American Freedom Defense Initiative et al v. Suburban Mobility Authority For Regional Transportation (SMART) et al
Filing
77
NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re 58 MOTION for Summary Judgment Supplemental Authority (Muise, Robert)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
AMERICAN FREEDOM
DEFENSE INITIATIVE; et al.,
No. 2:10-cv-12134-DPH-MJH
Plaintiffs,
PLAINTIFFS’ NOTICE OF
SUPPLEMENTAL
AUTHORITY
v.
SUBURBAN MOBILITY
AUTHORITY for REGIONAL
TRANSPORTATION (“SMART”);
et al.,
Hon. Denise Page Hood
Magistrate Judge Hluchaniuk
Defendants.
Pending before this Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary
judgment. (Doc. Nos. 57 & 58). Recently, and following the submission of these
motions, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Minnesota Voters
Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018).1 In Mansky, the Court analyzed a
Minnesota statute banning voters from wearing a “political badge, political button,
or other political insignia” at a polling place, a nonpublic forum. Id. at 1883. The
Court held that portion of the statute unconstitutional because the State failed to
draw “a reasonable line.”
Id. at 1888.
The statute did not define the term
“political,” which in the Court’s view was simply too broad. The State proffered
as a limiting construction the idea that “political” meant “conveying a message
1
A copy of the Court’s opinion is attached to this notice as Exhibit A.
-1-
about the electoral choices at issue in [the] polling place,” but the Court noted this
construction introduced line-drawing problems of its own. Id. at 1888-89. The
crux of the Court’s decision was that the State’s discretion in enforcing the statute
had to be “guided by objective, workable standards.” Id. at 1891. Because the
unqualified ban on “political” apparel did not provide those standards, it was
unreasonable in violation of the First Amendment.
The same is true here with regard to SMART’s restriction on “political” ads.
As set forth in Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment:
According to SMART’s designated witness under Rule 30(b)(6), the
term “political” for purposes of its advertising guidelines means “any
advocacy of a position of any politicized issue.” (SMART Dep. at 41
at Ex. 4) (emphasis added). In an effort to explain this tautology (i.e.,
“political” = politicized issue), SMART defined “politicized” as
follows: “if society is fractured on an issue and factions of society
have taken up positions on it that are not in agreement, it’s
politicized.”
(Pls. Mot. for Summ. J. at 9 [Doc. No. 58]; see also id. at 21 [arguing that
SMART’s speech restriction is unconstitutional because it grants a public official
unbridled discretion such that the official’s decision to limit speech is not
constrained by objective criteria]). Under the Court’s ruling in Mansky, SMART’s
restriction violates the First Amendment.
-2-
Respectfully submitted,
AMERICAN FREEDOM LAW CENTER
/s/ Robert J. Muise
Robert J. Muise, Esq.
Counsel for Plaintiffs
-3-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 17, 2018, a copy of the foregoing was filed
electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent to all parties for whom counsel has
entered an appearance by operation of the court’s electronic filing system. Parties
may access this filing through the court’s system.
AMERICAN FREEDOM LAW CENTER
/s/ Robert J. Muise
Robert J. Muise, Esq. (P62849)
-4-
EXHIBIT A
Caution
As of: August 17, 2018 4:05 PM Z
Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky
Supreme Court of the United States
February 28, 2018, Argued; June 14, 2018, Decided
No. 16-1435.
Reporter
138 S. Ct. 1876 *; 201 L. Ed. 2d 201 **; 2018 U.S. LEXIS 3685 ***; 86 U.S.L.W. 4401; 27 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 348; 2018 WL 2973746
MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. JOE MANSKY, ET AL.
Notice: The LEXIS pagination of this document is subject to
change pending release of the final published version.
Subsequent History: On remand at, Remanded by Minn.
Majority v. Mansky, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 21623 (8th Cir.
Minn., Aug. 3, 2018)
Prior History: [***1] ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
because polling places were nonpublic forums, it had to draw
a reasonable line, and neither § 211B.11, subd. 1 nor an
Election Day Policy the State developed and distributed to
election officials met that test because they allowed election
judges to decide what was "political” when screening
individuals at the entrance to the polls without using
objective, workable standards which restrained that discretion.
Outcome
Reversed and remanded. 7-2 Decision; 1 dissent.
LexisNexis® Headnotes
Minn. Majority v. Mansky, 849 F.3d 749, 2017 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3585 (8th Cir. Minn., Feb. 28, 2017)
Disposition: Reversed and remanded.
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental
Freedoms > Freedom of Speech > Political Speech
Core Terms
voters, polling place, ban, election, apparel, campaign, ballot,
button, candidate, voting, wearing, display, election day, shirt,
certification, restrictions, polls, plurality opinion, insignia,
message, nonpublic forum, state law, plurality, prohibits,
badge, views, political party, positions, court of appeals,
district court
Case Summary
Overview
HOLDINGS: [1]-Minn. Stat. § 211B.11, subd. 1 (Supp.
2017), violated the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to the extent it
prohibited voters from wearing a political badge, political
button, or anything bearing political insignia inside a polling
place on Election Day; [2]-Although Minnesota had the right
to prohibit certain apparel in polling places on Election Day
Governments > State & Territorial
Governments > Elections
HN1[
] Freedom of Speech, Political Speech
The First Amendment prohibits laws abridging the freedom of
speech. Minnesota’s ban on wearing any political badge,
political button, or other political insignia plainly restricts a
form of expression within the protection of the First
Amendment. But the ban applies only in a specific location:
the interior of a polling place. It therefore implicates the
United States Supreme Court's "forum based" approach for
assessing restrictions that the government seeks to place on
the use of its property.
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental
Freedoms > Freedom of Speech > Political Speech
Robert Muise
Page 2 of 17
Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental
Freedoms > Judicial & Legislative Restraints > Time,
Place & Manner Restrictions
HN2[
] Freedom of Speech, Political Speech
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental
Freedoms > Judicial & Legislative Restraints > Time,
Place & Manner Restrictions
Governments > Local Governments > Elections
Generally speaking, the United States Supreme Court's
decisions recognize three types of government-controlled
spaces: traditional public forums, designated public forums,
and nonpublic forums. In a traditional public forum—parks,
streets, sidewalks, and the like—the government may impose
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on private
speech, but restrictions based on content must satisfy strict
scrutiny, and those based on viewpoint are prohibited. The
same standards apply in designated public forums—spaces
that have not traditionally been regarded as a public forum but
which the government has intentionally opened up for that
purpose. In a nonpublic forum, on the other hand—a space
that is not by tradition or designation a forum for public
communication—the government has much more flexibility
to craft rules limiting speech. The government may reserve
such a forum for its intended purposes, communicative or
otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable
and not an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker’s view.
Governments > State & Territorial
Governments > Elections
HN4[ ] Judicial & Legislative Restraints, Time, Place &
Manner Restrictions
A polling place in Minnesota qualifies as a nonpublic forum.
It is, at least on Election Day, government-controlled property
set aside for the sole purpose of voting. The space is a special
enclave, subject to greater restriction. Rules strictly govern
who may be present, for what purpose, and for how long.
Minn. Stat. § 204C.06 (2014).
Civil Rights Law > Protection of Rights > Voting Rights
Governments > State & Territorial
Governments > Elections
HN5[
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental
Freedoms > Freedom of Speech > Political Speech
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental
Freedoms > Judicial & Legislative Restraints > Time,
Place & Manner Restrictions
HN3[
] Freedom of Speech, Political Speech
The United States Supreme Court employs a distinct standard
of review to assess speech restrictions in nonpublic forums
because the government, no less than a private owner of
property, retains the power to preserve the property under its
control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. Nothing
in the Constitution requires the government freely to grant
access to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on
every type of government property without regard to the
nature of the property or to the disruption that might be
caused by the speaker’s activities. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court's decisions have long recognized that the government
may impose some content-based restrictions on speech in
nonpublic forums, including restrictions that exclude political
advocates and forms of political advocacy.
] Protection of Rights, Voting Rights
Casting a vote is a weighty civic act, akin to a jury’s return of
a verdict, or a representative’s vote on a piece of legislation. It
is a time for choosing, not campaigning, and a State may
reasonably decide that the interior of a polling place should
reflect that distinction.
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental
Freedoms > Freedom of Speech > Political Speech
Governments > State & Territorial
Governments > Elections
HN6[
] Freedom of Speech, Political Speech
United States Supreme Court decisions have noted the
nondisruptive nature of expressive apparel in more mundane
settings. But those observations do not speak to the unique
context of a polling place on Election Day. Members of the
public are brought together at that place, at the end of what
may have been a divisive election season, to reach considered
decisions about their government and laws. A State may
reasonably take steps to ensure that partisan discord not
follow the voter up to the voting booth, and distract from a
sense of shared civic obligation at the moment it counts the
most. That interest may be thwarted by displays that do not
Robert Muise
Page 3 of 17
Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky
raise significant concerns in other situations.
