Hill et al v. Granholm et al

Filing 228

OPINION & ORDER Denying Defendants' Motion for Clarification (Dkt. 215 ). Signed by District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. (Sandusky, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

HENRY HILL, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 10-cv-14568
Hon. Mark A. Goldsmith

vs.
RICK SNYDER, et al.
Defendants.
____________________________/
OPINION & ORDER
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION (Dkt. 215)
On April 9, 2018, this Court found that Mich. Comp. Law § 769.25a(6) violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Hill v. Snyder, -- F. Supp. 3d. --, 2018 WL
1782710 (E.D. Mich. 2018). The Court entered a permanent injunction as follows:
Defendants are permanently enjoined from enforcing or applying
Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.25a(6). Within fourteen days of today’s
date, Defendants shall cause to be calculated the good time credits
and disciplinary credits for each subclass member (as defined
below) who has been resentenced, without regard to, or application
of, Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.25a(6), for purposes of determining
parole eligibility dates. For any subclass member resentenced after
today’s date, Defendants shall cause such calculations to be made
within seven days of resentencing. Defendants shall cause the
Michigan Parole Board to assume jurisdiction over subclass
members at the time of the earliest release date, as calculated in
conformity with this paragraph. The term “subclass members”
means all individuals in the custody of the Michigan Department of
Corrections who were convicted of first-degree murder for offenses
committed when they were below 18 years of age, were or will be
subjected to resentencing under Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.25a, are
or could become eligible for parole, and whose offenses occurred
prior to December 15, 1998.

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4/9/2018 Final Partial Judgment (Dkt. 204). Defendants filed the instant motion for clarification
(Dkt. 215), asking this Court to clarify whether its order requires the calculation of good time or
disciplinary credits for offenders who had already been released on parole before the Court’s April
9, 2018 order.
Defendants’ motion is denied, as the Court’s order is clear. By its terms, the order applies
to individuals who were already released on parole on April 9, 2018. Defendants note that the
order defined the subclass as, among other criteria, individuals “in the custody of the Michigan
Department of Corrections who . . . are or could become eligible for parole,” and argue that this
excludes parolees, who were already paroled. Def. Mot. at PageID.3321. Parolees are under the
custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections, Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.238(1) (“Each
prisoner on parole shall remain in the legal custody and under the control of the department”), and,
as they are currently on parole, necessarily “are . . . eligible for parole.” Further, as Plaintiffs note,
parolees may have their parole revoked; this may result in a return to prison where the former
parolees again “could become eligible for parole.” See Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.240a(1) (“After
a prisoner is released on parole, the prisoner’s parole order is subject to revocation at the discretion
of the parole board for cause . . . .”); In re Wayne Cty. Pros., 591 N.W.2d 359, 485-486 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1998) (describing the process for rescinding parole and noting that an order rescinding parole
“also sets the length of time before the offender will again be eligible for parole”). Defendants
also argue that the Court’s order that the Parole Board “assume jurisdiction” over the subclass
members suggests that the order would not apply to those who are already under its jurisdiction.
But this directive was not intended to limit the number of individuals eligible for relief.
Further, the order by its terms permanently enjoined Defendants “from enforcing or
applying Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.25a(6).” 4/9/2018 Final Partial Judgment.

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Defendants,

therefore, cannot rely upon this statute to deny good time and/or disciplinary credits to any
individual, regardless of his or her parole status.
Additionally, the rationale of this Court’s April 9, 2018 Opinion applies to parolees as well
as prisoners. For all of the reasons explained in that Opinion, applying Mich. Comp. Laws §
769.25a(6) to parolees would also result in an Ex Post Facto Clause violation. Parole is “a permit
to the prisoner to leave the prison, and not . . . a release.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.238(6). A
parolee “shall be considered to be serving out the sentence imposed by the court[.]” Id. Failing
to provide good time and/or disciplinary credits to parolees increases their sentences and prolongs
their dates of release, “impos[ing] additional punishment to that . . . prescribed” at the time the
criminal act was committed. Hill, -- F. Supp. 3d at --, 2018 WL 1782710 at *9 (quoting Weaver
v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981)).
Defendants’ motion for clarification (Dkt. 215) is denied, as the Court’s April 9, 2018
Order is clear. Accordingly, Defendants must come into compliance with the order. Defendants
shall calculate good time credits for subclass members paroled before entry of the Court’s April 9,
2018 Opinion within seven days of the entry of the instant order, and shall calculate disciplinary
credits for such subclass members within twenty-one days of the entry of this order.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 30, 2018
Detroit, Michigan

s/Mark A. Goldsmith
MARK A. GOLDSMITH
United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and any
unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail
addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on May 30, 2018.
s/Karri Sandusky
Case Manager
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