Turner v. Wolfenbarger
Filing
30
OPINION and ORDER Denying 1 12 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Granting a Certificate of Appealability and Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis. Signed by District Judge Arthur J. Tarnow. (CPic)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
THOMAS EDWARD TURNER,
Petitioner,
Civil No. 2:08-CV-11724
HONORABLE ARTHUR J. TARNOW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
v.
CARMEN PALMER,
Respondent,
/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS AND GRANTING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY AND
LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Thomas Edward Turner, (“petitioner”), confined at the Michigan
Reformatory in Ionia, Michigan, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction for first-degree
premeditated murder, M.C.L.A. 750.316(1)(a), felon in possession of a firearm,
M.C.L.A. 750.224f, and felony-firearm, M.C.L.A. 750.227b. For the reasons that
follow, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The Court will issue
petitioner a certificate of appealability and an application to proceed on appeal in
forma pauperis.
I. Background
Petitioner was convicted of the above offenses following a jury trial in the
Wayne County Circuit Court. This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts relied
1
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
upon by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas
review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410,
413 (6th Cir. 2009):
About a month before the incident, Dontanyal Reed, Nathaniel
Foreman, and defendant moved into the home of Janice Smith. Smith
testified that defendant and Reed did not get along well and had an
argument the morning in question. Defendant pointed a handgun at
Reed but then walked away. Defendant accused Reed of taking and
selling some boots that had $1,000 worth of drugs in them. Reed left
to go look for the boots. Defendant threatened Reed throughout the
day. Defendant and Reed left the house together in the afternoon,
walking toward Harding Street, and that was the last time Smith saw
both of them. A customer came to the house and asked about
defendant, indicating that he shot somebody.
On the afternoon in question, 13-year-old Ebony Waters was walking
down Harding Street to pick her brother up from school when she saw
two men in a field arguing over money. Waters testified that the men
were about six feet away from her. Waters recognized the men from
the neighborhood. Waters heard the man without a gun tell defendant
that he was not giving him anything, and then he began to walk
backwards. The two men continued to argue, and Waters saw
defendant shoot the other man.
After defendant shot the other man, Waters crossed the street.
Defendant crossed the street, came up behind Waters, put his arm
around her, put the gun to her head and said “I won’t hear anything
about this, will I?” Then defendant ran up the street, jumped in a black
Neon, and a lady yelled at him to come back with her car. Waters
picked up her brother from school. Defendant drove by them in the
black Neon, rolled down the window, and shook his head up and down
at Waters. Waters had a clear view of defendant’s face when she saw
him in the car. Waters identified defendant at the preliminary
examination and at the trial.
People v. Turner, No. 263048, * 2 (Mich.Ct.App. November 28, 2006).
2
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. Id., lv. den. 477 Mich. 1115,
730 N.W.2d 221 (2007).
Petitioner filed an application for writ of habeas corpus which was held in
abeyance so that petitioner could exhaust additional claims in the state courts.
Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment, which was denied. People
v. Turner, No. 05-000533-01 (Wayne County Circuit Court, March 26, 2009). The
Michigan appellate courts denied petitioner leave to appeal. People v. Turner, No.
294912 (Mich.Ct.App. March 31, 2010); lv. den. 488 Mich. 911, 789 N.W.2d 479
(2010).
On March 1, 2011, this Court granted petitioner’s motion to lift the stay and
to file an amended habeas petition. In his amended habeas petition, petitioner
seeks relief on the following grounds:
I. Petitioner was denied due process of law where the evidence was
insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.
II. Defense trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the
state trial judge instruct the jury regarding the lesser offense of
voluntary manslaughter. Petitioner did not knowingly and intentionally
waive the instruction and the lack of instruction violated due process.
U.S. Const. Amends. VI and XIV.
III. Petitioner’s right to due process and a fair trial was violated where
the identification procedure employed was unnecessarily suggestive
and conducive to irreparable harm and there was no independent basis
for the in court identification. Counsel’s inability to object renders his
representation ineffective. U.S. Const. Amends. VI, XIV.
3
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
IV. Petitioner was deprived of a fair trial and due process of law where
the prosecution failed to conduct a reasonable pre-trial investigation to
determine whether its chief witness would perjure herself at trial.
Counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this claim before or during
trial. U.S. Const. Amends. VI, XIV.
V. Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the defense of
alibi. U.S. Const. Amends. VI, XIV.
VI. Defense trial counsel was ineffective and deprived petitioner of a
fair trial by failing to impeach the prosecution’s key witness and failing
to object to damaging hearsay testimony of another witness. U.S.
Const. Amends. VI, XIV.
II. Standard of Review
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of review for
habeas cases:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits
in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim–
(1)
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
A decision of a state court is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if
the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme
4
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the
Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An “unreasonable application” occurs
when “a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme
Court] to the facts of a prisoner’s case.” Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may
not “issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent
judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established
federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 410-11.
The Supreme Court explained that “[A] federal court’s collateral review of
a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our
federal system.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The “AEDPA
thus imposes a ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’and
‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Renico v.
Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010)((quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333,
n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). “[A]
state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas
relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the
state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011)(citing
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has
emphasized “that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s
5
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.
63, 75 (2003)). Furthermore, pursuant to § 2254(d), “a habeas court must
determine what arguments or theories supported or...could have supported, the
state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded
jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the
holding in a prior decision” of the Supreme Court. Id.
III. Discussion
A. The procedural default issue.
Respondent contends that petitioner’s second through sixth claims are
procedurally defaulted, because he raised them for the first time in his postconviction motion for relief from judgment and failed to show cause for failing to
raise these issues in his appeal of right, as well as prejudice, as required by
M.C.R. 6.508(D)(3).
Petitioner claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise his claims in his appeal of right. Ineffective assistance of counsel may
establish cause for procedural default. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,
451-52 (2000). If petitioner could show that he received ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel that rose to the level of a Sixth Amendment violation, it would
excuse his procedural default for failing to raise his claims on his direct appeal in
the state courts. Seymour v. Walker, 224 F. 3d 542, 550 (6th Cir. 2000). Given
6
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
that the cause and prejudice inquiry for the procedural default issue merges with
an analysis of the merits of petitioner’s defaulted claims, it would be easier to
consider the merits of these claims. See Cameron v. Birkett, 348 F. Supp. 2d
825, 836 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
B. The sufficiency of evidence claim.
Petitioner first contends that there was insufficient evidence of to support
his conviction for first-degree murder.
It is beyond question that “the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In Re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970). But the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is, “whether the record evidence could
reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979). This inquiry, however, does not require a
court to “ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Instead, the relevant question is whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id. at 318-19(internal citation and footnote
omitted)(emphasis in the original).
7
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
More importantly, a federal habeas court may not overturn a state court
decision that rejects a sufficiency of the evidence claim simply because the
federal court disagrees with the state court’s resolution of that claim. Instead, a
federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court decision was an
objectively unreasonable application of the Jackson standard. See Cavazos v.
Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011). “Because rational people can sometimes
disagree, the inevitable consequence of this settled law is that judges will
sometimes encounter convictions that they believe to be mistaken, but that they
must nonetheless uphold.” Id. Indeed, for a federal habeas court reviewing a
state court conviction, “the only question under Jackson is whether that finding
was so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare rationality.” Coleman
v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2065 (2012).
Finally, on habeas review, a federal court does not reweigh the evidence
or redetermine the credibility of the witnesses whose demeanor was observed at
trial. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983). It is the province of the
factfinder to weigh the probative value of the evidence and resolve any conflicts
in testimony. Neal v. Morris, 972 F.2d 675, 679 (6th Cir. 1992). A habeas court
therefore must defer to the fact finder for its assessment of the credibility of
witnesses. Matthews v. Abramajtys, 319 F.3d 780, 788 (6th Cir.2003).
8
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
Petitioner’s primary claim is that there was insufficient evidence to
establish his identity as the murderer.
Ebony Waters positively identified petitioner at trial as the shooter. The
Court notes that “the testimony of a single, uncorroborated prosecuting witness
or other eyewitness is generally sufficient to support a conviction.“ Brown v.
Davis, 752 F. 2d 1142, 1144 (6th Cir. 1985)(internal citations omitted). Waters
unequivocally identified petitioner at trial as being the person who shot and killed
the victim. This evidence was sufficient to support petitioner’s conviction for firstdegree murder. See Brown v. Burt, 65 Fed. Appx. 939, 944 (6th Cir. 2003).
