Markel American Insurance Company v. Olsen

Filing 47

ORDER denying 26 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; denying 30 Motion to Strike; denying 31 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Lawrence P. Zatkoff. (MVer)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MARKEL AMERICAN
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,
Case No. 10-11667
Hon. Lawrence P. Zatkoff

v.
LORN H. OLSEN,
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff.
/

OPINION AND ORDER
AT A SESSION of said Court, held in the United States Courthouse,
in the City of Port Huron, State of Michigan, on March 29, 2012
PRESENT: THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
In this lawsuit, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Markel American Insurance Company
(“Plaintiff”) filed a declaratory judgment action in relation to an insurance policy it issued on a yacht
owned by Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff Lorn H. Olsen (“Defendant”). In turn, Defendant filed a
counter-complaint to recover under the policy. Currently before the Court are three motions, each
of which has been fully briefed:
1.

Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket #26);

2.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Affidavit of Defendant Lorn H. Olsen (Docket #30); and

3.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket #31).

The Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the parties’ papers
such that the decision process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Therefore,

pursuant to E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2), it is hereby ORDERED that the motions be resolved on the
briefs submitted. For the following reasons, all three motions are DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Sinking of the Camelot
Defendant was the owner of a 1982, 56-foot yacht (“Camelot”) that he purchased in March

2006. As of August 2007, the Camelot was insured under a Helmsman Yacht Policy of Insurance,
#YH5069549-62 (the “Policy”), issued by Plaintiff. For purposes of this lawsuit, the Policy,
commonly referred to as a time hull coverage policy, was in effect from August 30, 2009 to August
30, 2010.
On or about October 24, 2009, Defendant and several passengers departed Hayes, Virginia,
onboard the Camelot to travel to Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. They arrived and moored the vessel on
November 3, 2009. According to Defendant, during that trip, the Camelot experienced no
mechanical or equipment failures, no leaking, and no taking on of water other than that routinely
expected of all water-bound vessels. During this journey, Defendant states that he performed the
normal, routine and regular inspections that he would on any journey, including inspections of the
bilge areas in the mechanical room where the raw water intake hose was located.
On November 4, 2009, Defendant left the Camelot docked in Florida. On November 7,
2009, Defendant received a telephone call advising him that the Camelot had begun taking on water
late in the evening on November 6, 2009, and that by early morning November 7, 2009, the Camelot
was completely submerged at its dock. The parties agree that the vessel sank in calm waters while
tied to the dock.

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B.

Defendant’s Claim on the Loss
Defendant submitted a claim to Plaintiff for the loss of the Camelot in November 2009.

Once it received the claim, Plaintiff retained a marine surveyor, Randal S. Roden (“Roden”), to
investigate the cause of the sinking. Roden stated that the Camelot sank due to the ingress of water
through a failed raw water intake hose that: (a) was soft and pliable, and (b) showed evidence of
wear and tear and deterioration. Roden concluded that the raw water intake hose of the main engine
was approximately 90% severed. Plaintiff then hired Robert Taylor (“Taylor”), a licensed
professional engineer with expertise in naval architecture, marine and mechanical engineering, and
failure analysis, to examine the raw water intake hose. Taylor opined that there had been a large
change in hardness values of the hose (an indication of age and deterioration) and corrosion from
chloride exposure, with the deterioration accelerated at the region of failure. Taylor concluded that
“the hose failed due to long-term degradation, wear and tear, and corrosion.”
In a letter dated December 1, 2009, Plaintiff denied Defendant’s claim based on language
in the Policy that excludes loss or damage caused by “[w]ear and tear, gradual deterioration . . .”
and/or “[f]ailure to maintain the insured yacht (including its machinery and equipment) in good
condition[.]” The letter stated, in part:
The hose failed over time due to wear and tear and/or gradual
deterioration. The condition of the hose is suggestive that it was
original to the vessel and had not been replaced. The vessel sank in
calm waters at the dock.
Due to the above stated policy provisions, we cannot provide
coverage for your claim as presented. . . .
Defendant states that the Camelot sank because a raw water intake hose had burst, thereby
allowing water to flood the engine compartment. Defendant’s position regarding the cause of

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sinking is that: (1) the Camelot’s bilge pump system properly engaged at that time in an effort to
remove the water that was entering the engine compartment through the failed raw water intake
hose, (2) this system continued to operate properly to keep the Camelot afloat until such time as the
batteries that powered the bilge pumps were depleted, thus (3) resulting in the sinking of the vessel.
C.

