Gomez v. McQuiggin
Filing
6
OPINION and ORDER Denying the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Denying a Certificate of Appealability, and Denying Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on Appeal. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CHem)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
EPIGMENIO GOMEZ,
Petitioner,
CASE NO: 2:10-CV-14408
HONORABLE NANCY G. EDMUNDS
v.
GREG MCQUIGGIN,
Respondent.
________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS, DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND
DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL
I.
Introduction
Michigan prisoner Epigmenio Gomez (“Petitioner”) has filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 asserting that he is being held in violation
of his constitutional rights. Petitioner was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder,
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316(1)(a), following a jury trial in the Wayne County Circuit
Court and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in 2007.
In his pleadings, he alleges that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by
refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense. For the reasons stated herein, the Court
denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court also denies a certificate of
appealability and denies leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
II.
Facts and Procedural History
Petitioner’s conviction arises from the stabbing death of Cathleen Jasmine Hahn
(“victim”) in Dearborn Heights, Michigan on February 3, 2007. At trial, Crystal Manuel, a
self-described “stripper” testified that, on the evening of February 2, 2007, she received
a call from the Petitioner about an escort advertisement she had placed in the
newspaper. Manuel sent her boyfriend, Gregory Smith, to drive the victim to Petitioner’s
address at 10:00 or 11:00 p.m.
Smith drove the victim to Petitioner’s apartment and waited for her in the parking
lot. After about 45 minutes, Smith became concerned and called both the victim’s phone
and Petitioner’s number, which Manuel had written on a sheet of paper for him. Smith
testified that he called the victim “about twenty-five or more” times, and the other
number “a lot.” After some time, he went up to Petitioner’s second-floor apartment and
knocked on the door. Someone eventually came to the door, and without opening it,
said “He’s not here.” After several more unsuccessful attempts to get a response from
either Petitioner or the victim, Smith left the apartment building.
At 7:43 a.m. on February 3, 2007, the police and fire departments responded to a
fire at Petitioner’s apartment; the cause of which was never determined. It was at this
time that the police found the victim’s body about 30 yards from the apartment complex.
The body was found with duct tape around the neck and a sheet wrapped partially
around the body. After calling the owner of the apartment, the police identified Petitioner
as the person who had been staying there. The police then learned that Petitioner had
been arrested in Ionia County at 11:20 a.m. that morning for diving while intoxicated
with a blood-alcohol level of 0.26. Later that day, Petitioner was transported from Ionia
to Wayne County and charged with first-degree murder.
Assistant Wayne County Medical Examiner, Doctor John Bechinski, performed
the victim’s autopsy on February 4, 2007. Dr. Bechinski cited the cause of death as two
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stab wounds. One stab wound went through the victim’s abdomen, rib cage, and liver.
The second wound, which was fatal, went into her abdomen; through her rib cage, liver,
pancreas; and into her aorta. Dr. Bechinksi also stated that manual strangulation was a
possible cause of death due to fingernail abrasions on both sides of the victim’s neck.
Dr. Bechinksi found that the victim had defensive bruises on her left and right
hands, her left elbow, and on the front of her lower legs. He found that these were
consistent with the victim being on her back and kicking or struggling away from an
assailant. Dr. Bechinski also found three possible bite marks on the victim’s body as
well as several other “probable torture wounds.” Dr. Bechinski opined that the victim
was restrained while several incised wounds were clustered in her chest area because
they were “nice straight wounds.” Finally, Dr. Bechinski found a large incised wound,
which spanned the victim’s entire lower back and went into her abdominal cavity.
The blood on Petitioner’s sweat shirt, boxer shorts, cigarette pack, as well as two
knives found in his apartment all matched the victim’s DNA. Petitioner’s DNA was also
found in the victim’s vaginal swabs.
Petitioner testified in his own defense at trial. He stated that after spending most
of the day on February 2, 2007, with his sister, he went home and began to drink beer
and tequila. Sometime after 7:00 p.m., he began making phone calls to escort services,
estimating that he called “more than ten” different numbers before calling Manuel and
agreeing on an acceptable price.
Petitioner testified that he arranged for a woman to visit his apartment for the
price of $190 per hour. By the time the victim came to his apartment, Petitioner had
drank “several” beers. Petitioner stated that when the victim arrived, she took $200 from
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him, and they began to have protected sex. After some time, Petitioner asked the victim
if he could “enter her from behind.” For an additional $50, the victim agreed.
Petitioner testified that after having sex, the victim asked him for the additional
$50, as well as a tip. When Petitioner responded that he did not have any more money,
the victim became “very angry and started talking English real fast.” At some point, the
victim came back into the room with a knife in her hand. The victim, again, demanded
more money and cut Petitioner’s right hand. Petitioner grabbed the victim’s neck, and
they struggled for a minute. The victim scratched Petitioner’s neck and chest and did
not drop the knife. Petitioner pushed the victim back, and she slammed against the wall
and fell but still had possession of the knife. Petitioner was unsure if the victim was
conscious, but noticed that she was bleeding from her stomach. When Petitioner heard
Smith knocking at the door, he got scared. He fled to the basement of the building
where he fell asleep for more than two hours.