Candidates for statewide and federal office and major political
parties can be expected to take positions on a wide array of
subjects of local and national import.
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental
Freedoms > Freedom of Speech > Political Speech
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental
Freedoms > Judicial & Legislative Restraints > Prior
Restraint
Governments > State & Territorial
Governments > Elections
HN7[
] Freedom of Speech, Political Speech
In light of the special purpose of the polling place itself,
Minnesota may choose to prohibit certain apparel there
because of the message it conveys, so that voters may focus
on the important decisions immediately at hand.
Governments > State & Territorial
Governments > Elections
Judicial & Legislative Restraints, Prior
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental
Freedoms > Judicial & Legislative Restraints > Prior
Restraint
] Freedom of Speech, Political Speech
A State that chooses to prohibit certain apparel in polling
places on Election Day must draw a reasonable line. Although
there is no requirement of narrow tailoring in a nonpublic
forum, the State must be able to articulate some sensible basis
for distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out.
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental
Freedoms > Judicial & Legislative Restraints > Time,
Place & Manner Restrictions
HN12[ ]
Restraint
Judicial & Legislative Restraints, Prior
It is self-evident that an indeterminate prohibition carries with
it the opportunity for abuse, especially where it has received a
virtually open-ended interpretation.
Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
HN9[
HN11[ ]
Restraint
Perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required
even of regulations that restrict expressive activity.
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental
Freedoms > Freedom of Speech > Political Speech
HN8[
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental
Freedoms > Judicial & Legislative Restraints > Time,
Place & Manner Restrictions
] Legislation, Interpretation
Syllabus
The United States Supreme Court considers a State’s
authoritative constructions in interpreting a state law.
[**204] [*1879]
Minnesota law prohibits individuals,
including voters, from wearing a “political badge, political
button, or other political insignia” inside a polling place on
Election Day. Minn. Stat. §211B.11(1) (Supp. 2017). This
“political apparel ban” covers articles of clothing and
accessories with political insignia upon them. State election
judges have the authority to decide [**205] whether a
particular item falls within the ban. Violators are subject to a
civil penalty or prosecution for a petty misdemeanor.
Governments > Federal Government > Elections
Governments > Local Governments > Elections
Governments > State & Territorial
Governments > Elections
HN10[
] Federal Government, Elections
A rule whose fair enforcement requires an election judge to
maintain a mental index of the platforms and positions of
every candidate and party on the ballot is not reasonable.
Days before the November 2010 election,
Minnesota Voters Alliance (MVA) and other
challenged the ban in Federal District Court
Amendment grounds. In response to the lawsuit,
Robert Muise
petitioner
plaintiffs
on First
the State
Page 4 of 17
Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky
distributed an Election Day Policy to election officials
providing guidance on enforcement of the ban. The Election
Day Policy specified examples of prohibited apparel to
include items displaying the name of a political party, items
displaying the name of a candidate, items supporting or
opposing a ballot question, “[i]ssue oriented material designed
to influence or impact voting,” and “[m]aterial promoting a
group [***2] with recognizable political views.” App. to Pet.
for Cert. I-1 to I-2. On Election Day, some voters ran into
trouble with the ban, including petitioner Andrew Cilek, who
allegedly was turned away from the polls for wearing a
“Please I. D. Me” button and a T-shirt bearing the words
“Don’t Tread on Me” and a Tea Party Patriots logo.
MVA and the other plaintiffs argued that the ban was
unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to their
particular items of apparel. The District Court granted the
State’s motion to dismiss, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the facial challenge and remanded the case for
further proceedings on the as-applied challenge. The District
Court granted summary judgment to the State on the asapplied challenge, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. MVA,
Cilek, and petitioner Susan Jeffers (collectively MVA)
petitioned for review of their facial First Amendment claim
only.
Held: Minnesota’s political apparel ban violates the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Pp. 7-19.
(a) Because the political apparel ban applies only in a specific
location—the interior of a polling place—it implicates the
Court’s “‘forum based’ approach for assessing restrictions
that the government seeks to place on the use of [***3] its
property.” International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.
v. Lee, 505 U. S. 672, 678, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 120 L. Ed. 2d
541, 549-550. A polling place in Minnesota qualifies as a
nonpublic forum under the Court’s precedents. As such it may
be subject to content-based restrictions on speech, see, e.g.,
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.
S. 788, 806-811, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 87 L. Ed. 2d 567, so long as
the restrictions are “reasonable and not an effort to suppress
[*1880] expression merely because public officials oppose
the speaker’s view,” Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local
Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 46, 103 S. Ct. 948, 74 L. Ed.
2d 794, 805. Because the text of the statute makes no
distinction based on the speaker’s political persuasion, the
question is whether the apparel ban is “reasonable in light of
the purpose served by the forum”: voting. Cornelius, 473 U.
S., at 806, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 87 L. Ed. 2d 567, 582. Pp. 7-9.
(b) Minnesota’s prohibition on political apparel serves a
permissible objective. In Burson v. Freeman, 504 U. S. 191,
112 S. Ct. 1846, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, the Court upheld a
Tennessee law imposing a 100-foot zone around [**206]
polling place entrances in which no person could solicit votes,
distribute campaign materials, or “display . . . campaign
posters, signs or other campaign materials.” 504 U. S., at 193194, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 10-11 (plurality
opinion). In finding that the law withstood even strict
scrutiny, the Burson plurality—whose analysis was endorsed
by Justice Scalia’s opinion concurring in the judgment—
emphasized the problems of fraud, voter intimidation,
confusion, and general disorder that had plagued
polling [***4] places in the past. Against that historical
backdrop, the plurality and Justice Scalia upheld Tennessee’s
determination that a campaign-free zone outside the polls was
necessary to secure the advantages of the secret ballot and
protect the right to vote.
MVA argues that Burson considered only active campaigning
outside the polling place by campaign workers and others
trying to engage voters approaching the polls, while
Minnesota’s ban prohibits passive self-expression by voters
themselves when voting. But although the plurality and
Justice Scalia in Burson did not expressly address the
application of the Tennessee law to apparel—or consider the
interior of the polling place as opposed to its environs—the
Tennessee law swept broadly to ban even the plain “display”
of a campaign-related message, and the Burson Court upheld
the law in full. The plurality’s conclusion that the State was
warranted in designating an area for the voters as “their own”
as they enter the polling place, id., at 210, 112 S. Ct. 1846,
119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 21, suggests an interest more significant, not
less, within that place.
No basis exists for rejecting Minnesota’s determination that
some forms of campaign advocacy should be excluded from
the polling place in order [***5] to set it aside as “an island
of calm in which voters can peacefully contemplate their
choices.” Brief for Respondents 43. Casting a vote is a
weighty civic act, and the State may reasonably decide that
the interior of the polling place should reflect the distinction
between voting and campaigning. And while the Court has
noted the “nondisruptive” nature of expressive apparel in
more mundane settings, see, e.g., Board of Airport Comm’rs
of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. , 482 U. S. 569, 576,
107 S. Ct. 2568, 96 L. Ed. 2d 500, 508, those observations do
not speak to the unique context of a polling place on Election
Day. Pp. 9-12.
(c) But the line the State draws must be reasonable. The State
therefore must be able to articulate some sensible basis for
distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out.
The unmoored use of the term “political” in the Minnesota
law, combined with haphazard interpretations the State has
provided in official guidance and representations to this
Court, cause Minnesota’s restriction to fail this test.
Robert Muise
Page 5 of 17
Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky
The statute does not define the term “political,” a word that
can broadly encompass anything “of or relating to
government, a government, or the conduct of governmental
affairs.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1755.
The [*1881] State argues [***6] that the apparel ban should
be interpreted more narrowly to proscribe “only words and
symbols that an objectively reasonable observer would
perceive as conveying a message about the electoral choices
at issue in [the] polling place.” Brief for [**207]
Respondents 13. At the same time, the State argues that the
category of “political” apparel is not limited to campaign
apparel.
