to take judicial notice of the law governing misdemeanors, and failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct. The trial court granted an evidentiary hearing. The evidentiary hearing was conducted on October 23, 2003. Trial counsel was the only testifying witness. Several months after the evidentiary hearing, the trial court
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issued an order denying Petitioner's motion for a new trial. People v. Ratajczak, No. 00-1225 (Bay County Circuit Court May 27, 2004). Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals, raising the following claims: I. Where a defense of accidental discharge is offered, the trial court erred reversibly when it allowed the jury to experiment with the weapon which was no longer in the same condition as it was on the day of the incident. Prosecutorial misconduct denied appellant due process of law in the following ways: A. The prosecutor appealed to the emotions of the jury to obtain a conviction by displaying throughout trial a poster-sized photograph of the complainant and the bloody t-shirt. The prosecutor who is charged with knowing the law argued that the Michigan State Police would not refuse to respond to a misdemeanor call.
II.
B. III.
Appellant was denied the effective assistance of counsel in the following ways: A. Counsel failed to bring forth evidence which would have corroborated the defendant's testimony that he had been hit by the complainant and would have supported his defense of self defense. Counsel failed to object to the court taking judicial notice of landlord tenant law and failed to object to the court's findings that the deceased and the defendant were in a landlord-tenant relationship. Defense counsel failed to object to prosecutorial misconduct. Counsel either failed to secure an instruction on or failed to ask the court to take judicial notice of M.C.L. 764.15 or failed to explain to the jurors that the call reported a non-criminal problem to which the police are not required to respond. Defense counsel failed to object to the court's re-instruction on the defense of accident.
B.
C. D.
E.
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IV.
The trial court erred when it took judicial notice of facts which had not been proven and were open to dispute and where it took judicial notice of a law that was irrelevant. The appellant was denied his right to a properly instructed jury when the trial court refused to instruct on the defense of self defense and when it excluded consideration of the defense of accident from the offense of second-degree murder based on the third mental state. Appellant was denied due process of law and his right to a proportionate sentence where the court erred in scoring offense variables 7 and 9.
V.
VI.
Petitioner filed the following additional claim in a pro per supplemental brief: VII. The sentence imposed by the court violated appellant's right to trial by jury, the right to due process of law, and the right to be free from excessive punishment.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences. People v. Ratajczak, No. 242715 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2005). Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, raising the same claims raised in the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Ratajczak, No. 128128 (Mich. July 26, 2005). Petitioner then filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court, raising the following claims: (i) Petitioner was absent when the bailiff was sworn; (ii) the 911 operator should have been permitted to testify as to the content of the phone calls and that hang-up calls were received; (iii) post-arrest, pre-Miranda statements were improperly admitted; (iv) jurors improperly commenced deliberations before jury was reduced to 12 jurors; (v) trial court improperly took judicial notice of landlord-tenant law and it was ineffective for counsel to fail to object; (vi) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct; (vii) two witnesses were permitted to commit perjury; (viii) prosecutor committed misconduct when he called Petitioner a "liar" in closing argument; (ix) prosecutor committed misconduct by calling 6
defense arguments a "red herring;" (x) counsel was ineffective for failing object to various instances of misconduct and improper rulings; (xi) counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a pre-trial motion to suppress Petitioner's statements; (xii) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to hire an expert witness; (xiii) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on accident; (xiv) jury was improperly permitted to have murder weapon in jury room; (xv) trial counsel failed to impeach prosecution witnesses; (xvi) cumulative effect of alleged errors warrants a new trial; (xvii) trial counsel improperly failed to suppress certain exhibits; (xviii) search warrant was not based on probable cause; and (xix) jury was not a fair cross-section of the community. The trial Court denied the motion for relief from judgment. People v. Ratajczak, No. 00-1225-FC-C (Bay County Circuit Court Apr. 26, 2007). Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. People v. Ratajczak, No. 278055 (Mich. Ct. App. July 19, 2007). Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, which was also denied. People v. Ratajczak, No. 134624 (Mich. Dec. 28, 2007). Petitioner then filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising the following claims: I. II. The trial judge, over defense counsel's objection, permitted the jury to test the trigger for pull on the rifle that fired the fatal bullets in the jury room. The trial court violated Petitioner's constitutional rights when it took judicial notice of facts which had not been proven and were open to dispute and where it took judicial notice of a law that was irrelevant. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on the defense of self defense and it excluded consideration of the defense of accident. The prosecutor's misconduct denied Petitioner due process of law.
