Graham Medical Technologies, LLC v. Akron Medical, Inc. et al
Filing
32
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 13 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Lawrence P. Zatkoff. (MVer)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
GRAHAM MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
a Michigan limited liability company, d/b/a
GRAMEDICA,
Case No. 2:09-cv-14905
Hon. Lawrence P. Zatkoff
Plaintiff,
v.
AKRON MEDICAL, INC., Nevada corporation
d/b/a AMI,
Defendant.
__________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER
AT A SESSION of said Court, held in the United States Courthouse,
in the City of Port Huron, State of Michigan, on May 18, 2011
PRESENT: THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and for dismissal
of Defendant’s counterclaims [dkt 13]. On February 2, 2011, the Court granted Defendant’s motion
to stay Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion for sixty days due to the stroke of Defendant’s sole
employee, Robert Hastings. Defendant asserted that it could not refute Plaintiff’s allegations
without Hastings’s participation, which could not occur until his medical treatment progressed. On
March 22, 2011, the Court granted Defendant’s counsel’s motion to withdraw as attorney for
Defendant and ordered Defendant to obtain new counsel within twenty days. The Court also ordered
that the Court’s February 2, 2011, order remained in effect, such that Defendant’s supplemental
response to Plaintiff’s pending motion for summary judgment remained due by April 11, 2011. The
April 11, 2011, deadline has elapsed and Defendant has not retained new counsel or supplemented
its response to Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion. Therefore, the Court will now address
Plaintiff’s motion, which has been fully briefed. The Court finds that the facts and legal arguments
are adequately presented in the parties’ papers such that the decision process would not be
significantly aided by oral argument. Therefore, pursuant to E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1 (f)(2), it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion be resolved on the briefs submitted. For the following reasons,
Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a developer and manufacturer of medical devices for feet and ankles. On
February 15, 2008, Plaintiff entered into an Independent Representative Agreement (“Agreement”)
with Defendant for the sale and distribution of Plaintiff’s devices. Plaintiff provided its medical
devices, as well as demonstration models and training manuals (collectively, “the inventory”), to
Defendant on consignment. Defendant would receive commissions based on sales. With respect
to termination, the Agreement provided:
This Agreement may be terminated by either party with thirty (30)
days notice for any reason and without cause. All products and other
property of [Plaintiff] must be returned within seven (7) working
days to [Plaintiff] upon receipt of any notice of termination.
If all products and property of [Plaintiff] are not returned within
those seven (7) working days, we reserve the right to withhold
[Defendant’s] commission checks until inventory is returned. If any
of the inventory has been lost or misplaced, you will be charged for
the missing items.
The Agreement also provided that Defendant had the exclusive right to sell the devices within the
2
territory of Indiana and Ohio.
After the Agreement was executed, Plaintiff implemented a new inventory management
system to better track and collect outstanding inventory. Pursuant to the new management system,
Plaintiff began requesting that its sales representatives return outstanding inventory being held on
consignment. On December 11, 2008, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant describing the new
management system and requesting that Defendant return its inventory by December 26, 2008.
According to Plaintiff, Defendant failed to respond to the letter, prompting Plaintiff to send a followup letter on May 4, 2009. On May 28, 2009, purportedly after receiving no meaningful response
from Defendant, Plaintiff notified Defendant in writing that it was terminating the Agreement and
demanded that all inventory be returned to Plaintiff within seven working days. Pursuant to the
Agreement, the termination became effective on June 27, 2009. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant
returned some of its outstanding inventory after Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit, but that $164,570
worth of inventory has not been returned. In response, Plaintiff has withheld $9,468 in commission
checks earned by Defendant. In its complaint, Plaintiff states claims for (1) breach of contract, (2)
claim and delivery, and (3) conversion.
Defendant responds that it has returned all inventory to Plaintiff. Defendant has also filed
counterclaims alleging that Plaintiff (1) breached the Agreement by withholding commission checks,
(2) breached the Agreement’s exclusivity provision by selling medical devices to various providers
in Ohio and Indiana, and (3) has been unjustly enriched.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
3
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A party must support its
assertions by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits
or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the
motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;
or;
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot
produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other
materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine
dispute as to a material fact, and all inferences should be made in favor of the nonmoving party.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party discharges its burden by “‘showing’—that is, pointing
out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s
case.” Horton v. Potter, 369 F.3d 906, 909 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325)).
Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving
party, who “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “[T]he mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party’s] position will be insufficient
[to defeat a motion for summary judgment]; there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252
(1986).
4
B. Dismissal
A motion brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted tests the legal sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court must accept as true
all factual allegations in the pleadings, and any ambiguities must be resolved in Plaintiff’s favor.
See Jackson v. Richards Med. Co., 961 F.2d 575, 577–78 (6th Cir. 1992). While this standard is
decidedly liberal, it requires more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions. See Advocacy Org.
for Patients & Providers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 176 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir. 1999). A plaintiff
must make “a showing, rather than a blanket assertion of entitlement to relief” and “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” so that the claim is
“plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.” See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
__ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), this Court may only
consider “the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by
reference in the pleadings, and matters of which the [Court] may take judicial notice.” 2 James Wm.
Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 12.34[2] (3d ed. 2000). If, in deciding the motion, the
Court considers matters outside the pleadings, the motion will be treated as one for summary
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff’s Claims
Plaintiff seeks an order of summary judgment with respect to its claims for breach of
5
contract, claim and delivery, and conversion. The determination of each claim depends largely on
whether there is a genuine dispute with respect to whether Defendant returned to Plaintiff the
inventory in question.
1. Breach of Contract/Claim and Delivery
“Under Michigan law, the elements of a breach of contract claim are: (1) the existence of a
contract between the parties, (2) the terms of the contract require performance of certain actions, (3)
a party breached the contract, and (4) the breach caused the other party injury.” Burton v. William
Beaumont Hosp., 373 F.Supp.2d 707, 718 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (citing Webster v. Edward D. Jones
& Co., L.P., 197 F.3d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1999)). To prevail on a claim and delivery claim, Plaintiff
must prove that Defendant unlawfully took or detained goods or personal property, to which Plaintiff
has a right to possess. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2920; Mich. Court Rule § 3.105(A).
In this case, there is no dispute that (1) the parties entered into a valid contract, (2) both
parties had the right to terminate the Agreement with thirty (30) days notice for any reason and
without cause, (3) Plaintiff had the right to demand the return of its inventory upon termination, and
(4) the terms of the contract required Defendant to return the inventory to Plaintiff within seven
working days of termination. The only dispute with respect to Plaintiff’s claims for breach of
contract and claim and delivery is whether Defendant returned the inventory in question to Plaintiff.
According to Plaintiff, $164,570 worth of inventory has not been returned. In support of this
assertion, Plaintiff has produced the following evidence: (1) copies of the consignment agreements
and shipping documents evidencing that Plaintiff shipped the inventory to Defendant; (2) a
spreadsheet summary of all outstanding inventory; and (3) the affidavit of Plaintiff’s Director of
Operations, Maria Recchia, in which Recchia declares that Defendant has failed to return $164,570
6
worth of inventory.
In its response, Defendant claims that it has returned all of the inventory in question. The
sole piece of evidence relied upon by Defendant in support of this assertion is the declaration of
Hastings, in which Hastings declares that “[s]ubsequent to filing the complaint, [Defendant] returned
all remaining inventory, samples, trays and other medical products to [Plaintiff.]” Hastings’s
declaration further states:
Because of a stroke, I have not been able to review the documents
and exhibits attached to the motion for summary judgment filed by
[Plaintiff]. Also, because of the stroke, I have not been able to gather
documents and information relative to [Defendant]’s defenses to the
complaint and relative to [Defendant]’s counterclaim. While I am
able to review this declaration with my local Dallas Counsel, I have
not been able to participate further in this action. I anticipate that I
will continue my recovery and will be able to conduct the necessary
review of documents and materials supporting [Defendant]’s defense
to the complaint and the claims alleged in the counterclaim.
