Davis v. City of Dearborn, et al

Filing 78

OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 68 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 75 Motion for Settlement Conference.. Signed by District Judge Marianne O. Battani. (BThe)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
YANCY D. DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:09-CV-14892
v.
HON. MARIANNE O. BATTANI
DEARBORN, CITY OF, et al.,
Defendant.
________________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court is Defendants Dennis David, City of Dearborn, and Dearborn
Police Department’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 68).

The Court has

reviewed all the relevant filings and finds oral argument will not aid in the resolution of
this dispute. See E. D. Mich. LR 7.1(e)(2). For the reasons discussed below, the Court
GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Dearborn Defendants’ motion.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Yancy Davis filed this action, alleging violations of state and federal law
in connection with the impoundment and subsequent sale of her 1998 Mercedes Benz.
In her complaint, Davis named as Defendants, the City of Dearborn, the Dearborn
Police Department, and Officer Dennis David (collectively “the Dearborn Defendants”),
as well as the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”), and Amtrak
employee Dan Hardy (collectively “the Amtrak Defendants”). The Court dismissed the
Amtrak Defendants and the majority of claims brought against the Dearborn
Defendants. (See Doc. No. 37). In her remaining claim, Davis contends the Dearborn

Defendants exercised acts of wrongful dominion over her vehicle during the sale of her
car following its seizure as an abandoned vehicle.
The facts giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims have been detailed in prior dispositive
motions, so only a brief summary, limited to the facts relevant to the resolution of this
motion, follows. On September 1, 2007, Davis parked her vehicle in a parking lot at the
Amtrak station located in Dearborn, Michigan, where the car remained for over two
months. Although when Davis left her car, it had a valid Missouri license plate, and was
parked legally, on November 9, 2007, a Dearborn Police officer tagged her vehicle,
which then had no license plate and was blocking bus traffic in front of the station.
When the officer returned several days later, and discovered that the vehicle had not
been moved, he issued an abandoned vehicle citation, completed paperwork, and
forwarded the information to facilitate notification by the Secretary of State.
The Auto Pound Coordinator for the Dearborn Police, Defendant David, arranged
the public auction of the vehicle. Plaintiff alleges that David told her that he had
purchased the car, (Am. Compl., ¶ 37), although the records show that it was purchased
by VIP Auto Sales (Doc. No. 68, Ex. H). In rejecting the Dearborn Defendants’ previous
request for summary judgment, the Court noted that David failed to follow the statutory
requirements under the motor vehicle statute relative to the sale of an abandoned
vehicle with no ownership information. Moreover, even if David had determined the last
registered owners of the auto and was required to wait only five days after publishing a
public notice before auctioning the car, there is no dispute that he waited only four days.
Therefore, the Court denied the Dearborn Defendants summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

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conversion claim. In their most recent motion, the Dearborn Defendants assert they are
entitled to governmental immunity under Michigan law.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) authorizes a court to grant summary

judgment if “the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” There is no genuine issue of
material fact if there is no factual dispute that could affect the legal outcome on the
issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining
whether to grant summary judgment, this Court “must construe the evidence and draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”

Hawkins v. Anheuser-

Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 332 (6th Cir. 2008). However, the nonmoving party “cannot
rely merely on allegations but must set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for
trial.” Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 2009).
III.

ANALYSIS
The parties disagree as to whether governmental immunity applies to intentional

torts. Although Plaintiff maintains that there is no immunity for intentional torts, in
Odom v. Wayne Co., 760 N.W.2d 217, 228 (Mich. 2008), the Michigan Supreme Court
rejected that position, and summarized the steps a court should follow when analyzing
individual governmental immunity under MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1407. The Odom
Court distinguished the considerations relevant to immunity for a lower-ranking
employee based on whether the plaintiff pleaded an intentional or a negligent tort.
Here, the Dearborn Defendants analyzed subsection (2) of the statute, which addresses
negligent tort claims, in support of their contention that David is entitled to immunity

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relative to Plaintiff’s conversion claim.

Because conversion is an intentional tort,

subsection (3) governs the analysis. See Odom, 760 N.W.2d at 222-23.
To invoke governmental immunity in connection with an intentional tort, courts
assess whether the defendant establishes three criteria. First, he must show that the
challenged acts “were undertaken during the course of employment and the employee
was acting, or reasonably believed that he was acting, within the scope of his authority.”
Id. at 228. Second, he must show that “the acts were undertaken in good faith, or were
not undertaken with malice.” Id. Third, he must show “the acts were discretionary, as
opposed to ministerial.” Id.
Here, the public auction is governed by statute, and the challenged conduct was
ministerial. Therefore, governmental immunity is not available to David. The same
conclusion cannot be reached as to the City of Dearborn and Dearborn Police
Department. The City of Dearborn is considered a governmental agency, and the Court
agrees that the operation of the police department is a governmental function.
Accordingly, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1407(1) provides immunity to these Defendants
from the intentional tort alleged by Davis.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Dearborn Defendant

Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to City of Dearborn and Dearborn
Police Department and DENIED as to David.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request for a settlement conference is
GRANTED.

(Doc. No. 75).

The parties are to appear in person, with settlement

authority, on September 6, 2011, at 10:00 a.m. in Rm. 277 for a settlement conference.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Marianne O. Battani
U. S. District Court Judge

Dated: August 1, 2011

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon Plaintiff and counsel of record on this
date by ordinary mail and/or electronic filing.
s/Bernadette M. Thebolt
Case Manager

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