The Court considers a State’s authoritative constructions in
interpreting a state law. But far from clarifying the
indeterminate scope of the provision, Minnesota’s “electoral
choices” construction introduces confusing line-drawing
problems. For specific examples of what messages are banned
under that standard, the State points to the Election Day
Policy. The first three categories of prohibited items in the
Policy are clear. But the next category—“issue oriented
material designed to influence or impact voting”—raises more
questions than it answers. The State takes the position that
any subject on which a political candidate or party has taken a
stance qualifies as an “issue” within the meaning of that
category. Such a rule—whose fair enforcement requires an
election judge to maintain a mental index of the platforms
and [***7] positions of every candidate and party on the
ballot—is not reasonable.
The next broad category in the Election Day Policy—any
item “promoting a group with recognizable political views”—
makes matters worse. The State does not confine that category
to groups that have endorsed a candidate or taken a position
on a ballot question. As a result, any number of associations,
educational
institutions,
businesses,
and
religious
organizations could have an opinion on an “issue confronting
voters.” The State represents that the ban is limited to apparel
promoting groups with “well-known” political positions. But
that requirement only increases the potential for erratic
application, as its enforcement may turn in significant part on
the background knowledge of the particular election judge
applying it.
It is “self-evident” that an indeterminate prohibition carries
with it “[t]he opportunity for abuse, especially where [it] has
received a virtually open-ended interpretation.” Jews for
Jesus, 482 U. S., at 576, 107 S. Ct. 2568, 96 L. Ed. 2d 500,
508. The discretion election judges exercise in enforcing the
ban must be guided by objective, workable standards. Without
them, an election judge’s own politics may shape his views on
what counts as “political.” And if voters [***8] experience or
witness episodes of unfair or inconsistent enforcement of the
ban, the State’s interest in maintaining a polling place free of
distraction and disruption would be undermined by the very
measure intended to further it. Thus, if a State wishes to set its
polling places apart as areas free of partisan discord, it must
employ a more discernible approach than the one offered by
Minnesota here. Pp. 12-19.
849 F. 3d 749, reversed and remanded.
Counsel: J. David Breemer argued the cause for petitioners.
Daniel Rogan argued the cause for respondents.
Judges: Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, Kagan, and
Gorsuch, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Breyer, J., joined.
Opinion by: ROBERTS
Opinion
[**208] [*1882]
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the
opinion of the Court.
Under Minnesota law, voters may not wear a political badge,
political button, or anything bearing political insignia inside a
polling place on Election Day. The question presented is
whether this ban violates the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.
I
A
Today, Americans going to their polling places on Election
Day expect to wait in a line, briefly interact with an election
official, enter a private voting booth, and cast an anonymous
ballot. Little about this ritual would have been familiar to a
voter in the mid-to-late nineteenth [***9] century. For one
thing, voters typically deposited privately prepared ballots at
the polls instead of completing official ballots on-site. These
pre-made ballots often took the form of “party tickets”—
printed slates of candidate selections, often distinctive in
appearance, that political parties distributed to their supporters
and pressed upon others around the polls. See E. Evans, A
History of the Australian Ballot System in the United States
6-11 (1917) (Evans); R. Bensel, The American Ballot Box in
the Mid-Nineteenth Century 14-15 (2004) (Bensel).
The physical arrangement confronting the voter was also
different. The polling place often consisted simply of a
Robert Muise
Page 6 of 17
Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky
“voting window” through which the voter would hand his
ballot to an election official situated in a separate room with
the ballot box. Bensel 11, 13; see, e.g., C. Rowell, Digest of
Contested-Election Cases in the Fifty-First Congress 224
(1891) (report of Rep. Lacey) (considering whether “the
ability to reach the window and actually tender the ticket to
the [election] judges” is “essential in all cases to constitute a
good offer to vote”); Holzer, Election Day 1860, Smithsonian
Magazine (Nov. 2008), pp. 46, 52 (describing the [***10]
interior voting window on the third floor of the Springfield,
Illinois courthouse where Abraham Lincoln voted). As a
result of this arrangement, “the actual act of voting was
usually performed in the open,” frequently within view of
interested onlookers. Rusk, The Effect of the Australian
Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting: 1876-1908, Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 1220, 1221 (1970) (Rusk); see Evans 11-13.
As documented in Burson v. Freeman, 504 U. S. 191, 112 S.
Ct. 1846, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5 (1992), “[a]pproaching the polling
place under this system was akin to entering an open auction
place.” Id., at 202, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 16
(plurality opinion). The room containing the ballot boxes was
“usually quiet and orderly,” but “[t]he public space outside
the window . . . was chaotic.” Bensel 13. Electioneering of all
kinds was permitted. See id., at 13, 16-17; R. Dinkin, Election
Day: A Documentary History 19 (2002). Crowds would
gather to [*1883] heckle and harass voters who appeared to
be supporting the other side. Indeed, “[u]nder the informal
conventions of the period, election etiquette required only that
a ‘man of ordinary courage’ be able to make his way to the
voting window.” Bensel 20-21. “In short, these early elections
were not a very pleasant spectacle for those who believed in
democratic government.” [**209] Burson, 504 U. S., at 202,
112 S. Ct. 1846, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 16 (plurality
opinion) [***11] (internal quotation marks omitted).
By the late nineteenth century, States began implementing
reforms to address these vulnerabilities and improve the
reliability of elections. Between 1888 and 1896, nearly every
State adopted the secret ballot. See id., at 203-205, 112 S. Ct.
1846, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 17-18. Because voters now needed to
mark their state-printed ballots on-site and in secret, voting
moved into a sequestered space where the voters could
“deliberate and make a decision in . . . privacy.” Rusk 1221;
see Evans 35; 1889 Minn. Stat. ch. 3 §§27-28, , p. 21
(regulating, as part of Minnesota’s secret ballot law, the
arrangement of voting compartments inside the polling place).
In addition, States enacted “viewpoint-neutral restrictions on
election-day speech” in the immediate vicinity of the polls.
Burson, 504 U. S., at 214-215, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 119 L. Ed. 2d
5, 24-25 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (by 1900, 34 of
45 States had such restrictions). Today, all 50 States and the
District of Columbia have laws curbing various forms of
speech in and around polling places on Election Day.
Minnesota’s such law contains three prohibitions, only one of
which is challenged here. See Minn. Stat. §211B.11(1) (Supp.
2017). The first sentence of §211B.11(1) forbids any person
to “display campaign material, post signs, ask, solicit, or in
any manner try to induce or persuade [***12] a voter within
a polling place or within 100 feet of the building in which a
polling place is situated” to “vote for or refrain from voting
for a candidate or ballot question.” The second sentence
prohibits the distribution of “political badges, political
buttons, or other political insignia to be worn at or about the
polling place.” The third sentence—the “political apparel
ban”—states that a “political badge, political button, or other
political insignia may not be worn at or about the polling
place.” Versions of all three prohibitions have been on the
books in Minnesota for over a century. See 1893 Minn. Laws
ch. 4, §108, pp. 51-52; 1912 Minn. Laws, 1st Spec. Sess., ch.
3, p. 24; 1988 Minn. Laws ch. 578, Art. 3, §11, p. 594
(reenacting the prohibitions as part of §211B.11).
There is no dispute that the political apparel ban applies only
within the polling place, and covers articles of clothing and
accessories with “political insignia” upon them. Minnesota
election judges—temporary government employees working
the polls on Election Day—have the authority to decide
whether a particular item falls within the ban. App. to Pet. for
Cert. I-1. If a voter shows up wearing a prohibited item, the
election [***13] judge is to ask the individual to conceal or
remove it. Id., at I-2. If the individual refuses, the election
judge must allow him to vote, while making clear that the
incident “will be recorded and referred to appropriate
authorities.” Ibid. Violators are subject to an administrative
process before the Minnesota Office of Administrative
Hearings, which, upon finding a violation, may issue a
reprimand or impose a civil penalty. Minn. Stat. §§211B.32,
211B.35(2) (2014). That administrative body may also refer
the complaint to the county attorney for prosecution as a petty
misdemeanor; the maximum penalty is a $300 fine.
§§211B.11(4) (Supp. 2017), 211B.35(2) (2014), 609.02(4a)
(2016).
[**210] [*1884] B
Petitioner Minnesota Voters Alliance (MVA) is a nonprofit
organization that “seeks better government through election
reforms.” Pet. for Cert. 5. Petitioner Andrew Cilek is a
registered voter in Hennepin County and the executive
director of MVA; petitioner Susan Jeffers served in 2010 as a
Ramsey County election judge. Five days before the
November 2010 election, MVA, Jeffers, and other likeminded
groups and individuals filed a lawsuit in Federal District
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Court challenging the political apparel ban on First
Amendment grounds. The groups—calling themselves
“Election [***14] Integrity Watch” (EIW)—planned to have
supporters wear buttons to the polls printed with the words
“Please I. D. Me,” a picture of an eye, and a telephone
number and web address for EIW. (Minnesota law does not
require individuals to show identification to vote.) One of the
individual plaintiffs also planned to wear a “Tea Party
Patriots” shirt. The District Court denied the plaintiffs’
request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction and allowed the apparel ban to remain in effect for
the upcoming election.
