Sweet v. Conerly

Filing 8

OPINION AND ORDER Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Denying Certificate of Appealability Signed by District Judge Victoria A. Roberts. (CPin)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

RICHARD SWEET, #512646,
Petitioner,
v.

CASE NO. 2:09-CV-11241
HONORABLE VICTORIA A. ROBERTS

PERCY CONERLY,
Respondent.
_____________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
I.

Introduction
Michigan prisoner Richard Sweet filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §2254 challenging his 2004 St. Clair County Circuit Court conviction for third-degree
criminal sexual conduct, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520d(1)(a), Petitioner is on parole; the Court
sentenced him to 2 - 15 years in prison.
Petition raises claims concerning the effectiveness of trial counsel, his equal protection and
due process rights, and cumulative error. Respondent answered contending that the writ should be
denied.
The Court denies the Petition and a certificate of appealability.
II.

Facts and Procedural History
Petitioner’s conviction arises from his sexual conduct with a 13-year-old girl at his home in

Port Huron, Michigan on December 12, 2001. Petitioner was charged with two counts of third-

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degree criminal sexual conduct arising from incidents in his home on December, 2001 and January,
2002. The trial court appointed counsel for Petitioner about a month before the original trial date
of August 13, 2002. The court adjourned the trial date to allow counsel more preparation time.
After several postponements, a trial date was set for January 28, 2003. On January 17, 2003,
defense counsel filed a notice of alibi listing four witnesses. The prosecutor objected to the notice
because it failed to provide the location for the alibi.
Petitioner was held in custody following his arrest, but posted bond on November 25, 2002.
On January 28, 2003, defense counsel and the prosecutor appeared for trial; Petitioner did not. The
court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. Petitioner was located in Iowa and extradited to
Michigan. A new trial date was scheduled for August 10, 2004. The parties agreed to adjourn the
trial to August 28, 2004 because some defense witnesses had not been subpoenaed.
At the start of trial, the court considered the prosecutor’s objections to the alibi notice.
Defense counsel withdrew the notice because the witnesses were unavailable. The trial court
consequently ruled that Petitioner could not present an alibi defense.
The victim testified at trial that Petitioner was her mother’s friend and her older sister’s
boyfriend for a short time. She testified that she and Petitioner had sex at his home before she went
to middle school one day in December, 2001. She was 13 years old and in the seventh grade. She
explained that they had vaginal intercourse while lying on top of a sleeping bag on the couch in
Petitioner’s basement. She said that it hurt and she bled a little bit. Afterward, she got dressed and
left for school. She met her friend Jessica on the bus. She was upset and told Jessica what had
happened at Petitioner’s home. She made Jessica promise not to tell anyone. The victim testified
that she and Petitioner had sex a second time at his home about a month later. She said it happened

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before school but earlier in the morning. She went to Petitioner’s basement at 5:30 or 6:30 in the
morning, woke him up, had sex with him, and then went home to get ready for school. She said that
the sex was less painful and she did not bleed.
Her mother found out, became very upset and contacted the police. The victim admitted that
she only reported the first incident to the police and did not discuss the second incident until she
testified at the preliminary examination in April, 2002. She explained that she was in trouble and
did not want her mother to know about the second incident. The victim recalled having a physical
examination about a week after the second incident and said it was embarrassing. She also indicated
that she was in foster care for a period of time. The victim admitted that she could not recall specific
dates and some details of the incidents due to the passage of time, but she was certain that they
occurred one month apart. She said that her mother had previously pressed her for specific
information about the incidents. The victim indicated that it was not her choice to pursue criminal
charges and she was testifying because she had to.
Pediatric Nurse Practitioner Sharon Johnston testified that she examined the victim on
January 17, 2002. She determined that the victim’s hymen had three lacerations, which was
consistent with sexual penetration. Johnston did not conduct a full pelvic examination or rape kit
due to the victim’s age and the lapse of time. She did not test for sexually transmitted diseases or
pregnancy.
Jessica Thomas testified that she and the victim were friends and rode the bus together during
the 2001-2002 school year when they were in middle school. She recalled seeing the victim leave
Petitioner’s home one morning to get on the bus. The victim was crying. When Jessica asked her
what was wrong, the victim said that she and Petitioner had sex. The victim said that she knew what

