Ata v. Scutt

Filing 49

ORDER AND OPINION Denying Petitioner Muzaffer Ata's Request for Equitable Tolling and Dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as Time-barred 1 . Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (JCur)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

Muzaffer Ata,
Case No. 08-13849
Petitioner,
Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds
v.
Debra Scutt, Warden,
Respondent.
/
ORDER AND OPINION DENYING PETITIONER MUZAFFER ATA's REQUEST FOR
EQUITABLE TOLLING AND DISMISSING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AS TIME-BARRED
I.

Introduction and background
On September 8, 2008, Petitioner Muzaffer Ata filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. (Dkt. 1.) Also on that day, Petitioner filed a motion for equitable tolling of the
applicable one-year statute of limitations. (Dkt. 3.) In that motion, Petitioner acknowledged
that, under normal circumstances, his claim would have expired on April 30, 2001. (Id.)
Petitioner argued that he should have been entitled to equitable tolling of his petition
because he had been hospitalized on numerous occasions for paranoid schizophrenia and
other psychoses. (Id.)
The Court ordered Defendant to respond to the petition. (Dkt. 5.) On March 10, 2009,
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 8.) Five days later, the Court
addressed both Petitioner's motion for equitable tolling and Defendant's motion for
summary judgment. (Dkt. 10, Court's March 18 Order.) The Court noted that Petitioner
was competent to stand trial in his underlying Michigan court case and was able to pursue

his rights on appeal. (Court's March 18 Order at 10.) The Court further noted that he failed
to establish his burden that he was incompetent during the time period in which his statute
of limitations was running. (Id.) The Court then addressed various other factors from which
it found that Petitioner had not met his burden of establishing that he was entitled to
equitable tolling because of his alleged mental illness. (Id.)
Petitioner appealed. (Dkt. 13.)
On November 28, 2011, the Sixth Circuit vacated the Court's finding and remanded
the matter so that the Court could conduct an evidentiary hearing on the equitable tolling
issue. Ata v. Scutt, 662 F.3d 736 (6th Cir. 2011). The Sixth Circuit found that Petitioner's
allegations created enough of a question to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on the
tolling issue.
On December 5, 2013, the Court held Petitioner's evidentiary hearing. (Dkt. 43.)
II.

Discussion
A. Guiding equitable tolling law
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110

Stat. 1214 (AEDPA) applies to all habeas petitions filed after the Act's effective date and
imposes a one-year limitations period for habeas corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1).
A petitioner can equitably toll the limitations period if he shows "(1) that he has been
pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way
and prevented timely filing." Ata, 662 F.3d at 741 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). The Sixth Circuit has stated that district courts should apply equitable tolling
"sparingly" and on a "case-by-case basis." Id. (citations omitted).

2

A petitioner asserting equitable tolling "bears the ultimate burden of persuading the
court that he or she is entitled to equitable tolling." Ata, 662 F.3d at 741 (citation omitted).
"Mental incompetence or incapacity may provide a basis for equitable tolling." Ata,
662 F.3d at 741 (citation omitted). From the Sixth Circuit's remand in this case:
To obtain equitable tolling of AEDPA's statute of limitations on the basis of
mental incompetence, a petitioner must demonstrate that (1) he is mentally
incompetent and (2) his mental incompetence caused his failure to comply
with AEDPA's statute of limitations. In short, a blanket assertion of mental
incompetence is insufficient to toll the statute of limitations. Rather, a causal
link between the mental condition and untimely filing is required.
Id. at 742 (citation omitted).
B. The Sixth Circuit's opinion
The Sixth Circuit held that Petitioner had set out facts and the causal connection
necessary to be entitled to a hearing. Ata, 622 F.3d at 743. The Sixth Circuit reviewed the
facts that it found to support its holding. Id. The Sixth Circuit pointed to Petitioner's
allegation that he untimely filed his petition "because he had been hospitalized on
numerous occasions for paranoid schizophrenia" and "because he has been and continues
to be medicated by the [MDOC] for paranoid schizophrenia and other psychoses." Id. The
court held that the fact that Petitioner alleged that his untimeliness was due to being
hospitalized and medicated, combined with his affidavit that he did not understand the oneyear limitation period, was sufficient for an evidentiary hearing. Id. The Sixth Circuit stated
that "while certainly not elaborate, [Petitioner's] allegations are specific enough to assert
a causal link between his mental incompetence and his untimely petition." Id. The court
added a helpful footnote. After quoting that "ignorance of the law alone is not sufficient to
warrant equitable tolling[,]" the court stated that "[i]t is not clear whether [Petitioner] is
3

