Darwich v. Dearborn Police Department et al

Filing 24

OPINION AND ORDER Terminating as Moot 13 Defendants' Motion for More Definite Statement; Granting 16 Defendants' Motion for More Definite Statement and Directing Plaintiff to File an Amended Complant by 5/30/2011; and Denying 17 Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Show Cause. Signed by District Judge Robert H. Cleland. (LWag)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ALI HUSSEIN DARWICH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 10-14073

CITY OF DEARBORN
(DEARBORN POLICE DEPARTMENT) et al.,
Defendants.
/
OPINION AND ORDER (1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ DECEMBER 29, 2010,
MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, (2) TERMINATING AS MOOT
DEFENDANTS’ DECEMBER 14, 2010, MOTION (3) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Before the court is a motion for more definite statement by Defendants pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). Having reviewed the motion and opposing
brief1 by Plaintiff Ali Darwich, the court concludes that a hearing is not necessary.2 E.D.
Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion will be granted.

1

In response to the motion for more definite statement, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to
Show Cause and Respond for a More Definite Statement Under Rule 12(e).” While
entitled both a motion and a response, the substance of the document responds to
Defendants’ motion and will therefore be treated as a response brief. To the extent
Plaintiff seeks additional relief in the document, such request will be denied. The court
does not accept motions contained within response briefs. In any event, the court
cannot discern any basis to issue an “Order to Show Cause” based on the arguments in
the response brief.
2

For some reason, Defendants filed two successive motions addressing the
same subject matter. The motions appear to be identical. The court will assume that
the latter filed motion supplanted the original motion and will terminate the original
motion as moot.

I. STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) allows for the filing of a motion for a more
definite statement, and gives the district court the discretion to grant such motion if the
pleading complained of “is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably
prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Likewise, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a) establishes the requirements of a complaint. Rule 8 requires that a pleading
setting forth a claim for relief contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of such
statement is to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). The Supreme Court in Bell
Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), noted that it is significant that
Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “showing” of entitlement to relief, rather than merely a “blanket
assertion.” Id. at 556. A plaintiff must “satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair
notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. The
Court held that a “showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” requires the allegation of
sufficient facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
[entitlement to relief].” Id. at 556. In so stating, the Court spoke in terms of “plausibility,”
rather than mere “conceivability.” Id. This interpretation of Rule 8 does not require
heightened fact pleading of specifics, “but only enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
Citing Twombly, the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009),
explained that:

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the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual
allegations,” but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers “labels and
conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions
will not do.” Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertions”
devoid of “further factual enhancement.”
Id. at 1949 (citations omitted). Although Rule 8(a) does not bar the courthouse door to
plaintiffs for lack of perfect specificity, “it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a
plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 1950.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10 establishes the required form of pleadings,
including complaints. A complaint must state each claim in one or more numbered
paragraphs, with each paragraph “limited as far as is practicable to a single set of
circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Additionally, “each claim founded on a separate
transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count” when doing so would
increase the clarity of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) (emphasis added).
II. DISCUSSION
On October 12, 2010, Plaintiff Ali Hussein Darwich initiated this case against City
of Dearborn (Dearborn Police Department), and officers Kevin Schaumburger, Richard
Conrad, Guerino Cerroni, Glenn Carriveau, Michael Gracer, and Joseph Kass, in their
individual and official capacities. In his cryptic, pro se complaint, Defendant alleges that
Dearborn police officers “tortoured” and “kidnapped” him in connection with his state law
arrest for arson in case number 09-07432. Reading Darwich’s pro se complaint
extremely generously, it appears he alleges a cause of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.
To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that Defendants, acting under the
color of state law, deprived him of specific “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
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the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Lindsey v. Detroit Entm't, LLC, 484 F.3d 824, 827
(6th Cir. 2007); Hughes v. Region VII Area Agency on Aging, 542 F.3d 169, 176 (6th
Cir. 2008) (“Section 1983 makes liable only those who, while acting under color of state
law, deprive another of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.” (citing
Romanski v. Detroit Entm't, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 636 (6th Cir. 2005)). There is no
indication of which right Plaintiff alleges was violated by which Defendant, but it appears
he may be asserting that his rights under the Fourth or, possibly, Eighth Amendment
were violated.
Given the ambiguity of the complaint, Defendants have moved for a more definite
statement, asserting that Plaintiff’s claims are “so vague or ambiguous” that they cannot
possibly produce an answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). The court agrees. Despite
Plaintiff’s pro se status, he must nonetheless meet the pleading requirements of the
Federal Rules. His hand-written, form complaint does not provided any factual basis for
his claim of “kidnap” and “torture,” nor does he identify the exact claim he intends to
assert against each individual Defendant. As the pleadings now stand, Defendants
cannot reasonably prepare a response to the overly vague allegations in the complaint.
At a minimum, Plaintiff’s complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The court will thus
order Plaintiff to file an amended complaint that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and provides Defendants with “fair notice of what the claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. Plaintiff is particularly directed to
the language in Iqbal that “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation” does not comply with the pleading standards of Rule 8. 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
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Rather, Plaintiff must allege sufficient details to give Defendants fair notice of the details
of his allegations, including the “specific time, place, or person involved.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 565 n.10. Accordingly, Plaintiff is instructed that, for each count of his amended
complaint, Plaintiff must clearly state against which Defendant or Defendants the claim
is made and a factual basis sufficient to establish the claim.
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement [Dkt. #
16] is GRANTED and that Plaintiff file an amended complaint complying with this order
on or before May 30, 2011.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ original motion for more definite
statement [Dkt. # 13] is TERMINATED as moot.
Finally, Plaintiff’s “Motion [for Order] to Show Cause . . .” [Dkt. # 17] is DENIED.

S/Robert H. Cleland
ROBERT H. CLELAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: May 10, 2011
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record
on this date, May 10, 2011, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/Lisa Wagner
Case Manager and Deputy Clerk
[phone]

S:\Cleland\JUDGE'S DESK\C3 ORDERS\10-14073.DARWICH.Motion.More.Definite.Statement.chd.wpd

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