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she was doing, but when she told Petitioner to stop, he did not do so. Jessica could not recall the day
when this occurred, but testified that winter was coming. Jessica knew Petitioner because she had
been at his house a few times with the victim and her older sister, Jennifer.
Police officers testified about their investigation. Port Huron Police Officer Jennifer Sly
took the victim’s complaint on January 13, 2002. She spoke with the victim and her mother at their
home and then interviewed the victim alone. The victim identified Petitioner in her statement.
Officer Sly took a statement from Petitioner at his home that same day. Petitioner told her that the
victim was only at his home with her older sister whom he had previously dated. Officer Sly did
not obtain evidence from Petitioner’s home due to the lapse of time between the reported incident
and her investigation.
Port Huron Police Detective Elaine Butts testified that she interviewed Petitioner about the
December 12, 2001 incident on January 31, 2002. Petitioner told her that the victim had been at his
home several times with her older sister. He also said that she had visited him alone twice in
December, 2001 for an eyebrow piercing. Petitioner claimed that he had micro cassette tapes of
conversations from the victim’s home that would clear him, but he never produced those tapes.
Detective Butts explained that she did not request a rape kit from the victim or collect evidence from
Petitioner’s home because the victim had only reported the December 12, 2001 incident to police
and she believed that too much time had passed since then to gather physical evidence. Detective
Butts also testified that Petitioner did not appear for his scheduled trial date on January 28, 2003 and
a bench warrant was issued for his arrest.
Petitioner testified in his own defense. He said that he was working for ANR Contracting
in December 2001 and that he worked on jobs on a contractor’s house and on a sewage filtration

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plan in Detroit. He had to be at work at 7:00 a.m. and would usually leave his home at 5:30 or 5:45
a.m. to catch a bus to Detroit. Petitioner testified that he also did artwork and tattoos. He had
tattoos on most of his body. His tattoos included his name, the number 32, and skulls on his
stomach. He had his name tattooed on his stomach in 1995. Petitioner first met the victim’s mother,
Kim Yeagley, doing tattoos. He then met her daughters. He dated her older daughter, Jennifer, for
a period of time while she and her baby stayed with him after her mother kicked her out of the
house.
Petitioner denied have sex with the victim. He claimed that he was not at home when the
incidents allegedly occurred. He recalled meeting with the police and said that he offered to allow
them to test his couch and take a DNA sample, but they did not do so. He testified that the victim
and her friend, Jessica Thomas, visited his home a few times and that he pierced the victim’s
eyebrow. Petitioner said he fled because none of his witnesses had been subpoenaed for trial.
Petitioner admitted that he never gave any tapes to the police and that he never produced pay stubs
or other employment records.
Michael Mehler, Petitioner’s father, testified that Petitioner lived in a two-bedroom house
with his grandfather during the relevant time. Petitioner maintained a tattoo shop with a separate
entrance in the basement. Mehler also testified that Petitioner has “thousands” of tattoos, including
several down his arms and his name in three-inch red letters on his abdomen.
Sharon O’Neill, Petitioner’s neighbor across the street, testified that she could observe
children waiting for the bus in front of Petitioner’s home in 2001 and 2002. She was home and
awake most mornings because she babysat young children. She never observed any children, other
that Petitioner’s own child, entering or exiting his home. She could not be specific about dates.