explaining that he was merely ignorant of the law or whether his mental incapacity
prevented him from being able to comprehend the substance or applicability of the law."
Id. n. 7. The Sixth Circuit explained that "[a] hearing will permit the district court to explore
this issue." Id.
The Sixth Circuit reviewed the record and found that Petitioner's medical records
showed a long history of mental illness. Ata, 662 F.3d at 744. The medical records, the
court found, supported Ata's allegation that his medical illness caused his untimeliness.
Id. The court paused again in a footnote that is relevant here. The Sixth Circuit noted,
We are mindful that the Supreme Court requires more than an "extraordinary
circumstance" that "prevented timely filing" for a petitioner to be entitled to
equitable tolling. It required petitioners to demonstrate diligent pursuit of their
rights.
Here, in the affidavit attached to his motion for equitable tolling, [Petitioner]
stated that "I have made every attempt known to me and my reasoning and
understanding to facilitate any appeals before any court and to diligently
prepare my appeal. I have not forsook any opportunity to present my
appeal." Thus, [Petitioner] has set forth the basis for his claim of reasonable
diligence in filing his petition.
Id. at 745, n. 8. Given the records and the allegations, the Sixth Circuit held that the Court
must conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Petitioner is entitled to equitable
tolling.
C. Petitioner has not met his burden to show that he is entitled to equitable
tolling
The Court finds that Petitioner has not met his burden to show that he is entitled to
equitable tolling. Petitioner fails to show that he was mentally incompetent while the oneyear limitations period was tolling. Petitioner also fails to show that any alleged mental

4

incompetence caused his seven-year delay in filing his petition. Petitioner finally fails to
show that he diligently pursued his claim.
The Court makes this finding from the medical records that the parties have submitted
as well as from the testimony during the evidentiary hearing.
1. Petitioner's factual showing
a. The medical records
The Court has reviewed the MDOC documents for the relevant time period, 2000 and
beyond. (Dkt. 44, Records.) For the most part, the records are unremarkable. The
records show that Petitioner has been one hundred percent medication compliant since at
least 2000. (Records at 378.) In March, 2000, Petitioner began working in the corrections
system. (Id. at 371.) The records show that Petitioner set weight loss goals during this
period. (Id.) Petitioner was alert and oriented to person, time, and place. (Id.) A May 2,
2000 note indicates that Petitioner was very focused on his thoughts, and that his job was
going well. (Id. at 377.) Summer 2000 records show that he missed one appointment, but
show no other remarkable notes. (Id. at 376.) A June 2010 record shows that he was
depressed, but that he did not note any bizarre behavior. (Id. at 369.) In the Fall of 2010,
the records continue to show that Petitioner was doing well. (Id. at 374.) A note from
September 12, 2000, shows that Petitioner requested literature about counting calories and
fat grams to help him in his effort to lose weight. (Id.) The Fall records show that Petitioner
continued to be medication compliant and alert and oriented times three. (Id.) Winter
records of that year are also unremarkable. (Id. at 373.)
A March 16, 2001 record shows that Petitioner was stable and that he had been one
hundred percent medication compliant for a year. (Records at 365.) That record also
5

shows that Petitioner had a goal to lose more weight. (Id.) And the record notes, on an
"update of legal issues" section, that Petitioner had "[n]o possible appeals." (Id. at 366.)
The March 15 record shows that Petitioner had been maintaining his work assignment at
the facility. (Id. at 364.)
An August 29, 2001 record shows that Petitioner was one hundred percent medication
compliant and that he had been maintaining perfect attendance at his work assignment.
(Records at 358.) Fall records show nothing remarkable. (Id. at 354.) Petitioner was alert
and oriented times three, continued his work assignment, and denied any disturbing
symptoms. (Id.)
A December 14, 2001 record shows that Petitioner expressed displeasure about his
life sentence. (Records at 353.) The record shows that he stated that he should have
received a more lenient sentence because he was mentally ill. (Id.) The record further
shows that Petitioner voiced anger that his attorney did not present the mental illness issue.
(Id.)
A June 2002 note shows that Petitioner was still maintaining one hundred percent
compliance with his medications and that he was stable. (Records at 336.) Petitioner also
represented that he had no complaints of emotional instability. (Id.) The note shows that
Petitioner was very concerned over a number of legal issues and documentation. (Id.) The
note states that "efforts were [made] to gain a sentence reduction" and that Petitioner spent
much emotional energy on the efforts and that he was seeking legal counsel appropriately.
(Id.)

