Williams v. Berghuis

Filing 7

OPINION and ORDER Denying 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and Declining to Issue a Certificate of Appealability. Signed by District Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III. (CCoh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOHN HENRY WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,

Case No. 10-cv-10307

v.
HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
MARY BERGHUIS,
Respondent.
_______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS AND DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Petitioner John Henry Williams, confined at the Brooks Correctional Facility in
Muskegon, Michigan, seeks the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. Represented by counsel, Williams challenges his conviction for first-degree felony
murder, Mich Comp. Laws § 750.316(1)(b). For the reasons stated below, the Court will
deny the petition.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Williams was convicted of the above offense after a jury trial in the Wayne County
Circuit Court.1 He was tried jointly with co-defendant Corey Edward Frazier, who was
convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, felon in
possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
Williams’s conviction arises out of the shooting death of Gerald Gadie at his home in
Detroit, Michigan. The following evidence was produced at trial.
On the afternoon of May 27, 2006, an unidentified person called 911 from a
payphone to report a dead body at a home located at 19362 Hull Street in Detroit. Police

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Williams was acquitted of a separate charge of first-degree premeditated murder.

responded to investigate. Upon arrival, the police discovered that the doors to the home
were locked and the windows barred. Officers gained entry by using a fishnet to go
between the bars of an open window to fish the house keys off of a coffee table. Police
discovered the victim’s body in the basement lying face-up on the floor, with a single,
near-contact gunshot wound to his head. They searched the house and found $6,285.00
in cash and a bag of suspected Ecstasy pills in a box on the television stand in the living
room. Trial. Tr. day 1, 128-35, 179-81, 189-90, Nov. 13, 2006.
Kareemah Greer, the victim’s neighbor, called Williams, who sold drugs with the
victim, and informed him that Gadie was dead. Williams replied, “What; I’ll call you back”
and hung up. Fifteen to twenty minutes later, Williams and Frazier, who served as Gadie’s
bodyguard, drove to the scene and parked about two houses down from Gadie's home.
Frazier walked over to Greer, hugged her, and said, “It's going to be okay; we going to find
out who did this.” Neither Williams nor Frazier attended Gadie’s wake or funeral. Trial Tr.
day 2, 8-9, 31-37, Nov. 14, 2006. Greer testified that on June 4, 2006, Williams told her
that he participated in the armed robbery of Gadie, but insisted that Frazier shot and killed
Gadie. Id. at 41-42.
Around the time of the funeral, Williams telephoned Gadie’s cousin, Deville
Thedford. Richard Peeples, another one of Gadie’s cousins, overheard the conversation.
Williams told Peeples and Thedford that he went with Frazier to Gadie’s house, where
Gadie let them in because the two men owed Gadie money. Frazier and Gadie began to
fight. Williams told Thedford and Peeples that Frazier ordered Gadie to go to the basement
so Williams and Frazier could rob him. Williams told Peeples and Thedford that Frazier told
Gadie that they were only going to rob him, not kill him. Frazier told Williams to go through
the house while Frazier went into the basement with Gadie. While Williams was going up
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to the second floor of the house, he heard a gunshot. Williams told Peeples and Thedford
that he did not know that Frazier was going to kill Gadie and that he felt bad about it.
Williams said he called 911 from a payphone twice, once to inform the police that someone
was injured, and the second time to report the dead body. Williams said he was going to
turn himself in to the police. Id. at 116-22, 127, 170-78.
After the funeral, Gadie’s brother, Wayne Gadie, received a call from Frazier.
Frazier told Wayne Gadie that Williams killed his brother and that Frazier had nothing to
do with it. Frazier told Wayne Gadie that he went into the bathroom, heard a gunshot,
came out, and observed Williams holding a gun. Frazier said that he and Williams then
