Greenhill v. Booker
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus &DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY Signed by District Judge Patrick J. Duggan. (MOre)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
WILEY GREENHILL,
Petitioner,
Case Number: 2:10-CV-10296
Honorable Patrick J. Duggan
v.
RAYMOND D. BOOKER,
Respondent.
/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
I.
Introduction
Michigan prisoner Wiley Greenhill has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 contending that he is being held in violation of his
constitutional rights. On November 4, 2005, following a jury trial in the Circuit Court for
Wayne County, Michigan, Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder in violation
of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.317. In 2005, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to
seventeen to forty years in prison. In his habeas pleadings, Petitioner raises claims
concerning the effectiveness of trial and appellate counsel and the information relied upon
at sentencing. For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. The Court also denies a certificate of appealability and denies leave to
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
II.
Factual and Procedural Background
Petitioner’s convictions arise from the shooting death of Carlos Hamilton on June
9, 2005, in Detroit. The prosecution presented evidence that the shooting was
precipitated by a disagreement over $5.00 Hamilton purportedly owed Petitioner. At
trial, several witnesses testified that on the date of the shooting, Hamilton was seated in a
parked car, when Petitioner arrived in his blue car and parked behind Hamilton’s white
car. A younger man, later identified as Petitioner’s co-defendant Detrick Bundrage, rode
in the passenger seat of Petitioner’s car. Petitioner told Bundrage that the man seated in
the white car was Hamilton. Bundrage exited his vehicle, approached Hamilton, who had
since exited his car, and hit Hamilton with a bottle. Bundrage then fatally shot Hamilton
once in the chest. Petitioner gave a custodial statement in which he denied seeing
Bundrage with a gun prior to the shooting, but admitted that Bundrage talked as if he
were carrying a gun.
Following his conviction and sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal of right with
the Michigan Court of Appeals. He raised a single claim asserting that the trial court
denied his right to present a defense by ruling that the prosecution could cross-examine a
potential defense witness, Donnel Lee, on the circumstances of charges pending against
him, causing Lee not to testify. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s
conviction. People v. Greenhill, No. 267576, 2007 WL 1203547 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr.
24, 2007) (unpublished). Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal in the
Michigan Supreme Court, in which he raised the same claim concerning Lee’s testimony
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as well as claims challenging the trial court’s use of incorrect information at sentencing
and an ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleging that counsel failed to adequately
investigate and call alibi witnesses during trial. The Michigan Supreme Court denied
Petitioner leave to appeal in a standard order. People v. Greenhill, 480 Mich. 917, 739
N.W.2d 865 (2007).
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. He
raised the same claims that he raised in his application to the Michigan Supreme Court, as
well as an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. The trial court denied the
motion. People v. Greenhill, No. 05-006556-02 (Wayne County Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 2009).
Petitioner did not seek leave to appeal the trial court’s decision.
Petitioner then filed the pending habeas petition, raising the following claims:
I.
Petitioner was denied his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial,
due process, equal protection, and the effective assistance of trial counsel.
A.
Appellate counsel was ineffective due to the failure to raise obvious
meritorious issues overlooked by trial counsel.
B.
Trial counsel was ineffective due to failure to investigate.
C.
Trial court used incorrect information when imposing prisoner’s
sentence.
D.
The trial court denied Petitioner’s right to present a defense when it
allowed the prosecutor to question a defense witness about pending
criminal charges, thereby causing the witness not to testify
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III.
Standard of Review
Review of this case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner is entitled to a writ of
habeas corpus only if he can show that the state court’s adjudication of his claims–
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A decision of a state court is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the
state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a
question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has
on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06,
120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519-20 (2000). An “unreasonable application” occurs when “a state
court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a
prisoner’s case.” Id. at 409, 120 S. Ct. at 1521. A federal habeas court may not “issue
the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant
state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.”
Id. at 410-11, 120 S. Ct. at 1522.
The Supreme Court has explained that “[a] federal court’s collateral review of a
state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal
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system.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003). The
“AEDPA thus imposes a ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’
and ‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Renico v.
Lett, 559 U.S. – , –, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320,
333 n. 7, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2067 n.7 (1997); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.
Ct. 357, 360 (2002) (per curiam)). “[A] state court’s determination that a claim lacks
merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the
correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. –, –, 131 S.Ct.
770, 786 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S. Ct. 2140,
2149 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized “that even a strong case for relief does
not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. (citing Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003)). Furthermore, pursuant to § 2254(d),
“a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have
supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible
fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with
the holding in a prior decision” of the Supreme Court. Id. “[I]f this standard is difficult
to meet, that is because it was meant to be.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786.
Although 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the AEDPA, does not completely
bar federal courts from relitigating claims that have previously been rejected in the state
courts, it preserves the authority for a federal court to grant habeas relief only “in cases
where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s
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decision conflicts with” the Supreme Court’s precedents. Id. Indeed, “Section 2254(d)
reflects the view that habeas corpus is a ‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the state
criminal justice systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.”
Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332, n. 5, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment)). Therefore, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a
state prisoner is required to show that the state court’s rejection of his claim “was so
lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in
existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786-787.