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Kimberly Yeagley, the victim’s mother, testified that she met Petitioner when he gave her
a tattoo and they became friends. She visited him several times in his basement when her older
daughter, Jennifer, lived with him. Yeagley testified that she was very upset with the victim and
Petitioner after learning about their sexual conduct and she contacted the police. She acknowledged
that the victim was placed in foster care after the incident.
During deliberations, the jury requested that portions of Petitioner’s testimony regarding his
employment with ANR Contracting be read back to them. The trial court denied the request,
explaining that an alibi defense had been precluded for legal reasons and could not be considered.
The jury convicted Petitioner on one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (December 12,
2001), but acquitted him on the other count (January 10, 2002). The trial court sentenced him to a
term of 2 to 15 years in prison with credit for time served.
Petitioner filed an appeal of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals asserting that he was
denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied relief and
affirmed the conviction. People v. Sweet, No. 259608, 2006 WL 1009263 (Mich. Ct. App. April 18,
2006) (unpublished). Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan
Supreme Court raising the same claim; it was denied. People v. Sweet, 477 Mich. 868, 721 N.W.2d
195 (2006).
Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment with the state trial court, asserting he was
denied the effective assistance of counsel, that his equal protection and due process rights were
violated, and that the cumulative effect of the errors warranted a new trial. The trial court denied
the motion on July 20, 2007 and denied reconsideration on October 11, 2007. Petitioner then filed
a delayed application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals, which was denied for

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lack of merit. People v. Sweet, No. 281626 (Mich. Ct. App. May 15, 2008) (unpublished).
Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was
denied because Petitioner “failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR
6.508(D).” People v. Sweet, 482 Mich. 1065, 757 N.W.2d 458 (2008).
This federal habeas action raises the following claims:
I.

Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly notice, investigate, and
present an alibi defense.

II.

His equal protection and due process rights were violated because he is
actually innocent, he was not allowed to present a defense based upon a
provable alibi, and the authorities did not search for exculpatory DNA
evidence.

III.

Cumulative effect of error.

Respondent says the claims lack merit and/or are barred by procedural default.
III.

Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), codified 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241 et seq., sets forth this standard of review for federal habeas actions:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim –
(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (1996).
“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law if it ‘applies a rule that

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contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts
that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless
arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.’” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003)
(per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535
U.S. 685, 694 (2002). “[T]he ‘unreasonable application’ prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal
habeas court to ‘grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from
[the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of petitioner’s case.”
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413); see also Bell, 535
U.S. at 694. However, “[i]n order for a federal court to find a state court’s application of [Supreme
Court] precedent ‘unreasonable,’ the state court’s decision must have been more than incorrect or
erroneous. The state court’s application must have been ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Wiggins, 539
U.S. at 520-21 (citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. “AEDPA thus imposes a
‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’ and ‘demands that state-court
decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Renico v. Lett, _ U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010)
(quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333, n. 7; Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).
The Supreme Court recently held that “a state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit
precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of
the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (citing
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court emphasized “that even
a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id.
( citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). Pursuant to § 2254(d), “a habeas court must
determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state court’s

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decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those
arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision” of the Supreme Court.
Id. Thus, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state
court’s rejection of his claim “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood
and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id.
Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal habeas court’s review to a determination of whether the
state court’s decision comports with clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme
Court at the time the state court renders its decision. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; see also
Knowles v. Mirzayance, _ U.S. _, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court “has
held on numerous occasions that it is not ‘an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal
law’ for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established
by this Court”) (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2008) (per curiam)); Lockyer
v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). Section 2254(d) “does not require a state court to give
reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been ‘adjudicated on the merits.’” Harrington,
131 S. Ct. at 785. Furthermore, it “does not require citation of [Supreme Court] cases–indeed, it
does not even require awareness of [Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the
result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002); see also
Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 16. While the requirements of “clearly established law” are to be determined
solely by Supreme Court precedent, the decisions of lower federal courts may be useful in assessing
the reasonableness of the state court’s resolution of an issue. See Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488,
493 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 2003)); Dickens v.
Jones, 203 F. Supp. 354, 359 (E.D. Mich. 2002).

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Lastly, a state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct on federal habeas review.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this presumption only with clear and
convincing evidence. See Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998).
IV.