The Policy
The Policy includes the following provision regarding “PROPERTY COVERAGE”:
I. Coverage
a. Hull Coverage (Including Tenders)
i. Coverage
We shall pay for sudden accidental direct physical loss or damage to the
insured yacht unless:
1) the property is described under Property Not Covered in item ii.; or
2) the cause of loss is described under Exclusions in item iii.
ii. Property Not Covered
Under Hull Coverage, we shall not pay for loss or damage to dock boxes,
moorings, cradles, trailers, wearing apparel, cameras, fishing equipment,
diving equipment, fuel, provisions, portable radios and other portable audio
equipment, portable cellular telephones, water skis and other sporting
equipment, or personal watercraft such as jet skis or wave runners.
This provision does not apply to marine electronics.
iii. Exclusions - The following apply in addition to the GENERAL
EXCLUSIONS:
We shall not pay for loss, damage or expense caused by or resulting from:
1) wear and tear, gradual deterioration, electrolysis, corrosion, rust, mold,
rot, marring, denting, scratching, weathering, osmosis or blistering of
fiberglass, resin or gelcoat or willful misconduct of an insured;

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2) failure to maintain the insured yacht (including its machinery and
equipment) in good condition so that the insured yacht can be damaged by
ordinary weather or water conditions or the rigors of normal use; [or]
3) manufacturer’s defects or design defects.
However, if the loss or damage has not resulted from the negligence of any
insured, this exclusion does not apply to loss, damage or expense directly
caused by explosion, bursting of boilers, breakage of shafts or any latent
defect in the hull or machinery (excluding the cost and expenses of replacing
or repairing the defective part).
Defendant had an Actual Cash Value (“ACV”) Endorsement on the Policy. The ACV
Endorsement modified the “PROPERTY COVERAGE” section as follows:
PROPERTY COVERAGE is amended as follows:
1. Coverage, a. Hull Coverage (Including Tenders), Item i. Coverage is deleted
in its entirety and replaced with the following:
i. Coverage
We shall pay for sudden accidental direct physical loss or damage to the
insured yacht unless:
1) the property is described under Property Not Covered in Item ii;
2) the cause of the loss is described under Exclusions in item iii; or
3) the insured yacht is over 25 years of age, in which case, coverage for
underwater machinery (running gear of any kind), engine(s), transmission(s),
generators, and any attached equipment to these components must be caused
by or resulting from the Named Perils listed below.
The Named Perils are:
a) collision;
b) lightning;
c) sinking;
d) fire; [and]
e) theft.
Age, as used in this provision, is calculated by subtracting the model year
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from the calendar year, and adding one (1) to the result.

III. LEGAL STANDARD
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“[T]he plain language
of Rule 56[] mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”). A party must support its assertions by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits
or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the
motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;
or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot
produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other
materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine
dispute as to a material fact, and all inferences should be made in favor of the nonmoving party.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party discharges its burden by “‘showing’–that is, pointing
out to the district court–that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”
Horton v. Potter, 369 F.3d 906, 909 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325)).
Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving
party, who “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
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facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “[T]he mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party’s] position will be insufficient
[to defeat a motion for summary judgment]; there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252
(1986).

IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Affidavit
In support of his motion for partial summary judgment, Defendant submitted an affidavit that

averred, among other things, that Plaintiff had caused the Camelot to be inspected after July 12,
2009, but prior to the sinking of the Camelot in November 2009, as the result of a lightning strike.
Defendant averred that:
2.

Since acquiring ownership of the Camelot, I have made regular
inspections and properly maintained that vessel in a safe and
seaworthy condition.

3.

Whenever I observed or became aware of any part or item on the
Camelot which required repair or replacement, I took the action
necessary either personally or by retaining appropriately trained
personnel to do so.

4.

During my ownership of the Camelot, I made sure that all necessary
and/or required maintenance was performed in a timely and
appropriate manner.
*****

9.

After suffering a lightening [sic] strike on July 12, 2009, the Camelot
was thoroughly inspected, including all through-hull fittings, by a
marine surveyor retained by [Plaintiff].

10.

Following the inspection of the Camelot as mentioned above, no
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problems were reported to me regarding the raw water intake hose at
issue, nor was I advised to repair, replace or even closely observe that
hose for potential failure by [Plaintiff]’s retained marine surveyor or
anyone else.
11.

