Woodmore v. Farmington Hills Police Department et al
Filing
42
OPINION AND ORDER Granting 30 Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing Action with prejudice. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (JCur)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DAMIAN D. WOODMORE,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 09-12967
v.
HONORABLE DENISE PAGE HOOD
FARMINGTON HILLS POLICE
DEPARTMENT and WILLIAM
DWYER,
Defendants.
________________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND
DISMISSING ACTION
I.
BACKGROUND
On July 28, 2009, Plaintiff Damian Woodmore (“Woodmore”) filed the instant suit against
Defendants Farmington Hills Police Department (“FHPD”) and William Dwyer (“Dwyer”) alleging
a two-count Complaint of wrongful discharge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment. Defendants’ first motion was withdrawn by the parties’ agreement. Response and reply
briefs have been filed by the parties and a hearing held on the matter.
Woodmore was employed by the FHPD as a Police Officer. Dwyer is the Chief of Police
of the Department. As an officer, Woodmore was a member of the Police Officers Association of
Michigan (“POAM”). The terms of his employment were governed by a collective bargaining
agreement between the City of Farmington Hills and POAM. The bargaining agreement provided
that the FHPD promulgate “Regulations and Operational Guidelines.” The Regulations do not
provide Chief Dwyer the authority to terminate an employee but does provide the authority to
suspend an officer pending an investigation of any infraction. Serious infractions must go through
the Police Trial Board which then determines any appropriate discipline, if warranted. (Regulations,
§ 7.11)
The FHPD claims that in August 2007, it became aware that certain monies, seized as
evidence, were missing. An internal investigation was launched and the investigation revealed that
Plaintiff checked out money from FHPD’s Property Section between December 26, 2006 through
July 26, 2007, in the amount of $7,021.50, but could not recall where the money went. (Ex. K,
Defendants’ Br.) The FHPD’s investigation was turned over to the Oakland County Sheriff’s
Department. While the Sheriff’s investigation was ongoing, Plaintiff was placed on administrative
leave, with pay and benefits, on September 10, 2007. The Sheriff’s Department completed its
investigation on November 2, 2007 resulting in the issuance of a warrant charging Plaintiff with four
felony counts and one misdemeanor count of larceny by conversion and misconduct in public office.
(Exs. O and P, Defendants’ Br.) Plaintiff was placed on unpaid suspension pending the adjudication
of the criminal charges. Plaintiff was arrested on January 11, 2008 and was bound over for trial
before the Oakland County Circuit Court.
On June 2, 2008, Plaintiff entered a guilty plea on four misdemeanor counts of larceny by
conversion over $200 but less than $1,000. Plaintiff agreed to resign as a Police Officer with the
FHPD. This agreement was placed on the record during Plaintiff’s plea hearing. (Ex. C,
Defendants’ Br.) On the same day, Plaintiff submitted a letter of resignation to the FHPD, stating,
On June 2, 2008 I pled guilty to four misdemeanor counts of larceny
by conversion.
I am resigning from the Farmington Hills Police Department effective
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November 1, 2007, the date that the warrant for my arrest was issued.
I am resigning freely, voluntarily and without coercion promise or
duress.
(Ex. D, Defendants’ Br.) Plaintiff also agreed to pay the FHPD $7,000.00 in restitution. Id.
Plaintiff thereafter filed the present lawsuit on July 28, 2009 alleging that Defendants
discriminated against him because of his race.
II.
ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
Defendants move for summary judgment under Rule 56(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment should be entered only where “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to the interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.” The presence of factual disputes will preclude granting of summary
judgment only if the disputes are genuine and concern material facts. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” only if “the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. Although the
Court must view the motion in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, where “the moving
party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there
is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). If,
after sufficient opportunity for discovery, the non-moving party cannot meet that burden, summary
judgment is clearly proper. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. Summary judgment must be entered
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
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essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such
a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as to any material fact,” since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. A court must look to the substantive law to identify
which facts are material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
B.
Race Discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
1.