III. IV.
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V.
Petitioner's trial and appellate counsels were ineffective within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment which severely prejudiced the Petitioner: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13 14 failed to provide evidence that the victim hit Petitioner failed to object to prosecutorial misconduct failed to secure an instruction regarding MCL 764.15 regarding deputization of stenographer regarding the cross-examination of Schultz regarding Miranda challenge allowing the alternate jurors to deliberate allowing Schultz to commit perjury allowing prosecutor to call Petitioner a liar allowing prosecutor to call defense a red herring allowing prosecutor to strike foul blows failure to hire expert witness failing to request an accident instruction failed to impeach witness McCall
VI.
The state courts erroneously relied on Michigan's finality rule, MCR 6.508(D) to deny Petitioner's successive action even though he presented ample proofs that he was denied effective assistance of trial and appellate counsels. III.
Section 2254(d) of Title 28 U.S.C., imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases: An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any
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claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.
(2)
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application occurs" when "a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 410-11. IV. A. Petitioner argues that his right to due process, right to cross-examine and confront witnesses against him and his right to counsel were violated when jurors performed a trigger pull test outside the presence of Petitioner. During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge stating: "The jurors would like to see the rifle, with the intent to try the trigger for pull." Tr., 9
2/22/02, at 5. The court allowed the jury to receive the rifle in the jury room, with the following cautionary instruction: The jury should be aware, however, that the condition the rifle is in today may not be the condition the rifle was in on February the 8th, 2000. For example, then, the gun was loaded; had a magazine; had been previously fired four times. The bolt may have been opened and the spring may have been compressed for the past two years; and the gun has been . . . scientifically tested since then, which may or may not change the conditions of the rifle. Id. at 27. "As a matter of law, clearly established Supreme Court precedent requires that a criminal defendant be afforded the right to confront the evidence and the witnesses against him, and the right to a jury that considers only the evidence presented at trial." Doan v. Brigano, 237 F.3d 722, 733 n.7 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). "Thus, under clearly established federal law, jury exposure to extrinsic evidence or other extraneous influence violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, . . . and a state court decision that conflicts with this rule may justify habeas relief under the standard set forth in the AEDPA." Fletcher v. McKee, No. 08-1240, 2009 WL 4755293, *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 2009). An extraneous influence on a juror is "`one derived from specific knowledge about or a relationship with either the parties or their witnesses.'" Garcia v. Andrews, 488 F.3d 370, 376 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Herndon, 156 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 1998)). Examples of extraneous influence include "`prior business dealings with the defendant, applying to work for the local district attorney, conducting an out of court experiment, and discussing the trial with an employee.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Owens, 426 F.3d 800, 805 (6th Cir. 2005)). Examples of "internal" influences include "the behavior of jurors during deliberations, 10
the jurors' ability to hear and comprehend trial testimony, and the physical and mental incompetence of a juror." Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 945 n.7 (6th Cir. 2004). The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the jurors' experimentation with the murder weapon did not deprive Petitioner of his right to an impartial jury. The Michigan Court of Appeals reasoned that none of the jurors performed an experiment outside the jury room or outside the presence of other jurors. In addition, the jurors "relied on the testimonial and physical evidence introduced at trial, including the rifle itself, to test the parties' competing arguments. This test was a natural outgrowth of the jurors' discussions regarding what they heard during the trial." Ratajczak, 2005 WL at *2. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently decide a case factually similar to Petitioner's. In Fletcher v. McKee, No. 08-1240, 2009 WL 4755293 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 2009), Michael Fletcher challenged his second-degree murder conviction for the shooting death of his wife, Leann. Fletcher's defense was that Leann had accidentally shot herself. After the trial ended, ten jurors were interviewed on a national television broadcast and revealed that, during deliberations, they had conducted an experiment in the jury room to determine where the gun would have fallen if Leann had accidentally shot herself as claimed by the defense. Fletcher argued that this experiment created extrinsic evidence amounting to an extraneous influence on the jury, violating his Sixth Amendment right to be present during critical stages of the trial, to the assistance of counsel, and to confrontation. The Sixth Circuit held that the "jury room reenactment using trial exhibits and testimony was part of the jury's private, internal deliberations and did not violate Fletcher's Sixth Amendment rights." Id. at *1. The Court noted that "[w]here no extraneous influence is present,