In response to the lawsuit, officials for Hennepin and Ramsey
Counties distributed to election judges an “Election Day
Policy,” providing guidance on the enforcement of the
political apparel ban. The Minnesota Secretary of State also
distributed the Policy to election officials throughout the
State. The Policy specified that examples of apparel falling
within the ban “include, but are not limited to”:
“•Any item including the name of a political party in
Minnesota, such as the Republican, [Democratic-FarmerLabor], Independence, Green or Libertarian parties.
•Any item including the name of a candidate at any
election.
•Any item in support of or opposition to a ballot [***15]
question at any election.
•Issue oriented material designed to influence or impact
voting (including specifically the ‘Please I. D. Me’
buttons).
•Material promoting a group with recognizable political
views (such as the Tea Party, MoveOn.org, and so on).”
App. to Pet. for Cert. I-1 to I-2.
As alleged in the plaintiffs’ amended complaint and
supporting declarations, some voters associated with EIW ran
into trouble with the ban on Election Day. One individual was
asked to cover up his Tea Party shirt. Another refused to
conceal his “Please I. D. Me” button, and an election judge
recorded his name and address for possible referral. And
petitioner Cilek—who was wearing the same button and a Tshirt with the words “Don’t Tread on Me” and the Tea Party
Patriots logo—was twice turned away from the polls
altogether, then finally permitted to vote after an election
judge recorded his information.
Back in court, MVA and the other plaintiffs (now joined by
Cilek) argued that the ban was unconstitutional both on its
face and as applied to their apparel. The District Court
granted the State’s motions to dismiss, and the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in
part. [***16] Minnesota Majority v. Mansky, [**211] 708
F. 3d 1051 (2013). In evaluating MVA’s facial challenge, the
Court of Appeals observed that this Court had previously
upheld a state law restricting speech “related to a political
campaign” in a 100-foot zone outside a polling place; the
Court of Appeals determined that Minnesota’s law likewise
passed constitutional muster. Id., at 1056-1058 (quoting
Burson, 504 U. S., at 197, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5,
13 (plurality opinion)). The Court of Appeals reversed the
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge, however,
finding that [*1885] the District Court had improperly
considered matters outside the pleadings. 708 F. 3d, at 1059.
Judge Shepherd concurred in part and dissented in part. In his
view, Minnesota’s broad restriction on political apparel did
not “rationally and reasonably” serve the State’s asserted
interests. Id., at 1062. On remand, the District Court granted
summary judgment for the State on the as-applied challenge,
and this time the Court of Appeals affirmed. Minnesota
Majority v. Mansky, 849 F. 3d 749 (2017).
MVA, Cilek, and Jeffers (hereinafter MVA) petitioned for
review of their facial First Amendment claim only. We
granted certiorari. 583 U. S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 446, 199 L. Ed.
2d 328 (2017).
II
HN1[ ] The First Amendment prohibits laws “abridging the
freedom of speech.” Minnesota’s ban on wearing any
“political badge, political button, or other political insignia”
plainly restricts a form of expression within the protection
of [***17] the First Amendment.
But the ban applies only in a specific location: the interior of a
polling place. It therefore implicates our “‘forum based’
approach for assessing restrictions that the government seeks
to place on the use of its property.” International Soc. for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U. S. 672, 678, 112
S. Ct. 2701, 120 L. Ed. 2d 541, 549-550 (1992) (ISKCON).
HN2[ ] Generally speaking, our cases recognize three types
of government-controlled spaces: traditional public forums,
designated public forums, and nonpublic forums. In a
traditional public forum—parks, streets, sidewalks, and the
like—the government may impose reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions on private speech, but restrictions based
on content must satisfy strict scrutiny, and those based on
viewpoint are prohibited. See Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, 555 U. S. 460, 469, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 172 L. Ed. 2d
853 (2009). The same standards apply in designated public
forums—spaces that have “not traditionally been regarded as
a public forum” but which the government has “intentionally
opened up for that purpose.” Id., at 469-470, 129 S. Ct. 112,
172 L. Ed. 2d 853, 862. In a nonpublic forum, on the other
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hand—a space that “is not by tradition or designation a forum
for public communication”—the government has much more
flexibility to craft rules limiting speech. Perry Ed. Assn. v.
Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 46, 103 S. Ct.
948, 74 L. Ed. 2d 794, 805 (1983). The government may
reserve such a forum “for its intended purposes,
communicative or [***18] otherwise, as long as the
regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose
the speaker’s view.” Ibid.
We therefore evaluate MVA’s First Amendment challenge
under the nonpublic forum standard. The text of the apparel
ban makes no distinction based on the speaker’s political
persuasion, so MVA does not claim that the ban discriminates
on the basis of viewpoint on its face. The question
accordingly is whether Minnesota’s ban on political apparel is
“reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum”:
voting. Cornelius, 473 U. S., at 806, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 87 L.
Ed. 2d 567, 582.
HN3[ ] This Court employs a distinct standard of review to
assess speech [**212] restrictions in nonpublic forums
because the government, “no less than a private owner of
property,” retains the “power to preserve the property under
its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 47, 87 S. Ct. 242, 17 L. Ed.
2d 149 (1966). “Nothing in the Constitution requires the
Government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise
their right to free speech on every type of Government
property without regard to the nature of the property or to the
disruption that might be caused by the speaker’s activities.”
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.
S. 788, 799-800, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 87 L. Ed. 2d 567 (1985).
Accordingly, our decisions have long recognized that the
government may impose some content-based restrictions on
speech in nonpublic forums, including restrictions [*1886]
that exclude political advocates and forms of political
advocacy. See id., at 806-811, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 87 L. Ed. 2d
567, 582-585; Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 831-833, 838839, 96 S. Ct. 1211, 47 L. Ed. 2d 505 (1976); Lehman v.
Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298, 303-304, 94 S. Ct. 2714, 41 L.
Ed. 2d 770 (1974) (plurality opinion); id., at 307-308, 94 S.
Ct. 2714, 41 L. Ed. 2d 770, 779 (Douglas, J., concurring in
judgment).
A
HN4[ ] A polling place in Minnesota qualifies as a
nonpublic forum. It is, at least on Election Day, governmentcontrolled property set aside for the sole purpose of
voting. [***19] The space is “a special enclave, subject to
greater restriction.” ISKCON, 505 U. S., at 680, 112 S. Ct.
2701, 120 L. Ed. 2d 541, 551. Rules strictly govern who may
be present, for what purpose, and for how long. See Minn.
Stat. §204C.06 (2014). And while the four-Justice plurality in
Burson and Justice Scalia’s concurrence in the judgment
parted ways over whether the public sidewalks and streets
surrounding a polling place qualify as a nonpublic forum,
neither opinion suggested that the interior of the building was
anything but. See 504 U. S., at 196-197, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 119
L. Ed. 2d 5, 12-13, and n. 2 (plurality opinion); id., at 214216, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 24-25 (opinion of
Scalia, J.).
That analysis emphasized the problems of fraud, voter
intimidation, confusion, and general disorder that had plagued
polling places in the past. See id., at 200-204, 112 S. Ct. 1846,
119, L. Ed. 2d 5, 15-17 (plurality opinion). Against that
historical backdrop, the plurality and Justice Scalia upheld
Tennessee’s determination, supported by overwhelming
consensus among the States and “common sense,” that a
campaign-free zone outside the polls was “necessary” to
secure the advantages [***21] of the secret ballot and protect
the right to vote. Id., at 200, 206-208, 211, 112 S. Ct. 1846,
119, L. Ed. 2d 5, 15, 18-20, 22. As the plurality explained,
“[t]he State of Tennessee has decided that [the] last 15
seconds before its citizens enter the polling place should be
their own, as free from interference as possible.” [*1887] Id.,
at 210, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 119, L. Ed. 2d 5, 21. That was not “an
unconstitutional choice.” Ibid.
III
We first consider whether Minnesota is pursuing a
permissible objective in prohibiting voters from wearing
particular kinds of expressive apparel or accessories while
inside the polling place. The natural starting point for
evaluating a First Amendment challenge to such a restriction
is this Court’s [***20] decision in Burson, which upheld a
Tennessee law imposing a 100-foot campaign-free zone
around polling place entrances. Under the Tennessee law—
much like Minnesota’s buffer-zone provision—no person
could solicit votes for or against a candidate, party, or ballot
measure, distribute campaign materials, or “display . . .
campaign posters, signs or other campaign materials” within
[**213] the restricted zone. 504 U. S., at 193-194, 112 S. Ct.