Prima Facie Case
As 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, and only a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred, a plaintiff must set forth specific constitutional
grounds for asserting a § 1983 claim. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-394 (1989); Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979). Claims of employment discrimination under § 1983 must
be analyzed using the same analytical framework applicable to Title VII actions. Weberg v. Franks,
229 F.3d 514, 522 (6th Cir. 2000). Under the burden shifting approach developed for Title VII cases
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1972), a plaintiff must establish a prima facie
case and create a presumption of discrimination by showing by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) that he/she belongs to a protected class; (2) that he/she was subjected to an adverse employment
action; (3) that he/she was qualified for the job; and (4) that he/she was treated differently from
similarly situated employees from a non–protected class. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802;
Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, 61 F.3d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1995); and Wilcoxon v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 235 Mich. App. 347, 361 (1999). Alternatively, a plaintiff could establish a
prima facie case by presenting credible, direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Terbovitz v. Fiscal
Court of Adair County, 825 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1987).
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2.
Adverse Action
Defendants claim that Plaintiff is unable to show that he was subject to an adverse
employment action. Defendants submit a copy of Plaintiff’s letter of resignation which expressly
notes that Plaintiff “freely, voluntarily, and without coercion promise or duress” resigned from his
employment. (Ex. D, Defendants’ Br.) Plaintiff’s criminal lawyer reviewed and also signed the
letter. Id. The resignation was also placed on the record when Plaintiff entered his plea of guilty.
(Ex. E, Defendants’ Br.) Defendants submit that a letter of resignation does not constitute an
adverse employment action by Defendants.
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges he was forced to sign a letter of resignation. (Comp., ¶ 26) In
his response, Plaintiff claims he suffered adverse employment action because he was constructively
discharged by Defendants. Beginning in February 2004, Plaintiff was moved laterally into the
detective bureau. From February 2004 through September 2007, Plaintiff claims he began to come
into contact with Defendant Dwyer, who subjected him to comments and epithets regarding
Plaintiff’s race. (Ex. B, Plaintiff’s Br.) Plaintiff claims Defendant Dwyer would greet White
detectives with a customary handshake but would greet Plaintiff with a series of complex hand
maneuvers, such as a “black handshake.” (Ex. B, pp. 124-28, Plaintiff’s Br.) Defendant Dwyer
would address Plaintiff with the salutation “Power to the People” along with his fist raised in the air.
(Ex. B, pp. 124-25, 128, Plaintiff’s Br.) Plaintiff claims Defendant Dwyer behaved in this manner
toward Plaintiff in front of other employees, all of whom were subordinates of Defendant Dwyer.
Plaintiff claims other officers subsequently began to make comments that Plaintiff was only in the
detective bureau because he was Black. Plaintiff claims he felt humiliated and threatened but had
no recourse since the source of the problem stemmed from his highest superior, Defendant Dwyer.
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(Ex. B, Plaintiff’s Br.)
On August 27, 2007, Plaintiff was laterally moved to the position of school liaison. (Ex. D,
Plaintiff’s Br.) He claims that it was not his desire to move to this position and that he was happy
in the detective bureau and felt he had a better chance of advancement if he stayed in the bureau.
Plaintiff states his White superior wanted him to go to the high school because he was Black, and
it would be “good for him.” However, Plaintiff admits he was still handling his high profile cases
from the detective bureau while serving as the school liaison. As a result of handling these high
profile cases, items from several cases, including money, were stored in his desk drawer, which was
not the procedure.
Plaintiff agrees money came up missing as part of ongoing criminal
investigations. Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave in September 2007 pending an
investigation and later suspended without pay. (Ex. E, Plaintiff’s Br.) Plaintiff claims that his case
was turned over to the Oakland county Sheriff’s Department for an independent investigation which
led to criminal charges. (Ex. F., Plaintiff’s Br.) Plaintiff alleges the case went on for a nearly a year,
leaving Plaintiff on the verge of bankruptcy. In the best interest of his family, Plaintiff asserts he
pled to four counts of misdemeanor larceny and was not allowed to return to his position, unlike his
White coworkers. Plaintiff argues that his employer placed him in a position where he felt he was
forced to sign the letter of resignation. (Ex. G, Plaintiff’s Br..)
Generally, a plaintiff does not suffer an adverse action where a plaintiff submits a voluntary
resignation letter. Sims-Eiland v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 173 F. Supp. 2d 682, 689 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
A voluntary resignation that amounts to a constructive discharge may be an adverse employment
action. See, Smith v. Henderson, 376 F.3d 529, 533-34 (6th Cir. 2004); Kocsis v. Multi-Care
Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 886-87 (6th Cir. 1996). “To constitute a constructive discharge,
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the employer must deliberately create intolerable working conditions, as perceived by a reasonable
person, with the intention of forcing the employee to quit and the employee must actually quit.”
