Hatchett v. Woods

Filing 18

OPINION and ORDER Denying Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Court declines to issue a Certificate of Appealability but grants an Application for Leave to Proceed on Appeal In Forma Pauperis. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CHem)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DARRIN HATCHETT,
Petitioner,
v.

Civil Action No. 2:10-cv-10817
Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds

JEFFREY WOODS,
Respondent,
_________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY BUT GRANTING PERMISSION FOR AN APPLICATION FOR
LEAVE TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
I. INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Darrin Hatchett’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See ECF No. 1. Hatchett is a state prisoner
incarcerated by the Michigan Department of Corrections, currently housed at the Lakeland
Correctional Facility in Coldwater, Michigan, where he is serving a life sentence, with the
possibility of parole, for a second-degree murder conviction. His conviction occurred on
September 29, 1987, following a bench trial in what was then Recorder’s Court in Detroit,
Michigan. He was sentenced on October 9, 1987. Hatchett also was convicted of felony
firearm for which he served a two-year prison term. He was fifteen years old at the time
of the murder.
In his Habeas Petition, filed pro se, Hatchett raises one claim concerning the
effectiveness of his appellate counsel and three claims concerning the waiver of jurisdiction
in the probate court. The Court finds that Hatchett’s first claim lacks merit and his

remaining three claims are state-law claims that are noncognizable in this habeas
proceeding. Thus, the Court will deny his Petition. The Court also will decline to issue him
a Certificate of Appealability but will grant him permission for an Application for Leave to
Proceed on Appeal In Forma Pauperis, should he decide to appeal the Court’s decision.
II. BACKGROUND
The Court adopts the following summary of the relevant facts set forth in its prior
Opinion and Order granting Hatchett habeas relief on October 7, 2005. Hatchett v.
Kapture, No. 00-CV-74340-DT, 2005 WL 2491454 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 7, 2005).
Petitioner was charged at the age of fifteen with first-degree murder
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony
firearm). The charges arose from allegations that Petitioner shot and killed
another fifteen-year-old boy, Rodney McRae, on December 29, 1986, in
Detroit, Michigan.
In 1987, the juvenile division of the Wayne County Probate Court held
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the court should waive
jurisdiction so that Petitioner could be tried as an adult in Recorder’s Court
for the City of Detroit. At the conclusion of the hearing, the probate court
waived jurisdiction and transferred Petitioner’s case to Detroit Recorder’s
Court for trial as an adult.
Petitioner’s family retained attorney Charles Campbell to represent
Petitioner after the waiver hearing. Campbell was expected to appeal the
probate court’s decision and to represent Petitioner on the criminal charges
in Recorder's Court.
At the preliminary examination in state district court, Campbell initially
moved to adjourn the hearing, in part, because the probate court had waived
jurisdiction. Campbell said, “We have to study all of that and consider our
options there and here . . . .” The prosecutor, however, objected to an
adjournment, and Campbell agreed to proceed with the preliminary
examination.
Campbell never appealed the probate court’s decision to waive
jurisdiction, and Petitioner was bound over to Recorder’s Court where he was
represented by another attorney, Rene Cooper. Following a bench trial on
September 29, 1987, the trial court found Petitioner guilty of second-degree
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murder, [], and felony firearm, []. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to two
years in prison for the felony[-]firearm conviction and to life imprisonment,
with the possibility of parole, for the murder conviction.
Hatchett, 2005 WL 2491454, at *1 (footnote and citations omitted).
Following his convictions and sentences, Hatchett filed a direct appeal with the
Michigan Court of Appeals, raising claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence and
his sentence for second-degree murder. On March 10, 1989, the Court of Appeals affirmed
his convictions and sentences. People v. Hatchett, No. 104510 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 10,
1989). The Michigan Supreme Court denied his Application for Leave to Appeal on
November 29, 1989. People v. Hatchett, No. 85743 (Mich. Sup. Ct. Nov. 29, 1989).
In 1997, Hatchett filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment with the state trial court,
raising claims concerning the effectiveness of his trial counsel. The trial court denied the
Motion on November 20, 1997. People v. Hatchett, No. 87-2645 (Wayne Cnty. 3rd Judicial
Cir. Ct. Nov. 20, 1997). Both state appellate courts denied his Applications for Leave to
Appeal. People v. Hatchett, No. 209790 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 1999); People v. Hatchett,
461 Mich. 877, 602 N.W.2d 580 (1999) (Table).
Then, on September 29, 2000, Hatchett filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
in this district court. The case was assigned to the undersigned. In that Habeas Petition,
he raised two grounds for relief: whether he was entitled to a new trial because he received
ineffective assistance of counsel from three different attorneys; whether his due process
rights were violated when the trial judge failed to strike the inaccurate information from the
presentence report; and whether there was error in waiving jurisdiction from the juvenile
division. Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that the statute
of limitations barred habeas review but the Court denied the Motion. Respondent then filed
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an Answer to the Petition, arguing that Hatchett had procedurally defaulted his claims. The