1846, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 10-11 (plurality opinion). The plurality
found that the law withstood even the strict scrutiny
applicable to speech restrictions in traditional public forums.
Id., at 211, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 119, L. Ed. 2d 5, 22. In his
opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia argued that
the less rigorous “reasonableness” standard of review should
apply, and found the law “at least reasonable” in light of the
plurality’s analysis. Id., at 216, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 119, L. Ed.
2d 5, 25.
MVA disputes the relevance of Burson to Minnesota’s
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apparel ban. On MVA’s reading, Burson considered only
“active campaigning” outside the polling place by campaign
workers and others trying to engage voters approaching the
polls. Brief for Petitioners 36-37. Minnesota’s law, by
contrast, prohibits what MVA characterizes as “passive,
silent” self-expression by voters themselves when voting.
Reply Brief 17. MVA also points out that the plurality
focused on the extent to which the restricted zone combated
“voter intimidation and election fraud,” 504 U. S., at 208, 112
S. Ct. 1846, 119, L. Ed. 2d 5, 20—concerns that, in MVA’s
view, have little to do with a prohibition on certain types of
voter apparel.
Campaign buttons and apparel did come up in the Burson
briefing and argument, but neither the plurality nor Justice
Scalia expressly addressed such applications of the law. 1 Nor
did either opinion specifically consider the interior of the
polling [***22] place as opposed to its environs, and it is true
that the plurality’s reasoning focused on campaign activities
of a sort not likely to occur in an area where, for the most
part, only voters are permitted while voting. At the same time,
Tennessee’s law swept broadly to ban even the plain
“display” of a campaign-related message, [**214] and the
Court upheld the law in full. The plurality’s conclusion that
the State was warranted in designating an area for the voters
as “their own” as they enter the polling place suggests an
interest more significant, not less, within that place. Id., at
210, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 119, L. Ed. 2d 5, 21.
In any event, we see no basis for rejecting Minnesota’s
determination that some forms of advocacy should be
excluded from the polling place, to set it aside as “an island of
calm in which voters can peacefully contemplate their
choices.” Brief for Respondents 43. HN5[ ] Casting a vote
is a weighty civic act, akin to a jury’s return of a verdict, or a
representative’s vote on a piece of legislation. It is a time for
choosing, not campaigning. The State may reasonably decide
that the interior of the polling place should reflect that
distinction.
To be sure, HN6[ ] our decisions have noted the
“nondisruptive” nature [***23] of expressive apparel in more
mundane settings. Board of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles
v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U. S. 569, 576, 107 S. Ct. 2568,
96 L. Ed. 2d 500, 508 (1987) (so characterizing “the wearing
of a T-shirt or button that contains a political message” in an
airport); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 508, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d
731 (1969) (students wearing black armbands to protest the
Vietnam War engaged in “silent, passive expression of
opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance”). But
those observations do not speak to the unique context of a
polling place on Election Day. Members of [*1888] the
public are brought together at that place, at the end of what
may have been a divisive election season, to reach considered
decisions about their government and laws. The State may
reasonably take steps to ensure that partisan discord not
follow the voter up to the voting booth, and distract from a
sense of shared civic obligation at the moment it counts the
most. That interest may be thwarted by displays that do not
raise significant concerns in other situations.
Other States can see the matter differently, and some do. 2
The majority, however, agree with Minnesota that at least
some kinds of campaign-related clothing and accessories
should stay outside. 3 That broadly shared judgment is entitled
to respect. Cf. Burson, 504 U. S., at 206, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 119,
L. Ed. 2d 5, 19 (plurality opinion) (finding [***24] that a
“widespread and time-tested consensus” supported the
constitutionality of campaign buffer zones).
Thus, HN7[ ] in light of the special purpose of the polling
place itself, Minnesota may choose to prohibit certain apparel
there because of the message [**215] it conveys, so that
voters may focus on the important decisions immediately at
2
1
The State of Tennessee represented that its prohibition on campaign
displays extended both to items of apparel and to voters. Tr. of Oral
Arg. in No. 90-1056, p. 33 (argument of Atty. Gen. Burson)
(explaining that the statute banned “[t]ee-shirts,” “campaign
buttons,” and “hats” because such items “implicate and invite the
same problems,” and that voters would be “asked to take campaign
button[s] off as they go in”); see Brief for State of Tennessee et al. as
Amici Curiae 3, 28-30, and n. 3 (making the same representation in
the present case). The Burson plaintiff also emphasized that the
Tennessee law would cover apparel, including apparel worn by
voters, see Brief for Respondent in No. 90-1056, p. 3; Tr. of Oral
Arg. in No. 90-1056, p. 21, and Justice Stevens in dissent referred to
the application of the law to campaign buttons, see Burson, 504 U.
S., at 218-219, 224, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 119, L. Ed. 2d 5, 26-27, 30.
See, e.g., Ala. Secretary of State, 2018 Alabama Voter Guide 14
(voters may wear “campaign buttons or T-shirts with political
advertisements”); 2018 Va. Acts ch. 700, §1 (prohibitions on
exhibiting campaign material “shall not be construed” to prohibit a
voter “from wearing a shirt, hat, or other apparel on which a
candidate’s name or a political slogan appears or from having a
sticker or button attached to his apparel on which a candidate’s name
or a political slogan appears”); R. I. Bd. of Elections, Rules and
Regulations for Polling Place Conduct 3 (2016) (voters may “display
or wear any campaign or political party button, badge or other
document or item designed or tending to aid, injure or defeat any
candidate for public office or any political party or any question,”
but they must “immediately exit the polling location without
unreasonable delay” after voting).
3
See Appendix, infra.
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hand.
B
But HN8[ ] the State must draw a reasonable line. Although
there is no requirement of narrow tailoring in a nonpublic
forum, the State must be able to articulate some sensible basis
for distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out.
See Cornelius, 473 U. S., at 808-809, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 87 L.
Ed. 2d 567, 583-584. Here, the unmoored use of the term
“political” in the Minnesota law, combined with haphazard
interpretations the State has provided in official guidance and
representations to this Court, cause Minnesota’s restriction to
fail even this forgiving test.
Again, the statute prohibits wearing a “political badge,
political button, or other political insignia.” It does not define
the term “political.” And the word can be expansive. It can
encompass anything “of or relating to government, a
government, or the conduct of governmental affairs,”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1755 (2002),
or anything “[o]f, [***25] relating to, or dealing with the
structure or affairs of government, politics, or the state,”
American Heritage Dictionary 1401 (3d ed. 1996). Under a
literal reading of those definitions, a button or T-shirt merely
imploring others to “Vote!” could qualify.
The State argues that the apparel ban should not be read so
broadly. According to the State, the statute does not prohibit
“any conceivably ‘political’ message” or cover “all ‘political’
speech, broadly construed.” Brief for Respondents 21, 23.
Instead, the State interprets the ban to proscribe “only words
and symbols that an objectively reasonable observer would
perceive as conveying a message about the [*1889] electoral
choices at issue in [the] polling place.” Id., at 13; see id., at 19
(the ban “applies not to any message regarding government or
its affairs, but to messages relating to questions of
governmental affairs facing voters on a given election day”).
At the same time, the State argues that the category of
“political” apparel is not limited to campaign apparel. After
all, the reference to “campaign material” in the first sentence
of the statute—describing what one may not “display” in the
buffer zone as well as inside the polling place—implies
that [***26] the distinct term “political” should be
understood to cover a broader class of items. As the State’s
counsel explained to the Court, Minnesota’s law “expand[s]
the scope of what is prohibited from campaign speech to
additional political speech.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 50.
HN9[ ] We consider a State’s “authoritative constructions”
in interpreting a state law. Forsyth County v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U. S. 123, 131, 112 S. Ct. 2395, 120 L. Ed. 2d
101 (1992). But far from clarifying the indeterminate scope of
the political apparel provision, the State’s “electoral choices”
construction introduces confusing line-drawing problems. Cf.
Jews for Jesus, 482 U. S., at 575-576, 107 S. Ct. 2568, 96 L.
Ed. 2d 500, 507-508 (a resolution banning all “First
Amendment activities” in an airport could not be saved by a
“murky” construction excluding “airport-related” activity).
For specific examples of what is banned under its standard,
the State [**216] points to the 2010 Election Day Policy—
which it continues to hold out as authoritative guidance
regarding implementation of the statute. See Brief for
Respondents 22-23. The first three examples in the Policy are
clear enough: items displaying the name of a political party,
items displaying the name of a candidate, and items
demonstrating “support of or opposition to a ballot question.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. I-2.