Based on my education and experience as a yacht owner and
operator, it is my belief that the bilge pump system operated properly
to keep the Camelot afloat following the failure of the raw water
intake hose but the Camelot’s ultimate sinking occurred because the
batteries simply could not continue operating the bilge pump system
[because they] became depleted[,] thus allowing the continuing flow
of water through the burst hose to capsize the yacht.

Plaintiff contends the affidavit must be struck because many of the factual assertions are for the
purpose of supporting Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff is estopped from relying on the Policy
exclusions. Plaintiff further contends that Defendant’s failure to plead estoppel defense as an
affirmative defense, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c), bars Defendant’s attempts
to raise an estoppel argument now. Plaintiff also contends that not all of Defendant’s representations
are based on personal knowledge or are accurate. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that: (a) Defendant
is not competent to testify regarding the scope of the thoroughness of the inspection by the marine
surveyor after the Camelot was struck by lightning in July 2009, and (b) Defendant is wrong
regarding the scope of the marine surveyor’s inspection.
Despite Plaintiff’s contentions, the Court finds no basis to strike Defendant’s affidavit. First,
the Court concludes that Defendant’s estoppel defense is not barred by Defendant’s admitted failure
to plead estoppel as an affirmative defense. As Defendant argues, in certain circumstances, a court
may determine that a defense is sufficiently pled if it is pled in a counter-complaint. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c)(2). Rule 8(c) provides, in relevant part:
(c) Affirmative Defenses.
(1) In General. In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively
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state any avoidance or affirmative defense, including: . . . estoppel[.]
(2) Mistaken Designation. If a party mistakenly designates a defense as
a counterclaim, or a counterclaim as a defense, the court must, if justice
requires, treat the pleading as though it were correctly designated, and
may impose terms for doing so.
In order for the Court to treat a mistakenly designated counterclaim as an affirmative
defense, the Court must find that Defendant has set forth factual support for the elements of an
estoppel claim, namely that:
(1)

there be conduct or language amounting to a representation of
material fact,

(2)

the party to be estopped must be aware of the true facts,

(3)

the party to be estopped must intend that the representation be acted
upon - or the party asserting estoppel must reasonably believe that the
party to be estopped so intends,

(4)

the party asserting the estoppel must be unaware of the true facts, and

(5)

the party asserting the estoppel must reasonably or justifiably rely on
the representation to his detriment.

See Moore v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 416, 428-29 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
Although Defendant does not use the word “estoppel” in his pleading, the Court finds that
Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff “engaged in one or more unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
breach of the implied terms of the [P]olicy,” together with the other allegations in Defendant’s
counter-complaint, sufficiently sets forth a defense of estoppel, and the Court shall treat the pleading
as though it were correctly designated as an affirmative defense.
Second, many of the averments in the affidavit do not relate to the averments to which
Plaintiff has objected, and Plaintiff has not asked the Court to strike only certain portions of the
affidavit. Third, although Plaintiff’s argument and the affidavit of C. Robert Skord, Jr. (“Skord”)
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attached to Plaintiff’s motion to strike constitute evidence that: (a) the factual assertions in the
affidavit are false, and/or (b) Defendant is not competent to opine regarding the marine surveyor’s
inspection, such argument and affidavit do not establish either of those contentions, as a matter of
law. In other words, Plaintiff’s argument and Skord’s affidavit simply establish that there is a
genuine dispute regarding the factual assertions set forth in Defendant’s affidavit.
Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant’s affidavit in support
of Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment.
B.

Dispositive Motions
The parties agree that the ACV Endorsement governs the loss coverage in this matter, and

the Court also concludes that it does. For purposes of this Opinion, the key ACV Endorsement
language is limited to the “Coverage” provision therein:
i. Coverage
We shall pay for sudden accidental direct physical loss or damage to the
insured yacht unless:
1) the property is described under Property Not Covered in Item ii;
2) the cause of the loss is described under Exclusions in item iii; or
3) the insured yacht is over 25 years of age, in which case, coverage for
underwater machinery (running gear of any kind), engine(s), transmission(s),
generators, and any attached equipment to these components must be caused
by or resulting from the Named Perils listed below.
The Named Perils are: . . . c) sinking; . . .
The Court finds that the language in the “Coverage” provision of the ACV Endorsement is
unambiguous–Plaintiff must pay for damage to the Camelot unless any one of the three listed
exceptions applies. The Court’s conclusion is based on simple contract construction–where the