Court rejected that argument, dismissed claims two and three, but addressed Hatchett’s
claims with respect to the effectiveness of counsel involving attorneys Charles Campbell
and Roman Karwowski. The Court held oral arguments on those claims and subsequently
denied Hatchett habeas relief. Hatchett v. Kapture, No. 00-CV-74340-DT (E.D. Mich. Mar.
6, 2003).
Hatchett then appealed the Court’s decision to the Untied States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the Court’s decision denying habeas relief. Hatchett
v. Kapture, 109 F. App’x 34 (6th Cir. 2004). Respondent filed a Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which was denied. Metrish v. Hatchett,
544 U.S. 1032 (2005).
On remand from the Sixth Circuit, this Court concluded that Hatchett was entitled
to habeas relief:
Charles Campbell’s failure to appeal the probate court’s decision
amounted to deficient performance, and the deficient performance prejudiced
Petitioner. Roman Karwowski was ineffective for not asserting on appeal that
Campbell had been ineffective.
The state courts’ denial of relief resulted in decisions that were
contrary to federal law. The State is ordered to release Petitioner unless,
within ninety days, it provides Petitioner with an appeal of right from the
probate court’s decision waiving jurisdiction.
Hatchett, 2005 WL 2491454, at *5.
The State complied with the Court’s order on remand and provided Hatchett with an
appeal of right from the probate court’s decision waiving jurisdiction.
In August 2006, Hatchett filed an appeal with the Wayne County Circuit Court
alleging that the probate court’s decision waiving jurisdiction was in error and contrary to
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MCR 5.911. The trial court affirmed the juvenile waiver. People v. Hatchett, No. 87002645-01 (Wayne Cnty. 3rd Judicial Cir. Ct. Dec. 11, 2006).
Hatchett then filed a Delayed Application for Leave to Appeal that decision with the
Michigan Court of Appeals, raising six claims concerning jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
denied his Delayed Application “for lack of merit in the grounds presented.” People v.
Hatchett, No. 282205 (Mich. Ct. App. July 3, 2008). The Michigan Supreme Court also
denied his Application for Leave to Appeal, “because [it was] not persuaded that the
questions presented should be reviewed by [the] Court.” People v. Hatchett, 483 Mich.
893, 760 N.W.2d 487 (2009) (Table).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996), which govern Hatchett’s
case, “circumscribe[d]” the standard of review federal courts must apply when considering
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus raising constitutional claims, including claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003). As
amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) permits a federal court to issue the writ only if the statecourt decision on a federal issue “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” or “was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1)-(2); Parker v. Matthews, --- U.S. ---, ---,
132 S.Ct. 2148, 2151 (2012). Under that review standard, mere error by the state court
does not justify issuance of the writ; rather, the state court’s application of federal law “must
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have been objectively unreasonable.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (quoting Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000) (internal quotes omitted)). Additionally, this Court must
presume the correctness of state-court, factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (“In
a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a
State court shall be presumed to be correct.”); see also West v. Seabold, 73 F.3d 81, 84
(6th Cir. 1996) (stating that “[t]he court gives complete deference to state[-]court findings
of historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous”).
The Supreme Court has explained the proper application of the “contrary to” clause
as follows:
A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to [the Supreme Court’s]
clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts
the governing law set forth in our cases . . . .
A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court’s clearly established
precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially
indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a
result different from [the Court’s] precedent.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06.
The Supreme Court has held that a federal court should analyze a claim for habeas
relief under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1) “when a state-court
decision unreasonably applies the law of this Court to the facts of a prisoner’s case.”
Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. The Supreme Court has explained that an unreasonable
application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law; “a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal
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principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to
the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.
The Supreme Court has continued to emphasize the limited nature of this Court’s
review of habeas-corpus petitions. In its unanimous decision in Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. ---, 131 S.Ct. 770 (2011), the Supreme Court reiterated that the AEDPA requires
federal courts to review state-court decisions with “deference and latitude,” and “[a] state
court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal[-]habeas relief so long as
‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Id., 562
U.S. at ---, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).
The Sixth Circuit observed recently that “[t]his is a very high standard, which the [Supreme]
Court freely acknowledges.” Peak v. Webb, 673 F.3d 465, 472 (6th Cir. 2012). The Peak
Court suggested that Harrington holds that the review standard “is even more constricted
than AEDPA’s plain language already suggests.” Ibid.
The distinction between mere error and an objectively unreasonable application of