robbed the house, and Williams stole Gadie’s diamond Rolex watch. Trial Tr. day 3, 55-62,
Nov. 15, 2006.
Donnell Hornbuckle testified that after Gadie died, Williams called him to report that
Frazier killed the victim. Williams told him that Frazier ordered Gadie to the basement,
after which Williams heard a gunshot. Id. at 98-99.
On November 3, 2006, while awaiting trial, Williams and Frazier were detained in the
county jail along with Larry Oldham. Oldham heard Frazier tell Williams to get some
telephone records. Frazier then told Williams, “Bitch, I wish I would have went on let you
leave like I started to.” Frazier then advised Williams to testify in court that he left the
house before Gadie was killed, explaining, “If you go in here and say [Gadie] was
already—that you had already left, I will be able to handle this easier.” Trial Tr. day 2, 20511, Nov. 14, 2006.
After hearing the evidence, the jury found Williams guilty of first-degree felony
murder and acquitted him of first-degree premeditated murder.
Williams’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. People v. Frazier, Nos. 275083 &
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275589, 2008 WL 782593 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2008) (per curiam), and leave to appeal
to the Michigan Supreme Court was later denied. People v. Williams, 482 Mich. 1031
(2008).
Williams then filed the instant petition, seeking relief on the following grounds:
I. The State of Michigan unreasonably applied well-established federal law
and unreasonably determined the facts in concluding that the trial court did
not violate Mr. Williams’ right to confrontation of witnesses under the United
States Constitution when the trial court, over his objection, admitted an out
of court statement of a non-testifying codefendant.
II. The State of Michigan unreasonably applied well-established federal law
and unreasonably determined the facts in concluding that the trial court did
not violate Mr. Williams’ constitutional right to due process of law when it
denied his motion for a jury separate from his codefendant where statements
from his codefendant inculpated Mr. Williams and exculpated the
codefendant.
III. The State of Michigan unreasonably applied well-established federal law
and unreasonably determined the facts when it concluded that it was unlikely
that the outcome of the trial court would have been different where Mr.
Williams was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed
under the United States Constitution when his counsel failed to objection to
the admission of testimony that Mr. Williams was engaged with the decedent
in the business of selling drugs, failed to present evidence of telephone
records and failed to allow Mr. Williams the opportunity to testify in his own
defense.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) imposes the
following standard of review for habeas cases:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect
to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
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determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A decision of a state court is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state
court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question
of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set
of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An
“unreasonable application” occurs when “a state court decision unreasonably applies the
law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner’s case.” Id. at 409.
“[A] state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas
relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s
decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v.
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). A federal court’s task on habeas review is to
“determine what arguments or theories supported . . . the state court’s decision; and then
it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or
theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision” of the Supreme Court. Id.
Thus, in order to obtain relief in federal court, a state prisoner must show the state court’s
decision “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at
786-87.
DISCUSSION
Williams raises three claims in his petition: 1) the introduction of hearsay testimony
violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause; 2) failure to grant severance violated his
right to due process; 3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

