Roberson v. Torres et al

Filing 126

ORDER Regarding Motion in Limine 121 . Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
NICHOLAS ROBERSON,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 09-CV-12927-DT
v.
HONORABLE DENISE PAGE HOOD
JAMES TORRES,
Defendant.
_________________________________________/
ORDER REGARDING MOTION IN LIMINE
I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Procedure

Plaintiff Nicholas Roberson (“Plaintiff”) seeks to recover damages from
Defendant James Torres (“Defendant”) for the use of a chemical agent and physical
force against Plaintiff, without need or provocation, which actions Plaintiff alleges
were done maliciously and sadistically and constitute cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A trial by
jury is scheduled to commence on January 12, 2016.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude
Evidence, specifically, a March 10, 2009 video involving Plaintiff but not Defendant.
(Doc. No. 121) Plaintiff has filed a response. (Doc. No. 122) The Court, having

concluded that the decision process would not be significantly aided by oral argument,
orders that the motion be resolved on the motion and briefs submitted by the parties.
E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2).
B.

Facts

At the time the events giving rise to the present matter occurred, Plaintiff was
incarcerated at the Gus Harrison Correctional Facility in Adrian, Michigan, one of
many Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) facilities. While in prison,
Plaintiff has battled depression and attempted suicide four times. On March 10, 2009,
MDOC staff asked Plaintiff’s bunkmate to move out of their cell. When the bunkmate
did not comply, MDOC officers donned protective gear, applied a chemical agent to
the cell, and extracted both Plaintiff and his bunkmate. The March 10, 2009, incident
was captured on video (“March 10 video”). It is undisputed that: (1) Defendant was
not involved in the March 10, 2009, incident, and (2) he does not appear, nor is he
mentioned, in the March 10 video.
After the events of March 10, 2009, Plaintiff contends he fell into an introverted
state of depression. Plaintiff refused to eat for three days, and he was placed in a
suicide observation cell. On March 13, 2009, Defendant was tasked with escorting
Plaintiff from the suicide observation cell to a local hospital. Due to depression and
fatigue, Plaintiff was unresponsive when Defendant ordered him to the cell door.
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Defendant sprayed a chemical agent into Plaintiff’s cell and left. Once the chemical
agent hit Plaintiff’s lungs, Plaintiff immediately complied with Defendant’s order.
After a period of time, Defendant returned with a team of MDOC officers to free
Plaintiff from the gas filled cell. The March 13, 2009, incident was captured on video
(“March 13 video”).
II.

ANALYSIS
In his motion in limine, Defendant seeks to exclude the March 10 video

pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. Defendant cites no other legal
authority in support of his motion.
A.

Legal Standard

District courts have broad discretion over matters involving the admissibility
of evidence at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Seago, 930 F.2d 482, 494 (6th Cir.
1991). Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401 (emphasis added).
“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, [or] misleading the jury[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added).
B.

March 10 Video
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1.

Relevancy under Rule 401

Defendant argues that the March 10 video is not relevant and should be
excluded pursuant to Rule 401. Defendant contends that nothing in the video makes
any fact of consequence in this matter any more or less probable. Defendant’s
argument is rooted in the undisputed facts that he was not involved in the March 10,
2009, incident and does not appear, nor is he mentioned, in the March 10 video.
Plaintiff responds that the March 10 video is relevant because it:
1.

Establishes how Plaintiff ended up in a suicide observation cell;

2.

Establishes he was suffering from immense depression and fatigue on
March 13, 2009;

3.

Demonstrates the proper procedure for MDOC applying a chemical
agent to a cell; and

4.

Contains the basis for his damages; specifically, it demonstrates how the
March 10, 2009, incident sparked a new battle of depression for Plaintiff.

