Reynolds v. Social Security, Commissioner of
Filing
34
ORDER Denying 31 Petition for Attorney Fees filed by Maryanne Reynolds Signed by District Judge Marianne O. Battani. (BThe)
UNTIED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MARYANNE REYNOLDS,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 08-13055
v.
HON. MARIANNE O. BATTANI
MICHAEL ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_______________________ __________/
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS’
FEES UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
Before the Court is Plaintiff Maryanne Reynolds’s Application for Attorney Fees
under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (Doc. No. 31). The Court has
reviewed the pleadings, and finds oral argument will not aid in the resolution of this
dispute. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(e)(2). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s application
is DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income in May of 2005. (Doc. No. 33, at 4). Plaintiff’s initial application was denied by
Defendant Commissioner of Social Security.
(Id.).
On January 26, 2007, an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) performed the five-step inquiry required by the social
security regulations and held that Plaintiff was not disabled, and denied her benefits.
(Id.). The ALJ’s decision became Defendant’s final decision after the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (Id.). Plaintiff filed a civil action in this Court on
July 15, 2008. (Id.). The Court affirmed Defendant’s decision. (Doc. No. 21). Plaintiff
appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and
remanded “for the ALJ to revisit the case and explain his findings at Step Three” of the
process. See Reynolds v. Comm’r of Social Sec., No. 09-2060, 2011 WL 1228165, at
*1 (6th Cir. 2011).
Subsequent to the Sixth Circuit’s decision, Plaintiff filed this application for EAJA
fees in the amount of $7,603.32. (Doc. No. 33, at 4.). Plaintiff contends that the Sixth
Circuit’s reasoning as to why the case was remanded justifies awarding her attorney
fees. Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to EAJA fees because its position in
defending the action was substantially justified. (Doc. No. 33, at 5).
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) reads in
relevant part:
a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the
United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any
costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that
party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort),
including proceedings for judicial review of agency action,
brought by or against the United States in any court having
jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the
position of the United States was substantially justified or
that special circumstances makes an award unjust.
III.
ANALYSIS
In order to succeed on a claim for the recovery of attorney fees under EAJA, four
requirements must be met: (1) the claimant must be a “prevailing party”; (2) the
Government’s position was not “substantially justified”; (3) there must be no special
circumstances that make an award unjust; and (4) an application must be submitted to
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the court within 30 days of a final judgment in the action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B);
Comm’r, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 158 (1990).
At issue in this case is whether Defendant Commissioner’s position was
substantially justified.
The EAJA statute addresses the “substantially justified”
affirmative defense:
[w]hether or not the position of the United States was
substantially justified shall be determined on the basis of the
record (including the record with respect to the action or
failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is
based) which is made in the civil action for which fees and
other expenses are sought.
§ 2412(d)(1)(B). A defendant’s position is substantially justified if it has a “reasonable
basis both in law and fact.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). In other
words, substantially justified means “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable
person.” Id.; see also United States v. 2323 Charms Road, 946 F.2d 437, 440 (6th Cir.
1991) (finding that a position is justified even if it is not correct, if a reasonable person
could think it to be correct). In addition, it is a defendant’s burden to establish that its
position was substantially justified. Peck v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 165 F. App’x. 443,
446 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 414 (2004)).
The fact that a defendant’s position might be unsupported by substantial
evidence does not infer that the position was not substantially justified. Howard v.
Barnhart, 376 F.3d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 2004).
“Congress did not . . . want the
‘substantially justified’ standard to ‘be read to raise a presumption that the
Government[‘s] position was not substantially justified simply because it lost the
case . . . .’” Id. (citing Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 415).
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In her application, Plaintiff seeks $7,603.32 in attorneys’ fees. Defendant objects
on the ground that it was substantially justified in defending this case.
Defendant
contends its position was substantially justified because the appellate court found all of
Plaintiff’s points of error meritless. (Doc. No. 33, at 6). Defendant also highlights the
fact that the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for a reason that Plaintiff
never advanced on appeal: insufficient articulation by the ALJ at Step Three of the
disability review process. (Id. at 6-7). Therefore, Defendant argues the record clearly
establishes that its litigation position was substantially justified. The Court agrees.
Notably, the Sixth Circuit held that each of Plaintiff’s points of error were
insufficient to overturn the ALJ’s decision and the court raised the issue regarding the
ALJ’s inadequate reasoning at Step Three on its own. Thus, Defendant’s position has
been consistently upheld throughout these proceedings. See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 569
(“[t]he fact that one other court agreed or disagreed with the Government does not
establish whether its position was substantially justified . . . . Nevertheless, a string of
losses can be indicative; and even more so a string of successes.”).
Additionally,
Defendant properly asserts that the ALJ’s decision was legally sufficient for Defendant
to pursue the case. Moreover, the Court finds that the ALJ did not erroneously apply
the social security regulations, further supporting the conclusion that Defendant’s
position was substantially justified.
A. The ALJ’s Decision Was Legally Sufficient
Defendant correctly asserts that the ALJ’s statement at Step Three was legally
sufficient, justifying the Commissioner’s position to defend the case.