But the next example—“[i]ssue oriented material
designed [***27] to influence or impact voting,” id., at I-2—
raises more questions than it answers. What qualifies as an
“issue”? The answer, as far as we can tell from the State’s
briefing and argument, is any subject on which a political
candidate or party has taken a stance. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37
(explaining that the “electoral choices” test looks at the
“issues that have been raised” in a campaign “that are relevant
to the election”). For instance, the Election Day Policy
specifically notes that the “Please I. D. Me” buttons are
prohibited. App. to Pet. for Cert. I-2. But a voter identification
requirement was not on the ballot in 2010, see Brief for
Respondents 47, n. 24, so a Minnesotan would have had no
explicit “electoral choice” to make in that respect. The buttons
were nonetheless covered, the State tells us, because the
Republican candidates for Governor and Secretary of State
had staked out positions on whether photo identification
should be required. Ibid.; see App. 58-60. 4
HN10[ ] A rule whose fair enforcement requires an election
judge to maintain a mental index of the platforms and
positions of every candidate and party on the ballot is not
reasonable. Candidates for statewide and federal [***28]
office and major political parties can be expected to take
positions on a [*1890] wide array of subjects of local and
national import. See, e.g., Democratic Platform Committee,
2016 Democratic Party Platform (approved July 2016)
4
The State also maintains that the “Please I. D. Me” buttons were
properly banned because the buttons were designed to confuse other
voters about whether they needed photo identification to vote. Brief
for Respondents 46-47. We do not doubt that the State may prohibit
messages intended to mislead voters about voting requirements and
procedures. But that interest does not align with the State’s
construction of “political” to refer to messages “about the electoral
choices at issue in [the] polling place.” Id., at 13.
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(stating positions on over 90 issues); Republican Platform
Committee, Republican Platform 2016 (approved July 2016)
(similar). Would a “Support Our Troops” shirt be banned, if
one of the candidates or parties had expressed a view on
military funding or aid for veterans? What about a “#MeToo”
shirt, referencing the movement to increase awareness of
sexual harassment and assault? At oral argument, the State
indicated that the ban would cover such an item if a candidate
had “brought up” the topic. Tr. of Oral Arg. 64-65.
The next broad category in the Election Day Policy—any
item “promoting a group with recognizable political views,”
App. to Pet. for Cert. I-2—makes matters worse. The State
construes the category as limited to groups with “views”
about “the issues confronting voters in a given election.” Brief
for Respondents 23. The State does not, however, confine that
category to groups that have endorsed a candidate or taken a
position on a ballot question.
Any number [***29] of associations, educational [**217]
institutions, businesses, and religious organizations could
have an opinion on an “issue[ ] confronting voters in a given
election.” For instance, the American Civil Liberties Union,
the AARP, the World Wildlife Fund, and Ben & Jerry’s all
have stated positions on matters of public concern. 5 If the
views of those groups align or conflict with the position of a
candidate or party on the ballot, does that mean that their
insignia are banned? See id., at 24, n. 15 (representing that
“AFL-CIO or Chamber of Commerce apparel” would be
banned if those organizations “had objectively recognizable
views on an issue in the election at hand”). Take another
example: In the run-up to the 2012 election, Presidential
candidates of both major parties issued public statements
regarding the then-existing policy of the Boy Scouts of
America to exclude members on the basis of sexual
orientation. 6 Should a Scout leader in 2012 stopping to vote
5
See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union, Campaign for Smart
Justice (2018), online at http://www.aclu.org/issues/massincarceration/ smart-justice/campaign-smart-justice (taking positions
on criminal justice reform) (all Internet materials as last visited June
11, 2018); AARP, Government & Elections, online at
https://www.aarp.org/ politics-society/government-elections/ (listing
positions on Social Security and health care); World Wildlife Fund,
A Win on Capitol Hill (Apr. 17, 2018), online at
https://www.worldwildlife.org/stories/a-win-on-capitol-hill
(describing the organization’s position on federal funding for
international conservation programs); Ben & Jerry’s, Issues We Care
About, online at https://www.benjerry.com/values/issues-we-careabout (sharing the corporation’s views on campaign finance reform,
international conflict, and civil rights).
6
C. Camia, Obama, Romney Opposed to Boy Scouts Ban on Gays,
USA Today OnPolitics (updated Aug. 08, 2012), online at http : / /
on his way to a troop meeting have been asked to cover up his
uniform?
The State emphasizes that the ban covers only apparel
promoting groups whose political positions are sufficiently
“well-known.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 37. But that requirement, if
anything, [***30] only increases the potential for erratic
application. Well known by whom? The State tells us the
lodestar is the “typical observer” of the item. Brief for
Respondents 21. But that measure may turn in significant part
on the background knowledge and media consumption of the
particular election judge applying it.
[*1891] The State’s “electoral choices” standard, considered
together with the nonexclusive examples in the Election Day
Policy, poses riddles that even the State’s top lawyers struggle
to solve. A shirt declaring “All Lives Matter,” we are told,
could be “perceived” as political. Tr. of Oral Arg. 41. How
about a shirt bearing the name of the National Rifle
Association? Definitely out. Id., at 39-40. That said, a shirt
displaying a rainbow flag could be worn “unless there was an
issue on the ballot” that “related somehow . . . to gay rights.”
Id., at 38 (emphasis added). A shirt simply displaying the text
of the Second Amendment? Prohibited. Id., at 40. But a shirt
with the text of the First Amendment? “It would be allowed.”
Ibid.
HN11[ ] “[P]erfect clarity and precise guidance have never
been required even of regulations that restrict expressive
activity.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 794,
109 S. Ct. 2746, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1989). But the State’s
difficulties with its restriction go beyond close calls on
borderline or fanciful [***31] cases. And that is a serious
matter when the [**218] whole point of the exercise is to
prohibit the expression of political views.
HN12[ ] It is “self-evident” that an indeterminate
prohibition carries with it “[t]he opportunity for abuse,
especially where [it] has received a virtually open-ended
interpretation.” Jews for Jesus, 482 U. S., at 576, 107 S. Ct.
2568, 96 L. Ed. 2d 500, 508; see Heffron v. International Soc.
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 649, 101 S.
Ct. 2559, 69 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1981) (warning of the “more
covert forms of discrimination that may result when arbitrary
discretion is vested in some governmental authority”).
Election judges “have the authority to decide what is
political” when screening individuals at the entrance to the
polls. App. to Pet. for Cert. I-1. We do not doubt that the vast
majority of election judges strive to enforce the statute in an
evenhanded manner, nor that some degree of discretion in this
setting is necessary. But that discretion must be guided by
content.usatoday.com/communities/onpolitics/post/2012/08/barackobama-boy-scouts-gays-mitt-romney-/1.
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objective, workable standards. Without them, an election
judge’s own politics may shape his views on what counts as
“political.” And if voters experience or witness episodes of
unfair or inconsistent enforcement of the ban, the State’s
interest in maintaining a polling place free of distraction and
disruption would be undermined by the very measure
intended to further it.
That is not to say [***32] that Minnesota has set upon an
impossible task. Other States have laws proscribing displays
(including apparel) in more lucid terms. See, e.g., Cal. Elec.
Code Ann. §319.5 (West Cum. Supp. 2018) (prohibiting “the
visible display . . . of information that advocates for or against
any candidate or measure,” including the “display of a
candidate’s name, likeness, or logo,” the “display of a ballot
measure’s number, title, subject, or logo,” and “[b]uttons,
hats,” or “shirts” containing such information); Tex. Elec.
Code Ann. §61.010(a) (West 2010) (prohibiting the wearing
of “a badge, insignia, emblem, or other similar
communicative device relating to a candidate, measure, or
political party appearing on the ballot, or to the conduct of the
election”). We do not suggest that such provisions set the
outer limit of what a State may proscribe, and do not pass on
the constitutionality of laws that are not before us. But we do
hold that if a State wishes to set its polling places apart as
areas free of partisan discord, it must employ a more
discernible approach than the one Minnesota has offered here.
7
[**219] ***
[*1892] Cases like this “present[ ] us with a particularly
difficult reconciliation: the accommodation of the right to
engage in political [***33] discourse with the right to vote.”