After waking up, Petitioner returned to his apartment and began to remember
what happened. Petitioner had two drinks of tequila and went back into his bedroom
where he found the victim on the floor surrounded by lots of blood. Petitioner drank
more tequila, wrapped the victim in a blanket, and duct taped her neck. After throwing
the victim’s body out a window, Petitioner dragged it away from the building where it
was discovered by the police a few hours later.
Petitioner claimed that he did not remember using a knife on the victim or cutting
her neck and hands. He also did not recall putting the bloody clothing and knives in the
dumpster, setting the apartment on fire, or leaving the apartment. Petitioner denied
planning to kill the victim that day.
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At the close of the defense’s case, the trial judge excused the jury and told the
defense counsel that Petitioner “takes the issue [of self-defense] away from us by his
own denial of having inflicted any of the injuries that caused [the victim’s] death.” The
trial court concluded that there was no way a jury could find that Petitioner inflicted the
injuries on the victim in self-defense based on his own testimony. The trial judge refused
to instruct the jury on self-defense. Defense counsel objected.
The trial court granted Petitioner’s motion for a directed verdict on felony-murder,
leaving only the premeditated murder charge for the jury to consider. Following
deliberations, the jury found Petitioner guilty of the first-degree murder. The trial court
subsequently sentenced Petitioner to the mandatory term of life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole.
Petitioner filed an appeal of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals raising
claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions. The
Michigan Court of Appeals denied relief on those claims and affirmed his conviction.
People v. Gomez, No. 280808, 2009 WL 418542 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2009)
(unpublished). Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan
Supreme Court, which was denied in a standard order. People v. Gomez, 484 Mich.
870, 769 N.W.2d 714 (2009).
Petitioner thereafter filed his federal habeas petition, raising the following claim:
He was denied the right to a jury trial, and the right to present a defense
when the trial judge refused to instruct the jury on the defense theory of
self-defense.
Respondent has filed an answer to the petition contending that it should be
denied for lack of merit.
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III.
Standard of Review
Federal law imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless
the adjudication of the claim–
(1)
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States or
(2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. §2254(d).
“A State court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ ...clearly established law if it ‘applies a
rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]’ or if it
‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [The
Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.’”
Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 405-406 (2000)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002).
“[T]he ‘unreasonable application’ prong of §2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas
court to ‘grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle
from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of
petitioner’s case.’” Wiggins v. Smith 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529
U.S. at 413); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. However, “[i]n order for a federal court to
find a state court’s application of our precedent ‘unreasonable,’ the state court’s
decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court’s application
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must have been ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (citations
omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. “AEDPA thus imposes a ‘highly deferential
standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’ and ‘demands that state-court decisions be
given the benefit of the doubt.’” Renico v. Lett _U.S._, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010)
(quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333, n. 7; Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19,24 (2002) (per
curiam)).
The United States Supreme Court has held that “a state court’s determination
that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists
could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter,
_U.S._, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664
(2004)). The Supreme Court emphasized “that even a strong case for relief does not
mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. (citing Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). Under §2254(d), “a habeas court must determine
what arguments or theories supported or...could have supported, the state court’s
decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree
that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision” of
the Supreme Court. Id. Thus, in order to obtain federal habeas relief, a state prisoner
must show that the state court’s rejection of his claim “was so lacking in justification that
there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id.
Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal habeas court’s review to a determination of
whether the state court’s decision comports with clearly established federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision. See
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Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; see also Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009)
(noting that the Supreme Court “has held on numerous occasions that it is not ‘an
unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law’ for a state court to decline
to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court”)
(quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2008) (per curiam)); Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). Section 2254(d) “does not require a state court to
give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been ‘adjudicated on the
merits.’” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. At 785. Furthermore, it “does not require citation of
[Supreme Court] cases-indeed, it does not even require awareness of [Supreme Court]
cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision
contradicts them.” Early v. Packer 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002); see also Mitchell, 540 U.S. at
16. While the requirements of “clearly established law” are to be determined solely by
Supreme Court precedent, the decisions of lower federal courts may be useful in
assessing the reasonableness of the state court’s resolution of an issue. See Stewart v.
Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667,
671 (8th Cir. 2003)); Dickens v. Jones, 203 F. Supp. 354, 359 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
Lastly, a state court’s factual determinations are entitled to a presumption of
correctness on federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1). A petitioner may
rebut this presumption with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d
358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998). Moreover, habeas review is “limited to the record that was
before the state court.” Cullen v. Pinholster, _U.S._, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).
