LaFrance v. Grand River Navigation Company, Incorporated

Filing 50

ORDER denying 47 Motion for New Trial. Signed by District Judge Lawrence P. Zatkoff. (MVer)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MARC LAFRANCE,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 08-13411
Hon. Lawrence P. Zatkoff

GRAND RIVER NAVIGATION
COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant.
/
OPINION AND ORDER
AT A SESSION of said Court, held in the United States Courthouse,
in the City of Port Huron, State of Michigan, on September 20, 2011
PRESENT: THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial [dkt 47]. Defendant
has filed a response, and Plaintiff has replied. The Court finds that the facts and legal arguments
pertinent to Plaintiff’s Motion are adequately presented in the parties’ papers, and the decisional
process will not be aided by oral arguments. Therefore, pursuant to E.D. Mich. L. R. 7.1(f)(2), it
is hereby ORDERED that the Motion be resolved on the briefs submitted, without this Court
entertaining oral arguments. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a Florida resident who was employed as a cook aboard the M/V Maumee,
Defendant’s vessel, when the incident giving rise to this action occurred. On May 9, 2008, Plaintiff
departed on the M/V Maumee. As the cook, Plaintiff was responsible for preparing meals for the

crew, as well as maintaining a supply of beverages for the crew. The next morning, Plaintiff
prepared Kool-Aid in a five-gallon container. The container was stored inside of a dispensing
cooler. According to Plaintiff, while carrying the filled container to the cooler, the vessel rolled in
the water and the cooler door swung shut. Plaintiff rotated to the left and set the container down on
the floor. While lowering the container, Plaintiff severely injured his back. After the M/V Maumee
reached its final destination of Cleveland, Ohio, on May 12, 2008, Plaintiff first received medical
attention.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on August 6, 2008, asserting that Defendant was negligent under
the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, et seq., and that the vessel was unseaworthy under general maritime
law. Plaintiff also sought maintenance and cure. The case proceeded to trial on January 11, 2011.
At trial, Plaintiff argued that Defendant’s failure to provide a means to secure the cooler door in an
open position was negligent and the failure of the cooler door to remain in an open position
constituted an unseaworthy condition.
In proving his case, Plaintiff testified before the jury regarding the incident on May 10,
2008, and his experience as a seaman on other vessels. Plaintiff also called Captain Joe Maurer and
Chief Cook Theo Igieliski. They testified to the jury regarding general maritime practices to
maintain safety aboard the vessel, such as securing any item that swings, moves, or opens. Plaintiff
also called an expert biomechanical engineer and ergonomist, Dr. Andres, who testified about
Plaintiff’s incident from a biomechanical perspective. In opposing Plaintiff’s claims, Defendant
called two cooks who had worked aboard the M/V Maumee—Irenee Salva and Kathleen Pavlovich.
Defendant also called Brian Harvey, who was the first mate aboard the M/V Maumee at the time of
the incident. He testified about the conditions on the day of the incident as well as the general

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effects of weather on the vessel’s motion.
On January 14, 2011, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant. As set forth on the
Verdict Form, the jury answered “No” to both of the following questions:
1.

Did Defendant fail to provide a reasonably safe workplace for
Plaintiff?

2.

Did an unseaworthy condition exist on Defendant’s vessel?

Based on those answers, there were no additional questions for the jury to consider. The Court
entered a Judgment on March 23, 2011. Plaintiff timely filed the instant Motion for a New Trial.
In his Motion for a New Trial, Plaintiff asserts that the great weight of the evidence presented at trial
established that (1) the M/V Maumee was unseaworthy under general maritime law and
(2) Defendant was negligent under the Jones Act due to the unsecured cooler door that swung closed
while Plaintiff was attempting to place the five-gallon container into the cooler. The Court will
address each of Plaintiff’s claims below.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: “A new trial may be granted to all
or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues (1) in any action in which there has been a trial
by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law
in the courts of the United States.” The Supreme Court has stated that the authority to grant new
trials under Rule 59(a) “is large” and that authority to grant a new trial exists “if the verdict appears
to [the judge] to be against the weight of the evidence.” Gasperini v. Ctr. for the Humanities, Inc.,
518 U.S. 415, 433 (1996). The motion therefore should be denied if the verdict is one which could
reasonably have been reached; and the verdict should not be considered unreasonable merely
because different inferences and conclusions could have been drawn or because other results are
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more reasonable. Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 670 (6th Cir. 2001).
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

