King v. William Beaumont Hospital

Filing 60

ORDER Denying Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and/or Alter or Amend the Judgment 52 . Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MONISE KING,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 10-13623
v.
HON. DENISE PAGE HOOD
WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL,
Defendant.
______________________________________/
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
AND/OR TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT
I.

BACKGROUND
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Monise King’s Motion for New

Trial and/or to Alter or Amend the Judgment. Response and reply briefs have been
filed.
The jury trial began on November 13, 2012. A verdict was rendered on
November 28, 2012, the jury finding a no cause of action in favor of Defendant and
against Plaintiff. (Verdict Form, Doc. No. 47) On December 24, 2012, Plaintiff filed
the instant Motion for New Trial and/or to Alter or Amend the Judgment.
II.

ANALYSIS
A.

Motion for New Trial

Plaintiff argues that under Rule 59 of the Civil Rules of Procedure, she is
entitled a new trial because there is sufficient evidence of causation that she was
terminated from her employment as retaliation for filing a complaint of racial
discrimination. Plaintiff asserts that the jury’s conclusion that there was no causal
connection between the filing of the racial discrimination complaint and her
termination should not stand in light of the jury’s finding that Defendant was aware
that Plaintiff had filed such a compliant and that it thereafter terminated Plaintiff.
Defendant responds that Plaintiff has not met her burden that a new trial is
required since the verdict is not clearly against the weight of the evidence and that the
evidence supports the jury’s finding that there was no causal connection between
Plaintiff’s discrimination complaint and her termination.
Rule 59 provides that a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and
on all or part of the issues for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore
been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59.
Specific grounds for new trial have included: the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence; the damages are excessive; for other reasons the trial was not fair; there
were substantial errors in the admission or rejection of evidence; the giving or refusal
of instructions were in error; and misconduct of counsel. Clark v. Esser, 907 F.Supp.
1069, 1073 (E.D. Mich. 1995); City of Cleveland v. Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co., 624 F.2d
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749 (6th Cir. 1980); Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 697 F.3d
387, 414 (6th Cir. 2012).
The grant or denial of a new trial is purely within the discretion of the trial court
and will not be reversed except upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Logan v.
Dayton Hudson Corp., 865 F.2d 789, 790 (6th Cir. 1989). The trial court has broad
discretion in deciding a motion for a new trial to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
Clark, 907 F.Supp. at 1073; City of Cleveland, 624 F.2d at 756; Fryman v. Federal
Crop Ins. Corp., 936 F.2d 244, 248 (6th Cir. 1991). If there is no motion for directed
verdict made on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence, such is also not
available as a ground for a motion for new trial. Southern Ry. Co. v. Miller, 285 F.2d
202, 206 (6th Cir. 1960). However, such a motion can be viewed as one claiming that
the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, which can be considered by
the trial court as a motion for new trial under Rule 59. Id.
In considering a motion for new trial on the ground that the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence, the court cannot set aside the verdict simply because it
believes another outcome is more justified. Denhof v. City of Grand Rapids, 494 F.3d
534, 543-44 (6th Cir. 2007). The court must accept the jury’s verdict and can only
overturn the verdict if the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and the jury
verdict was unreasonable. Id. Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set
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aside the jury verdicts merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences
or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable. Bruner
v. Dunaway, 684 F.2d 422, 425 (6th Cir. 1982).
Plaintiff argues that the jury’s verdict of no cause of action based on its finding
that there was no causal connection between the filing of the racial discrimination and
complaint and her termination was against the great weight of the evidence presented
before the jury. Plaintiff testified that she sent her July 16, 2009 email to Human
Resources Manager Michael Dixon and Human Resources Representative Ebbonye
Graham, the same day she was issued a second one-day suspension resulting in her
termination. Plaintiff claims that the defense’s primary argument that Defendant
lacked knowledge of Plaintiff filing a racial discrimination complaint that same date
was rejected by the jury. Plaintiff claims the testimony of Mr. Dixon was that Ms.
Graham was not threatened by Plaintiff’s conduct, but was simply “disrespected.”
Ms. Lori Marchesi, who witnessed Plaintiff’s conduct on the day in question, did not