In addition, there was strong circumstantial evidence linking petitioner to
the crime. Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a conviction,
and it is not necessary for the evidence at trial to exclude every reasonable
hypothesis except that of guilt. Johnson v. Coyle, 200 F. 3d 987, 992 (6th Cir.
2000)(internal quotations omitted). Identity of a defendant can be inferred
through circumstantial evidence. See Dell v. Straub, 194 F. Supp. 2d 629, 648
(E.D. Mich. 2002).
Testimony at trial revealed that petitioner and the murder victim did not get
along and had an argument on the morning of the murder. Petitioner pointed a
firearm at the victim before walking away. Petitioner accused the victim of
selling some boots that had $ 1,000.00 worth of drugs in them. Petitioner
9
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
threatened the victim throughout the day. The earlier altercation between
petitioner and the victim, as well as the fact that petitioner threatened the victim
hours before the shooting, was sufficient evidence to permit a rational trier of fact
to conclude that petitioner was the person who murdered the victim. See
Pinchon v. Myers, 615 F. 3d 631, 643-44 (6th Cir. 2010).
Because there were multiple pieces of evidence, including eyewitness
testimony, to establish petitioner’s identity as the perpetrator of the murder, the
Michigan Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Jackson v. Virginia in
rejecting petitioner’s sufficiency of evidence claim. See Moreland v. Bradshaw,
699 F. 3d 908, 919-21 (6th Cir. 2012).
C. The lesser included jury instruction claim.
As part of his second claim, petitioner contends that he was denied a fair
trial when the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of
voluntary manslaughter.
The United States Supreme Court has declined to determine whether the
Due Process Clause requires that a state trial court instruct a jury on a lesser
included offense in a non-capital case. See Adams v. Smith, 280 F. Supp. 2d
704, 717 (E.D. Mich. 2003)(citing to Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638, n. 4
(1980)). Thus, a state trial court’s failure to give the jury an instruction on a
lesser included offense in a non-capital case is not contrary to, or an
10
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as required for
federal habeas relief. Id. Beck has been interpreted by the Sixth Circuit to mean
that “the [federal] Constitution does not require a lesser-included offense
instruction in non-capital cases.” Campbell v. Coyle, 260 F. 3d 531, 541 (6th Cir.
2001). Thus, the failure of a state trial court to instruct a jury on a lesser
included offense in a non-capital case is not an error cognizable in federal
habeas review. Bagby v. Sowders, 894 F. 2d 792, 797 (6th Cir. 1990); See also
Scott v. Elo, 302 F. 3d 598, 606 (6th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, petitioner is not
entitled to habeas relief on this portion of his second claim. 1
D. The suggestive identification claim.
Petitioner next alleges that the pre-trial identification procedure was
suggestive because Ms. Waters failed to identify him in two photographic arrays,
identifying him only for the first time at the preliminary examination.
Due process protects the accused against the introduction of evidence
which results from an unreliable identification obtained through unnecessarily
suggestive procedures. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 227 (1977). However, to
determine whether an identification procedure violates due process, courts look
first to whether the procedure was impermissibly suggestive; if so, courts then
1
The Court will discuss the portion of petitioner’s second claim alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel together with petitioner’s other ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, infra p. 16 et. seq.
11
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
determine whether, under the totality of circumstances, the suggestiveness has
led to a substantial likelihood of an irreparable misidentification. Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. 188 (1972). Five factors should be considered in determining the
reliability of identification evidence: (1) the witness’s opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of attention at the time
of the crime; (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the defendant;
(4) the witness’s level of certainty when identifying the suspect at the
confrontation; and (5) the length of time that has elapsed between the time and
the confrontation. Id. at 199-200.
A criminal defendant has the initial burden of proving that the identification
procedure was impermissibly suggestive. It is only after a defendant meets this
burden of proof that the burden then shifts to the prosecutor to prove that the
identification was reliable independent of the suggestive identification procedure.
See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240, n. 31(1967). If a defendant fails
to show that the identification procedures were impermissibly suggestive, or if
the totality of the circumstances indicates that the identification is otherwise
reliable, no due process violation has occurred. As long as there is not a
substantial likelihood of misidentification, it is for the jury to determine the
ultimate weight to be given to the identification. See United States v. Hill, 967
F.2d 226, 230 (6th Cir. 1992).
12
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief because he has failed to show
that Waters’ in-court identification was the result of suggestive procedures.