Burson, 504 U. S., at 198, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 119, L. Ed. 2d 5,
13-14 (plurality opinion). Minnesota, like other States, has
sought to strike the balance in a way that affords the voter the
opportunity to exercise his civic duty in a setting removed
from the clamor and din of electioneering. While that choice
is generally worthy of our respect, Minnesota has not
supported its good intentions with a law capable of reasoned
application.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
APPENDIX
State Laws Prohibiting Accessories or Apparel in the Polling
Place *
Go to table1
[**220]
Dissent by: SOTOMAYOR
7
The State argues that, in the event this Court concludes that there is
a “substantial question” about the proper interpretation of
§211B.11(1), we should postpone our decision and certify that issue
to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Brief for Respondents 57; see
Minn. Stat. §480.065(3) (2016). The dissent takes up this cause as
well. See post, at 1 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.). The decision to
certify, however, “rests in the sound discretion of the federal court.”
Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 581 U. S. ___, ___, 137
S. Ct. 1144, 197 L. Ed. 2d 442, 456 (2017) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in judgment). We decline to exercise that discretion in
this instance. Minnesota’s request for certification comes very late in
the day: This litigation had been ongoing in the federal courts for
over seven years before the State made its certification request in its
merits brief before this Court. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U. S.
914, 945, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 147 L. Ed. 2d 743 (2000) (noting, in
denying certification, that the State had never asked the lower federal
courts to certify). And the State has not offered sufficient reason to
believe that certification would obviate the need to address the
constitutional question. Our analysis today reflects the State’s
proffered interpretation; nothing in that analysis would change if the
State’s interpretation were also adopted by the Minnesota Supreme
Court. Nor has the State (or the dissent) suggested a viable
alternative construction that the Minnesota Supreme Court might
adopt instead. See Brief for Respondents 56-58; post, at 5-8.
Dissent
Justice Sotomayor, [***35] with whom Justice Breyer joins,
dissenting.
I agree with the Court that “[c]asting a vote is a weighty civic
act” and that “State[s] may reasonably take steps to ensure
that partisan discord not follow the voter up to the voting
booth,” including by “prohibit[ing] certain apparel [in polling
places] because of the message it conveys.” Ante, at 11-12. I
disagree, however, with the Court’s decision to declare
Minnesota’s political apparel ban unconstitutional on its face
because, in its view, the ban is not “capable of reasoned
application,” ante, at 19, when the Court has not first afforded
the Minnesota state courts “‘a reasonable opportunity to pass
upon’” and construe the statute, Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442
U. S. 289, 308, 99 S. Ct. 2301, 60 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1979). I
*
* Based on statutory or regulatory language and official resources,
where available.
Robert Muise
Page 13 of 17
Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky
would certify this case to the Minnesota Supreme Court for a
definitive interpretation of the political apparel ban under
Minn. Stat. §211B.11(1) (Supp. 2017), which likely would
obviate the hypothetical line-drawing problems that form the
basis of the Court’s decision today.
I
As the Court acknowledges, Minnesota adopted its political
apparel ban late in the 19th century against the backdrop of
often “‘chaotic’” voting conditions where “[c]rowds would
gather to heckle and harass voters who appeared to be
supporting the other [***36] side.” Ante, at 2. Polling places
became “highly charged ethnic, religious, and ideological
battleground[s] in which individuals were stereotyped as
friend or foe,” even “on the basis of clothing.” R. Bensel, The
American Ballot Box in the Mid-Nineteenth Century 21
(2004). As a result, States began adopting reforms [*1894]
“to address these vulnerabilities and improve the reliability of
elections.” Ante, at 3.
[**221] Minnesota thus enacted the political apparel ban at
issue in this case, which prohibits an individual from wearing
“[a] political badge, political button, or other political insignia
. . . at or about the polling place.” §211B.11(1). Respondents
maintain that this prohibition, together with other election-day
regulations, furthers Minnesota’s compelling interests in (1)
“maintaining peace, order and decorum in the polling place,”
(2) “protecting voters from confusion and undue influence
such as intimidation,” and (3) “preserving the integrity of its
election process.” Brief for Respondents 41 (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted); see Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U. S. 191, 193, 199, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 119 L.
Ed. 2d 5 (1992) (plurality opinion) (recognizing such interests
as compelling).
The majority accords due respect to the weight of these state
interests in concluding [***37] that there is “no basis for
rejecting Minnesota’s determination that some forms of
advocacy should be excluded from the polling place, to set it
aside as ‘an island of calm in which voters can peacefully
contemplate their choices.’” Ante, at 11. Polling places today
may not much resemble the chaotic scenes of the turn of the
20th century, but they remain vulnerable to interpersonal
conflicts and partisan efforts to influence voters. 1 Even acts
1
See, e.g., J. Johnson, Fight Breaks Out at Polling Place (Nov. 8,
2016) (describing a fight in which a voter sprayed pepper spray at a
campaign volunteer who allegedly had been handing out campaign
materials), http://www.wpbf.com/article/fight-breaks-out-at-pollingplace/ 8258506 (all Internet materials as last visited June 8, 2018); R.
Reilly, A Guy in a Trump Shirt Carried a Gun Outside of a Virginia
Polling Place. Authorities Say That’s Fine (Nov. 4, 2016) (describing
a man wearing a shirt bearing the name of a candidate and carrying a
of interference that are “undetected or less than blatant . . .
may nonetheless drive the voter away before remedial action
can be taken.” Burson, 504 U. S., at 207, 112 S. Ct. 1846,
119, L. Ed. 2d 5, 19; see also Brief for Campaign Legal
Center as Amicus Curiae 9 (noting that, “[a]bsent a ban on
political paraphernalia, [poll] workers might unintentionally
exhibit unconscious bias against voters who wear the ‘wrong’
paraphernalia”).
In holding that a polling place constitutes a nonpublic forum
and that a State must establish only that its limitations on
speech inside the polling place are reasonable, see ante, at 89, the Court goes a long way in preserving States’ discretion
to determine what measures are appropriate to further
important interests in maintaining order and decorum,
preventing confusion [***38]
and intimidation, and
protecting the integrity of the voting process. The Court errs,
however, in declaring Minnesota’s political apparel ban
unconstitutional under that standard, without any guidance
from the State’s highest court on the proper interpretation of
that state law. Ante, at 13, 19, n. 7.
[**222] II
The Court invalidates Minnesota’s political apparel ban based
on its inability to [*1895] define the term “political” in
§211B.11(1), so as to discern “some sensible basis for
distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out” of
a polling place. Ante, at 12-13. The majority believes that the
law is not “capable of reasoned application,” ante, at 19, but it
reaches that conclusion without taking the preferential step of
first asking the state courts to provide “an accurate picture of
how, exactly, the statute works,” Expressions Hair Design v.
Schneiderman, 581 U. S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 197 L.
Ed. 2d 442, 455 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in
judgment). It is a “cardinal principle” that, “when confronting
a challenge to the constitutionality of a . . . statute,” courts
“will first ascertain whether a construction . . . is fairly
possible that will contain the statute within constitutional
weapon
outside
of
a
polling
place),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trumpsupporter - gun -voterintimidation-virginia_us_581cf16ee4b0aac624846eb5;
Houston Chronicle, Nov. 5, 2012, p. 2 (reporting that individuals
wearing shirts bearing the name of a racial equality organization
allegedly were “disruptive,” “took over” a polling place, and were
“electioneering and voicing support” for a particular candidate);
Orlando Sentinel, Nov. 8, 2006, p. A5 (reporting arrest of a poll
worker who was “charged with assault and interfering with an
election after allegedly choking a voter and pushing him out the
door”); Orlando Sentinel, Mar. 2, 2005, p. B1 (reporting “[s]houting
matches and rowdy behavior” and “harass[ment] and intimidat[ion]
at the polls”).
Robert Muise
Page 14 of 17
Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky
bounds,” and in the context of a challenge to a state statute,
federal courts should be particularly [***39] hesitant to
speculate as to possible constructions of the state law when
“the state courts stand willing to address questions of state
law on certification.” Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 78-79, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 137 L. Ed. 2d
170 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Minn. Stat.
§480.065(3) (2016) (authorizing the Minnesota Supreme
Court to answer certified questions). Certification “save[s]
time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative
judicial federalism.” Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U. S.
386, 391, 94 S. Ct. 1741, 40 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1974). Neither of
the majority’s proffered reasons for declining to certify this
case justifies its holding.
First, the Court notes that respondents’ “request for
certification comes very late in the day,” as the litigation
already had been ongoing for more than seven years before
the request. Ante, at 19, n. 7. But certification is not an
argument subject to forfeiture by the parties. It is a tool of the
federal courts that serves to avoid “friction-generating error”
where a federal court attempts to construe a statute “not yet
reviewed by the State’s highest court.” Arizonans for Official
English, 520 U. S., at 79, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 137 L. Ed. 2d 170,
201. This Court has certified questions to a state court “sua
sponte, even though the parties had not sought such relief and
even though the district court and the court of appeals
previously had resolved the disputed point of state law.” S.