Defendant counters that Plaintiff’s depression is not an issue of fact for trial and that
there is no evidence that: (a) Defendant knew Plaintiff’s mental condition on March
13, 2009, or (b) Plaintiff’s mental condition was relevant to Defendant’s decision to
use a chemical agent that day. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s mental
condition is not relevant to the legal issue of whether Defendant used excessive force.
In assessing the relevancy of proposed evidence, the Court does not “consider
the weight or sufficiency of the evidence in determining relevancy and ‘[e]ven if [the]
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district court believes the evidence is insufficient to prove the ultimate point for which
it is offered, it may not exclude the evidence if it has even the slightest probative
worth.’” Robinson v. Runyon, 149 F.3d 507, 512 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Douglass
v. Eaton Corp., 956 F.2d 1339, 1344 (6th Cir. 1992)). The Court need not, as
Defendant suggests, determine that the evidence is relevant to the specific legal issue
of whether Defendant used excessive force against Plaintiff on March 13, 2009.
The Court finds that the March 10 video contains probative evidence that is
relevant to the issues to be tried. Contrary to Defendant’s position, Plaintiff’s mental
condition may be relevant in this matter. For example, Plaintiff’s mental condition
on March 13, 2009, may be probative of why Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s
order to Plaintiff to come to his cell door to be placed in restraints to be taken for an
off-site medical visit. Plaintiff’s mental condition also may be probative of why he
was not eating the days prior to March 13, 2009 (creating the need to be taken to an
off-site medical visit) and was in a suicide observation cell at the time of the March
13, 2009, incident. Finally, Plaintiff’s mental condition may bear on the amount of
damages, if any, he suffered. In addition, to the extent that the March 10 video shows
that the procedure used by MDOC officers to apply chemical agent to a cell and
extract the prisoner(s) on March 10, 2009, differed from the procedure utilized by
Defendant on March 13, 2009, such evidence may be probative and relevant as to
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whether Defendant used excessive force when spraying a chemical agent into, and
removing Plaintiff from, the suicide observation cell.
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the March 10 video is
probative and relevant to the issues to be litigated at trial.
2.

Rule 403 Analysis

Defendant contends that showing the March 10 video will be “problematic” for
several reasons. First, because Defendant had no involvement in the March 10 cell
extraction, he asserts there is a danger he will be judged unfairly for, and prejudiced
by, the “violent” actions of others, such that even a curative jury instruction may not
be sufficient. Second, Defendant asserts that the March 10 video would likely and
unnecessarily confuse the issues for the jury because the jury might consider both the
March 10, 2009, incident and the March 13, 2009, incident as equally relevant when
only the events of March 13, 2009, are to be considered for purposes of determining
whether Defendant properly used a chemical agent in good faith on March 13, 2009.
Third, although Plaintiff wants to introduce the March 10 video to show to the jury
that he was emotionally unstable after the March 10, 2009, incident, Defendant asserts
that the jury could be inclined to: (a) give the video much more importance than that,
and (b) confuse the fact that the only legal issue for the jury to decide stems from the
March 13, 2009, incident.
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Plaintiff argues that showing the March 10 video is not prejudicial or confusing.
As Plaintiff notes, in the first few minutes of the March 10 video, the MDOC officers
involved are identified. Defendant is not one of the named MDOC officers, and he
does not appear, nor is he mentioned, in the March 10 video. Plaintiff suggests, and
the Court agrees, that it will be clear to the jury that Defendant was not involved in the
March 10 incident. For that reason, the Court concludes that any alleged prejudice
created by the introduction of the March 10 video would not substantially outweigh
its probative value.
There also will be no confusion between the videos because both videos begin
by clearly identifying the parties involved, and Defendant is not named or pictured in
the March 10 video. On the other hand, Defendant is named and pictured in the
March 13 video, and Defendant is the sole defendant and the only MDOC officer
expected to testify at trial. The Court believes the jury will have no trouble
understanding that the reasonableness of Defendant’s actions and/or omissions on
March 13, 2009, are the sole basis for Plaintiff’s claims.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the probative value of the March
10 video is not “substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 403.
The Court notes that Plaintiff suggests that any potential jury confusion could
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be resolved by giving curative jury instructions. Citing U.S. v. Hans, 684 F.2d 343,
346 (6th Cir. 1982). Plaintiff has even suggested that jurors could be instructed that
Defendant: (1) took no part in the March 10, 2009 incident, and (2) they should only
view the March 10, 2009 video for the limited purposes set forth in Section II.B.1
above. If Defendant wants such a limiting instruction given to the jury, the parties
must provide the Court with a stipulated limiting instruction at or before jury
selection.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence
(Doc. No. 121) is DENIED.

S/Denise Page Hood
Denise Page Hood
United States District Judge
Dated: January 14, 2016
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record on January 14, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/LaShawn R. Saulsberry
Case Manager

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