Burger v. IDIDIT Incorporated
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER denying 22 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Patrick J. Duggan. (MOre)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
HAROLD BURGER,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 10-15053
Honorable Patrick J. Duggan
IDIDIT, INC.,
Defendant.
____________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
On December 20, 2010, Plaintiff Harold Burger (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit
against his former employer, Ididit, Inc. (“Ididit”), alleging that he was unlawfully
terminated based on his sex and in retaliation for his complaints about sex discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen
Civil Rights Act. Ididit subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which this Court granted in part and denied in part in
an opinion and order entered October 17, 2011. The Court found a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to whether Ididit unlawfully chose Plaintiff for termination
based on his sex but found that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate his claims for retaliation.
Presently before the Court is Ididit’s motion for reconsideration with respect to
that decision, filed pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1 on October
31, 2011. On November 1, 2011, this Court issued a notice informing the parties that it
would permit Plaintiff to submit a response to Defendant’s motion if Plaintiff wished to
do so. Plaintiff filed a response on November 15, 2011.
Rule 7.1(h) provides that a motion for reconsideration only should be granted if the
movant demonstrates that the Court and the parties have been misled by a palpable defect
and that a different disposition of the case must result from a correction of such a palpable
defect. E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h). A motion that merely presents the same issues already
ruled upon by the Court shall not be granted. Id.
In its motion for reconsideration, Ididit argues that the Court failed to apply “the
well-established standard for determining whether there is a factual issue of pretext as set
forth in Bender v. Hecht’s Department Store, 455 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2006) . . ..” (Def.’s
Mot. at 1-2.) More specifically, Ididit argues that (1) Plaintiff presented little or no
probative evidence of discrimination and, therefore (2) he had to demonstrate that his
qualifications were “so significantly better than the successful applicant’s qualifications
that no reasonable employer would have chosen the latter applicant over the former.”
(Def.’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. at 5, citing Bender, 455 F.3d at 627.) Ididit contends that the
evidence failed to show that Plaintiff was a significantly better employee than Kellie
Weaver– the sales representative who Ididit chose to retain over him.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Bender did not alter the burdenshifting test that courts must apply where direct evidence of discrimination is lacking.
See Bender, 455 F.3d at 620 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973)). Bender also did not change the methods available to a
plaintiff to demonstrate that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were simply a
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pretext for discrimination: “‘by showing that the proffered reason (1) has no basis in fact,
(2) did not actually motivate the defendant’s challenged conduct, or (3) was insufficient
to warrant the challenged conduct.’” Id. at 624 (quoting Wexler v. White’s Fine
Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 576 (6th Cir. 2003)). Ididit fails to demonstrate that this
Court misapplied the applicable analysis.
Unlike Bender, this was not a case where Plaintiff relied solely on his alleged
superior qualifications to demonstrate pretext. Plaintiff put forth evidence to demonstrate
a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Ididit’s proffered reason for
retaining Weaver instead of him– i.e., her alleged superior sales abilities– had a basis in
fact. Plaintiff further raised a question of fact as to whether Ididit’s proffered reason for
selecting Weaver was a pretext for sex discrimination by presenting evidence of at least
two additional facts. First, that individuals within the company– including a supervisor
and a human resources officer– believed that the decision-maker favored female
employees. Second, that the company followed a different procedure in eliminating
Plaintiff’s position than it did when choosing who to eliminate in its manufacturing
section and that if the same method had been followed (i.e. asking the supervisors in the
area which employees should be retained) that they would have selected Plaintiff.
As such, the Court concludes that it did not commit a palpable defect in finding a
genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment in Ididit’s favor on
Plaintiff’s sex discrimination claims.
Accordingly,
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IT IS ORDERED, that Defendant Ididit Inc.’s motion for reconsideration is
DENIED.
Date: November 28, 2011
s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
David M. Blanchard, Esq.
Edward A. Macey, Esq.
C. Philip Baither III, Esq.
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