PLAINTIFF’S UNSEAWORTHINESS CLAIM
The Court first addresses whether the jury’s finding that the M/V Maumee was seaworthy

on May 10, 2008—the date of Plaintiff’s injury—appears to be against the weight of the evidence
presented at trial. According to general admiralty law, the doctrine of unseaworthiness imposes a
nondelegable duty on a ship owner to provide a vessel and its equipment that is reasonably suited
for their intended purpose. Cook v. Am. S.S. Co., 53 F.3d 733, 741 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Usner v.
Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494 (1971)); see Churchill v. Bluegrass Marine, Inc., 444
F.3d 898, 904 (6th Cir. 2006) (“A vessel is unseaworthy if the vessel and its appurtenances are not
reasonably fit for their intended use. Defective gear . . . or the use of an improper method of storage
or unloading cargo all render a vessel unseaworthy.” (citations omitted)). As the United States
Supreme Court has explained:
What has been said is not to suggest that the owner is obligated to
furnish an accident-free ship. . . . [I]t is a duty only to furnish a vessel
and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use. The standard
is not perfection, but reasonable fitness; not a ship that will weather
every conceivable storm or withstand every imaginable peril of the
sea, but a vessel reasonably suited for her intended service.
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960).
Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the evidence presented to the jury
demonstrated that: (1) the cooler door swung closed as Plaintiff was attempting to place the
five-gallon container in the cooler; (2) the testimony presented at trial indicated that a latch was used
to secure cooler doors in an open position on other vessels; and (3) the cooler door on the M/V
Maumee had a latch to secure it closed, yet no latch to secure it open. Plaintiff also argues that the
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testimony of the two cooks, Salva and Pavlovich, are irrelevant because their testimony does not
contradict Plaintiff’s testimony that the door swung closed, and thus the cooler door failed to
function properly due to the lack of a latch. As such, Plaintiff contends that the cooler door was not
reasonably fit for its intended purpose. Plaintiff also relies, among other cited legal authority, on
Oliveras v. Am. Exp. Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 431 F.2d 814 (2nd Cir. 1970), where the case was
remanded for a new trial because the jury incorrectly determined that a failed securing mechanism
on the vessel’s door was found to be seaworthy.
Contrary to Plaintiff, Defendant contends that the lack of a latch to hold the cooler door open
was not a determinative piece of evidence. Rather, significant evidence was presented by both
parties regarding the incident that resulted in Plaintiff’s injury. Defendant concludes that the jury
considered that evidence, weighed the credibility of the witnesses, and resolved the claim against
Plaintiff. As such, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Motion should be denied.
The Court finds that the verdict rendered by the jury was not against the weight of the
evidence and could have been reasonably reached because disputed issues of fact existed on which
reasonable minds could differ. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 433; Walker, 257 F.3d at 670. The mere
fact that Plaintiff failed to persuade the jury with the evidence that he presented at trial does not
establish that the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence. As opposed to Plaintiff’s
testimony that was based on two days aboard the M/V Maumee, Pavlovich testified that she worked
in the galley on the M/V Maumee for approximately two years. She stated that she filled the
container every other day. She further testified that she never experienced enough vessel motion
to cause the cooler door to swing closed, believing in part that the door would “stick” open. Salva,
another cook that had worked aboard the M/V Maumee for two years, was relieved by Plaintiff on

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May 7, 2008. She testified that due to her size she would request another crew member on the M/V
Maumee to place the five-gallon container in the cooler. She also testified that the cooler door never
inadvertently shut once it was opened. While Plaintiff argues that Salva and Pavlovich’s testimony
does not provide a reasonable basis to conclude that the cooler door did not swing closed on May
10, 2008, the jury was able to weigh Plaintiff’s testimony against Salva and Pavlovich’s testimony
to reasonably conclude that the cooler door did not swing closed as Plaintiff testified. Plaintiff’s
expert also provided no additional evidence to the jury on this issue. Dr. Andres discussed how the
weight of the filled container and rotation of Plaintiff to the left supported Plaintiff’s injury. Dr.
Andres’ testimony, however, was irrelevant as to whether the cooler door inadvertently closed.
In addition, Harvey, the first mate aboard the M/V Maumee on May 10, 2008, testified that
the weather condition on May 10, 2008, was calm with minimal winds and any motion aboard the
vessel would have been negligible. Harvey based his testimony on entries in the M/V Maumee’s log
book and his personal observations. Based on the evidence presented to the jury, the jury had a
reasonable basis to disregard Plaintiff’s testimony and conclude that there was insufficient vessel
motion on May 10, 2008, to cause the cooler door to swing closed.
As to Plaintiff’s relevant legal authority, Plaintiff asserts, based on the factual similarity of
this case and Oliveras, the Court should find that the lack of a latch to secure the cooler door open
made the vessel unseaworthy. In Oliveras, a plaintiff alleged that the shipowner’s vessel was
unseaworthy due to a wedge and hook that failed to secure a door on the vessel, causing an injury
to the plaintiff’s hand. 431 F.2d at 814–15. The incident occurred when the vessel was in rough
seas off the New England coast. Id. A wave broke over the bow and continued toward the direction
of the plaintiff. Id. at 815. The plaintiff headed through the open door, at which point the door shut,