IV.
Analysis
Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because the trial court failed
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to instruct the jury on the theory of self-defense in violation of his Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial and his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to present a defense.
In order for habeas relief to be warranted on the basis of incorrect jury
instructions, a petitioner must show more than that the instructions are undesirable,
erroneous or universally condemned. Rather, taken as a whole, they must be so infirm
that they rendered the entire trial fundamentally unfair. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.
62, 72 (1991). Additionally, the failure to give an instruction that is supported by the
evidence does not automatically entitle a petitioner to habeas relief; the failure to
instruct must have rendered the petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. See Maes v.
Thomas, 46 F.3d 979, 984-85 (10th Cir. 1995); Nickerson v. Lee, 971 F.2d 1125, 1137
(4th Cir. 1995); see also Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); Daniels v. Lafler,
501 F.3d 735, 741 (6th Cir. 2007). A failure to instruct does not deprive a petitioner of
fundamental fairness when the instructions as a whole adequately present the defense
theory to the jury. See Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 743 (9th Cir. 1995). “An
omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a
misstatement of the law.” Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155. State law instructional errors
rarely form the basis for federal habeas corpus relief. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72.
That being said, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
criminal trials to comply with “prevailing notions of fundamental fairness.” California v.
Trombetta, 476 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). This standard requires “that criminal defendants
be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Id. “A necessary
corollary of this holding is the rule that a defendant in a criminal trial has the right, under
appropriate circumstances, to have the jury instructed on his or her defense.” Taylor v.
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Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 852 (6th Cir. 2002). A defendant is thus entitled to a jury
instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a
reasonable juror to find in his or her favor. Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63
(1988). “The failure to give a requested self-defense instruction, however, does not
deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to due process if the evidence produced
during trial was insufficient to warrant such an instruction.” Allen v. Morris, 845 F.2d
610, 617 (6th Cir. 1988); see also Gimotty v. Elo, 40 F. App'x 29, 33–34 (6th Cir. 2002);
Taylor, 288 F.3d at 851.
In this case, the state trial court refused to instruct the jury on self-defense
because it found that the evidence, including Petitioner’s own testimony, did not support
such an instruction. The Michigan Court of Appeals agreed that a self-defense
instruction was not supported by the evidence and denied relief on this claim. The court
explained in relevant part:
The trial court's jury instructions must include all elements of the charged
offenses and any material issues, defenses, and theories if supported by
the evidence. People v. McGhee, 268 Mich. App. 600, 606, 709 N.W.2d
595 (2005), lv pending. A trial court's decision whether an instruction
applies to the facts is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Gillis,
474 Mich. 105, 113, 712 N.W.2d 419 (2006).
“In Michigan, the killing of another person in self-defense is justifiable
homicide if the defendant honestly and reasonably believes that his life is
in imminent danger or that there is a threat of serious bodily harm.” People
v. Heflin, 434 Mich. 482, 502, 456 N.W.2d 10 (1990). In order to act in
justifiable self-defense, there must be evidence that the defendant acted
intentionally, but that his actions were justified by the circumstances. Id. at
503, 456 N.W.2d 10.
Defendant argues that a self-defense instruction was warranted in light of
his own testimony that he was involved in a struggle with the victim after
she attacked him armed with a knife. According to defendant, he grabbed
the victim around the throat during the struggle, but stated that she did not
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lose consciousness. Defendant also testified that he pushed the woman
against the wall and then saw that she was bleeding from her belly, but
defendant denied ever holding a knife.
Initially, we note that defendant's testimony failed to account for much of
the undisputed physical evidence. Defendant's version of events did not
explain the numerous cuts, bruises, and abrasions that were all over the
victim's body, which the medical examiner testified were inflicted while she
was still alive. It also failed to account for the evidence that the victim was
strangled to unconsciousness, or the horizontal and vertical T-shaped stab
wounds to her chest. The cause of death was determined to be two deep
stab wounds and manual strangulation, but defendant denied stabbing the
victim or holding a knife, and also denied choking the victim to
unconsciousness. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by refusing to
instruct the jury on self-defense.
Gomez, 2009 WL 418542 at *2.
The Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision is neither contrary to Supreme Court
precedent nor an unreasonable application of federal law or the facts. The trial court’s
refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense did not violate Petitioner’s right to a fair trial
nor deprive him of the right to present a defense because there was insufficient
evidence to warrant such an instruction. While Petitioner testified that the victim
confronted him with a knife and they struggled, he never admitted intentionally killing the
victim or even holding a knife. Petitioner was also unable to explain many of the victim’s
numerous injuries – and he denied choking her to death and denied inflicting the deep
stab wounds to her stomach. Under Michigan law, “a finding that a defendant acted in
justifiable self-defense necessarily requires a finding that the defendant acted
intentionally, but that the circumstances justified his actions.” People v. Heflin, 434 Mich.