Shapiro, [***40] K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett, & D.
Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Practice §9.4, p. 611 (10th ed.
2013) (citing Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U. S. 647, 660-663, 668669, 98 S. Ct. 1338, 55 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1978)); see also
Massachusetts v. Feeney, 429 U. S. 66, 97 S. Ct. 345, 50 L.
Ed. 2d 224 (1976) (per curiam) (certifying a question to the
Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts “on [the Court’s] own motion”). Respondents’
delay in asking for certification does nothing to alter this
Court’s responsibility as a matter of state-federal comity to
give due deference to the state courts in interpreting their own
laws.
Second, the majority maintains that respondents have “not
offered sufficient reason to believe that certification would
obviate the need to [**223] address the constitutional
question,” as “nothing in [its] analysis would change if
[respondents’] interpretation were also adopted by the
Minnesota Supreme Court.” Ante, at 19, n. 7. The majority
also relies on its view that respondents have not “suggested a
viable alternative construction that the Minnesota Supreme
Court might adopt instead.” Ibid. To presume that the
Minnesota Supreme Court would adopt respondents’
interpretation wholesale or that it could not provide a
construction of its own that is “capable of reasoned
application,” ante, at 19, however, reflects precisely the
“gratuitous” [***41] “‘[s]peculation . . . about the [*1896]
meaning of a state statute’” that this Court has discouraged,
Arizonans for Official English, 520 U. S., at 79, 117 S. Ct.
1055, 137 L. Ed. 2d 170, 201.
It is at least “fairly possible” that the state court could
“ascertain . . . a construction . . . that will contain the statute
within constitutional bounds.” Id., at 78, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 137
L .Ed. 2d 170, 200 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ultimately, the issue comes down to the meaning of the
adjective “political,” as used to describe what constitutes a
“political badge, political button, or other political insignia.”
§211B.11(1). The word “political” is, of course, not
inherently incapable of definition. This Court elsewhere has
encountered little difficulty discerning its meaning in the
context of statutes subject to First Amendment challenges.
See, e.g., Civil Service Comm’n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S.
548, 550-551, 93 S. Ct. 2880, 37 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1973)
(rejecting First Amendment overbreadth and vagueness
challenge to §9(a) of the Hatch Act, then codified at 5 U. S.
C. §7324(a)(2), which prohibited federal employees from
taking “‘an active part in political management or in political
campaigns’”); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 602, 93
S. Ct. 2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1973) (rejecting First
Amendment overbreadth and vagueness challenge to a similar
Oklahoma law that “restricts the political activities of the
State’s classified civil servants”).
Even here, the majority recognizes a substantial amount of
speech that “clear[ly]” qualifies as “political,” such
as [***42] “items displaying the name of a political party,
items displaying the name of a candidate, and items
demonstrating support of or opposition to a ballot question.”
Ante, at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted). The fact that
the majority has some difficulty deciphering guidance to
§211B.11(1) that also proscribes “[i]ssue oriented material
designed to influence or impact voting” and “[m]aterial
promoting a group with recognizable political views,” App. to
Pet. for Cert. I-2; see ante, at 14-17, does not mean that the
statute as a whole is not subject to a construction that falls
within constitutional bounds. As this Court has made clear in
the context of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, the
“mere fact” that petitioners “can conceive of some
impermissible applications of [the] statute is not sufficient to
render it” unconstitutional. United States v. Williams, 553 U.
S. 285, 303, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 170 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted). That is especially so
where the state court is capable of clarifying the boundaries of
state law in a manner that would permit the Court to engage in
a comprehensive [**224] constitutional analysis. See, e.g.,
Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U. S. 383,
108 S. Ct. 636, 98 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1988) (certifying questions
Robert Muise
Page 15 of 17
Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky
to the Virginia Supreme Court for clarification as to whether a
state statute was readily susceptible to a narrowing [***43]
construction that would not violate the First Amendment);
Commonwealth v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 236 Va.
168, 372 S. E. 2d 618, 5 Va. Law Rep. 601 (1988)
(responding to certification with such a narrowing
construction).
Furthermore, the Court also should consider the history of
Minnesota’s “implementation” of the statute in evaluating the
facial challenge here. Forsyth County v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U. S. 123, 131, 112 S. Ct. 2395, 120 L. Ed. 2d
101 (1992). That history offers some assurance that the statute
has not been interpreted or applied in an unreasonable
manner. There is no evidence that any individual who refused
to remove a political item has been prohibited from voting,
and respondents maintain that no one has been referred for
prosecution for violating the provision. See Brief for
Respondents 4, n. [*1897] 2. Since the political apparel ban
was enacted in the late 19th century, this is the first time the
statute has been challenged on the basis that certain speech is
not “political.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 44. Even then, petitioners’ asapplied challenge was rejected by the District Court and the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. See Minnesota
Majority v. Mansky, 62 F. Supp. 3d 870, 878 (Minn. 2014);
Minnesota Majority v. Mansky, 2015 WL 13636675, *12 (D
Minn., Mar. 23, 2015); Minnesota Majority v. Mansky, 849 F.
3d 749, 752-753 (CA8 2017). Petitioners did not seek review
of those claims in this Court. See Pet. for Cert. i. On the
whole, the historical application of the law helps illustrate that
the statute is not so “indeterminate” so as to “carr[y] with it
‘[t]he opportunity for [***44] abuse.’” Ante, at 17.
III
Especially where there are undisputedly many constitutional
applications of a state law that further weighty state interests,
the Court should be wary of invalidating a law without giving
the State’s highest court an opportunity to pass upon it. See
Babbitt, 442 U. S., at 309, 99 S. Ct. 2301, 60 L. Ed. 2d 895,
913; Arizonans for Official English, 520 U. S., at 79, 117 S.
Ct. 1055, 137 L. Ed. 2d 170, 200-201. Because the Court
declines to take the obvious step of certification in this case, I
respectfully
dissent.
Robert Muise
Page 16 of 17
Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky
Table1 (Return to related document text)
Alaska
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Michigan
[*1893] Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Dakota
Ohio
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Wisconsin
Alaska Stat. §§15.15.170, 15.56.016(a)(2) (2016)
Ark. Code Ann. §7-1-103(a)(9)(Supp. 2017)
Cal. Elec. Code Ann. §§319.5, 18370 (West Cum. Supp. 2018)
Colo. Rev. Stat. §1-13-714(1) (2017)
Conn. Gen. Stat. §9-236 (2017)
Del. Code Ann., Tit. 15, §4942 (2015)
D. C. Code §1-1001.10(b)(2) (2016); D. C. Munic. Regs., tit. 3, §707, 65 D. C.
Reg. 4504 (2018)
Ga. Code Ann. §21-2-414(a)(Supp. 2017)
Haw. Rev. Stat. §11-132(d) (2009); Haw. Admin. Rule §3-172-63(a) (2017)
Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 10, §5/7-41(c) [***34] (West 2016)
Ind. Stat. Ann. §3-14-3-16 (Lexis 2011)
Kan. Stat. Ann. §25-2430(a)(2006)
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18:1462(West Cum. Supp. 2018)
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 54, §65 (West 2007)
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §168.744 (West Cum. Supp. 2018)
Minn. Stat. §211B.11(1)(Supp. 2017)
Miss. Code Ann. §23-15-895(Cum. Supp. 2017)
Mo. Rev. Stat. §115.637(18) (2006)
Mont. Code Ann. §13-35-211 (2017)
Neb. Rev. Stat. §32-1524(2) (2016)
Nev. Rev. Stat. §293.740 (2015)
N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §659:43(1)(Cum. Supp. 2017)
N. J. Stat. Ann. §19:34-19 (West 2014)
N. M. Stat. Ann. §1-20-16 (2011)
N. Y. Elec. Law Ann. §8-104(1) (West 2018)
N. D. Cent. Code Ann. §16.1-10-03 (2015)
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3501.35(A) (Lexis Supp. 2018)
S. C. Code Ann. §7-25-180 (2017 Cum. Supp.)
S. D. Codified Laws §12-18-3 (Cum. Supp. 2017)
Tenn. Code Ann. §2-7-111(b) (2014)
Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §61.010(a) (West 2010)
Utah Code §20A-3-501 (2017)
Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, §2508(a)(1)(Cum. Supp. 2017)
Wis. Stat. §12.03 (2011-2012)
Table1 (Return to related document text)
Robert Muise
Page 17 of 17
Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky
End of Document
Robert Muise
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