Discussion
A.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

Petitioner says trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly notice, investigate, and
present an alibi defense at trial.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set forth
a two-prong test for determining whether a habeas petitioner has received the ineffective assistance
of counsel. First, a petitioner must prove that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires
a showing that counsel made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as counsel as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Second, the petitioner must
establish that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Counsel’s errors must have
been so serious that they deprived the petitioner of a fair trial or appeal. Id.
As to the performance prong, a petitioner must identify acts that were “outside the wide
range of professionally competent assistance” in order to prove deficient performance. Id. at 690.
The reviewing court’s scrutiny of counsel’s performance is highly deferential. Id. at 689. Counsel
is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 690. The petitioner bears the burden to
overcome the presumption that the challenged actions were sound trial strategy. Id. at 689.
To satisfy the prejudice prong under Strickland, a petitioner must show that “there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

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would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. “On balance, the benchmark for judging any claim of
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the [proceeding] cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
The Supreme Court recently confirmed that a federal court’s consideration of ineffective
assistance of counsel claims arising from state criminal proceedings is quite limited on habeas
review due to the deference accorded trial attorneys and state appellate courts which review their
performance. “The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ and
when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (internal and
end citations omitted). “When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel’s actions
were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied
Strickland’s deferential standard. Id. at 788.
Petitioner says that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly notice, investigate,
and present an alibi defense. Well-established federal law requires that defense counsel conduct
a reasonable investigation into the facts of a defendant’s case, or make a reasonable determination
that such investigation is unnecessary. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522-23; Strickland, 466 U.S. at
691; Towns v. Smith, 395 F.3d 251, 258 (6th Cir. 2005). “American Bar Association standards ...
also mandate counsel’s duty to investigate all leads relevant to the merits of the case.” Blackburn
v. Foltz, 828 F.2d 1177, 1183 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 543 U.S. 374, 387 (2005)
(noting that the ABA standards provide guidance for determining the reasonableness of counsel’s
conduct). The duty to investigate “includes the obligation to investigate all witnesses who may