Petitioner does not allege that the two photographic arrays were unduly
suggestive. Instead, he argues that Waters’ in-court identification should have
been suppressed because she failed to identify petitioner at either photographic
showup. An earlier failure to identify a defendant, or even a positive
identification of a different suspect, does not require the exclusion of an in-court
or pretrial identification, if the identification is otherwise reliable. See Howard v.
Bouchard, 405 F. 3d 459, 484 (6th Cir. 2005)(collecting cases). Waters’ failure to
previously identify petitioner at the photo arrays went to the weight, not the
admissibility, of her in-court identification. Id. at 484-85.
The mere fact that petitioner was subsequently identified by Waters at his
preliminary examination does not make the identification procedure unreliable or
unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive. In Baker v. Hocker, 496 F. 2d 615,
617 (9th Cir. 1974), the Ninth Circuit held that a robbery victim’s identification of
the defendant at a preliminary hearing, after having failed to identify him at a
police lineup, was not unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive, even though
the petitioner in that case was seated at the preliminary hearing next to the two
co-defendants whom the victim had previously identified, thereby suggesting that
petitioner was the third robber. In rejecting the claim, the Ninth Circuit admitted
13
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
that any in-court identification confrontation, whether at a preliminary hearing or
at trial, “carries with it the stigma of the inevitable suggestion that the state thinks
the defendant has committed the crime.” Id. at 617. However, the Court ruled
that more than suggestion is required for a due process violation. The
procedure must create ‘unnecessary’ or ‘impermissible’ suggestion. Id.
Moreover, assuming that the pre-trial identification procedures were
unduly suggestive, petitioner has failed to show, under the totality of
circumstances, that the suggestiveness led to a substantial likelihood of an
irreparable misidentification. First, Ms. Waters testified that she witnessed
petitioner and the victim arguing for about fifteen minutes. Waters viewed the
argument from about six feet away. After petitioner shot the victim, he came up
to Ms. Waters and put a gun to her head. He also drove by her in a black Neon
car he had just stolen. Moreover, Waters never identified anyone else as being
the shooter. These factors all support a finding that an independent basis
existed for Waters’ in-court identification of petitioner. See Robertson v.
Abramajtys, 144 F. Supp. 2d 829, 847 (E.D. Mich. 2001.).
Finally, the reliability of Waters’ in-court identification is supported by the
fact that she “testified without equivocation” that petitioner was the murderer.
Howard, 405 F. 3d at 473. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his third claim.
14
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
E. The perjury claim.
Petitioner next contends that he was deprived of a fair trial because Ebony
Waters committed perjury at his trial.
The deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of
known and false evidence is incompatible with the rudimentary demands of
justice. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972). There is also a denial
of due process when the prosecutor allows false evidence or testimony to go
uncorrected. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)(internal citations
omitted). To prevail on a claim that a conviction was obtained by evidence that
the government knew or should have known to be false, a defendant must show
that the statements were actually false, that the statements were material, and
that the prosecutor knew they were false. Coe v. Bell, 161 F. 3d 320, 343 (6th
Cir. 1998). However, a habeas petitioner must show that a witness’ statement
was “indisputably false,” rather than misleading, to establish a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct or a denial of due process based on the knowing use
of false or perjured testimony. Byrd v. Collins, 209 F. 3d 486, 517-18 (6th Cir.
2000).
Mere inconsistencies in a witness’ testimony do not establish the knowing
use of false testimony by the prosecutor. Coe, 161 F. 3d at 343. Additionally,
the fact that a witness contradicts himself or herself or changes his or her story
15
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
also does not establish perjury either. Malcum v. Burt, 276 F. Supp. 2d 664, 684
(E.D. Mich. 2003)(citing Monroe v. Smith, 197 F. Supp. 2d 753, 762 (E.D. Mich.
2001)). A habeas petition should be granted if perjury by a government witness
undermines the confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id.
Petitioner has failed to establish that Waters committed perjury. Petitioner
merely points to inconsistencies between Waters’ prior statements to the police,
her preliminary examination and trial testimony, and the evidence at trial,
particularly the medical examiner’s report. This is insufficient to establish a
perjury claim. Coe, 161 F.3d at 343 (“mere inconsistencies” do not show
indisputable falsity). More importantly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief
on his perjury claim, because he has failed to show that the prosecutor knew
that Waters testified falsely. See Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F. 3d 577, 587 (6th
Cir. 2009).
