Watkins v. McKee
Filing
38
OPINION and ORDER denying 33 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Arthur J. Tarnow. (CPic)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
GARY EUGENE WATKINS,
Petitioner,
v.
Civil No. 2:10-CV-13199
HONORABLE ARTHUR J. TARNOW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
RANDALL HAAS,
Respondent,
____________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Gary Eugene Watkins,(“Petitioner”), currently confined at the Carson City
Correctional Facility in Carson City, Michigan, filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, through his attorneys James C. Thomas
and Phillip D. Comorski. This Court granted petitioner a writ of habeas corpus,
finding that he had been denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Watkins
v. Haas, 143 F. Supp. 3d 632, 634 (E.D. Mich. 2015). The Sixth Circuit reversed
this Court’s decision. Watkins v. Deangelo-Kipp, 854 F.3d 846 (6th Cir. 2017).
Petitioner has filed a petition for writ of certiorari which remains pending in the
United States Supreme Court. Watkins v. Deangelo-Kipp, No. 16-1385 (U.S.).
Pending before the Court is petitioner’s pro se motion for reconsideration, in
which he seeks to be released on bond. For the reasons that follow, the motion
is DENIED.
1
Watkins v. Deangelo-Kipp, No. 10-cv-13199
The Court denies petitioner’s motion for several reasons.
First, a habeas petitioner who is represented by counsel is not entitled to
consideration of any pro se motions that he or she files on his or her behalf. See
Jones v. Bradshaw, 138 F. Supp. 3d 921, 923 (N.D. Ohio 2015). A habeas
petitioner is not entitled to “proceed by means of hybrid representation” in his or
her case. Id. (citing United States v. Mosely, 810 F.2d 93, 97 (6th Cir.1987)).
Petitioner is represented by competent counsel, therefore, any motions on his
behalf should be filed by his attorneys.
Secondly, petitioner is not entitled to a bond pending appeal because the
Sixth Circuit reversed this Court’s decision to grant habeas relief.
There is a presumption that a successful habeas petitioner should be
released from custody pending the state’s appeal of a federal court decision
granting habeas relief, but this presumption may be overcome if the judge
rendering the decision, or an appellate court or judge, orders otherwise. Hilton v.
Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 774 (1987); Workman v. Tate, 958 F. 2d 164, 166 (6th
Cir. 1992); F.R.A.P. Rule 23(c). Because habeas proceedings are civil in nature,
the general standards of governing stays of civil judgments should also guide
courts when they must decide whether to release a habeas petitioner pending the
state’s appeal. Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776. The factors regulating the issuance of a
stay are:
2
Watkins v. Deangelo-Kipp, No. 10-cv-13199
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is
likely to succeed on the merits;
(2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay;
(3) whether the issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other
parties interested in the proceeding; and
(4) where the public interest lies.
Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. at 776; Workman v. Tate, 958 F. 2d at 166.
In determining whether to release a successful petitioner on bail pending
the appeal of the order granting relief to a habeas petitioner, federal courts are
not restricted to consider only the petitioner’s risk of flight, but are authorized to
consider traditional stay factors, including the risk that petitioner would pose a
danger to the public if released, the state’s interest in continuing custody and
rehabilitation of the petitioner, the interest of the habeas petitioner in his or her
release pending appeal, and the likelihood of the state’s success on the merits of
the appeal. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. at 777. The state’s interest in continuing
custody and rehabilitation of the habeas petitioner pending a final determination
of the case on appeal will be strongest where the remaining portion of the
sentence to be served is long, and weakest where there is little of the sentence
remaining to be served. Id. The interests of the habeas petitioner in release
pending appeal, while always substantial, will be strongest where these factors
are the weakest. Id. at 777-778. The balance of factors relevant to determining
whether a successful habeas petitioner should be released pending appeal may
3
Watkins v. Deangelo-Kipp, No. 10-cv-13199
depend to a large extent upon a determination of the state’s prospects of success
in its appeal. Hilton, 481 U.S. at 778; Workman v. Tate, 958 F. 2d at 166.
Although this Court still believes that it was correct to grant habeas relief,
the Sixth Circuit felt otherwise and reversed this Court’s decision. The Sixth
Circuit vacated this Court’s decision to grant habeas relief; there is no longer a
“presumption of release from custody” nor is the case under review by the Sixth
Circuit. Petitioner is thus not entitled to a bond pending appellate review of his
case. See Nash v. Eberlin, 437 F.3d 519, 526 (6th Cir. 2006).
ORDER
Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration [Dkt. # 33] is DENIED.
S/Arthur J. Tarnow
Arthur J. Tarnow
Senior United States District Judge
Dated: July 24, 2017
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon
parties/counsel of record on July 24, 2017, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/Catherine A. Pickles
Judicial Assistant
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