Police and Fire Retirement System of the City of Detroit et al v. Watkins et al

Filing 214

ORDER denying 209 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Victoria A. Roberts. (CPin)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

POLICE AND FIRE RETIREMENT
SYSTEM OF THE CITY OF DETROIT,
ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,

CASE NUMBER: 08-12582
HONORABLE VICTORIA A. ROBERTS
Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen

v.
DONALD V. WATKINS, ET AL.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Before the Court is Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration
of this Court’s May 1, 2012 Order (Doc. # 207) affirming the Magistrate Judge’s Opinion
and Order (Doc. # 189) Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion for a
Protective Order Prohibiting Defendants from taking the Depositions of Plaintiffs’
Counsel (Doc. # 176).
Local Rule 7.1(h)(3) provides the Court’s standard of review:
Generally, and without restricting the court’s discretion, the court will not
grant motions for rehearing or reconsideration that merely present the
same issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable
implication. The movant must not only demonstrate a palpable defect by
which the court and the parties and other persons entitled to be heard on
the motion have been misled but also show that correcting the defect will
result in a different disposition of the case.
E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3).
Palpable defects are those which are “obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest or
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plain.” Mich. Dep’t of Treasury v. Michalec, 181 F. Supp. 2d 731, 734 (E.D. Mich. 2002)
(citing Marketing Displays, Inc. v. Traffix Devices, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 262, 278 (E.D.
Mich. 1997), rev’d in part on other grounds, 200 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 1999)). “It is an
exception to the norm for the Court to grant a motion for reconsideration.” Maiberger v.
City of Livonia, 724 F. Supp. 2d 759, 780 (E.D. Mich. 2010). “[A]bsent a significant error
that changes the outcome of a ruling on a motion, the Court will not provide a party with
an opportunity to relitigate issues already decided.” Id.
The Court reviewed Defendants’ motion; it does not provide a basis to grant
reconsideration. Defendants do not demonstrate a palpable defect by which the Court
has been misled. They ignore the pertinent case law, which makes clear that the
“practice of taking opposing counsel’s deposition [is] one that should be employed only
in limited circumstances.” Shelton v. Am. Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir.
1986); see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 278 F.3d 621, 628-29 (6th
Cir. 2002). Instead, they cite cases which do not deal with the unique discovery request
involved here.
A review of the transcript of the hearing before Magistrate Judge Whalen on
Plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order reveals that he based his decision on the threepart test set forth in Shelton and Nationwide, (see 2/16/12 Tr. 28), and on his view that
granting Defendants’ discovery request in full would lead to a “fishing expedition,” (id. at
30). See Surles v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 305 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Although
a plaintiff should not be denied access to information necessary to establish her claim,
neither may a plaintiff be permitted ‘to go fishing and a trial court retains discretion to
determine that a discovery request is too broad and oppressive.’” (quoting Marshall v.
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Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 1978))). Although he cites
various evidentiary rules, the Magistrate Judge does not base his decision on trial
standards of admissibility; he observes that Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 provides “relaxed
standards” for discovery. (2/16/12 Tr. 30).
Defendants’ motion is DENIED.
IT IS ORDERED.

s/Victoria A. Roberts
Victoria A. Roberts
United States District Judge
Dated: August 3, 2012
The undersigned certifies that a copy of this
document was served on the attorneys of
record by electronic means or U.S. Mail on
August 3, 2012.
s/Carol A. Pinegar
Deputy Clerk

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