Moore v. KUKA Welding Sys. & Robot Corp., 171 F.3d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1999). In order to
determine if there is a constructive discharge, both the employer’s intent and the employee’s
objective feelings must be examined. Id. Intent can be shown by demonstrating that quitting was
a foreseeable consequence of the employer’s actions. Id. A plaintiff must show more than a Title
VII violation to prove constructive discharge. Id. It is not enough that a plaintiff can prove a hostile
work environment under Title VII. Id. The Sixth Circuit’s two-pronged test for constructive
discharge requires “an inquiry into both the objective feelings of an employee, and the intent of the
employer.” Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 635 (6th Cir. 1987).
The objective component exists if “working conditions would have been so difficult or
unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.”
Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 648 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982). In determining whether a reasonable person
would have felt compelled to resign, courts have generally considered the following factors: 1)
demotion; 2) reduction in salary; 3) reduction in job responsibilities; 4) reassignment to menial or
degrading work; 5) reassignment to work under a younger supervisor; 6) badgering, harassment, or
humiliation by the employer calculated to encourage the employee’s resignation; or, 7) offers of
early retirement or continued employment on terms less favorable than the employee’s former status.
Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 569 (6th Cir. 2001).
The intolerable working conditions Plaintiff cites in his response include a lateral move
within the department from the detective bureau to school liaison, harassment and discrimination
by Defendant Chief Dwyer and the criminal investigation of missing monies which led to Plaintiff’s
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plea of guilty and ultimate resignation as part of the plea.
As to the lateral move from the detective bureau to school liaison, the Sixth Circuit has noted
that dissatisfaction with a work assignment is, as a matter of law, normally not so intolerable as to
be a basis for constructive discharge. Smith, 376 F.3d at 534. Plaintiff asserts that he was pressured
into applying for the position of school liaison because he was afraid that if he did not do so, his
career would be hampered. Even though he was in the new position, Plaintiff claims he was still
handling some of his high profile cases from the detective bureau. Plaintiff states that the move to
the position of school liaison was a lateral move and he does not claim that he lost any compensation
or benefits as a result of the move. Plaintiff has not shown a genuine issue of material fact that his
transfer from the detective bureau to school liaison is sufficient to establish constructive discharge.
Plaintiff was still able to handle cases from the detective bureau while performing the position of
school liaison.
Regarding the harassment and discrimination by Defendant Chief Dwyer while in the
detective bureau, although the actions by Defendant Dwyer appear to be inappropriate and
humiliated Plaintiff, Plaintiff indicates in his response brief that he was “happy in the detective
bureau.” (Plaintiff’s Br., p. 7) Offhand comments and isolated incidents of offensive conduct,
unless extremely serious, will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of
employment. Faraghar v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). Although Defendant
Dwyer’s comments offended Plaintiff, it is not clear that these comments were not so extreme that
they were intended to force Plaintiff to resign from his position, in light of Plaintiff’s admission that
he was happy in the detective bureau. Plaintiff did not complain of Dwyer’s actions until after
Plaintiff’s resignation, which was part of his plea bargain with the Prosecutor’s Office and nine
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months after Plaintiff had any contact with Dwyer. (Plaintiff’s Dep., pp. 317-18, 340, 342) The
Sixth Circuit has rejected hostile-environment claim arising from facts far more compelling that
those alleged in this case in In re Rodriguez, 487 F.3d 1001 (6th Cir. 2007). The Sixth Circuit noted
that prima facie case was not shown where a male supervisor continuously made sexually suggestive
comments about the female plaintiff’s appearance, touched her breast as he removed and replaced
a pen from her shirt picket, leered at her and told that if he had someone like her, he would never
let her leave the house. Id. at 1010-11 (quoting Clark v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 400 F.3d 341, 352
(6th Cir. 2005)). The comments in this case are less compelling than those noted by the Sixth
Circuit.
Plaintiff appears to claim that his resignation as a result of a plea agreement after criminal
charges were brought against him was a result of Defendants’ discriminatory actions. In his
response, Plaintiff does not attempt to address his statements before the trial court that his plea was
freely and voluntarily made. If the Court were to find that Plaintiff was forced to resign from his
position, this would result in a finding that Plaintiff’s plea was not freely and voluntarily made. Any
such findings would implicate Plaintiff’s misdemeanor conviction, which this Court cannot so
determine.