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have information concerning his or her client’s guilt or innocence.” Towns, 395 F.3d 251 at 258.
“A purportedly strategic decision is not objectively reasonable when the attorney has failed to
investigate his options and make a reasonable choice between them.” Id. (quoting Horton v. Zant,
941 F.2d 1449, 1462 (11th Cir. 1991)). Inattention or negligence, as opposed to reasoned strategic
judgment, is inexcusable. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 526; Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d 1575, 1580-81
(6th Cir. 1992).
Decisions concerning the evidence to present and whether to call certain witnesses are
generally presumed to be a matter of trial strategy. The failure to call witnesses or present evidence
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel only when it deprives a defendant of a substantial
defense. See Chegwidden v. Kapture, 92 F. App’x 309, 311 (6th Cir. 2004); Hutchison v. Bell, 303
F.3d 720, 749 (6th Cir. 2002). When making strategic decisions, counsel’s conduct must be
reasonable. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000); see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at
522-23.
Applying the Strickland standard, the Michigan Court of Appeals denied relief on this
claim. The court explained:
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
that his counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable and the representation
was so prejudicial that he was deprived of a fair trial. To demonstrate prejudice, the
defendant must show that, but for counsel's error, there was a reasonable probability
that the result of the proceedings would have been different. This Court presumes
that counsel's conduct fell within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance,
and the defendant bears a heavy burden to overcome this presumption. [People v.
Watkins, 247 Mich App 14, 30; 634 NW2d 370 (2001) (citations omitted).]
The decision to argue one defense over another is a matter of trial strategy. People
v. Hedelsky, 162 Mich App 382, 387; 412 NW2d 746 (1987). “Decisions regarding
what evidence to present and whether to call or question witnesses are presumed to
be matters of trial strategy. This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of
counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess counsel's competence
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with the benefit of hindsight.” People v. Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76-77; 601
NW2d 887 (1999) (citations omitted). Ineffective assistance of counsel can take the
form of a failure to investigate and present a particular defense if the defendant
made a good-faith effort to avail himself of that defense and the defense was
substantial. People v. Kelly, 186 Mich App 524, 526; 465 NW2d 569 (1990). “A
substantial defense is one that might have made a difference in the outcome of the
trial.” Id. “[A] substantial alibi defense would be one in which defendant's proposed
alibi witnesses verified his version.” Id. at 527.
The record shows that counsel filed a notice of alibi defense identifying four
witnesses but omitted to state with particularity where defendant claimed to have
been at the time the offense occurred. See MCL 768.20(1). Counsel later withdrew
the notice due to the unavailability of the witnesses. Because the record is silent
regarding the testimony these witnesses would have offered if called, defendant has
not shown that their testimony would have benefitted the defense. Therefore, to the
extent defendant contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to call these alibi
witnesses, his claim must fail. People v. Pratt, 254 Mich App 425, 430; 656 NW2d
866 (2002); People v. Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 508; 597 NW2d 864 (1999).
Defendant also contends that defendant was ineffective for failing to pursue an alibi
through his own, otherwise unsupported, testimony. See People v. Merritt, 396
Mich 67, 87-89; 238 NW2d 31 (1976). However, the record does not show that
defendant had an alibi for the offense, which occurred between 6:30 and 7:00 a.m.
on December 12, 2001. Defendant testified that he began working for ANR
Contracting in November 2001. He took the bus to the job site in Detroit and
because he had to be at work by 7:00 a.m., he left home by 5:45 a.m. at the latest.
But defendant did not testify that he worked for ANR full time or even that he was
scheduled to work on December 12, 2001. Although defendant later volunteered
that he had told a previous lawyer that he was not at home on the day of the
incident, he did not say where he was, much less that he was at work or on his way
there. Therefore, his limited testimony does not show that he was not at home on the
morning the offense occurred. Because there is nothing in the record to show that
defendant had a substantial alibi defense, counsel was not ineffective for failing to
pursue such a defense.
Sweet, 2006 WL 1009263 at *1-2.
This decision is neither contrary to Strickland nor an unreasonable application thereof. The
record indicates that trial counsel filed a notice of alibi in a timely fashion, but was then unable to
obtain alibi witnesses for trial. Given such circumstances, it was reasonable trial strategy for
counsel to withdraw the notice of alibi and to pursue an alternate defense at trial – essentially
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pointing to inconsistencies in the victim’s statements and challenging her credibility, pointing to
the lack of DNA or physical evidence, and presenting Petitioner’s own testimony denying that he
committed the offenses. As the Supreme Court recently stated, “[t]here comes a point where a
defense attorney will reasonably decide that another strategy is in order, thus making particular
investigations unnecessary. . . .Those decisions are due a heavy measure of deference.” Cullen v.
Pinholster, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1407 (2011) (reversing grant of habeas relief on ineffective
assistance of counsel claim) (citations omitted). It was also reasonable for counsel not to further
pursue an alibi defense through Petitioner’s own testimony given that he was unable to provide any
evidence to support his claim that he was working or traveling to work during the relevant time
period on December 12, 2001.
Moreover, even assuming that trial counsel was deficient in some way for failing to more
thoroughly investigate or pursue an alibi defense, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he was
prejudiced by counsel’s conduct. He has offered no evidence, other than his own conclusory
statements, to support his claimed alibi. It is well-settled that conclusory allegations, without
evidentiary support, do not provide a basis for habeas relief. See Cross v. Stovall, 238 F. App’x 32,
39-40 (6th Cir. 2007); Prince v. Straub, 78 F. App’x 440, 442 (6th Cir. 2003); Workman v. Bell,
178 F.3d 759, 771 (6th Cir. 1998) (conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel do
not justify federal habeas relief); see also Washington v. Renico, 455 F.3d 722, 733 (6th Cir. 2006)
(bald assertions and conclusory allegations do not provide sufficient basis for an evidentiary
hearing on habeas review). Additionally, as noted by the Michigan Court of Appeals, even
Petitioner’s own testimony about his employment with ANC Contracting did not establish an alibi
for the specific day at issue in this case – December 12, 2001.