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A. Confrontation Clause
Williams first contends that his right to confront the witnesses against him was
violated when the trial court admitted an out of court statement made by co-defendant
Frazier to Wayne Gadie accusing Williams of being the shooter. Williams contends that
the admission of this statement at the joint trial, where Frazier did not testify, was contrary
to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1968), in which the Supreme Court held
that a defendant is denied the constitutional right of confrontation where a non-testifying
co-defendant’s incriminating confession is admitted at a joint trial.
The Warden contends that this claim is procedurally defaulted because Williams
failed to preserve the claim at trial. Before trial, Williams’s attorney filed a “motion to quash
hearsay statement and for separate jury.” In the motion, counsel argued that Frazier’s
statement should be suppressed because it lacked adequate indicia of reliability and
because the statement was testimonial in nature. At oral argument on the motion,
however, counsel objected to the admission of Frazier’s statement only on hearsay
grounds, without raising a Confrontation Clause objection. Counsel failed to renew the
objection at trial when he learned that Frazier would not be testifying. The Michigan Court
of Appeals found that Williams failed to preserve the confrontation clause claim and
reviewed the challenge for plain error. Frazier, 2008 WL 782593, at *1, 3-4.
It is well established that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ application of plain-error
review constitutes the invocation of an independent and adequate procedural rule barring
federal review of the merits of the claim absent a showing of cause and prejudice to excuse
the procedural default. See Fleming v. Metrish, 556 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2009).
Williams did not argue cause and prejudice in his petition, nor did he file a reply brief
addressing the Warden’s argument that cause and prejudice did not exist to excuse the
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default. It was Williams’s burden to demonstrate cause and prejudice, Haliym v. Mitchell,
492 F.3d 680, 690 (6th Cir. 2007), and his failure to do so is fatal to his Confrontation
Clause claim.
But even if the claim were not defaulted, the Court would not grant relief, for the
claim lacks merit. The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that no error occurred
because Frazier’s statement to Wayne Gadie was not testimonial and that any error in the
admission of the statement was harmless in light of the additional incriminating evidence
against Williams. Frazier, 2008 WL 782593, at *4. The Court agrees.
Out of court statements that are testimonial in nature are barred by the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant
has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness, regardless of whether such
statements are deemed reliable by the court. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004). The Confrontation Clause is not implicated, however, when the hearsay at issue
is non-testimonial. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823-26 (2006). Testimonial
statements do not include remarks made to family members or acquaintances, business
records, or statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52,
56. As the Supreme Court stated in Crawford:
The text of the Confrontation Clause reflects this focus [on testimonial
hearsay]. It applies to “witnesses” against the accused-in other words, those
who “bear testimony.” 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English
Language (1828). “Testimony,” in turn, is typically “[a] solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” Ibid.
An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an
acquaintance does not.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (second alteration in original).
Moreover, “[b]ecause it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule,

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like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimonial statements.” United
States v. Johnson, 581 F. 3d 320, 326 (6th Cir. 2009).
Frazier’s statement to Wayne Gadie was not a testimonial statement covered by the
Confrontation Clause because it was a casual remark made to a friend or acquaintance,
not one made to law enforcement for the purpose of establishing a fact. See Desai v.
Booker, 538 F.3d 424, 427 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gibson, 409 F.3d 325, 338 (6th
Cir. 2005). “And the Confrontation Clause no longer applies to non-testimonial statements.”
Desai, 538 F.3d at 427 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 823-26). Thus, admission of Frazier’s outof-court statement to Wayne Gadie did not violate Williams’s right to confrontation.2 And
for the same reason, admission was not contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bruton, as amended by Crawford and Davis.
Moreover, any error in admitting Frazier’s statements was harmless.

A

Confrontation Clause error is subject to harmless error analysis. Delaware v. Van Arsdall,
475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). On habeas review, a federal court can grant habeas relief only
if the trial error had “‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s
verdict.’” Ford v. Curtis, 277 F.3d 806, 809 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). Under this standard, a petitioner is not entitled to relief unless
he can establish that the trial error resulted in “actual prejudice.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Stanford v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442, 456 (6th Cir. 2001) (articulating
same standard of review for Bruton violation on collateral review).