The Court, however, finds that Hastings’s declaration, which offers little more than
conclusory allegations, fails to demonstrate a genuine dispute as to whether Defendant returned the
inventory. See Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he party opposing
summary judgment must show that she can make good on the promise of the pleadings by laying
out enough evidence that will be admissible at trial to demonstrate that a genuine issue on a material
fact exists, and that a trial is necessary.”); Sigmon v. Appalachian Coal Props., Inc., No. 08-6258,
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 19493, at *14–15 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 17, 2010) (“Given this dearth of
specifics, it cannot be said that the affidavits offer anything beyond conclusory allegations and bald
conclusions of law. Therefore, the affidavits alone are insufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to the existence of an oral sales agreement.”). Furthermore, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4)
requires that “[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on
7
personal knowledge, [and] set out facts that would be admissible in evidence . . . .” Given
Hastings’s medical condition and his admission that he has not been able to review any documents
or exhibits necessary to defend against Plaintiff’s motion, it is unclear to the Court how Hastings’s
declaration that Defendant has returned all inventory to Plaintiff is based on his personal knowledge.
Hastings’s declaration also fails to set out facts that would be admissible at trial, as it contains
nothing more than allegations. Thus, the Court finds Hastings’s declaration to be of little value to
the present inquiry.
Defendant also claims that Plaintiff’s evidence fails to demonstrate the absence of a genuine
dispute with respect to whether Defendant returned the inventory. First, Defendant argues that
Plaintiff’s inventory procedures are unreliable based on the following notation in Plaintiff’s
inventory spreadsheet: “Additional 16 items returned that were not signed out to [Defendant].”
Unfortunately, Defendant declined to elaborate on the significance of this notation. It seems to the
Court that the notation reflects an error that may have occurred at the time the items were delivered
to Defendant, in that Plaintiff did not properly “sign out” the items. However, it does not follow that
the notation renders Plaintiff’s inventory spreadsheet unreliable; the notation suggests that whatever
error occurred was resolved favorably to Defendant in that Plaintiff acknowledged the return of the
items. Moreover, Defendant does not argue that the notation is inaccurate.
Next, Defendant argues that there is only one affidavit attached to Plaintiff’s motion, and that
the affidavit fails to authenticate several of Plaintiff’s exhibits, including Plaintiff’s inventory
spreadsheet. As a result, Defendant argues that the Court should not consider such evidence. In its
reply, however, Plaintiff produces the declaration of Michaeleen Bartolone, an employee of Plaintiff
whose job duties include keeping track of Plaintiff’s inventory and compiling and maintaining
8
shipping invoices and “replacement implant sheets.” In her declaration, Bartolone verifies that (1)
“[t]he records of all inventory provided by [Plaintiff] to [Defendant] are contained in Exhibit G to
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment,” (2) Plaintiff’s documents evidence that Plaintiff shipped
the inventory described in the documents, (3) the documents are kept by Plaintiff in the ordinary
course of its business operations, and (4) Bartolone, or someone under her direct supervision, is
responsible for maintaining those documents. Bartolone further declares that she prepared the
inventory spreadsheet with the assistance of Plaintiff’s counsel and that it accurately reflects the
inventory that Defendant has not returned. Therefore, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff’s
documents are authentic and substantiated, and the Court will consider them in connection with
Plaintiff’s motion.
Lastly, Defendant claims that Recchia’s affidavit is inaccurate according to its own terms
because Recchia states that “[Defendant] failed to respond” to a letter sent by Plaintiff on December
26, 2008. According to Defendant, this statement is contradicted by Exhibit 2 to Recchia’s
affidavit—Plaintiff’s May 4, 2009, letter to Defendant—which states: “Please know that your voice
mails and emails have not gone unnoticed.” Defendant asserts that this is clear proof that Defendant
did respond to Plaintiff’s December 26, 2008, letter, and suggests that this should cause the Court
to question the accuracy of the remainder of Recchia’s affidavit. However, the Court does not agree
that the statement in the May 4, 2009, letter renders the affidavit inaccurate.
In her affidavit,
Recchia does not state that the parties never communicated; she merely states that Defendant did
not respond to a particular letter.