6

A December 2002 note shows that Petitioner discussed goals and activities, including
church and classes. (Records at 351.) That note also shows that Petitioner expressed a
desire to get a new lawyer to review his case. (Id.)
The Court has reviewed the other medical records; the Court will not set forth those
records--they are not relevant to the issue here nor do they differ from the records that the
Court has summarized.
b.

Hearing testimony
i.

Petitioner's testimony

Petitioner, born in 1955, testified that he had been "incarcerated" in mental institutions
eleven times between 1973 and 1992. (Tr. at 30.) Petitioner explained that he was
institutionalized because of his schizophrenia. (Id. at 31.)
Petitioner acknowledged that he filed nothing in his case from 2000 to 2006. (Tr. at
38.) He stated that he did not file anything because he had no one to help him. (Id. at 38.)
As a reason for not filing his habeas petition, he maintained that he did not know the
difference between state appeals and a federal habeas petition. (Id. at 38.)
Plaintiff confirmed much of what the medical records showed. Plaintiff explained that
he obtained a job in the Cotton facility kitchen, in food service, because he needed money
to pay someone to do legal services for him. (Tr. at 39.) He stated he put his legal work
to the side so he could earn the money necessary. (Id.) He worked in the kitchen until
October or November, 2004. (Id. at 39.) He then explained that someone told him that,
since he did not have a high school degree or GED, he had the right to have a legal writer
help him on his case without payment. (Id.)

7

Petitioner testified that he began working with a legal writer in 2004 or 2005. (Tr. at
40.)
Petitioner stated that he began taking GED classes around February, 2005. (Tr. at
42.) He said that he passed four GED subjects in one attempt in 2006: language arts
writing, language arts reading, language arts social studies, and language arts science.
(Id.) He explained that he did not pass the math GED portion until July, 2009. (Id.)
Plaintiff maintained that he had a substantial learning disability in math reasoning and
word comprehension. (Tr. at 43.) He explained that, when reading, he often had to go
back and reread to retain what he had learned. (Id.) He agreed that he had difficulty
thinking through legal issues and that he only had a "very basic" knowledge of the legal
process. (Id. at 44.) He did admit that he had a better understanding of legal reasoning
and the legal process 'now' than he had had before. (Id.)
Petitioner acknowledged that, since he had been in MDOC facilities, he had been
receiving medication for his mental illness and that he had always been compliant in taking
those medications. (Tr. at 45.) As for side effects, Petitioner stated that he experienced
some lethargy and that he gained some weight. (Id. at 45-46.) He stated that he did not
have any significant side effects from the medication. (Id. at 46.)
Petitioner agreed on examination that, during his time in correction facilities, he
accomplished a lot. (Tr. at 47-48.) He acknowledged that he obtained a GED, engaged
in fairly extensive religious studies. (Id. at 48.) Also during that time, he had "excellent work
reports" and had perfect job attendance in August, 2001. (Id.) He maintained, at one point
during his incarceration, when he was having problems with a roommate, he requested a
transfer away from his roommate so that he would not have a problem. (Id.)
8

He acknowledged that he understood that fighting was not allowed in MDOC facilities.
(Tr. at 48.)
Petitioner testified that while he was in jail he also learned that he had diabetes. (Tr.
at 49.) He stated that he was able to pay close attention to his condition. (Id.)
Petitioner testified that he only had one misconduct while he was incarcerated. (Tr.
at 50.)
c.

Petitioner's expert's testimony

Steven Miller, PhD, a forensic psychologist, testified on Petitioner's behalf. (Tr. at 52.)
Miller stated that he conducted a standard clinical evaluation on Petitioner. (Id. at 54.) He
explained that this evaluation involved a review of Petitioner's history and mental status.
(Id.) Miller also administered tests that evaluated Petitioner's personality and verbal
intelligence. (Id.) Miller stated that he additionally reviewed the MDOC medical records.
(Id.) Miller agreed that Petitioner had been compliant with his mental health program. (Id.
at 54-55.) Miller stated that Petitioner's mental illness was in remission. (Id. at 55.)
Miller testified that Petitioner has a history of being diagnosed with learning disability.
(Tr. at 56.) Miller explained that Petitioner's learning disability was primarily in math,
although the math disability interacted with his language disability as well. (Id.) Miller
concluded that Petitioner's math learning disability affected his ability to reason through
complex problems. (Id. at 57.) Miller stated that the math learning disability would
"[a]bsolutely" have an effect on Petitioner's understanding of the statute of limitations. (Id.
at 57-58.) He reasoned that Petitioner's dyscalculia caused petitioner to have problems
with any type of procedure. (Id. at 58.) Miller also reasoned that Petitioner became quickly
distracted and "[fell] apart" at times when he faced a complex problem. (Id.) Miller stated
9