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courts will not intrude into matters internal to jury deliberations." Id. at *3. "`There is simply no constitutional command preventing a jury from using common sense and ordinary and uninflammatory props to reenact a crime in the privacy of the jury room.'" Id. at *4 (quoting United States v. Abeyta, 27 F.3d 470, 477 (10th Cir. 1994)). In the present case, as in Fletcher, the experiment conducted by the jury utilized trial exhibits and testimony. "[J]urors must be given enough latitude in their deliberations to permit them to use common experiences and illustrations in reaching their verdict. U.S. v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1026 (6th Cir. 1983). The testing of the weapon did not result in extrinsic evidence. Petitioner has not cited and the Court has not found any supreme Court case suggesting that the handling of admitted evidence amounts to a violation of a defendant's right of confrontation, right to an impartial jury, or any other constitutional right. Thus, the Court concludes that the state court's decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. B. Petitioner argues that the trial court improperly took judicial notice of landlord-tenant law and the requirements under Michigan law for evicting a tenant and relied on facts not in evidence in doing so, specifically, that Petitioner and Evans had a landlord-tenant relationship. Petitioner claims that this relieved the state of its burden of proof and denied Petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine on the evidence. It is not the role of a federal court on habeas review "to decide whether a state trial judge's decision whether to admit evidence pursuant to state evidentiary rules was a proper one." Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 528 (6th Cir. 2000). The federal court's "sole task is to decide
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whether federal constitutional violations have occurred." Id. citing Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n. 6, (1983) ("[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules."). "Errors by a state court in the admission of evidence are not cognizable in habeas proceedings unless they so perniciously affect the prosecution of a criminal case as to deny the defendant the fundamental right to a fair trial." Roe v. Baker, 316 F.3d 557, 567 (6th Cir.2002). "When reviewing a state court's evidentiary determination pursuant to § 2254, a federal appellate court may not grant a petitioner's request for relief simply because it would have decided the evidentiary question differently than the state court." Sanders v. Freeman, 221 F.3d 846, 860 (6th Cir. 2000). A federal court may only grant habeas relief if the petitioner is able to show that the state trial court's evidentiary rulings were in conflict with a decision reached "by the [Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court [decided the evidentiary issue] differently than [the Supreme] Court [did] on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). The Michigan Court of Appeals held that judicial notice of landlord-tenant law was proper under Michigan Rule of Evidence 202(b), which requires a court to take judicial notice of Michigan law where a party requests it do so. This ruling is premised entirely on application of state law. Nothing in this ruling was contrary to rulings of the United States Supreme Court on a similar question of law, nor did the state courts decide the evidentiary issues differently than the Supreme Court in a case with materially indistinguishable facts. Consequently, there has been no infringement of a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
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C. In his third habeas claim, Petitioner argues that the trial court improperly denied his request for a self-defense instruction and excluded consideration of an accident defense. The trial court gave a defense of others instruction regarding Petitioner's testimony that he feared for the safety of his girlfriend Anita Breitner. It is well established that the failure to give a self-defense instruction "does not deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to due process if the evidence produced during trial was insufficient to warrant such an instruction." Allen v. Morris, 845 F.2d 610, 617 (6th Cir. 1988); see also, Gimotty v. Elo, 40 F. App'x 29, 33-34 (6th Cir. 2002). Under Michigan law, a defendant is entitled to instruction on a defense theory of the case where the instruction is supported by the evidence presented at trial. See People v. Mills, 450 Mich. 61, 81, 537 N.W.2d 909, 919-20 (1995). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that "[g]enerally, a defendant is entitled to jury instructions on defense theories that are supported by law and raised by the evidence presented." Williams v. Kentucky, 124 F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 1997). "While a defendant is entitled to have a jury instruction on any defense which provides a legal defense to the charge against him. . . the failure to give such an instruction will not alone mandate the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Sanders v. Israel, 717 F.2d 422, 425 (7th Cir. 1983) (internal citations omitted). Petitioner testified that he and Evans were arguing and that Evans was also arguing with his girlfriend Anita Breitner Stone. Petitioner testified that Evans threatened him. Petitioner left the basement. He could still hear Evans and Stone arguing. Petitioner stated that he was fearful of Evans. Petitioner went to his bedroom, retrieved a rifle and went back to the basement door.
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He testified that he returned to the basement door rather than leaving the house because he felt that Stone was in danger and he did not want to leave her in the basement with Evans. Petitioner testified that he knew Evans had a history of violence against women and that this was something he had heard Evans brag about. Petitioner could hear Evans and Breitner arguing. He could not muster the will to go down the basement steps, so he stood at the top of the stairs and fired several warning shots with the intention of frightening Evans. After firing the warning shots, Petitioner descended the steps to the basement. He found Evans standing by the laundry room. Petitioner was surprised that Evans was not in a submissive or conciliatory pose. Petitioner testified that Evans appeared not at all cowered by the gunshots. Petitioner's rifle was pointed at Evans. Petitioner saw something move out of the corner of his eye and he flinched. He testified that the flinching caused the gun to discharge accidentally. On cross-examination, Petitioner testified that when he retrieved his gun, when he walked to the basement door, when he fired the warning shots, and when he descended the basement steps, his only thought was of Stone and rescuing her. Given Petitioner's own testimony that his focus was on saving Breitner, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that a defense of others instruction was warranted, while a self-defense instruction was not. Petitioner also argues that the trial court improperly excluded from the jury's consideration the defense of accident. The jury was instructed on the defense of accident. Therefore, this claim is denied.
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D. Petitioner argues that he was denied his right to a fair trial because the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. Specifically, Petitioner argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by: (i) appealing to the emotions of the jurors by displaying throughout the trial a poster-sized photo of the victim and his bloody t-shirt; (ii) incorrectly arguing that the Michigan State Police would not refuse to respond to a misdemeanor call; (iii) misrepresenting testimony; and (iv) "arg[uing] half-truths." Respondent argues that these prosecutorial misconduct claims are procedurally defaulted. "[F]ederal courts are not required to address a procedural-default issue before deciding against the petitioner on the merits." Hudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 2003), citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997). "Judicial economy might counsel giving the [other] question priority, for example, if it were easily resolvable against the habeas petitioner, whereas the procedural-bar issue involved complicated issues of state law." Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 525. In this case, the Court finds that the interests of judicial economy are best served by addressing the merits of Petitioner's prosecutorial misconduct claims. It is well-established that prosecutors must "`refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction.'" United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). However, "[c]laims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed deferentially on habeas review." Millender v. Adams, 376 F.3d 520, 528 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Bowling v. Parker, 344 F.3d 487, 512 (6th Cir. 2003)). Prosecutorial misconduct may warrant habeas corpus relief only if the misconduct "`so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.'" Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168,
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181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). "To constitute a denial of due process, the misconduct must be `so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.'" Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 529-30 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Pritchett v. Pitcher, 117 F.3d 959, 964 (6th Cir. 1997)). The Court must examine "
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