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due to the vessel’s sudden movement, and hit the plaintiff’s hand. Id. at 815. At trial, a jury
returned a verdict that the vessel was seaworthy. Id. at 815. Reviewing the judgment against the
plaintiff, the appeals court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of whether
the ship was unseaworthy. Id. at 815. The appeals court noted that “[a] ship is not secure for sea,
and hence is unseaworthy, when the fitting under scrutiny does not perform its intended function in
weather which can be reasonably anticipated.” Id. at 816. The appeals court, applying this
principle, held that “[n]othing more need be shown except that the [wedge and hook] failed under
conditions when it should have functioned properly.” Id. at 816.
Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the Court finds Oliveras distinguishable from this case.
In Oliveras, it appears that the defendant shipowner did not dispute that the wedge and hook failed
to secure the door. Instead, the appeals court analyzed whether the failure of the wedge and hook
meant it was not fit for its intended purpose. See id. 815–16. Unlike Oliveras, in this case there was
no latch already in place and the jury had a reasonable basis to conclude from the testimony of the
cooks and first mate that the door on the cooler did not swing shut. Accordingly, for the reasons
stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial is denied with respect to his unseaworthiness claim.
B.

PLAINTIFF’S JONES ACT CLAIM
The Court next addresses whether the jury’s finding that Defendant was not negligent under

the Jones Act appears to be against the weight of the evidence presented at trial. Under the Jones
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, a seaman may maintain a negligence action for personal injury suffered in the
course of employment against his or her employer. Churchwell, 444 F.3d at 907. To establish a
claim under the Jones Act, the seaman must show that the employer was negligent and such
negligence caused, however slight, the injury to the seaman. Perkins v. Am. Elec. Power Fuel

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Supply, Inc., 246 F.3d 593, 599 (6th Cir. 2001). Negligence is shown by demonstrating that the
“employer failed to provide a safe workplace by neglecting to cure or eliminate obvious dangers of
which the employer or its agents knew or should have known and that such failure caused the
plaintiff’s injuries and damages.” Taylor v. Teco Barge Line, Inc., 517 F.3d 372, 383 (6th Cir. 2008)
(citing Rannals v. Diamond Jo Casino, 265 F.3d 442, 447 (6th Cir. 2001)).
The parties’ make the same arguments with respect to the jury’s finding under the Jones Act
claim as they did with respect to the jury’s finding under the seaworthiness claim. After reviewing
the parties’ arguments under the Jones Act and the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that
a reasonable jury could have found that Defendant was not negligent under the Jones Act as this jury
did. The jury had a reasonable basis to conclude from the evidence presented that Defendant, or its
employees, did not know or should have not known that the cooler door would swing shut and cause
Plaintiff’s injury. As the testimony of Pavlovich indicated, the cooler door never inadvertently shut
while she was working as a cook. Salva’s testimony, a second cook that worked on the M/V
Maumee, supports Pavlovich’s statements. Other than Plaintiff’s testimony that he worked on a
vessel that had a latch to secure the cooler door open, no other evidence presented to the jury
established that Defendant knew or should have known of any possible defect in the cooler door.
See Havens v. F/T Polar Mist, 996 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1993) (“There must be some evidence
from which the trier of fact can infer that the owner either knew, or in the exercise of due care,
should have known of the unsafe condition.”). Absent such evidence, the jury had a reasonable
basis to find that Defendant was not negligent under the Jones Act. See Barnes v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 201 F.3d 815, 821 (6th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial
is denied with respect to his Jones Act Claim.

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V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial [dkt 47]
is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Lawrence P. Zatkoff
LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 20, 2011
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of this Order was served upon the attorneys of
record by electronic or U.S. mail on September 20, 2011.

S/Marie E. Verlinde
Case Manager
[phone]

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