Simpson v. Lafler

Filing 17

ORDER denying 13 Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissal of petition for writ of habeas corpus and requiring responsive pleading. Response due within 90 days of Order date (10/26/11). Signed by District Judge George Caram Steeh (MBea)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMES SIMPSON,
Case Number: 2:09-CV-11998

Petitioner,

HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH

v.
BLAINE LAFLER,
Respondent.
/

ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DISMISSAL OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
AND REQUIRING RESPONSIVE PLEADING
In the pending habeas corpus petition, filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Petitioner
James Simpson challenges his convictions for second-degree murder, two counts of
assault with intent to commit murder, and possession of a firearm in the commission of
a felony. Simpson filed this petition on May 26, 2009. The Court transferred the petition
to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals because Simpson previously filed a habeas corpus
petition which was denied on the merits and he had not received authorization for the
Court of Appeals to file a second petition. On June 24, 2010, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted Simpson permission to file a second petition for a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). This Court then reopened the habeas
corpus proceeding and directed Respondent to file a responsive pleading. Respondent
has filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition was not timely filed.

I.

Following a bench trial, Simpson was convicted in Wayne County Circuit Court of
second-degree murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.317, two counts of assault with intent
to commit murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.83, and possession of a firearm while
committing a felony, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b. He was sentenced to twenty-five
to forty years in prison for the murder conviction, twenty to thirty-five years in prison for
the assault convictions, and a consecutive term of two years in prison for the felonyfirearm conviction. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Simpson’s convictions.
People v. Simpson, No. 155093 (Mich. Ct. App. June 2, 1994). On November 30, 1994,
the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. See People v. Simpson, No.
99893 (Mich. Nov. 30, 1994).
In 1995, Simpson filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. The
trial court denied the motion. Simpson moved for reconsideration, which the trial court
denied on June 30, 1995. Simpson did not appeal the trial court’s decision.
On January 20, 1998, Simpson filed a second motion for relief from judgment.
The trial court denied the motion. Both Michigan appellate courts denied Simpson’s
applications for leave to appeal the trial court’s decision. People v. Simpson, No.
222311 (Mich. Ct. App. May 3, 2000); People v. Simpson, No. 117533 (Mich. Feb. 26,
2001).
On August 13, 2001, Simpson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this
Court. The District Court dismissed the petition with prejudice because the petition was
time-barred. See Simpson v. Howes, No. 01-cv-10307 (E.D. Mich. June 10, 2002)
(Lawson, J.).
On August 10, 2005, Simpson filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial
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court, raising the claim that newly-discovered evidence showed that the only witness
placing Simpson at the scene of the crime had recanted his testimony. Simpson
presented an affidavit from the witness in support of this claim. The trial court denied
the motion. People v. Simpson, No. 91-010300-01-FC (Wayne County Circuit Ct. May
7, 2007). Simpson’s applications for leave to appeal were denied by the Michigan Court
of Appeals, People v. Simpson, No. 280279 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2007), and the
Michigan Supreme Court, No. 135932 (Mich. Feb. 4, 2009). The Michigan Supreme
Court denied a motion for reconsideration. People v. Simpson, No. 135932 (Mich. April
28, 2009).
On May 5, 2009, Simpson filed another habeas corpus petition. This Court
transferred the petition to the Court of Appeals. On June 24, 2010, the Court of Appeals
authorized the filing of a second petition for writ of habeas corpus. The matter was
returned to this Court and Respondent ordered to file a responsive pleading.
Respondent has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that the petition
was not timely filed.
II.
A.
A motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 presumes the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The Court must view the evidence and draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and determine “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it
is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty

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Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The “[s]ummary judgment procedure is
properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part
of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327
(1986) (internal quotes omitted).
A fact is “material” if its resolution affects the outcome of the lawsuit. Lenning v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2001). “Materiality” is
determined by the substantive law claim. Boyd v. Baeppler, 215 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir.
2000). An issue is “genuine” if a “reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Henson v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 14 F.3d 1143, 1148
(6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Irrelevant or unnecessary factual
disputes do not create genuine issues of material fact. St. Francis Health Care Centre
v. Shalala, 205 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 2000). When the “record taken as a whole could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,” there is no genuine issue
of material fact. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 951 (6th Cir. 2000). Thus a
factual dispute which “is merely colorable or is not significantly probative” will not defeat
a motion for summary judgment which is properly supported. Kraft v. United States,
991 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and
Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 772 (6th Cir.
1999).
The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying portions of the
record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. Mt.
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Lebanon Personal Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Univ., Inc., 276 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir.
2002). The party opposing the motion then may not “rely on the hope that the trier of
fact will disbelieve the movant’s denial of a disputed fact” but must make an affirmative
showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion. Street v. J.C. Bradford &
Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989). A party opposing a motion for summary
judgment must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual
material showing “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. If the non-moving party, after sufficient opportunity for
discovery, is unable to meet his or her burden of proof, summary judgment is clearly
proper. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.
B.
Respondent argues that the petition was not filed within the applicable limitations
period and that the Court of Appeals’ opinion authorizing the filing of a second petition
does not foreclose dismissal of the petition as untimely.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), codified at
28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., became effective on April 24, 1996, and governs the filing
date for this action because Bell filed his petition after the AEDPA's effective date. See
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA includes a one-year period of
limitations for habeas petitions brought by prisoners challenging state court judgments.
The statute provides:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion
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of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of
limitation under this subsection.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
The Sixth Circuit previously has held that when considering a request for
authorization to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition, the Court of
Appeals will not consider whether or not the habeas corpus petition complies with the
one-year statute of limitations. In re Dewitt McDonald, Jr., 514 F.3d 539, 543 (6th Cir.
2008). The Court of Appeals reasoned that, when evaluating a petition under §
2244(b), a Court of Appeals does not have a developed record. Consequently, the
Court of Appeals is not in the best position to evaluate certain issues, for example,
whether due diligence has been exercised in uncovering newly-discovered evidence.
Id. In this case, the Sixth Circuit’s decision authorizing the filing of a second habeas
petition did not address the timeliness of the petition. Therefore, the timeliness of the
pending petition has not yet been decided.
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The petition is based upon purportedly newly-discovered evidence: a recanting
affidavit from key prosecution witness Thomas Hale, dated February 22, 2005. If the
limitations period runs from the date of the Hale Affidavit, the petition was timely filed
because Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment approximately six months after
the date of the affidavit. The filing of this motion would have tolled the limitations period,
with approximately six months remaining. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (the time during
which a prisoner seeks state-court collateral review of a conviction does not count
toward the limitations period). The limitations period resumed running when the
Michigan Supreme Court denied reconsideration of its denial of leave to appeal, on April
28, 2009. Petitioner filed the pending petition approximately one month later, well within
the approximately six months that remained of the limitations period.
Respondent argues that the Hale Affidavit should not trigger the running of the
limitations period because Simpson “gives no logical reason why he could not have
discovered Hale’s purportedly false testimony . . . sooner.” Respondent’s Motion at 8.
At the same time, Respondent gives no logical reason why or how Hale’s purportedly
false testimony could or should have been discovered sooner.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in
a light most favorable to Simpson, as well as draw all reasonable inferences in
Simpson’s favor. See Sutherland v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 613 (6th
Cir.2003); Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir.2003). The Hale Affidavit is
dated February 22, 2005. While Respondent questions the authenticity of the affidavit,
this argument is nothing but conjecture. Respondent points to no letter, affidavit, trial
transcript, or other source to show that the affidavit was discoverable prior to February
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22, 2005. Respondent’s argument that the information could have been discovered
sooner amounts to nothing more than conjecture. Additionally, Simpson filed a motion
for relief from judgment within six months after the date of the Hale affidavit. Simpson
filed the habeas corpus petition within several days after exhausting his state court
remedies for this claim. Thus, once the affidavit was signed, Simpson moved
expeditiously to obtain state court, then federal court relief. Drawing all reasonable
inferences in Simpson’s favor, the Court finds that Respondent has failed to show that
summary judgment is appropriate. Therefore, the Court will deny the motion.
III.
For the reasons stated, the Court DENIES Respondent’s Motion for Summary
Judgment and Dismissal of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [dkt. #13].
The Court ORDERS Respondent to file an answer in accordance with Rule 5,
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, within 90 DAYS from the date of this Order.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 27, 2011
S/George Caram Steeh
GEORGE CARAM STEEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
July 27, 2011, by electronic and/or ordinary mail and also to
James Simpson at Carson City Correctional Facility, 10522
Boyer Road, Carson City, MI 48811.
S/Josephine Chaffee
Deputy Clerk

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