F. The ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
Petitioner alleges in his second through sixth claims that he was denied
the effective assistance of counsel.
To show that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel under
federal constitutional standards, a defendant must satisfy a two prong test. First,
the defendant must demonstrate that, considering all of the circumstances,
counsel’s performance was so deficient that the attorney was not functioning as
16
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In so doing, the defendant must overcome a strong
presumption that counsel’s behavior lies within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Id. In other words, petitioner must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Second, the defendant must
show that such performance prejudiced his defense. Id. To demonstrate
prejudice, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “Strickland’s test for prejudice is a
demanding one. ‘The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just
conceivable.’” Storey v. Vasbinder, 657 F.3d 372, 379 (6th Cir. 2011)(quoting
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 792). The Supreme Court’s holding in Strickland
places the burden on the defendant who raises a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, and not the state, to show a reasonable probability that the result of
the proceeding would have been different, but for counsel’s allegedly deficient
performance. See Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 27 (2009).
Petitioner initially argues that he was constructively denied the assistance
of counsel at trial because of counsel’s ineffectiveness.
17
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
Where defense counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to
“meaningful adversarial testing,” there has been a constructive denial of counsel,
and a defendant need not make a showing of prejudice to establish ineffective
assistance of counsel. Moss v. Hofbauer, 286 F. 3d 851, 860 (6th Cir.
2002)(quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984)). However, in
order for a presumption of prejudice to arise based on an attorney’s failure to
test the prosecutor’s case, so that reversal based on ineffective assistance of
counsel is warranted without any inquiry into prejudice, the attorney’s failure to
test the prosecutor’s case “must be complete.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697
(2002).
In the present case, counsel’s alleged errors did not rise to the level of the
constructive denial of counsel, because counsel actively represented petitioner
at his trial. Moss, 286 F. 3d at 860-62. Trial counsel participated in voir dire,
made an opening statement, cross-examined the witnesses, made objections,
and made a closing argument.
The Cronic presumption “applies only where defense counsel completely
or entirely fails to oppose the prosecution throughout the guilt or penalty phase
as a whole.” Benge v. Johnson, 474 F. 3d 236, 247 (6th Cir. 2007)(citing Bell,
535 U.S. at 697). In the present case, counsel’s alleged failures do not amount
to a complete failure to provide a defense. The presumption of prejudice
18
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
therefore does not apply and petitioner would be required to show that he was
actually prejudiced by counsel’s alleged omissions in order to obtain habeas
relief. Id.
As part of his second claim, petitioner alleges that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on the lesser offense of
voluntary manslaughter.
Petitioner’s primary defense strategy was a mistaken identity defense,
thus, it was a reasonable trial strategy for counsel to forego requesting
instructions on the lesser included offense of manslaughter. Tinsley v. Million,
399 F. 3d 796, 808 (6th Cir. 2005). Moreover, in addition to the first-degree
murder charge, the jury was instructed on the lesser offense of second-degree
murder. (Tr. 4/14/05, pp. 56-57). Although the jury was instructed on the lesser
offense of second-degree murder, the jury chose to find petitioner guilty as
charged of first-degree murder. Petitioner has failed to establish that he was
prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to request an instruction on the
lesser-included offense of manslaughter, where in addition to finding defendant
guilty or not guilty of first-degree murder, the jury had the third option of
convicting petitioner of second-degree murder, but the jury declined to choose
this option. See United States v. Valencia, 188 Fed. Appx. 395, 401-02 (6th Cir.
2006).
19
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
As part of his third claim, petitioner contends that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to move to suppress the suggestive pre-trial identification of
petitioner.
A trial counsel's failure to move to suppress an allegedly unreliable,
in-court identification is not ineffective assistance, absent a reasonable
probability that the suppression motion would have resulted in a decision to
exclude the testimony. See Johnson v. Warren, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1091
(E.D. Mich. 2004). In light of the fact that petitioner has failed to show that the
lineup procedure was unduly suggestive, he has failed to show that his lawyer
was ineffective for failing to move for suppression of the pre-trial identification.
Id.
Moreover, defense counsel cross-examined Waters at great length
concerning the problems with her identification of petitioner. (Tr. 4/12/05, pp.
