Jordan v. Detroit, City of et al

Filing 39

ORDER Granting 27 Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint; Denying as Moot 30 Motion to Dismiss; Denying as Moot 32 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Robert H. Cleland. (LWag)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

JASMINE GUY JORDAN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 11-10153

CITY OF DETROIT, et al.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S “MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT” AND DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
On August 10, 2011, Plaintiff Jasmine Guy Jordan moved to amend his
complaint to substitute named parties for John Doe Defendants and to clarify the factual
basis of his claims. On August 11, 2011, the court conducted a scheduling conference
with counsel for all parties, during which it was determined that the motion will be
granted in the interest of justice. Nevertheless, Defendant Wayne County filed a
response in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion and simultaneously filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 on August 17, 2011.1 On August 22,
2011, Defendant City of Detroit filed a motion concurring in Wayne County’s response
and motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated below, the court will grant Plaintiff’s
motion for leave to amend and deny as moot Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The
court, however, will allow Defendants to file fully-briefed motions to dismiss after Plaintiff
files an amended complaint.

1

The court will interpret Defendants’ motions to dismiss as motions directed at
Plaintiff’s original complaint, not Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint. Despite
references to the proposed amended complaint in the motions to dismiss, a complaint
that has not yet been filed cannot logically be attacked by a motion to dismiss.

As a general matter, amendments to pleadings are governed by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15. As amended in 2009, Rule 15 allows a plaintiff to amend a
complaint “once as a matter of course” within twenty-one days of a defendant’s answer
or motion under Rule 12. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). Where the time to amend
pleadings as a matter of course has expired, a party may nonetheless amend its
pleadings by leave of the court, and “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so
requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The courts have long recognized a policy favoring
trying cases on the merits and liberally granting leave to amend when doing so does not
prejudice an opposing party. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (stating
leave should be freely given, absent factors “such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
amendment, [or] futility of amendment”); Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d
419, 425 (6th Cir. 1999); Tefft v. Seward, 689 F.2d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 1982).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim is futile because the
state trial judge in the underlying criminal prosecution made a determination of probable
cause during a preliminary examination. (Wayne County’s Resp. 7.) In support of this
position, Defendant Wayne County directs the court to Holtz v. City of Sterling Heights,
465 F.Supp. 2d 758 (E.D. Mich. 2006), for the proposition that a finding of probable
cause in a criminal prosecution estops a Plaintiff from pursuing a malicious prosecution
claim under § 1983. However, the Sixth Circuit has held that “a finding of probable
cause in a prior criminal proceeding does not bar a plaintiff in a subsequent civil action
from maintaining a claim for malicious prosecution . . . where the claim is based on a

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police officer's supplying false information to establish probable cause.” Hinchman v.
Moore, 312 F.3d 198, 202-03 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255
F.3d 301, 311 (6th Cir. 2001)).
In the amended complaint, Plaintiff generally alleges that the “probable cause
[determination] was based on unduly suggestive show-up identification techniques; and
upon material misrepresentations and omissions contained in the warrant issued for
Plaintiff’s arrest,” (Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 43.), and Plaintiff characterizes the core
issue of his malicious prosecution claim as “whether law enforcement or prosecutors
supplied false or misleading information or misstated the facts to establish probable
cause.” (Reply 4.) The allegations of misrepresentations and omissions in the
amended complaint lack substantial supporting facts, but the court concludes that, in
light of the overriding principle of freely granting leave to amend in order to try cases on
their merits, Plaintiff’s claim is not necessarily futile. Plaintiff’s amended complaint could
conceivably allege facts to support the general allegations of misrepresentations and
omissions that led to the finding of probable cause.
Further, no other Foman factor weighs in favor of denying Plaintiff’s motion.
There is no indication of “delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive.” Foman, 371 U.S. at 182.
Although preliminary motion practice has resulted in the dismissal of some claims
originally brought by Plaintiff, the schedule for discovery was not yet even in place prior
to the motion to amend. Nor would Defendants be prejudiced by the proposed
amendment at this point.
Permitting amendment of the complaint may also facilitate a sharpening of the
issues presented, and will allow the Defendants to fully analyze and address each of

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Plaintiff’s amended allegations. Defendants’ responses to Plaintiff’s motion, on the
whole, fall short of substantive legal analysis of Plaintiff’s claims. For example, Plaintiff
asserts a vague § 1983 claim against Defendant City of Detroit founded on an alleged
violation of a settlement order issued in United States v. City of Detroit, Case No. 0372258. (Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 46.) Yet the City of Detroit failed to even address the
claim, and the entirety of its response brief is a single string citation with each citedauthority stating the same proposition. (See City of Detroit’s Resp. 2-3.) By granting
Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, the court is hopeful that Plaintiff will coherently
and concisely state its claims against Defendants.2 Defendants, if necessary, will then
file fully-briefed motions to dismiss that include substantive legal analysis, and not mere
string citations supporting unremarkable propositions.
Having determined that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend will be granted,
Defendants’ motions to dismiss the malicious prosecution claims asserted in the original
complaint are moot. After Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Defendants will be
allowed to file motions to dismiss that address each claim asserted in Plaintiff’s
amended complaint that Defendants believe are subject to dismissal under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Complaint” [Dkt. # 27] is GRANTED. Plaintiff is directed to file an amended complaint
within seven days of issuance of this order.

2

Plaintiff should specifically endeavor to clarify its malicious prosecution claim
against Wayne County set forth in count III of the proposed amended complaint. The
purported malicious prosecution claim focuses almost exclusively on Wayne County’s
failure to protect Plaintiff while he was in the custody of the county, a topic that does not
seem logically related to a malicious prosecution claim.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Wayne County’s “Second Motion to
Dismiss” [Dkt. # 30] and Defendant City of Detroit’s “Second Motion to Dismiss” [Dkt. #
32] are DENIED AS MOOT.

s/Robert H. Cleland
ROBERT H. CLELAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 21, 2011
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record
on this date, September 21, 2011, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Lisa Wagner
Case Manager and Deputy Clerk
[phone]

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