2

“An erroneous

Williams appears only to claim that the admission of Frazier’s statement to Wayne
Gadie violated his right to confrontation. To the extent Williams contends that Frazier’s
statements to Williams overheard by Oldham should have been suppressed, he has failed
to show a violation of his right to confrontation because statements between inmates in a
prison or jail cell are non-testimonial. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 825.
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admission of a non-testifying co-defendant's confession can constitute harmless error
where the defendant claiming a Bruton violation confessed to full participation in the
crimes.” Stanford, 266 F.3d at 456.
Greer, Thedford, and Peeples all testified that Williams told them that he and Frazier
agreed to rob the victim, during which time Frazier shot the victim. Williams also told
Hornbuckle that he was in the victim’s house with Frazier and heard a gunshot while
Frazier and the victim were in the basement.
Williams’s own statements to the witnesses were enough to convict him of firstdegree felony murder on a theory of aiding and abetting. In Michigan, the elements of
first-degree felony murder are:
(1) the killing of a human being, (2) with the intent to kill, to do great bodily
harm, or to create a very high risk of death or great bodily harm with
knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the probable result [i.e.,
malice], (3) while committing, attempting to commit, or assisting in the
commission of any of the felonies specifically enumerated in [the statute
including armed robbery]. one of the felonies enumerated in the felony
murder statute.
People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 759 (1999) (citation omitted) (alterations in original). A
jury can infer malice from evidence that a defendant set in motion a force likely to cause
death or great bodily harm. Id. at 759. Malice may also be inferred from the use of a
deadly weapon. Id.
To support a finding under Michigan law that a defendant aided and abetted in the
commission of a crime, the prosecutor must show that:
(1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person,
(2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the
commission of the crime, and (3) the defendant intended the commission of
the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the
time he gave aid and encouragement.
Id. at 757-58.
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Courts have held that a defendant’s participation in an armed robbery where he or
a co-defendant is armed with a loaded firearm can demonstrate a reckless disregard that
death or serious bodily injury could occur so as to support a conviction for felony-murder
on an aiding and abetting theory. See, e.g., Meade v. Lavigne, 265 F. Supp. 2d 849, 85859 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Harris v. Stovall, 22 F. Supp. 2d 659, 667 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Carines,
460 Mich. at 760-61; People v. Turner, 213 Mich. App. 558, 572-73 (1995), overruled in
part on other grounds by People v. Mass, 464 Mich. 615 (2001); People v. Hart, 161 Mich.
App. 630, 635 (1987); see also Hill v. Hofbauer, 337 F.3d 706, 719-20 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding that malice for second-degree murder can be inferred from aider and abettor’s
knowledge that principal possessed a weapon); Redmond v. Jackson, 295 F. Supp. 2d 767,
774 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (holding that petitioner was not entitled to tolling due to claim of
actual innocence where petitioner provided firearm to be used in armed robbery and
thereby demonstrated a wanton and willful disregard of the fact that a person could be
killed or suffer great bodily harm during the course of the robbery).
Because Williams admitted to several persons that he assisted in the armed robbery
of the victim, there was sufficient evidence to convict him of first-degree felony murder,
even if Frazier’s statement to Wayne Gadie were excluded. The Court cannot say that the
statement had a substantial and injurious effect or influence upon the jury’s verdict.
Therefore, even assuming an unreasonable Confrontation Clause error, the error was
harmless. Williams is not entitled to relief on this claim.
B. Severance
Williams next contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for a
separate trial or for separate juries.
The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected this claim on the merits:
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The trial court’s finding that there was insufficient evidence of mutually
exclusive defenses to support granting Williams’ motion for either a separate
trial or a separate jury was not an abuse of discretion. At trial, both Williams
and Frazier presented similar defenses that the witnesses who recounted
Williams’s and Frazier’s previous out of court statements were not credible.
Additionally, neither defendant testified at trial, and Frazier’s out of court
statement to Gadie’s brother did not incriminate Williams without also
incriminating himself. Whereas Frazier’s statement to Gadie’s brother
created the inference that Williams killed Gadie, Frazier admitted in this same
statement that he “robbed” Gadie’s house with Williams after Gadie was shot.
So, defendants’ defenses were not antagonistic, mutually exclusive, or
irreconcilable. Thus, Williams has failed to show that he was entitled to a