that Petitioner suffered from circumstantiality, which he defined as becoming quickly
distracted and discussing minutia that is irrelevant to discussions. (Id.)
Miller stated that Petitioner was not able to answer open-ended questions well and
that he became confused quickly. (Tr. at 59-60.)
Miller stated that Petitioner's mental illness complicated the math learning disability
and the math learning disability complicated Petition's ability to learn. (Tr. at 60.)
During Petitioner's mental evaluation, Miller stated that Petitioner tried to put forth a
better picture of him than was actually the case. (Tr. at 62.)
During the hearing, Petitioner's counsel asked Miller's ultimate conclusion about
whether a causal link existed between Petitioner's mental incompetence and his failure to
timely file his habeas petition. Miller explained that the Petitioner's medications controlled
his psychosis symptoms, but that the medications did not control Petitioner's ability to
become mentally confused. (Tr. at 64.) Miller testified that Petitioner became mentally
confused when he was challenged by novel situations. (Id.) Miller added that Petitioner's
math learning disability complicated his problems with novel situations. (Id.) Miller also
testified that Petitioner easily went off in tangents when he was talking, but also was easily
restructured. (Id. at 65.) Miller pointed to Petitioner's responses to Miller's questionnaire
as evidence of Petitioner's mental illness causing him confusion. (Id. at 66-67.) Miller
stated that Petitioner's response to a birth and age question involved a longer than
necessary response involving the world events that may have been occurring during his
birth year. (Id.) Miller testified that Petitioner had difficulty with following directions that
were not very precise or very rigid. (Id. at 67.)

10

Miller acknowledged that he only reviewed Petitioner's documents that he indicated,
and that those documents did not include any from 2000 to 2001. (Tr. at 69-70.)
Miller further acknowledged that the 2002-2012 records reflected that Petitioner was
"med" compliant during the entire time period and that Petitioner was consistently alert and
oriented, meaning he understood person, place, and time. (Tr. at 70-71.)
When questioned whether Petitioner's attaining his GED demonstrated that Petitioner
was capable of goal-oriented thinking, Miller stated that Petitioner's ability to achieve goals
was dependent "entirely on the complexity" of the goal.

(Tr. at 71.)

Miller also

acknowledged that Petitioner's reading and intelligence was in the high to average range.
(Tr. at 72.)
Miller conceded that nothing in the record showed that Petitioner was deemed
incompetent after he stood trial or while he was MDOC facilities. (Id. at 73.) Miller stated
his belief that once Petitioner became competent to stand trial, Miller did not see anything
in the record to suggest that Petitioner lost that competency. (Id. at 78.)
Miller agreed that the records showed that Petitioner was worried about his legal
proceedings in 2002 and that that worry showed that Petitioner was able to appreciate his
legal proceedings. (Id. at 75.)
Miller stated that "nothing" in the MDOC records supported his conclusion that
Petitioner's mental illness caused his to miss the one-year limitations period. (Tr. at 78.)
c. Petitioner's legal writers' testimony
Petitioner had three legal writers testify or submit affidavits on his behalf during the
hearing.

11

Kevin Minley, a current prisoner in the MDOC, and a legal writer in the corrections
system, testified. (Tr. at 5, 6.) Minley stated that, to secure a legal writer's services in the
prison, a prisoner usually was mentally unstable, did not have a GED, or spoke a foreign
language (Id.)
Minley worked as a legal writer from 2004 until 2011. (Tr. at 7.)
He stated that he met Petitioner in 2000, at a different correctional facility (Brooks),
because they were both housed there.1 (Id. at 8.) Minley explained that he did not see
Petitioner again until 2006, when Petitioner was assigned a legal writer, who turned out to
be Minley. (Id. at 8, 10.) At that time they were both at the Cotton Facility. (Id. at 8.)
Minley testified that he did all of the work on Petitioner's case. (Id. at 11.) When
questioned about Petitioner's level of participation during their interactions, Minley stated
that Petitioner was concerned about his case, but that his participation was minimal
because "he qualified for the legal writer program because of his situation." (Id. at 11-12.)