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Petitioner fails to establish that trial counsel was ineffective under the Strickland standard.
More pointedly -- for the purpose of habeas review -- he fails to establish that the state court’s
decision is unreasonable; habeas relief is not warranted.
B.

Equal Protection and Due Process

Petitioner says he is entitled to habeas relief because his equal protection and due process
rights were violated because he is actually innocent, he was not allowed to present a defense based
upon a provable alibi, and the authorities did not search for exculpatory DNA evidence.
Respondent says that these claims are barred by procedural default because Petitioner first raised
them in his post-conviction motion for relief from judgment and the Michigan Supreme Court
denied relief under Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D).
Under the procedural default doctrine, a federal habeas court will not review a question of
federal law if the state court’s decision rests on a substantive or procedural state law ground that
is independent of the federal question and is adequate to support the judgment. See Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). However, “a procedural default does not bar consideration
of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment
in the case ‘clearly and expressly’ states that its judgment rests on the procedural bar.” Harris v.
Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989). If the last state court judgment contains no reasoning, the federal
habeas court must look to the last reasoned state court judgment rejecting the federal claim and
apply a presumption that later unexplained orders upholding the judgment or rejecting the same
claim rested upon the same ground. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991).
The Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner leave to appeal on his post-conviction
motion because he “failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR

15

6.508(D).” The order does not refer to subsection (D)(3) or mention Petitioner’s failure to raise
these issues on direct appeal. Because the form order citing Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D) is
ambiguous as to whether it refers to a procedural default or a denial of relief on the merits, the order
is unexplained. See Guilmette v. Howes, 624 F.3d 286, 291 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court must
“therefore look to the last reasoned state court opinion to determine the basis for the state court’s
rejection” of the claims. Id. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal “for lack of
merit in the grounds presented” and the state trial court denied relief on the merits of the claims
without citing Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D)(3) or any failure to raise the claims on direct appeal.
Consequently, these claims are not procedurally defaulted, and the Court will address their merits.
Petitioner asserts that his equal protection and due process rights were violated because he
is innocent, he was unable to present an alibi defense, and the authorities failed to search for
exculpatory DNA evidence. The state trial court denied relief on these claims, finding that they all
derived from counsel’s failure to present an alibi defense, a claim which was addressed on direct
appeal and denied on the merits. Upon reconsideration, the Court explained that the authorities had
no duty to seek or find exculpatory evidence and all of Petitioner’s claims lacked merit. See Trial
Ct. Opin. supra.
The state court’s decision is neither contrary to Supreme Court precedent nor an
unreasonable application of federal law or the facts. First, Petitioner has not presented evidence
to demonstrate his actual innocence. As noted, conclusory allegations, without evidentiary support,
do not provide a basis for habeas relief. See Cross, 238 F. App’x at 39-40; Prince, 78 F. App’x at
442; Workman, 178 F.3d at 771; see also Washington, 455 F.3d at 733. Moreover, the victim’s
testimony, the corroborating testimony by witnesses Johnston and Thomas, and the evidence of

16

Petitioner’s flight, provided significant evidence of his guilt at trial.
Second, the trial court only precluded Petitioner from presenting an alibi defense because
defense counsel withdrew the alibi notice after being unable to produce the alibi witnesses and
being unable to substantiate Petitioner’s alibi. As explained supra, such action did not deprive
Petitioner of a substantial defense; he did not provide testimonial or documentary evidence to
support his claimed alibi. To be sure, he still has not offered evidence -- other than his own
conclusory assertions -- to support his claim.
While the right to present a defense has long been recognized as “a fundamental element
of due process,” Washington v. State, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967), “a defendant’s right to present
evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions.” United States v. Scheffer,
523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). A defendant “does not have an unfettered right to offer evidence that
is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.” Montana
v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988)). State
rules excluding evidence from criminal trials “do not abridge an accused’s right to present a defense
so long as they are not ‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.’”
Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308 (internal citations omitted). “A defendant’s interest in presenting . . .
evidence may thus bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.”
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
The Supreme Court has held that trial courts may constitutionally preclude defendants from
offering otherwise relevant evidence if they fail to comply with procedural rules that require notice
to be given. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1991); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400,
417 (1988); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). Specifically, with regard to a

