New Jerusalem Deliverance Church v. Rabette et al

Filing 64

ORDER denying 62 Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint and Ex-Parte Emergency Motion for Temporary Stay Pending Appeal. Signed by District Judge Robert H. Cleland. (LWag)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

NEW JERUSALEM DELIVERANCE CHURCH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 10-12566

THOMAS RABETTE, et al.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
AMEND THE COMPLAINT, AND EX-PARTE EMERGENCY MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY STAY PENDING APPEAL
On May 3, 2011, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Leave to
Amend the Complaint with Proposed Amended Complaint, and Ex-Parte Emergency
Motion for Temporary Stay Pending Appeal.” The court therefore construes the filing as
presenting three separate motions. All will be denied.
A motion for reconsideration will only be granted where the movant
“demonstrate[s] a palpable defect by which the court and the parties and other persons
entitled to be heard on the motion have been misled” and where “correcting the defect
will result in a different disposition of the case.” E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3). “[T]he court
will not grant motions for rehearing or reconsideration that merely present the same
issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable implication.” Id.
The reconsideration standard sets a high bar, and Plaintiff has not met it here.
Plaintiff asks the court to reconsider its April 20, 2011, opinion and order denying
Plaintiff’s motions for extension of time and for discovery, granting summary judgment,

and dismissing Count Two without prejudice, and its April 29, 2011, order striking
Plaintiff’s response, granting summary judgment in favor of nonmovant Evangelical
Christian Credit Union (“ECCU”), and dismissing Count Two without prejudice. In its
motion, Plaintiff presents two arguments directed toward reconsideration. First, Plaintiff
characterizes the April 29, 2011, order thus: “The Court cites prejudice to Defendant
ECCU as grounds for granting summary judgment on Count One but allowing the
supplemental state law claim of quiet title to be dismissed without prejudice.” (Mot. Br.
5.) Plaintiff contends that this “reasoning is not persuasive because [the] factual basis
of Count One is so intimately intertwined with the factual basis of Count Two that the
granting of summary judgment on the merits of Count One risks subjecting Plaintiff to
collateral estoppel . . . .” (Id.)
Second, Plaintiff focuses on the procedural posture of this case as contrasted to
that in Northrip v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975),
the controlling case that led to the grant of summary judgment. Plaintiff argues that the
Sixth Circuit in that case “did not affirm a grant of summary judgment.” (Id.) Further,
Plaintiff asserts that Northrip does not bar Plaintiff from amending its complaint. (Id.)
Plaintiff has not presented any defect, much less a palpable defect. No matter
how “intertwined” the facts underlying each count are, the court granted summary
judgment for all Defendants because Northrip controlled Plaintiff’s federal claim.
Further, the differing procedural postures of this case and Northrip do not affect that
case’s holding that there is no state action involved in the execution of the procedures
set forth in Michigan’s foreclosure by advertisement statute, Mich. Comp. Laws

2

§ 600.3201-.3285. The court was therefore bound to grant Defendants’ motion.
Without a federal claim, the court discretionarily determined that supplemental
jurisdiction should not be exercised over the quiet title claim. (4/20/11 Op. and Order 810.) In addition, the court found that it would not be in the interest of justice to allow
Plaintiff to amend its complaint at this late stage. (Id. at 7-8.)
It is clear from Plaintiff’s motion that Plaintiff disagrees with the court’s rulings.
But Plaintiff has not presented any argument not previously ruled on, nor has Plaintiff
pointed to a “palpable defect by which the court . . . [has] been misled.” E.D. Mich. LR
7.1(h)(3). Therefore, there is no basis to grant Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.
Plaintiff’s filing also presents a motion for leave to amend the complaint. That
motion will be denied for reasons already stated. (See 4/20/11 Op. and Order 7-8.)
Finally, Plaintiff moves for “an ex-parte emergency stay to prevent Defendant
ECCU from using the invalid sheriff deed [sic] as grounds to evict Plaintiff from the
disputed property.” (Mot. Br. 6.) Plaintiff requests a stay of a state-court eviction action
pending an appeal of this ruling.
As an initial matter, the court is skeptical of its power to enjoin or stay a civil
state-court foreclosure proceeding. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (applying
doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), to federal case seeking to enjoin civil
state-court action where the government is not a party). However, even if the court has
the power to stay the foreclosure action, the court would not be inclined to exercise it
here.

3

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, motion
for leave to amend the complaint, and ex-parte emergency motion for temporary stay
pending appeal [Dkt. # 62] is DENIED.

s/Robert H. Cleland
ROBERT H. CLELAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: May 24, 2011
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record
on this date, May 24, 2011, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Lisa Wagner
Case Manager and Deputy Clerk
[phone]

S:\Cleland\JUDGE'S DESK\C2 ORDERS\10-12566.NEWJERUSALEM.DenyReconsideration2.jmp.wpd

4