In Price v.
Heckler, the Sixth Circuit addressed minimum articulation requirements for an ALJ
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during a sequential disability evaluation. 767 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1985). In that case,
the plaintiff established the existence of a number of impairments. Id. at 282. At Step
Three of the process, the ALJ stated that the impairments “individually, or in
combination, do not meet or equal in severity the Secretary’s list of impairments.” Id. at
284 (Peck, J., dissenting). The appellate court reasoned that the ALJ’s findings of fact
were legally sufficient, even though the ALJ could have stated his findings with more
particularity. Id. (majority opinion).
The ALJ’s statement that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet Section 1.00 of the
listings was legally sufficient for purposes of Defendant’s decision to defend the case.
Here, the ALJ concluded: “Claimant does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments which, alone or in combination, meet sections 1.00 or 12.00 of the
Listings.” Reynolds, 2011 WL 1228165, at *3. In Price, the court required slightly less
detail for a finding of legal sufficiency.
Accordingly, the Commissioner could have
reasonably relied on the ALJ’s Step Three analysis.
Although the ALJ did not
comprehensively describe his thought process at Step Three, the Court finds that
Defendant was substantially justified in relying on the ALJ’s ultimate decision to deny
benefits. See Anderson v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 198 F.3d 244, *4 (Table) (6th Cir.
1999) (“The issue, when considering the award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party
under the EAJA, is not whether the ALJ gave adequate articulation for his findings, but
whether the Commissioner was justified in supporting the ALJ's decision to deny
benefits based on the record.”).
The Sixth Circuit’s remand to further develop the record does not alter the
Court’s conclusion that Defendant’s position was substantially justified. In Green v.
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Comm’r of Social Sec., the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the
Commissioner’s position was substantially justified after the case was remanded to the
ALJ for further development of the record.
52 F.App’x. 758, 759 (6th Cir. 2002).
Specifically, the case was remanded for the ALJ to determine whether the plaintiff had
the ability to perform light work.
Id.
The court noted that there was nothing that
contradicted the Commissioner’s position, and the only purpose of the district court’s
remand was for further development of the record. Id. In fact, the court reasoned that
because the Commissioner had won on several of its points, it further supported that its
position was substantially justified. Id.
Similar to Green, the purpose of the remand in this case is to further develop the
record. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on every other ground and remanded only for the ALJ
to state with more clarity whether the claimant’s disabilities equaled a listed impairment.
This case is factually indistinguishable from Green where the court remanded to
determine whether the claimant had the ability to perform light work. As the Sixth
Circuit held in Green, the Court finds that a remand for record development does not
necessarily imply that Defendant’s position lacked substantially justification.
Accord
Kinsora v. Comm’r of Social Sec., No. 09-11507, 2011 WL 2173909 (E.D. Mich. 2011)
(finding that a remand for failure to articulate does not translate to a lack of substantial
justification).
B. The ALJ Did Not Erroneously Apply The Social Security Regulations
The Court is reluctant to find that Defendant’s position was not substantially
justified because the ALJ did not make an error based upon a misapplication of the
regulations. Instead, the ALJ simply did not thoroughly explain his reasoning at Step
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Three of the process. In Howard v. Barnhart, 376 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 2004), the court
held that the Commissioner’s position to defend the case was not substantially justified
because the ALJ selectively considered the evidence. Id. at 553. Indeed, in Howard,
the ALJ did not weigh the evidence properly and wrongly determined not to accord a
doctor appropriate deference. Id. Consequently, the court held that because the ALJ
selectively considered the evidence, the Commissioner’s decision to defend the ALJ
was without substantial justification. Id. at 554 (citing Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562,
570 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Halverson v. Astrue, No. 08-784, 2009 WL 2256380 (D.
Minn. 2009) (holding that Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified where
ALJ failed to consider four opinions and ignored regulations dealing with credibility to be
given to non-medical sources); Gray v. Astrue, No. 0:08-cv-3910-PMD, 2010 WL
2622391 (D. S.C. 2010) (holding that the Commissioner’s position was not substantially
justified because the ALJ did not did not consider all of the claimant’s impairments
together).
This case is different from situations where courts have found that the
Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified.
Here, the ALJ did not
selectively consider the evidence or refuse to find witnesses credible as required by the
regulations. The record reflects that the ALJ considered all the evidence regarding the
claimant’s alleged obesity, credibility, residual functional capacity, and work
performance abilities. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the ALJ on every point and only
remanded because the ALJ failed to analyze in detail whether the claimant’s physical
impairments met or equaled a listed impairment. See Reynolds, 2011 WL 1228165 at
*1, *3.
In sum, the evidence in the record shows that Defendant’s position was
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substantially justified. Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Application for Attorney
Fees.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Application for Attorney Fees (Doc. No.
31) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Marianne O. Battani
MARIANNE O. BATTANI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATE: October 18, 2011
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the above date a copy of this Order was served upon all
parties via ordinary U.S. Mail and/or electronically.
s/Bernadette M. Thebolt
Case Manager
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