separate trial or separate jury.
Frazier, 2008 WL 782593, at *7.
A criminal defendant is not entitled to a separate trial merely because he or she
might have had a better chance for acquittal in a separate trial. Zafiro v. United States, 506
U.S. 534, 540 (1993). Nor does a criminal defendant have a right to a separate trial
because the defendant and the co-defendant present antagonistic defenses, absent some
evidence that alleged antagonistic defenses misled or confused the jury. Stanford, 266
F.3d at 458.
A petitioner seeking habeas relief on the ground that the state trial court’s failure to
sever his trial from co-defendant’s trial bears a very heavy burden. Id. at 459. He must
overcome the presumption that joinder of defendants for trial was the correct course. See
Foster v. Withrow, 159 F. Supp. 2d 629, 641 (E.D. Mich. 2001). A court should grant
severance “only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial
right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about
guilt or innocence.” Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539. A potential for a Bruton violation may require
severance. See id. at 539.
To the extent that Williams’s severance claim is based upon the admission of
Frazier’s statements at their joint trial, he is not entitled to relief because he has not shown
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that the admission of these statements was erroneous. See, e.g., United States v.
Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1275 (6th Cir. 1982).
More importantly, Williams has failed to show that there were mutually antagonistic
defenses between he and Frazier to justify separate trials. The fact that a defendant seeks
to lay blame upon the other defendant or defendants is not reason enough for a severance
without a showing that “the jury is unable to treat evidence applicable to each defendant
distinctively.” United States v. Smith, 197 F.3d 225, 230 (6th Cir. 1999). Antagonistic
defenses occur “when one person’s claim of innocence is predicated solely on the guilt of
a co-defendant.” United States v. Harris, 9 F.3d 493, 501 (6th Cir. 1993).
Here, Williams and Frazier presented similar defenses, i.e., that the witnesses
against them were not credible and that there was no physical evidence to corroborate their
testimony. See Trial Tr. day 1, 120-21, 122-23; Trial Tr. day 3, 174-193; 194-199. There
is no indication in the record that Frazier’s attorney ever pointed the finger at Williams. In
fact, Frazier’s attorney challenged the credibility of Wayne Gadie’s testimony in his closing
argument. Trial Tr. day 3, 196. Because Williams’s and Frazier’s defenses were not
mutually antagonistic or irreconcilable, Williams is not entitled to habeas relief on the
severance claim.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Finally, Williams contends he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.
To demonstrate the ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy two
prongs. First, the defendant must demonstrate that, considering all of the circumstances,
counsel’s performance was so deficient that the attorney was not functioning as the
“counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984). The defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s behavior
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lies within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, for the challenged action
might have been sound trial strategy. Id. at 687, 689. Second, the defendant must show
that the performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 689. To demonstrate prejudice, the
defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
The Supreme Court’s holding in Strickland places the burden on the defendant who raises
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to show a reasonable probability that the result
of the proceeding would have been different, but for counsel’s allegedly deficient
performance. See Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383, 390-91 (2009).
On habeas review, “the question ‘is not whether a federal court believes the state
court’s determination’ under the Strickland standard ‘was incorrect but whether that
determination was unreasonable — a substantially higher threshold.’” Knowles v.
Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473
(2007)). “The pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the Strickland
standard was unreasonable. This is different from asking whether defense counsel’s
performance fell below Strickland’s standard.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785. Indeed,
“because the Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has even more
latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard.” Knowles,
129 S. Ct. at 1420. A “doubly deferential judicial review” applies to a Strickland claim
brought by a habeas petitioner. Id. This means that on habeas review of a state court
conviction, “a state court must be granted a deference and latitude that are not in operation
when the case involves review under the Strickland standard itself.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct.
at 785.
Williams argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to present his telephone
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records, which would have shown that Greer did not call Williams, thus impeaching her
testimony that he called her.
