McCall v. Palmer
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER Denying re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Pierre McCall and Denying Certificate of Appealability. Signed by District Judge Marianne O Battani. (BThe)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
PIERRE LAMAR MCCALL, Petitioner, v. CARMEN PALMER, Respondent. / OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY Petitioner Pierre Lamar McCall has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner, who is incarcerated at the Michigan Reformatory, challenges his convictions for first-degree murder, three counts of kidnapping and four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the petition. I. Petitioner's convictions arise from the murder of his ex-girlfriend, Tiffany Burnett, on October 4, 2002. The Michigan Court of Appeals summarized the case as follows: This case arises from the shooting death of defendant's estranged girlfriend and mother of his child, Tiffany Burnett, on October 4, 2002. The prosecutor's theory was that defendant became enraged upon discovering that Burnett had become romantically involved with another woman. Defendant pistol-whipped Burnett for several minutes outside her home in Clinton Township and shot her several times before barricading himself in another home and taking several hostages. He eventually surrendered to police. Defendant's theory was that he was guilty only of voluntary manslaughter because he was acting in the heat of passion, and because the shooting was accidental in that the shots occurred when his gun accidentally discharged on three different occasions. Case Number: 2:08-CV-10489 HONORABLE MARIANNE O. BATTANI
People v. McCall, No. 252753, 2005 WL 2679689, *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2005). II. Following a jury trial in Macomb County Circuit Court, Petitioner was convicted of firstdegree murder, three counts of kidnapping, and four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On November 20, 2003, he was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction, 30-50 years' imprisonment for each of the kidnapping convictions, the foregoing to be served concurrently with one another and consecutively to four concurrent twoyears sentences for the felony-firearm convictions. Petitioner filed an appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, raising the following claims: I. The trial court's allowance of other uncharged act evidence, pursuant to MRE 404(b), and related hearsay utterances, was an abuse of discretion which denied defendant his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial. Defendant was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial and due process of law through misconduct of the prosecutor, which consisted of a pattern of improper presentation of evidence and argument.
II.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions. People v. McCall, No. 252753, 2005 WL 2679689 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2005). Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. He raised the same claims presented to the Michigan Court of Appeals and two additional claims: juror misconduct and prosecutorial misconduct. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. McCall, 474 Mich. 1125 (Mich. Apr. 28, 2006). Petitioner later filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court rasising the following claims: I. Defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Const. 1963 Art. 1, Section 20. 2
II.
Where the fact of jury members' consumption of alcohol during a break in deliberations and their possible intoxication when they returned to deliberations was substantiated by an independent television news source and report and this indiscretion is cause for a new trial. A. Defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated by allowing a verdict to stand which was arrived at by a jury that was possibly intoxicated during deliberations, without conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine the extent of their consumption of alcoholic beverages, what effect it may have had on their verdict, and that they allegedly discussed the case while drinking.
III.
Where defendant's assigned counsel for his appeal of right failed to raise a meritorious constitutional issue, defendant was denied due process by counsel's failure to raise the above issue, which resulted in a deprivation of defendant's constitutional rights to appeal, and to the effective assistance of counsel on appeals.
The trial court denied the motion for relief from judgment. People v. McCall, No. 20030897-FC (Macomb County Circuit Court Feb. 28, 2007). Petitioner filed applications for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court. Both state appellate courts denied leave to appeal. People v. McCall, No. 276974 (Mich. Ct. App. July 26, 2007); People v. McCall, 480 Mich. 1004 (Mich. Dec. 28, 2007). Petitioner then filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He raises the following claims: I. The trial court's allowance of other uncharged act evidence, pursuant to MRE 404(b), and related hearsay utterances, was an abuse of discretion which denied Petitioner his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial. Petitioner was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial and due process of law through misconduct of the prosecutor, which consisted of a pattern of improper presentation of evidence and argument. Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Const. 1963 Art. 1, Section 20. 3
II.