Supreme Court precedent creates a “substantially higher threshold for obtaining relief than
de novo review.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. ---, ---, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010) (the “AEDPA
thus imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, [], and
demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). The Supreme Court also has held that habeas review is
“limited to the record that was before the state court.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. ---, --,131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).
With those standards in mind, the Court proceeds to address Hatchett’s claims.
B. Ineffective-Assistance-of-Appellate-Counsel Claim
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In his first habeas claim, Hatchett alleges that his most recent appellate attorney,
Robert Giles, was ineffective for failing to investigate the facts surrounding the waiver of
jurisdiction in the probate court and for failing to raise the issues on appeal. Hatchett raised
this claim in his 2007 Delayed Application to the Michigan Court of Appeals, but the Court
of Appeals rejected the Delayed Application “for lack of merit in the grounds presented.”
Hatchett, No. 282205.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to the effective assistance
of counsel on direct appeal. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). In order to
establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a petitioner must satisfy the Strickland
v. Washington standard. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the United
States Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged test for determining whether a habeas
petitioner has received the ineffective assistance of counsel. First, a petitioner must prove
that counsel’s performance was deficient. That requires a showing that counsel made
errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. Id. Second, the petitioner must establish that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. Id.
However, it is well-established that a criminal defendant does not have a
constitutional right to have his or her appellate counsel raise every non-frivolous issue on
appeal. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). In Jones, the Supreme Court
stated that, “[f]or judges to second-guess reasonable professional judgments and impose
on appointed counsel a duty to raise every ‘colorable’ claim suggested by a client would
disserve the [] goal of vigorous and effective advocacy.” Id. at 754.
Strategic and tactical choices regarding which issues to pursue on appeal are
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“properly left to the sound professional judgment of counsel.” United States v. Perry, 908
F.2d 56, 59-60 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 751). “[T]he hallmark of effective
appellate advocacy” is the “process of ‘winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and
focusing on’ those more likely to prevail.” Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986)
(quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 751-52). “‘Generally, only when ignored issues are clearly
stronger than those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of appellate
counsel be overcome.’” Monzo v. Edwards, 281 F.3d 568, 579 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation
omitted). Appellate counsel may deliver deficient performance and prejudice a defendant
by omitting a “dead-bang winner,” defined as an issue which was obvious from the trial
record and would have resulted in reversal on appeal. Meade v. Lavigne, 265 F. Supp. 2d
849, 870 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, appellate counsel cannot be
found to be ineffective for failing to raise an issue that lacks merit. Greer v. Mitchell, 264
F.3d 663, 676 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Shaneberger v. Jones, 615 F.3d 448, 452 (6th Cir.
2010) (same).
When this Court granted Hatchett habeas relief in 2005, it found two Strickland
violations. First, the Court found that attorney Charles Campbell was ineffective for failing
to appeal the probate court’s decision to the circuit court. Second, the Court also found
that appellate attorney Roman Karwowski was ineffective for failing to allege on appeal that
Campbell was ineffective. As relief, the Court ordered that the State afford Hatchett his
appeal of right from the probate court’s decision waiving jurisdiction; an appeal that he was
not able to pursue because of Campbell’s deficient and prejudicial performance.
The State complied with the Court’s order and Robert Giles was appointed as
appellate counsel for Hatchett. Giles filed an appeal on Hatchett’s behalf with the Wayne
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County Circuit Court, raising a claim with respect to the Order of the juvenile court granting
waiver of jurisdiction to the Circuit Court.
The Court finds that it was a tactical decision on the part of attorney Giles to raise
the argument that he did; he made a reasonable choice to present the claim that he
believed had the best chance of succeeding. The claims that Hatchett maintains that
attorney Giles should have presented have no merit. See section C, infra. Additionally, the
Court resolved Hatchett’s claims with respect to his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
claims in his prior habeas action and those claims are no longer at issue.
Thus, the Court concludes that Hatchett’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel
claim must fail. Pursuant to the Strickland standard, Giles’s performance was neither
unreasonable under the circumstances nor prejudicial in an outcome determinative manner.
Habeas relief is not warranted with respect to this claim.
C. Waiver-of-Jurisdiction Claims
In his second, third, and fourth habeas claims, Hatchett alleges that the Wayne
County Circuit Court’s decision, affirming the probate court’s decision to waive jurisdiction
and transfer the case to the now-defunct Recorder’s Court in Detroit, Michigan, was in
error. The Court finds that these claims are noncognizable on habeas review because they
are state-law claims.