A state court’s factual determinations are entitled to a presumption of correctness
on federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this
presumption with clear and convincing evidence. See Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358,
360-61 (6th Cir. 1998). Moreover, habeas review is “limited to the record that was before
the state court.” Cullen v. Pinholster, – U.S. –, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).
IV.
Analysis
Respondent argues that all but Petitioner’s last claim are procedurally defaulted
because they are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. This Court agrees.
A prisoner seeking federal habeas relief must first exhaust his state court remedies
by fairly presenting the substance of each federal constitutional claim “within ‘one
complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.’” Carter v. Mitchell, –
F.3d –, 2012 WL 3854787, at *6 (6th Cir. Sept. 6, 2012) (quoting Williams v. Bagley, 380
F.3d 932, 967 (6th Cir. 2004)); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). State prisoners in Michigan must
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raise each claim in the Michigan Court of Appeals and in the Michigan Supreme Court
before seeking federal habeas corpus relief. See Manning v. Alexander, 912 F.2d 878,
881 (6th Cir. 1990). The petitioner bears the burden of showing that state court remedies
have been exhausted. Prather, 822 F.2d at 1420, n.3.
In this case, Petitioner has not presented his claims through one complete round of
the State’s established appellate review process. Petitioner raised his habeas claims for
the first time in state court in his motion for relief from judgment. He did not seek leave
to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion for relief from judgment and the time for
doing so has now passed. See M.C.R. 6.509(A) (setting a 6-month time limit for filing an
application for leave to appeal the denial of a motion for relief from judgment). His
claims are, therefore, unexhausted. No state-court remedy is available to Petitioner in
state court because he already filed a motion for relief from judgment and may not file a
successive motion. See M.C.R. 6.502(G)(1) (“one and only one motion for relief from
judgment may be filed with regard to a conviction”). Where a habeas petitioner fails to
exhaust his claims in state court, but is barred from doing so “his petition should not be
dismissed for lack of exhaustion because there are simply no remedies available for him
to exhaust.” Hannah v. Conley, 49 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995). The claims are
procedurally exhausted, however, unless the petitioner shows cause to excuse his failure
to present the claims in state court and actual prejudice to his defense at trial or on appeal.
Id.
Here, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to excuse his
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default. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct review would not excuse his
failure to present these claims on collateral review in state court. Hannah, 49 F.3d at
1196; see also Guilmette v. Howes, 624 F.3d 286, 291-92 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is properly exhausted when it is raised
at the first opportunity to do so – in a post-conviction motion for collateral relief in state
court).
Thus, these claims are procedurally defaulted and barred from review unless
Petitioner can establish that a constitutional error resulted in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321, 115 S. Ct. 851, 863 (1995). The Supreme
Court explicitly has tied the miscarriage of justice exception to procedural default to a
petitioner’s innocence. Id. To make a showing of actual innocence, “a petitioner must
show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found the
petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 327. Petitioner fails to present new,
reliable evidence in light of which no reasonable juror would have found him guilty.
Therefore, the first three claims asserted by Petitioner, see supra, are procedurally barred.
Petitioner also is not entitled to habeas relief based on his final claim challenging
the trial court’s decision to permit the prosecutor to inquire about criminal charges a
potential defense witness faced. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected this claim,
reasoning:
The prosecutor could not have cross-examined Lee on the facts and
circumstances surrounding his pending case unless those facts and
circumstances were relevant. Logical relevance is the foundation for
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admissibility. People v. VanderVliet, 444 Mich. 52, 60-61; 508 NW2d 114
(1993). Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible, and irrelevant
evidence is not. MRE 402. “Relevant evidence” means “evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” MRE 401.
Here, the prosecutor wished to introduce evidence of the facts and
circumstances of Lee’s pending case to show that Lee was biased in favor
of defendants. “Bias is a common-law evidentiary term used ‘to describe
the relationship between a party and a witness . . . in favor of or against a
party. Bias may be induced by a witness’ like, dislike, or fear of a party, or
by the witness’ self-interest.’” People v. Layher, 464 Mich. 756, 762; 631
NW2d 281 (2001), quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52; 105 S Ct
465; 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984). “‘Proof of bias is almost always relevant
because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically
been entitled to assess all evidence that might bear on the accuracy and
truth of a witness’ testimony.’” Layher, supra at 763, quoting Abel, supra at
52.
Defendants do not dispute that evidence of bias is generally admissible, but
argue that the facts and circumstances of Lee’s pending case do not show
bias. As the prosecution argued and the trial court accepted, Lee’s pending
case was relevant to the issue of bias because of a possible deal between
defendants and Lee to support their respective claims of self-defense. While
no evidence of such a deal exists, “a defendant need not first demonstrate
that some sort of deal exists before impeaching the witness in this manner
as the cross-examination is a proper means to attempt to illicit the existence
of a possible interest.” People v. Hall, 174 Mich. App 686, 691; 436 NW2d
446 (1989). Nevertheless, while the prosecution was able to cross-examine
Lee regarding the existence of any such deal, the facts and circumstances of
Lee’s case are irrelevant to any deal and, to the extent that the trial court
would have allowed cross-examination into the facts of Lee’s case because
of a potential deal, it abused its discretion.