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defendant’s failure to provide notice of an alibi, the Court concluded that a trial court may
constitutionally preclude an accused from calling an alibi witness if he fails to comply with the
state’s notice-of-alibi rule. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1970); see also Dolan v.
Donnell, No. 06-CV-5891, 2010 WL 5491101, *18, 20 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2010) (ruling that trial
court’s preclusion of alibi testimony did not violate habeas petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights
and counsel’s withdrawal of alibi notice was not ineffective).
In determining whether the exclusion of evidence infringes upon a defendant’s rights, the
question is not whether the excluded evidence would have caused the jury to reach a different
result. Rather, the question is whether the defendant was afforded “a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
Petitioner was not deprived of a substantial defense. He was able to contest the victim’s
credibility at trial and testify that he did not commit the charged offenses. The trial court did not
violate his constitutional rights by complying with state procedural notice-of-alibi rules, resulting
in the inability of the jury to consider his alibi defense.
Finally, Petitioner cannot prevail on his claim that his constitutional rights were violated
by a failure to obtain exculpatory DNA evidence. There is no general constitutional right to
discovery in a criminal case. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977). While due
process requires a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432-36 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 682 (1985), it “does not require the government to create exculpatory material that does
not exist.” Stadler v. Curtin, 682 F. Supp. 2d 807, (E.D. Mich. 2010) (citing United States v.

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Sukumolachan, 610 F.2d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 1980); Richards v. Solem, 693 F.2d 760, 766 (8th Cir.
1982)); see also Dallas v. Holmes, 137 F. App’x 746, 754 (6th Cir. 2005). Neither due process nor
equal protection requires the police or the prosecution to search for exculpatory evidence.
Moreover, Petitioner’s claim that further investigation or DNA testing would have uncovered
exculpatory evidence is entirely speculative and conclusory. Petitioner bears the burden to
establish entitlement to habeas relief. He has not offered exculpatory evidence in support of his
assertions. Habeas relief is not warranted.
C.

Cumulative Error

Petitioner says that he is entitled to habeas relief based upon the cumulative effect of the
alleged errors committed at trial. Petitioner cannot establish that he is entitled to habeas relief
based upon cumulative error; he fails to demonstrate an underlying constitutional violation. See
Gillard v. Mitchell, 445 F.3d 883, 898 (6th Cir. 2006). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court “has not held that distinct constitutional claims can be cumulated to grant habeas
relief.” Lorraine v. Coyle, 291 F.3d 416, 447 (6th Cir. 2002). The state courts’ denial of relief is
neither contrary to Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable application thereof. Habeas relief
is not warranted.
V.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas

relief on the claims contained in his petition.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES WITH

PREJUDICE the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Before Petitioner may appeal the Court’s decision, a certificate of appealability (“COA”)
must issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(a); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A COA may issue “only if the

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applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). When a federal district court denies relief on the merits, the substantial showing
threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates that reasonable jurists would find the court’s
assessment of the constitutional claim debatable or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484-85 (2000). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude
the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). A court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit
its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of the habeas claims. Id. at 336-37.
Based on its examination, the Court concludes that Petitioner fails to make a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right as to his habeas claims. Accordingly, the Court
DENIES a certificate of appealability.
IT IS ORDERED.

s/Victoria A. Roberts
Victoria A. Roberts
United States District Judge
Dated: July 12, 2011
The undersigned certifies that a copy of this
document was served on the attorneys of record
and Richard Sweet by electronic means or U.S.
Mail on July 12, 2011.
s/Linda Vertriest
Deputy Clerk

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