Section 2254(a) provides that the federal courts are authorized to entertain petitions
for writs of habeas corpus by a state prisoner only on the ground that the prisoner is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §2254(a);
see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (a federal habeas court is limited to
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deciding whether a conviction violated federal law); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780
(1990) (“federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.”); Strunk v. Martin,
27 F. App’x 473, 475, 2001 WL 1450740, at *2 (6th Cir. 2001) (determination of whether
a state court is vested with jurisdiction under state law is a function of the state courts, not
the federal judiciary) (citations omitted).
Hatchett’s argument, with respect to these claims, relies on various Michigan
statutes, court rules, and case law. His argument fails because he cannot obtain any
habeas relief under section 2254 based on claims of violations of Michigan law. Rather,
Hatchett’s claims for habeas relief under section 2254 must be predicated solely upon
federal law, not Michigan law. Thus, the Court concludes that Hatchett has failed to state
a claim upon which federal-habeas relief may be granted.
D. Certificate of Appealability
The Court declines to issue a Certificate of Appealability (COA) to Hatchett. A court
may issue a COA “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a federal district court rejects a habeas
claim on the merits, the substantial showing threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates
that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claim
debatable or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). “A petitioner
satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues
presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). In applying this standard, a district court may not
conduct a full merits review, but must limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the
underlying merit of the petitioner’s claims. Id. at 336-37. When a federal district court
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denies a habeas claim on procedural grounds without addressing the merits, a COA should
issue if it is shown that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petitioner states
a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. See Slack, 529
U.S. at 484-85.
The Court concludes that jurists of reason would not find its rulings debatable or
wrong. The Court thus declines to issue Hatchett a COA. However, should he wish to
appeal this Court’s rulings, he may proceed in forma pauperis on appeal because he was
granted in forma pauperis status in this Court. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Petitioner Hatchett is not entitled
to federal-habeas relief on the claims presented in his Habeas Petition.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” is
DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. Pet’r’s Pet. For Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 1.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court declines to issue Hatchett a Certificate
of Appealability and but grants him permission for an Application for Leave to Proceed on
Appeal In Forma Pauperis, if he so chooses to appeal the Court’s decision.

s/Nancy G. Edmunds
Nancy G. Edmunds
United States District Judge
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Dated: November 30, 2012
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record
on November 30, 2012, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Carol A. Hemeyer
Case Manager

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