While Defendant may have sent voice mails and emails to
Plaintiff, Defendant has not demonstrated that those communications were responsive to the
December 26, 2008, letter. Thus, Defendant has failed to show that the alleged statement in
9
Recchia’s affidavit is inaccurate, and the Court will not disregard the affidavit for that reason.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to demonstrate that a genuine dispute
exists with respect to whether Defendant returned the inventory in question. Since this is the only
issue disputed by Defendant, the Court will grant Plaintiff summary judgment on its claims for
breach of contract and claim and delivery.
2. Conversion
The tort of conversion is defined as “‘any distinct act of domain wrongfully exerted over
another’s personal property in denial of or inconsistent with the rights therein.’” Prime Fin. Servs.
LLC v. Vinton, 279 Mich. App. 245, 275 (2008) (quoting Foremost Ins. Co. v Allstate Ins. Co., 439
Mich. 378, 391 (1992)). In addition to its claims for breach of contract and claim and delivery,
Plaintiff asserts a claim for conversion based on Defendant’s failure to return its inventory. Plaintiff
also seeks treble damages for the alleged conversion. Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s conversion
claim on three grounds: (1) Defendant asserts that there is a genuine dispute as to whether it returned
the inventory in question; (2) Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot maintain causes of action for
breach of contract and the tort of conversion; and (3) Defendant asserts that treble damages are
punitive in nature and may not be recovered for a breach of contract when the parties did not
anticipate such damages. For the reasons discussed in Part IV(A)(1), supra, the Court finds that
Defendant has failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute as to whether it returned the
inventory in question to Plaintiff. The Court will now examine whether Plaintiff may recover under
both contract and tort theories, and whether treble damages are available to Plaintiff.
As Defendant points out, “the law in Michigan is well-settled that an action in tort requires
a breach of duty separate and distinct from a breach of contract.” Sudden Serv. v. Brockman
10
Forklifts, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 2d 811, 815 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (quoting Brock v. Consol. Biomedical
Labs, 817 F.2d 24, 25 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing Haas v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 812 F.2d 1015 (6th
Cir. 1987)). See also Hart v. Ludwig, 347 Mich. 559, 565 (1956) (“[I]f a relation exists which would
give rise to a legal duty without enforcing the contract promise itself, the tort action will lie,
otherwise not.”). According to Defendant, Plaintiff may not recover for the tort of conversion
because Defendant’s duty to return the inventory is governed by the Agreement, and that without
the existence of the Agreement, Defendant would have no duty to return the inventory.
“The distinction between tort and contract liability, as between parties to a contract, has
become an increasingly difficult distinction to make.” Prosser & Keaton, TORTS § 92 at 655 (5th
ed. 1984).
Tort obligations are in general obligations that are imposed by law on
policy considerations to avoid some kind of loss to others. They are
obligations imposed apart from and independent of promises made
and therefore apart from any manifested intention of parties to a
contract or other bargaining transaction. Therefore, if the alleged
obligation to do or not to do something that was breached could not
have existed but for the manifested intent, then contract law should
be the only theory upon which liability would be imposed.
***
[An] exception arises where the contract results in or accompanies
some relation between the parties which the law recognizes as giving
rise to a duty of affirmative care. The typical case is that of a
bailment, where the bare fact that the defendant has possession of the
plaintiff’s property is enough to create the duty, and it would exist if
there were no contract at all . . . .
Id. at 656, 663. See also Sherman v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 251 Mich. App. 41, 51 (2002) (relying on
Prosser & Keaton for the distinction between tort and contract liability).
While Defendant undertook a contractual obligation to return Plaintiff’s inventory upon
11
Plaintiff’s request following termination of the Agreement, Defendant’s failure to return the
inventory breached a duty separate and distinct from the breach of contract. Given the bailment
situation, in which Defendant was entrusted with Plaintiff’s inventory, Defendant had a separate tort
obligation to refrain from taking actions inconsistent with Plaintiff’s ownership interest in the
inventory, which would exist if there were no contract at all. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff
may maintain a conversion claim in addition to its breach of contract claim. Since Defendant does
not raise any additional defenses to this claim, summary judgment is appropriate.
However, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to treble damages. Treble damages are
available for statutory conversion, which is distinct from the tort of conversion. Statutory
conversion is governed by Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2919(a):
(1) A person damaged as a result of either or both of the following
may recover 3 times the amount of actual damages sustained, plus
costs and reasonable attorney fees:
(a) Another person’s stealing or embezzling property or converting
property to the other person’s own use.
In order for Plaintiff to prevail on its statutory conversion claim, Plaintiff must prove that
the inventory was stolen, embezzled, or converted to Defendant’s own use. While Plaintiff has
presented evidence showing that Defendant has failed to return its inventory—an act inconsistent
with Plaintiff’s ownership interests sufficient to prove common law conversion—Plaintiff has failed
to demonstrate that the inventory was stolen, embezzled or converted to Defendant’s own use for
purposes of statutory conversion. In fact, Plaintiff has presented no argument or evidence with
respect to what has happened to the inventory and, by all accounts, neither party is aware of the
inventory’s location at this point. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that it is entitled to
summary judgment with respect to its statutory conversion claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff is not
12
entitled to treble damages at this stage of the proceedings.
B. Defendant’s Counterclaims
1. Breach of Contract
Defendant first claims that Plaintiff breached the Agreement by withholding commission
checks. This issue, however, requires the existence of a genuine dispute over whether Defendant
returned the inventory to Plaintiff because the Agreement provided that Plaintiff may withhold
commission checks until inventory is returned. As discussed in Part IV(A)(1), supra, Defendant has
failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute as to this fact. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment is granted with respect to Defendant’s counterclaim for breach of contract
based on Plaintiff’s withholding of the commission checks.
Defendant also claims that Plaintiff breached the Agreement by selling medical devices
directly to various providers in Ohio and Indiana in alleged violation of the Agreement’s exclusivity
provision. Defendant bases this assertion entirely on Hastings’s declaration, which provides the
following:
And upon information and belief, during the term of the Agreement,
[Plaintiff] failed to honor the exclusivity provision contained in
Section 2 of the Agreement by selling the medical products directly
to various medical providers within Ohio and Indiana and thereby
bypassing [Defendant].
However, for the reasons discussed in Part IV(A)(1), supra, the Court finds that Hastings’s
declaration, which offers little more than conclusory allegations, is insufficient to demonstrate a
genuine dispute as to whether Plaintiff violated the exclusivity provision. Therefore, Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to Defendant’s claim that Plaintiff breached
the Agreement’s exclusivity provision.
13
2. Unjust Enrichment
Plaintiff also argues that Defendant’s unjust enrichment claim is inapplicable because there
is an express contract between the parties, and that courts are not to imply contracts where there is
an express contract covering the same subject matter. Belle Isle Grill Corp. v. City of Detroit, 256
Mich. App. 463, 478 (2003) (noting that “the law will imply a contract in order to prevent unjust
enrichment,” but that “a contract will be implied only if there is no express contract covering the
same subject matter.”) (citing Martin v. East Lansing Sch. Dist., 193 Mich. App. 166, 177 (1992)).
Defendant does not deny that an express contract covers the subject matter of the parties’
dispute, nor does Defendant rebut or otherwise respond to Plaintiff’s argument that the unjust
enrichment claim should be dismissed.
Accordingly, Defendant’s counterclaim for unjust
enrichment is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
3. Sanctions
In addition to dismissing Defendant’s counterclaims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and
56(c), Plaintiff requests that the Court dismiss Defendant’s counterclaims as a sanction for alleged
discovery violations, which include the failure to appoint a corporate representative to respond to
discovery requests. Since the Court has dismissed Defendant’s counterclaims on other grounds,
however, Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Defendant’s counterclaims as a sanction is moot.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment and for dismissal of Defendant’s counterclaims [dkt 13] is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
14
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant pay Plaintiff damages in the amount of
$164,570.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case shall proceed with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for
statutory conversion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Lawrence P. Zatkoff
LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: May 19, 2011
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of this Order was served upon the attorneys of record
by electronic or U.S. mail on May 19, 2011.
S/Marie E. Verlinde
Case Manager
(810) 984-3290
15
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?