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clauses are separated by “or,” only one clause need apply. See generally, Security Ins. Co. of
Hartford v. Tucker, 64 F.3d 1001, 1006-07 (6th Cir. 1995); General Casualty Co. of Wisc. v.
Wozniak Travel, Inc., 762 N.W.2d 572, 577 n.4 (Minn. 2009) (“since all of the advertising-injury
definitions are phrased in the disjunctive, only one provision of the definitions needs to cover an
allegation to trigger General Casualty’s duty to defend”).
Moreover, the Court is not persuaded by Defendant’s contention that the Policy language is
ambiguous because the parties disagree which “exception” to “Coverage” applies. As Defendant
notes, Plaintiff argues that the Exclusion exception applies, whereas Defendant argues that the 25
years/sinking exception applies. Contrary to Defendant’s interpretation, the exceptions do not create
obligations by which Plaintiff must pay for damage to an insured yacht or create an avenue by which
Defendant is entitled to payment. Rather, the exceptions constitute limitations on Plaintiff’s
obligation to pay for damage to an insured yacht (or, with respect to part “3),” a limitation on the
amount of coverage to be paid). In other words, the “Coverage” portion of the ACV Endorsement
that relates to a yacht that is over 25 years of age (i.e., the exception under part “3)”) means that
coverage for “underwater machinery (running gear of any kind), engine(s), transmission(s),
generators, and any attached equipment to these components” will be paid on such a yacht only if
one of the Named Perils (e.g., sinking) is the cause of the damage. If the cause of the damage to
such a 25 year old yacht is not caused by one of the Named Perils, however, there would be no
coverage for such equipment.
The Court now considers whether there are any material facts that are not in genuine dispute
such that either party can prevail on summary judgment.
1. Plaintiff’s Contention that Plaintiff’s Coverage Barred by Two Exclusions

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Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because the cause of the loss on the
Camelot comes within the “Exclusions” to “Coverage.” Plaintiff argues that: (a) the cause of the
loss regarding the sinking of the Camelot is attributable to two of the Exclusions described in item
iii (i.e., “wear and tear, gradual deterioration and corrosion” and “Defendant’s failure to maintain
the vessel in good condition”), and (b) the facts to support both such Exclusions are undisputed.
In this case, it is undisputed that Roden, the marine surveyor retained to investigate the cause
of the sinking of the Camelot, determined that the Camelot sank due to ingress of water through a
failed raw water intake hose - a hose Roden concluded showed evidence of wear and tear and
deterioration. It is also undisputed that Taylor, the engineer retained to examine the hose,
determined that a large change in hardness values had occurred with the hose (indicating age and
deterioration), as well as corrosion from chloride exposure, with deterioration accelerated at the
region of failure. Likewise, it is undisputed that Defendant admitted that he had never inspected or
replaced the raw water intake hose. Such facts, however, do not establish that the sinking was due
to “wear and tear and deterioration” or “Defendant’s failure to maintain the vessel in good
condition.” Rather, when there is material evidence to the contrary, such facts only constitute
evidence that the cause of the Camelot’s sinking was due to “wear and tear and deterioration” or
“failure to maintain the vessel in good condition.”
In this case, Defendant has submitted admissible evidence that contradicts each of the three
facts set forth by Plaintiff. For example, in his affidavit, Defendant averred that:
(1)

He regularly inspected and properly maintained the Camelot,

(2)

He caused any item he observed or learned needed repair or
replacement to be repaired or replaced (whether personally or hiring
someone appropriate to do so),

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(3)

He ensured that all necessary and/or required maintenance was
performed in a timely and appropriate manner,

(4)

Defendant observed a Plaintiff representative conduct a thorough
inspection of the Camelot only months before the Camelot sank, and

(5)

Following that inspection, Defendant was not advised of any problem
with the raw water intake hose at issue, nor was he instructed to
replace, repair or pay attention to that hose.

In addition, Defendant has submitted an exhibit that includes a compilation of his costs associated
with maintaining the Camelot.

That exhibit reflects that Defendant incurred expenses of

approximately $65,000 for the Camelot between March 2006 and the time the Camelot sank. Such
evidence creates a genuine dispute as to whether either of the two Exclusions on which Plaintiff
relies (i.e., “wear and tear, gradual deterioration and corrosion” and “failure to maintain the vessel
in good condition”) apply. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment must be denied.
2. Defendant’s Arguments for Summary Judgment
Defendant sets forth four arguments why he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
liability. Defendant first argues that, because the Policy language unambiguously provides that if
the insured yacht is more than 25 years old and sank–both of which are undisputedly true with
respect to the Camelot–Defendant is entitled to coverage. Specifically, Defendant asserts that the
relevant ACV Endorsement language governing his claim is the following language:
i. Coverage
We shall pay for sudden accidental direct physical loss or damage to the
insured yacht unless:
*****
3) the insured yacht is over 25 years of age, in which case, coverage . . .
must be caused by or resulting from . . .