III.
IV.
Where the fact of jury members' consumption of alcohol during a break in deliberations and their possible intoxication when they returned to deliberations was substantiated by an independent television news source and report and this indiscretion is cause for a new trial. A. Petitioner's rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated by allowing a verdict to stand which was arrived at by a jury that was possibly intoxicated during deliberations, without conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine the extent of their consumption of alcoholic beverages, what effect it may have had on their verdict, and that they allegedly discussed the case while drinking.
V.
Where Petitioner's assigned counsel for his appeal of right failed to raise a meritorious constitutional issue, Petitioner was denied due process by counsel's failure to raise the above issue, which resulted in a deprivation of Petitioner's constitutional rights to appeal, and to the effective assistance of counsel on appeals. III.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases: An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.
(2)
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially 4
indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application occurs" when "a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 410-11. IV. A. In his first claim, Petitioner argues that his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial were violated when the trial court admitted testimonial and photographic evidence of other uncharged acts pursuant to MRE 404(b). Specifically, Petitioner objects to the testimony of Clinton Township Police Officer Dena Caringi regarding an incident at the victim's house on September 2, 2002. Officer Caringi was called to testify as a rebuttal witness after Petitioner testified that he had slapped Burnett for the first time in September 2002, and defense expert witness Dr. Lyle Danuloff testified that Petitioner had told him that the relationship with Burnett had been non-violent. Officer Caringi testified that she arrived at Burnett's home in response to a 911 call on September 2, 2002. She found Burnett lying on a stretcher being treated by emergency medical personnel. Burnett had a laceration under her eye, bruising, redness, and swelling on her cheek and forehead, and a bite mark on her breast. Officer Caringi identified several photographs as actually depicting the blood-stained scene of the beating, and a photograph of Burnett's injuries. She further testified that Burnett told her that Petitioner had said he was going to kill her and would not stop beating her.
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The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the admission of Officer Caringi's testimony and the photographs was proper, reasoning, in relevant part: Before trial, the prosecutor filed a notice of intent to introduce prior bad acts evidence under MRE 404(b). The prosecutor also filed a motion to strike the testimony of defendant's expert witness, Dr. Lyle Danuloff, a clinical psychologist who evaluated defendant "regarding the possibility that the charge against him could be changed to Voluntary Manslaughter." The prosecutor moved to strike Dr. Danuloff's testimony on the ground that defendant's hearsay and self-serving statements to Dr. Danuloff would be admitted into evidence without defendant taking the stand. The trial court apparently denied both motions,[] ruling that the prosecutor could not introduce evidence of prior bad acts in his case-in-chief, but could introduce evidence of prior bad acts in rebuttal or on cross-examination.[] Indeed, the record contains a "hearing disposition" which states in part that the "Parties stipulate that if the defendant testifies, then Dr. Danuloff can testify. People can cross-examine both as to prior incidents."3 Defendant testified in his own behalf and described his relationship with the victim as free of domestic abuse except for a "slap" that occurred on September 30, 2002. Dr. Danuloff testified that defendant stated in an interview with Dr. Danuloff that he and the victim had a non-violent relationship, that there was no domestic abuse between defendant and the victim, and that police had never been called as a result of any abuse. On rebuttal, Clinton Township Police Officer Dena Caringi testified that she was called to a disturbance at the victim's house approximately one month before the victim was killed. Caringi testified that the victim said defendant beat her as she lay on the floor of her home, would not stop beating her to allow her to get up, and threatened to kill her. The prosecution also introduced photographs showing evidence of the victim's injuries from the altercation. Defendant now argues that the admission of the rebuttal testimony and photographs was an attempt to introduce defendant's prior bad acts in violation of the rules of evidence. The decision whether to admit other-acts evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Starr, 457 Mich. 490, 494; 577 N.W.2d 673 (1998). . . . Rebuttal evidence is admissible to "contradict, repel, explain or disprove evidence produced by the other party and tending directly to weaken or impeach the same." People v Figgures, 451 Mich 390, 399; 547 NW2d 673 (1996). Caringi's rebuttal testimony was proper in scope and purpose because it directly weakened and impeached the testimony of defendant's expert that defendant and the victim had a non-violent relationship. Caringi's testimony regarding her prior contact with the victim and defendant was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial, and was properly admitted. 6