To recover monetary damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,
a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence was reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by the
issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). A §
1983 suit in which a plaintiff seeks damages in connection with proceedings leading to his allegedly
wrongful state court conviction is not cognizable where the plaintiff’s conviction has never been
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reversed or otherwise invalidated. See Patrick v. Laskaris, 25 F. Supp. 2d 432, 433 (S.D.N.Y.
1998). Because Plaintiff does not allege that his conviction has been overturned, expunged, or
called into question by a writ of habeas corpus, his allegations relating to his criminal prosecution,
conviction, and incarceration against the defendants fail to state a claim for which relief may be
granted and must, therefore, be dismissed. See Adams v. Morris, 90 Fed. Appx. 856, 858 (6th Cir.
2004); Dekoven v. Bell, 140 F. Supp. 2d 748, 756 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
Plaintiff is unable to show that his voluntary resignation as part of a plea agreement amounts
to a constructive discharge and an adverse employment action by Defendants. Because Plaintiff
cannot establish an essential element of his prima facie case, his claim of racial discrimination
cannot succeed. See Clay v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 501 F.3d 695, 703 (6th Cir. 2007).
3.
Similarly Situated Employee/Comparable
Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not identified a similarly situated employee with whom
Plaintiff seeks to compare himself. Plaintiff identifies the following comparables: Robert
Tiderington, Michael Mackey, John Handy, Stacey Swanderski-Van Meter, Lt. Anderson, Sgt.
Hubbard, and, Mitchell Skazalski. Plaintiff argues that there are many instances in which
Defendants showed preferential treatment to White employees, but that these documents were never
turned over to Plaintiff. Defendants respond that the requested discovery was provided to Plaintiff
and that no further requests to supplement the discovery were made to the defense. Defendants note
that no motion to compel was filed regarding any failure to provide documents. Plaintiff’s response
to the motion is the first instance where Plaintiff has complained of not receiving the appropriate
documents during discovery.
An employee with whom Plaintiff seeks to compare must be similarly-situated in “all of the
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relevant respects.” Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998).
The failure to identify a similarly situated employee who was treated more favorably than Plaintiff
is fatal to the Plaintiff’s claim under a disparate treatment theory. Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964
F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992). The similarly situated employee must have the same supervisor, be
subject to the same standards and engaged in conduct of comparable seriousness to Plaintiff. Id.
As noted by Plaintiff in his brief, the following employees he identified as similarly situated
are civilian employees, Mackey and Handy. These two employees are not similarly situated to
Plaintiff because they are not police officers. Plaintiff has not disputed Chief Dwyer’s deposition
that police officer employees are held to a higher standard than civilian employees. (Dwyer Dep.,
pp. 55-56) As noted by the Sixth Circuit, the identified employee must be similarly-situated in “all
of the relevant respects.” Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 352.
Robert Tiderington, as Plaintiff asserts, is a White FHPD police officer who was arrested by
the Detroit Police Department for trying to pay his bar tab in a strip club with a counterfeit $20 bill.
Tiderington was charged with several felonies and ultimately pled to disorderly person. Plaintiff
claims Tiderington is a friend of Chief Dwyer and despite the heinous crimes he committed, he was
not forced to resign as a condition of his plea agreement and continues to work actively on the road
as an FHPD police officer. Plaintiff asserts Tiderington did not lose his seniority, his pay or
retirement eligibility.
Defendants argue Tiderington is not similarly situated to Plaintiff because Tiderington
challenged his termination pursuant to the grievance/appeal procedures. Plaintiff never filed such
a grievance or sought to appeal his resignation. Defendants assert that, like Plaintiff, administrative
charges were filed against Tiderington and he was suspended without pay pending an investigation.
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(Ex. O, Defendants’ Br.).
Plaintiff has not shown a genuine issue of material fact that Tiderington is similarly situated
to Plaintiff because he was charged with a different crime than Plaintiff. Tiderington is similar to
Plaintiff in that he pled guilty to some of the charges against him. Unlike Plaintiff, Tiderington went
through the Police Trial Board process to challenge any personnel action. Plaintiff chose to resign
from the FHPD, without going through the Police Trial Board process, where he could have
challenged any benefit, seniority or pay issues.