Minley stated that, during his meeting with Petitioner, that he explained Petitioner's
statute of limitations problem to him. (Tr. at 12. ) Minley said that Petitioner did not
"understand" the limitations issue and that he often tried to explain the problem with
Petitioner. (Id.) Minley added that Petitioner did not "have any understanding that [the
limitations period] applied to him." (Id. at 13.)

1

Minley added that Petitioner's participation

At Brooks, Minley stated that he and Petitioner were of the same religious affiliation
and that he always had contact with Petitioner. (Tr. at 17.) He explained that he was able
to have in-depth conversations with Petitioner during those times. (Id.) At Brooks, Minley
was never Petitioner's cell mate, nor was he with Petitioner on a continual basis. (Id. at
18.)
12

in his own case only amounted to him checking to see if Minley was doing the work. (Id.
at 13-14.) Minley suspected that Petitioner did not read any of the filings that Minley
prepared. (Id. at 13-14.) Minley stated that, in 2007, he stopped working on Petitioner's
case because he was transferred to another facility. (Id. at 14.)
Minley stated that, between 2000 and 2006, Petitioner was a totally different person.
(Id. at 16-17.)

He explained that Petitioner had improved "tremendously," although

Petitioner continued to struggle with understanding legal issues. (Id.)
Elmer Iron was another legal writer that assisted Petitioner. (Tr. at 23.) He stated that
he has been a legal writer since 1984. (Id.) He began working on the case at the end of
2007 or the beginning of 2008. (Id.) Iron explained that Petitioner's habeas petition was
very late. (Id. at 25.) He stated that he tried to explain Petitioner's statute of limitations
problem and what a statute of limitations was, but Iron explained that "he couldn't
understand what the limitations had to do with him." (Id.) He added that Petitioner "thought
that he was right, and that he had been pursuing his case . . . with people helping him, but
he didn't know anything about the limitations." (Id.)
Iron stated that he did not know Petitioner before he was assigned Petitioner's case.
(Tr. at 26.) He corrected his response, though, by saying that he knew him through their
shared religion. (Id. at 26-27.)
The Court has considered Hassan-Azzard Mohammed's affidavit. (Dkt. 1, Ex. 1,
Mohammed Aff.) He was also a legal writer for Petitioner. (Id. ¶ 4.) He stated that he
observed that he explained that Petitioner was filing his habeas petition after the one-year
statute of limitations period had expired. (Id. ¶ 5.) He stated that he observed that Plaintiff
was unable to comprehend the days of the week and was unable to realize the number of
13

weeks in a month and that he was significantly "time-challenged." (Id.) Mohammed
observed that Petitioner was unable to comprehend any type of limitation--whether it be a
time limitation, a page limitation, etc. (Id. ¶ 7.) He detailed his relationship with Petitioner.
He explained that Petitioner was always late for legal writing meetings and had difficulty
prioritizing events. (Id.) Mohammed added that he believed he felt that he was particularly
capable of rendering an opinion as to Petitioner's mental capacity as he worked closely with
Petitioner. (Id. at 8.)
2.

Analysis

Petitioner has not met his evidentiary burden. He first fails to show that he was
mentally incompetent during any of the time leading up to filing his habeas petition. The
Court credits the medical records and Petitioner and Dr. Miller's testimony over the legal
writers' testimony. He then fails to show that any alleged mental incompetence caused his
delay.
The records show that Petitioner was one hundred percent medication compliant and
that he did not have any significant symptoms. While that compliance does not mean that
Petitioner was not incompetent, it does militate toward a finding of competence. See Brown
v. McKee, 232 F.Supp.2d 761, 768 (E.D.Mich. 2002) (Rosen, J.) (citations omitted) (stating
that "the fact that [the] petitioner has been receiving psychotropic medications 'would
actually weigh more in favor of his being able to function than not.'"). The Court also looks
to the substance of the records to find that Petitioner was not incompetent. As Defendant
points out, Petitioner was able to set goals to lose weight, he requested literature to learn
how to manage his weight, he worked a job, and had good attendance at that job, for years,
and he expressed concern over his state case and how he had no more avenues to appeal
14