The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected this claim, concluding that counsel’s failure
to present the telephone records would not have changed the outcome of the trial since
Peeples, Thedford, and Hornbuckle all testified that Williams provided them information that
linked himself to the shooting, and because Peeples’s and Thedford’s rendition of the
information Williams provided in the phone call was “nearly identical in every material
aspect to Greer’s rendition of her phone call to Williams.” Frazier, 2008 WL 782593, at *8.
This was not an unreasonable application of Strickland.
Williams next alleges that counsel was ineffective because he did not allow Williams
to testify at trial. Rejecting this claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that Williams had
waived his right to testify at trial. Id. Review of the trial transcript confirms that Williams
voluntarily waived his right to testify before the trial court after agreeing that counsel had
explained to him the benefits and drawbacks of testifying. Trial Tr. day 3, 143.
When a tactical decision is made by an attorney that a defendant should not testify,
the defendant’s assent is presumed. Gonzales v. Elo, 233 F. 3d 348, 357 (6th Cir. 2000).
On habeas review there is “a strong presumption that trial counsel adhered to the
requirements of professional conduct and left the final decision about whether to testify with
the client.” Hodge v. Haeberlin, 579 F.3d 627, 639 (6th Cir. 2009). Overcoming the
presumption, requires the petitioner to present record evidence that he “somehow alerted
the trial court to his desire to testify.” Id. Because the record lacks any indication that
Williams disagreed with counsel’s advice that he should not testify, he has not overcome
the presumption.
Williams has also failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s advice
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concerning whether he should testify. Williams merely states that he would have testified
that he had nothing to do with the crime, but does not provide details of any proposed
testimony. This does not establish prejudice. See Hodge, 579 F.3d at 641 (holding that
defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice where defendant did not provide details about
his proposed testimony and merely speculated that his testimony would have had impact
on jury’s view of witnesses’ credibility and of his involvement in murders).
Williams claims finally that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to testimony that
Williams and the victim were involved in drug dealing because the evidence was
inadmissible under Michigan Rule of Evidence 404(b). The Michigan Court of Appeals
rejected this claim, finding no violation of Rule 404(b) because the testimony was relevant
to Williams’s motive, made his confessions to Greer, Peeples, and Thedford more
accurate, and was not unduly prejudicial. Given that the evidence was admissible, the
court of appeals found counsel’s decision not to object to its admission was sound trial
strategy. Frazier, 2008 WL 782593, at *9.
Federal habeas courts “‘must defer to a state court’s interpretation of its own rules
of evidence and procedure’ when assessing a habeas petition.” Miskel v. Karnes, 397 F.3d
446, 453 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Allen v. Morris, 845 F.2d 610, 614 (6th Cir. 1988)).
Accordingly, the Court defers to the Michigan Court of Appeals’ determination that the
evidence was admissible. See, e.g., Brooks v. Anderson, 292 F. App’x 431, 437-38 (6th
Cir. 2008); Adams v. Smith, 280 F. Supp. 2d 704, 721 (E.D. Mich. 2003); see also Karnes,
397 F.3d at 453 (deferring to state court ruling on evidentiary issue in context of
Confrontation Clause claim). Because the evidence was admissible under Michigan law,
it was reasonable for the Michigan Court of Appeals to conclude that counsel was not
ineffective for failing to challenging its admissibility.
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D. Certificate of Appealability
Before a petitioner may appeal a judgment denying habeas relief, he must obtain
a certificate of appealability from the district or circuit court. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(a); Fed.
R. App. P. 22(b). When denying relief, the district court must issue or deny a certificate of
appealability. Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. A
certificate may issue if the petitioner has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). He does so by demonstrating that “reasonable
jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.’” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).
Upon review, and for the reasons stated in the order above, the Court finds that
Williams has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right with
respect to his claims. Specifically, the Court finds that reasonable jurists could not debate
the correctness of the Court’s resolution of Williams’s claims.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of
appealability on any issue.
SO ORDERED.
s/Stephen J. Murphy, III
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
United States District Judge
Dated: May 6, 2011
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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or
counsel of record on May 6, 2011, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
Carol Cohron
Case Manager

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