218-34, 237-38). The decision to attack the credibility of Waters’ identification of
petitioner through cross-examination, rather than to object to the in-court
identification, was a reasonable trial strategy that defeats petitioner’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. See Millender v. Adams, 187 F. Supp. 2d 852, 868
(E.D. Mich. 2002); Monroe v. Stegall, 197 F. Supp. 2d at 760 (both citing to
Killebrew v. Endicott, 992 F. 2d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 1993)).
20
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
In his fifth claim, petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to call his fiancee, his mother, and his sister as alibi witnesses. The
trial court rejected petitioner’s claim on post-conviction review because petitioner
failed to supply affidavits from the witnesses to the court to establish that these
witnesses would have testified or what their proposed testimony would be. See
People v. Turner, No. 05-000533-01, * 5 (Wayne Co. Circuit Ct. March 29,
2009).
Under 28 U.S.C. §2254(e), a federal court may not rely on evidence not
presented to the state courts unless the petitioner can show 1) either that he was
diligent in seeking to develop the evidence in state court or that the claim relies
on a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law, and 2) that the facts underlying
the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
no reasonable fact-finder could have found him guilty. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(e);
Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652-53 (2004). Although petitioner has now
provided this Court an affidavit from himself and from his fiancee Ms. Spearman,
petitioner did not present this affidavit or any other affidavits to the trial or
appellate courts as part of his post-conviction motion. Since petitioner did not
submit the affidavits to the state court in his motion for relief from judgment, he
has failed to demonstrate the diligence required to meet the exception of 28
U.S.C. §2254(e).
21
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that habeas review
under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) is “limited to the record that was before the state court
that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388,
1398 (2011). Petitioner does not claim that his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim was not adjudicated on the merits in state court, and in fact argues that his
habeas claims were fully presented in his state court proceedings. Therefore,
Cullen precludes the Court from considering petitioner’s new evidence in
reviewing petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim under 28 U.S.C.
§2254(d). Cf. Campbell v. Bradshaw, 674 F.3d 578, 590, n.3 (6th Cir. 2012)
(declining to consider testimony taken in federal evidentiary hearing because it
was not part of the state court record). This Court, in fact, on September 25,
2012 denied petitioner’s request to expand the record to include this affidavit as
part of the record before this Court. (Dkt. # 28).
Petitioner offered no evidence to the Michigan courts beyond his own
assertions as to whether his witnesses would have been able to testify and what
the content of these witnesses’ testimony would have been. In the absence of
proof, petitioner failed to establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to
call these witnesses to testify at trial, so as to support the second prong of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Clark v. Waller, 490 F. 3d 551, 557
22
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
(6th Cir. 2007). The trial court’s rejection of petitioner’s fifth claim was thus not
an unreasonable application of the law or the facts.
As part of his fourth claim, petitioner alleges that counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to Waters’ perjured testimony. In his sixth claim, petitioner
contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Waters with an
inconsistent statement from the preliminary examination. Petitioner does not
identify what questions should have been asked. In his motion for relief from
judgment, petitioner argued that trial counsel should have impeached Waters on
her conflicting testimony regarding the order of shots fired. The judge rejected
this claim during the motion for relief from judgment:
Defendant next argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to
impeach Waters with her inconsistent statements at the preliminary
examination and trial. At trial, Waters testified that she saw defendant
shoot the victim once and then heard a second shot. As discussed
above, Waters testified on direct examination at the preliminary
examination that she heard a gunshot, turned, and then saw defendant
fire a shot at the victim. On cross-examination [at the preliminary
examination], Waters testified that she saw defendant fire the first
shot, and heard the second shot.
Even if counsel did not impeach Waters with her inconsistent
statements, defendant has not shown that, but for counsel’s failure to
do so, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.
Waters consistently testified that she was walking within approximately
six feet of where defendant and the victim were arguing. Waters than
crossed the street before either hearing a gunshot and turning to see
defendant fire at the victim, or seeing defendant fire the first shot, and
then hearing the second shot. Although Waters’ testimony was
inconsistent on the exact sequence of events, drawing attention to this
23
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
small inconsistency would not have given defendant a reasonably
likely chance of acquittal. Defendant is not entitled to relief from
judgment on this issue.
People v. Turner, No. 05-000533-01, * 5-6
In this case, counsel’s decision not to challenge Waters over the minor
inconsistency about the order of shots was not ineffective assistance of counsel.