Plaintiff identifies Stacey Swanderski-Van Meter, a White female officer, as similarly
situated to him because she was disciplined for requesting overtime pay for court appearances which
she did not attend. Plaintiff claims her case was not turned over to an outside agency. Plaintiff
asserts she continues to work today for the FHPD and was not forced to resign.
Defendants argue that Swanderski-Van Meter is not similarly situated to Plaintiff because
only officers suspected of misconduct involving money were referred to an outside agency for
investigation. Swanderski-Van Meter was accused of falsifying time cards which are handled within
the Department. (Dwyer Dep., p. 55) Defendants argue that falsifying three hours of overtime pay
is not comparable to Plaintiff’s conversion of over $7,000 in seized evidence. Defendants assert that
Swanderski-Van Meter was administratively charged for her misconduct and suffered a 5-day
unpaid suspension.
Plaintiff has not shown a genuine issue of material fact that Swanderski-Van Meter is
similarly situated to Plaintiff given that the misconduct causing his termination–conversion of more
than $7,000 in seized evidence. Plaintiff has not shown his actions are comparable to a charge of
falsifying three hours of overtime. A misconduct causing a termination must be of “comparable
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seriousness” to the misconduct of similarly-situated non-protected employee. See Parker v. City of
Toledo, 178 F.3d 1295 (6th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff identifies Lt. Anderson and Sgt Hubbard, both White officers, who were accused
of sexual harassment against a female officer. Plaintiff claims these charges were never turned over
to an outside agency for investigation. Plaintiff asserts that a settlement was reached between the
parties. Anderson and Hubbard were not forced to resign and retained their benefits and pay.
Plaintiff has not shown a genuine issue of material fact that Anderson and Hubbard are
similarly-situated to Plaintiff since the acts involved are not similar to the misconduct charged
against Plaintiff.
Plaintiff claims that Mitchell Skazalski, a White officer, was arrested and charged with 4th
degree criminal sexual conduct but that the investigation was not sent to an outside agency.
Skazalski was allowed to apply for unemployment benefits and resigned from the Department
without noting his misconduct which allowed Skazalski to apply for another police officer position
in another jurisdiction.
Defendants argue that the charge against Skazalski is not similar to the charge against
Plaintiff. Skazalski is not similarly-situated because he challenged the grievance against him
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. Defendants assert Plaintiff never went through the
grievance procedure after he resigned from the FHPD, although, like Plaintiff, he was suspended
without pay pending an investigation.
Plaintiff has not shown a genuine issue of material fact that Sazalski is similarly situated to
Plaintiff because the charge against Skazalski is not comparable to the charge against Plaintiff and
Plaintiff did not go through the grievance procedure pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement.
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Plaintiff did not challenge his pay and benefits in accordance with the collective bargaining
agreement.
As to Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants failed to provide him with documents relating to
other officers, Plaintiff has failed to show that he sought to compel such documents be produced by
Defendants. If such documents were not provided to Plaintiff pursuant to discovery requests,
Plaintiff should have filed the appropriate motion, as provided under the Rules of Civil Procedures.
Even if Plaintiff is able to identify an employee who was similarly situated to him but was
treated differently, Plaintiff is unable to show that he suffered an adverse action by Defendants.
Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race.
D.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim must be
dismissed because Plaintiff is unable to show outrageous conduct on behalf of Defendants. The
elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: 1) extreme and outrageous conduct; 2)
intent or recklessness; 3) causation; and 4) severe emotional distress. Doe v. Mills, 212 Mich. App.
73, 91 (1995); Roberts v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 422 Mich. 594 (1985).
Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state outrageous conduct by Defendants since he only
incorporates his general allegations of discrimination in his intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim. As noted above, Plaintiff voluntarily resigned from his position after he entered a
plea of guilty before the Oakland County Circuit Court. Defendants have properly supported their
summary judgment motion on this claim and Plaintiff has not submitted sufficient evidence to rebut
Defendants’ motion. Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim must be dismissed.
III.
CONCLUSION
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For the reasons set forth above,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 30, filed
1/13/2011) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED with prejudice.
S/Denise Page Hood
Denise Page Hood
United States District Judge
Dated: May 31, 2011
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on May
31, 2011, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/Johnetta M. Curry-Williams
For LaShawn R. Saulsberry
Case Manager
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