or ways to reduce his sentence. The records also show that he was oriented as to person,
time, and place, a record that contradicts Mohammed's assertion that Petitioner had time
limitations. The Court notes that Petitioner was also able to work towards, and eventually
attain, his GED, and showed interest in learning more about religion.2 Petitioner therefore
has demonstrated the capacity for learning new subjects and working towards passing new
subjects and subjects with which he initially had difficulty, i.e. math.
The Court finds that Dr. Miller's testimony also does not help Petitioner in his
argument that he is mentally incompetent. Dr. Miller presents his opinion that Petitioner's
math learning disability, when added to his mental illness, had an effect on Petitioner's
understanding of the statute of limitations. Dr. Miller testified that Petitioner was not able
concentrate when faced with complex problems and had problems with any types of
procedure. But Dr. Miller also testified that Petitioner had difficulty following directions that
were not very precise or very rigid. Dr. Miller therefore appears to have contradicted
himself when stating Petitioner's ability to deal with novel situations, complex problems, or
rigid procedures. Dr. Miller himself acknowledged that there was nothing in the record to
show that Petitioner was mentally incompetent since before his legal proceedings in state
court.

And Miller also acknowledged that Petitioner had been worried about legal

proceedings in 2002.
Given the medical records, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to
show that he was mentally incompetent during the relevant time period.

2

The Court acknowledges that Petitioner's working towards his GED was outside of the
one-year limitations period. But nothing in the record suggests that he did not have the
ability or wherewithal to attain his GED between 2000 and 2001.
15

Nor has Plaintiff shown any causal link between his untimely habeas petition and any
alleged mental incompetency, much for the reasons the Court has all ready discussed. The
medical records show that Petitioner had the ability to follow and strive to attain goals. The
records also show that Plaintiff was able to appreciate his legal predicament, for he
discussed not having any avenues through which to appeal his state sentence. He
therefore appreciated the legal issues and was able to understand the gravity of no longer
having the ability to appeal. See McKee, 232 F.Supp.2d at 768 (finding that the petitioner,
while on his psychotropic medications, did not warrant equitable tolling, when he was able
to file his habeas petition in federal court and that he was therefore able to manage his
legal affairs and act upon them while on his medications.). Petitioner also testified that he
put aside pursuing his legal issues because he did not have any money to have someone
help him. He therefore voluntarily did not pursue his habeas petition or find out if he was
entitled to a legal writer.

But not having legal assistance is not an extraordinary

circumstance that warrants tolling. See Holloway v. Jones, 166 F.Supp.2d 1185, 189
(E.D.Mich. 2001) (Tarnow, J.) (citations omitted) ("Claims that a petitioner did not have
professional legal assistance are not an extraordinary circumstance which would toll the
statute of limitations.") Even if he had shown an alleged mental incompetency, he has not
shown that that incompetency caused his tardy petition. Petitioner was able to timely arrive
for work and the majority of his scheduled psychiatric appointments. Dr. Miller also testified
that Petitioner was uncomfortable without a rigid structure. The Federal Rules provide such
a rigid structure.
Given his failure to show causation, his petition must fail. See Nowak v. Yukins, 46
F.App'x 257, 259 (6th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) ("The petitioner must make a threshold
16

showing of incompetence . . . and demonstrate that the alleged incompetence affected her
ability to file a timely habeas petition."). See also Bolarinwa v. Williams, 593 F.3d 226, 232
(2d Cir. 2010) (stating that "mental illness does not toll a filing deadline per se[.]" And
holding that, "in order to carry this burden, [the petitioner] must offer a 'particularized
description of how her condition adversely affected her capacity to function generally or in
the relationship to the pursuit of her rights.'") ("[I]n order to justify tolling of the AEDPA oneyear statute of limitations due to mental illness, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate that
her particular disability constituted an 'extraordinary circumstance' severely impairing her
ability to comply with the filing deadline, despite her diligent efforts to do so.") (citations
omitted).
The Court lastly notes that Petitioner did not diligently pursue his rights. There is no
indication that he sought legal redress during the time period or that he attempted to seek
legal redress during the time period and that he was unable to. The Court finds that, at
best, Petitioner did not know about the habeas one-year limitations period, but not that he
did not understand it. His unknowingness is not a reason to toll the statute of limitations.
III.

Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, the Court finds that the AEDPA's statute of limitations

bars Petitioner's habeas petition. The Court therefore dismisses the petition.
So ordered.
s/Nancy G. Edmunds
Nancy G. Edmunds
United States District Judge
Dated: March 10, 2014

17

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record
on March 10, 2014, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Johnetta M. Curry-Williams
Case Manager
Acting in the Absence of Carol A. Hemeyer

18