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*****
c) sinking; . . .
As discussed above, this interpretation of the ACV Endorsement language is incomplete and
erroneous. Likewise, Defendant’s interpretation ignores the unambiguous language of the Policy
and ACV Endorsement language.
Defendant next argues that ambiguities in the Policy must be interpreted in his favor such
that he is entitled to coverage under the Policy. Defendant contends that the Policy is ambiguous
because the Coverage language in the ACV Endorsement provision is subject to more than one
meaning. Again, as discussed above, the Coverage language is unambiguous and Defendant’s
interpretation of the Coverage provision of the ACV Endorsement is unsupportable.
Defendant’s third argument is that Plaintiff is estopped from asserting that the claim is
subject to the Exclusions provisions because Plaintiff caused the Camelot to be inspected after
lightning struck the Camelot in July 2009. As discussed above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff
has the right to pursue this defense. Defendant asserts that the scope of the inspection conducted
by Skord was thorough (“including all through-hull fittings”), but Skord avers otherwise in his
affidavit. Specifically, Skord avers that: (1) he did not thoroughly inspect the Camelot, (2) his
inspection did not include “any hoses as they are not normally subject to lightning strike damage,”
and (3) he did not make any comment to Defendant regarding the condition of the raw water intake
hose. As such, the Court concludes there is a genuine dispute as to several material facts necessary
to finding that Plaintiff is estopped from denying Defendant’s claim on the basis of the two
Exclusions cited by Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court must conclude that Defendant is not entitled
to summary judgment on his estoppel claim.

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Finally, Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff is required to pay for losses resulting from the
sinking of the Camelot, less the cost associated with repair of the raw water intake hose, under the
ACV Endorsement is also misplaced. In support of this argument, Defendant contends that a
provision of the ACV Endorsement “makes it clear that the sinking of the Camelot is covered,
except for the cost of repairing the hose” because “the raw water intake hose was damaged and that
damage was not repaired before the Camelot sank.” Defendant’s position is unsupportable and
illogical. Most significantly, the ACV Endorsement provision on which Defendant relies to support
his argument relates to the Policy provisions regarding “Loss Conditions,” not the Policy provisions
regarding “Coverage.” Therefore, in order for the Court to adopt Defendant’s position, the Court
would have to ignore the plain and unambiguous language of the Policy (namely the ACV
Endorsement language related to “Coverage”) that addresses losses covered by preexisting
unrepaired damage.
The Court also would have to defy a logical interpretation of the Policy to reach that
conclusion. In fact, the Court would have to:
(1)

determine, as a matter of law, that the explicit exclusion(s) to
coverage for Defendant’s claim (wear and tear, deterioration and
corrosion and/or failure to maintain the insured yacht in good
condition) is/are inapplicable, and

(2)

conclude instead that, as a matter of law, the wear and tear,
deterioration and corrosion and/or the failure to maintain the insured
yacht in good condition actually support a finding that Defendant’s
claimed loss vis a vis the Camelot (less the cost of repairing the raw
water intake hose) is covered.

For the reasons discussed above, the Court will not adopt such an interpretation of the Policy,
including the terms of the ACV Endorsement.
3. Conclusion
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For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that there are genuine disputes as to
material facts that preclude granting summary judgment to Plaintiff or partial summary judgment
to Defendant.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, and for the above reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
A.

Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket #26) is DENIED.

B.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Affidavit of Defendant Lorn H. Olsen (Docket #30)
is DENIED.

C.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket #31) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for the parties appear for a Final Pre-trial
Conference on June 14, 2012, at 10:30 A.M., 526 Water Street, Port Huron, MI. All counsel must
be present, as well as the clients and/or those with full settlement authority. The proposed joint final
pretrial order, along with joint-agreed upon jury instructions, shall be submitted to the Judge’s
Chambers at the Final Pretrial/Settlement Conference. If necessary, the case will be scheduled for
a trial date at the conference.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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S/Lawrence P. Zatkoff
LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: March 29, 2012
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of this Order was served upon the attorneys of
record by electronic or U.S. mail on March 29, 2012.

S/Marie E. Verlinde
Case Manager
[phone]

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