482, 502, 456 N.W.2d 10 (1990). Petitioner’s testimony does not support such a finding.
In Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846 (6th Cir. 2002), a case almost directly on
point, the Sixth Circuit held that state trial court’s ruling that there was no evidence of
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justified self-defense, and its consequent refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense and
imperfect self-defense, did not involve either an unreasonable determination of the facts
or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, so as to warrant
habeas relief, where the petitioner testified at his murder trial that he pulled his gun as a
defensive act but that he did not intentionally shoot the victim to defend himself, and
that, instead, the gun discharged accidently. Id. at 853-54. In so ruling, the Sixth Circuit
noted that under Michigan case law, a defendant cannot claim justified self-defense as
a defense to homicide unless the defendant claims that the killing was intentional. Id. at
853 (internal citation omitted).
In the present case, Petitioner argues that the trial court impermissibly evaluated
the evidence in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense. The record, however,
reveals that the trial court indicated that Petitioner could have had a self-defense claim
to an assault charge based upon his testimony that the victim initially confronted him
with a knife and he responded by choking her and pushing her against the wall. The trial
court then went on to state that Petitioner did not have a self-defense claim to the actual
murder because he denied intending to kill the victim and indicated that he did not
choke the victim to death nor possess a knife during the incident. The trial court thus did
not improperly evaluate the evidence, but rather simply determined that Petitioner’s own
testimony did not support a claim of self-defense to the murder because he denied
acting intentionally.
Petitioner also argues that evidence of his intoxication explains his incomplete
memory and inability to provide direct evidence of self-defense. But, under Michigan
Law, it is not a defense to claim that the defendant was impaired by voluntarily
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consumed alcoholic liquor. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 768.37. The United States
Supreme Court has held that states may bar voluntary intoxication defenses without
violating due process. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1999). Consequently, the
fact that Petitioner may have been drinking or intoxicated is irrelevant and is not enough
to overcome the fact that he did not remember, or admit to, killing the victim.
Because there was insufficient evidence that Petitioner acted in self-defense in
killing the victim, the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense did not deny
Petitioner a fundamentally fair trial. Moreover, Petitioner was not denied the opportunity
to present a complete defense. The record indicates that defense counsel argued the
lack of premeditation, combined with Petitioner’s intoxication, as a defense to the
charges. Defense counsel also insinuated that someone else other that Petitioner could
have entered the apartment and inflicted the fatal injuries after Petitioner fled the
apartment and before he returned and disposed of the body. Petitioner has thus failed
to establish that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense or that
his constitutional rights were violated. More importantly, for purposes of habeas review,
he has failed to demonstrate that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision is
unreasonable. Habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.
Lastly, the Court notes that even if the trial court erred in failing to give the selfdefense instruction, Petitioner is not entitled to relief. For purposes of federal habeas
review, a constitutional error that implicates trial procedures is considered harmless if it
did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s
verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551
U.S. 112, 117-18 (2007) (confirming that Brecht standard applies in “virtually all” habeas
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cases); O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 445 (1995) (habeas court should grant
petition if it has “grave doubt” about whether trial error had substantial and injurious
effect or influence upon the jury's verdict); Ruelas v. Wolfenbarger, 580 F.3d 403 (6th
Cir. 2009) (ruling that Brecht is “always the test” in this circuit). Here, it is highly unlikely
that the lack of a self-defense instruction affected the jury’s verdict. The nature and
extent of the victim’s injuries, the circumstances of the crime, Petitioner’s own
testimony, and Petitioner’s actions after the murder provided significant evidence of
Petitioner’s guilt of first-degree murder. Habeas relief is not warranted.
V.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to
federal habeas relief on the claim contained in his petition. Accordingly, the Court
DENIES WITH PREJUDICE the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Before Petitioner may appeal this decision, a certificate of appealability (“COA”)
must issue. See 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(1)(a); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A COA may issue
“only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). When a court denies relief on the merits, the substantial
showing threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates that reasonable jurists would
find the court’s assessment of the constitutional claim debatable or wrong. Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by
demonstrating that ... jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327
(2003). A court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit its examination to a
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threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of the claims. Id. at 336-37. Having conducted
the requisite review, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right as to his habeas claim. The Court
therefore DENIES a certificate of appealability.
Lastly, the Court concludes that Petitioner should not be granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal as an appeal cannot be taken in good faith. See
Fed. R. App. P. 24(a). The Court therefore DENIES Petitioner leave to proceed in forma
pauperis on appeal.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Nancy G. Edmunds
Nancy G. Edmunds
United States District Judge
Dated: October 19, 2012
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record on October 19, 2012, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Carol A. Hemeyer
Case Manager
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