See Campbell v. United States, 364 F. 3d 727, 735 (6th Cir. 2004). A review of
trial counsel’s cross examination of Waters as a whole indicates that he
effectively challenged her credibility. Counsel noted inconsistencies regarding
how much attention Ms. Waters was paying to petitioner and the victim, whether
she heard the contents of their conversation, and that she told police initially that
petitioner shot the victim twice. (Tr. 4/12/05, pp. 222-26). Counsel highlighted
Ms. Water’s statement to the police that the shooter had a “lazy eye.” (Id. pp.
226-28). Petitioner does not have a “lazy eye,” though Ms. Waters explained
that she was referring to the fact that there appeared to be something in his eye.
Finally, trial counsel extensively cross-examined Ms. Waters about the fact that
she could not pick out petitioner from a photographic lineup and that she had
never interacted with petitioner. (Id., pp. 230-31). Counsel’s failure to impeach
Waters about the minor inconsistency over the order of the gunshots did not
undermine confidence in outcome of the case, since a variety of other
impeachment evidence was admitted in this case. See Wolfe v. Bock, 412 F.
24
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
Supp. 2d 657, 676-77 (E.D. Mich. 2006). Moreover, because this discrepancy
was a minor difference in Waters’ testimony and is not a basis for concluding
that she perjured herself (See Issue E, supra at 15), defense counsel was not
ineffective for failing to cross-examine Waters about her prior testimony from the
preliminary examination or for failing to assert that she perjured herself at trial.
See Greene v. Lafler, 447 F. Supp. 2d 780, 794 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
Petitioner finally claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to Janice Smith’s hearsay testimony that someone had told her that petitioner
had shot the victim. Even if counsel provided deficient performance in deciding
not to object to this hearsay evidence, the effect of this evidence was harmless
given the substantial amount of independent evidence of guilt against petitioner.
Lewis v. Russell, 42 Fed. Appx. 809, 811 (6th Cir. 2002). Defense counsel was
not ineffective for failing to object to the alleged hearsay offered during
petitioner’s trial, in light of the fact that the trial court on post-conviction review,
Turner, No. 05-000533-01, * 6, concluded that this testimony did not prejudice
petitioner’s defense. See Adams v. Smith, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 721.
G. A certificate of appealability.
A habeas petitioner must receive a certificate of appealability (“COA”) in
order to appeal the denial of a habeas petition for relief from either a state or
25
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
federal conviction. 2 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253(c)(1)(A), (B). A court may issue a COA
“only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a federal district court rejects
a habeas claim on the merits, the substantial showing threshold is met if the
petitioner demonstrates that reasonable jurists would find the district court's
assessment of the constitutional claim debatable or wrong. See Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by
demonstrating that ... jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate
to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
322, 327 (2003). In applying this standard, a district court may not conduct a full
merits review, but must limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the
underlying merit of the petitioner’s claims. Id. at 336-37.
The Court concludes that jurists of reason would find its assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. Any
doubt regarding whether to grant a certificate of appealability from the denial of a
petition for federal habeas relief is resolved in favor of the habeas petitioner, and
2
Effective December 1, 2009, the newly created Rule 11 of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll.
§ 2254, provides that “[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of
appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Rule 11(a), 28
U.S.C. foll. § 2254.
26
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
the severity of the penalty may be considered in making that determination. See
Newton v. Dretke, 371 F. 3d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 2004). Any doubts regarding the
issuance of a certificate of appealability should be resolved in petitioner’s favor,
in light of the nonparolable life sentence that he is serving. The Court thus
issues petitioner a certificate of appealability.
Petitioner is also granted leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis, as
any appeal would not be frivolous. A court may grant in forma pauperis status if
the court finds that an appeal is being taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3); Fed. R.App.24 (a); Foster v. Ludwick, 208 F. Supp. 2d 750, 765
(E.D. Mich. 2002).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court concludes that Petitioner Turner
is not entitled to federal-habeas relief on the claims presented in his petition.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the amended petition for writ of habeas
corpus (Dkt. # 12) is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court issues petitioner a certificate of
appealability and leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.
Dated: January 27, 2014
s/Arthur J. Tarnow
Arthur J. Tarnow
Senior United States District Judge
27
Turner v. Palmer, 08-CV-11724
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon
parties/counsel of record on January 27, 2014, by electronic and/or ordinary
mail.
S/Catherine A. Pickles
Judicial Assistant
28
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?