describe Plaintiff as exhibiting a threatening behavior. Plaintiff claims that there was
evidence showing that on the morning of July 16, 2009, there was no decision to
suspend Plaintiff, but only to send her for a suitability examination. It was only later
in the afternoon that it was decided Plaintiff should instead be suspended. Plaintiff
claims it can be inferred that because of Plaintiff’s email on the morning of July 16,
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2009, Plaintiff was suspended which resulted in her termination.
Defendant argues that temporal proximity alone does not support causation.
Vice President of Home Health Services Deb LaRue, Administrative Director Michael
Bartz and Mr. Dixon all testified that they had no knowledge of Plaintiff’s July 16,
2009 email that same day when Plaintiff was suspended. Ms. LaRue and Mr. Dixon
testified when the Grievance Council was held on August 17, 2009, they were at that
time already aware of Plaintiff’s July 16, 2009 email.
The Sixth Circuit has recognized that in some instances temporal proximity
alone might support an inference of causation, but it is not always enough to prove
causation whether the facts supporting retaliation are weak. Nguyen v. City of
Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 566-67 (6th Cir. 2000); “Where an adverse employment
action occurs very close in time after an employer learns of a protected activity, such
temporal proximity alone may satisfy the causal prong of a prima facie retaliation
case. Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 523-35 (6th Cir. 2008).
However, the prima facie case is “only the first stage of proof,” and its purpose is
simply to force a defendant to proceed with its case. EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp.,
104 F.3d 858, 861-62 (6th Cir. 1997). Once a prima facie case is established, the
burden then shifts to the defendant to produce evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its action; and in response the plaintiff must demonstrate
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that this reason is pretextual. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 80105 (1973); Hamilton v. Gen. Elec. Co., 556 F.3d 428, 435 (6th Cir. 2009).
The jury marked on the verdict form that Plaintiff made complaints of racial
discrimination against Defendant, that Defendant was aware of the complaint and that
Defendant took an employment action adverse to Plaintiff. (Verdict Form, Q. 1-3)
However, the verdict form does not ask when Defendant was made aware of the racial
discrimination complaint–before or after the July 16, 2009 date when Plaintiff was
suspended for a second time or maybe after that date or at a later date when the
Grievance Council met in August 2009. The jury could have found Ms. LaRue and
Mr. Dixon’s testimony credible. They testified they did not know on July 16, 2009,
when Plaintiff was suspended that afternoon, that Plaintiff had filed a grievance
complaint earlier in the morning. Testimony shows that Defendant eventually learned
of Plaintiff’s discrimination complaint at some point after July 16, 2009. The jury’s
response to the verdict form does not establish “when” Defendant learned of
Plaintiff’s discrimination claim, which could have been after Plaintiff was suspended
on July 16, 2009.
Even if the jury found that Defendant had knowledge of Plaintiff’s
discrimination complaint prior to the issuance of the second suspension on July 16,
2009, Plaintiff still had to prove that Defendant’s reason for issuing the second
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suspension and Plaintiff’s eventual termination was pretext. Testimony at trial
revealed that Defendant upheld Plaintiff’s first suspension because she failed to follow
protocol and procedure when she changed a patient’s prescription (the patient was also
employed by Defendant). Plaintiff also had the burden to show at trial that the reason
given by Defendant for her suspensions and eventual termination was pretext. The
jury did not so find.
At trial, the jury listened and observed the testimonies of Plaintiff and
Defendants’ representatives. The jury was able to observe the demeanor of the
various individuals involved in Plaintiff’s suspensions. There was sufficient evidence
to support the jury’s verdict of no cause of action because Plaintiff could not establish
causation. It is within the jury’s purview to weigh the evidence and judge the
credibility of the witnesses. The Court cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute its
decision for that of the jury when there is evidence upon which reasonable minds
could differ. The jury’s verdict that Plaintiff had not proven causation was not against
the great weight of the evidence presented at trial. The Court finds that the jury’s
verdict was not unreasonable. Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial must be denied.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial and/or To Alter or
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Amend the Judgment [Doc. No. 52] is DENIED.

S/Denise Page Hood
Denise Page Hood
United States District Judge
Dated: March 27, 2014
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record on March 27, 2014, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/LaShawn R. Saulsberry
Case Manager

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