The trial court ruled, however, that the facts and circumstances of Lee’s
case were relevant to bias because the facts of Lee’s case and defendants’
case were so similar. The court’s reasoning is consistent with our Supreme
Court’s holding in Layher where the trial court and our Supreme Court
accepted the prosecution’s argument “that as a result of [the witness’] being
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accused and acquitted of a crime which he claims he did not do of a very
similar nature, . . . he is therefore biased in the Defendant’s favor and
presumably would color his testimony to help the Defendant, another
person who he may believe would also be wrongly accused of the same
crime.” Layher, supra at 764. We therefore conclude that evidence of the
facts and circumstances of Lee’s case are relevant to the issue of bias, and
thus admissible, because Lee’s own experience of being arrested and
charged with a crime he claims he did not commit, may have induced him
to slant his testimony in defendants’ favor.
Because the evidence of bias arising from the pending trial is relevant, it is
admissible so long as its probative value is not substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403. “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial
when there exists a danger that marginally probative evidence will be given
undue or preemptive weight by the jury.” People v. Crawford, 458 Mich.
376, 398; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). The trial court is in the best position to
gauge the effect of such testimony. VanderVliet, supra at 81. In this case,
while there is some danger that the jury might give undue weight to the fact
that Lee is accused of a similar crime, especially after hearing all the facts
and circumstance surrounding his case, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that the danger of undue prejudice was
not substantially outweighed by the probative value of the evidence. There
were numerous eyewitnesses to the shooting, both defendants gave
statements to the police, and the trial court was willing to give a limiting
instruction to the jury on the use of the evidence.
Greenhill, 2007 WL 1203547, at *1-2. The Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably
decided this claim.
Trial court errors in the application of state procedure or evidentiary law,
particularly regarding the admissibility of evidence, are generally not cognizable as
grounds for federal habeas relief. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68, 112 S. Ct.
475 (1991); Serra v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 4 F.3d 1348, 1354 (6th Cir. 1993). Only
when an evidentiary ruling is “so egregious that it results in a denial of fundamental
fairness,” may it violate due process and warrant habeas relief. See Bugh v. Mitchell, 329
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F.3d 496, 512 (6th Cir. 2003).
Although the Constitution does not explicitly provide a criminal defendant with
the right to “present a defense,” the Sixth Amendment provides a defendant with the right
to process to obtain witnesses in his favor and to confront the witnesses against him, and
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a defendant due process of law. Implicit in these
provisions is the right to present a meaningful defense. As the Supreme Court has
recognized, “[t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their
attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense.” Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (1967). “The right to compel a witness’
presence in the courtroom could not protect the integrity of the adversary process if it did
not embrace the right to have the witness’ testimony heard by the trier of fact. The right
to offer testimony is thus grounded in the Sixth Amendment . . ..” Taylor v. Illinois, 484
U.S. 400, 409, 108 S. Ct. 646, 653 (1988). Further, the Court has noted that “[t]his right
is a fundamental element of due process of law,” Washington, 388 U.S. at 19, 98 S. Ct. at
1923, and that “[f]ew rights are more fundamental[.]” Taylor, 484 U.S. at 408, 108 S. Ct.
at 652. Although the right to present a defense is fundamental, it is not absolute. Bazer
v. Parker, 371 F.3d 310, 323 (6th Cir. 2004). The right must yield to other constitutional
rights. See, e.g., United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1978)
(“The Sixth Amendment right of an accused to compulsory process to secure attendance
of a witness does not include the right to compel the witness to waive his Fifth
Amendment privilege.” The right may also be legitimately circumscribed by other
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legitimate demands of the criminal justice system. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S.
303, 308, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1264 (1998).
Petitioner sought to introduce Mr. Lee’s testimony to support his self-defense
claim. The trial court’s ruling allowing the admission of evidence concerning Mr. Lee’s
pending criminal charges did not prevent Petitioner from otherwise presenting his selfdefense claim to the jury. The state trial court allowed the testimony concerning Mr.
Lee’s pending criminal charges in accordance with Michigan evidentiary rules and the
court’s ruling did not violate clearly established Supreme Court precedent. As such,
Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief based on the trial court’s admission of this
evidence.
V.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal
habeas relief and the petition must be dismissed.
Before Petitioner may appeal this decision, a certificate of appealability must
issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(a); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A certificate of appealability
may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a court denies relief on the merits,
the substantial showing threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates that reasonable
jurists would find the court’s assessment of the constitutional claim debatable or wrong.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000). “A petitioner
satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues
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presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1034 (2003). When a court denies relief on
procedural grounds without addressing the merits, a certificate of appealability should
issue if it is shown that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petitioner
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Slack, 529
U.S. at 484-85, 120 S. Ct. at 1604.
The Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s ruling
debatable and that Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right. A certificate of appealability is not warranted.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s application for the writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
Dated:November 15, 2012
s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Wiley Greenhill, #145154
Gus Harrison Correctional Facility
2727 East Beecher St.
Adrian, MI 49221
AAG Andrea M. Christensen
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