With regard to the admission of the photographs on rebuttal, we note that defense counsel objected at trial on the ground that the defense had not been given sufficient notice of the photographs and that the prosecutor had not previously produced them during discovery. Thus, defendant did not preserve any issues regarding admissibility of the photographs under MRE 404(b), . . . and we find no plain error affecting substantial rights. MRE 103(d); People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 763-765; 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). ________________________________
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The "prior incidents" referred to include a September 2, 2002, incident and a September 30, 2002, incident, both of which resulted in the police being summoned to the scene. People v McCall, 2005 WL 2679689 at * 1-2. It is well established that "federal habeas corpus review does not lie for errors of state law." Louis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). "Habeas review does not encompass state court rulings on the admission of evidence unless there is a constitutional violation." Clemmons v. Sowders, 34 F.3d 353, 357 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Fuson v. Jago, 773 F.2d 55, 59 (6th Cir. 1985)). Thus, to the extent that Petitioner alleges violations of Michigan law, the claims are not cognizable upon federal habeas review. Petitioner must overcome a high threshold in order to demonstrate that the trial court's evidentiary ruling was unconstitutional. "When an evidentiary ruling is so egregious that it results in a denial of fundamental fairness, it may violate due process and thus warrant habeas relief." Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 512 (6th Cir. 2003). In general, "state-court evidentiary rulings cannot rise to the level of due process violations unless they `offend[ ] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'" Id. (citing Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 552 (6th Cir. 2000)). Moreover, there is no Supreme Court precedent establishing that a state violates due process by allowing the admission of other acts evidence. Id. "While the Supreme Court has addressed whether prior acts 7
testimony is permissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, it has not explicitly addressed the issue in constitutional terms." Id. at 513. Petitioner is unable to show that the admission of other acts testimony or exhibits was a ruling so egregious as to violate his fundamental rights. The evidence was directly relevant to Petitioner's and Dr. Danulof's testimony and directly contradicted Petitioner's trial testimony. Further, because the trial court's admission of other acts evidence is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, Petitioner's claim for habeas relief is denied. B. In his second habeas claim, Petitioner argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct through a pattern of improper presentation of evidence and improper argument. Specifically, Petitioner objects to the closing argument in which the prosecutor argued that the victim had outgrown Petitioner, that he did not care about his son to the extent he alleged in his trial testimony, and that Petitioner was angry because his "gravy train" had ended. Tr., 10/8/03 at p. 81. Respondent argues that this claim is procedurally defaulted because defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's closing. "[F]ederal courts are not required to address a procedural-default issue before deciding against the petitioner on the merits." Hudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 2003), citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525, 117 S. Ct. 1517, 1523 (1997). "Judicial economy might counsel giving the [other] question priority, for example, if it were easily resolvable against the habeas petitioner, whereas the procedural-bar issue involved complicated issues of state law." Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 525. In this case, the
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Court finds that the interests of judicial economy are best served by addressing the merits of this claim. It is well-established that prosecutors must "`refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction.'" United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). However, "[c]laims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed deferentially on habeas review." Millender v. Adams, 376 F.3d 520, 528 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Bowling v. Parker, 344 F.3d 487, 512 (6th Cir. 2003)). Prosecutorial misconduct may warrant habeas corpus relief only if the misconduct "`so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.'" Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). "To constitute a denial of due process, the misconduct must be `so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.'" Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 529-30 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Pritchett v. Pitcher, 117 F.3d 959, 964 (6th Cir. 1997)). The Court must examine "
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