Hill v. Hosington et al

Filing 126

ORDER ENTERING JUDGMENT on the Jury Verdict; Finding Moot: 114 MOTION for Judgment on jury verdict, 115 MOTION for Costs and 122 Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the Alternative, New Trial on Plaintiff's Excessive Force Claim filed by Ro' Kristian Broadnax Hill and Requiring the Filing of Amended Motions for Costs. Signed by District Judge Arthur J. Tarnow. (MLan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RO’KRISTIAN BROADNAX HILL,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 11-10333
HONORABLE ARTHUR J. TARNOW
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

DEPUTY SHERIFF HOISINGTON,
Defendant.
________________________________/
ORDER ENTERING JUDGMENT ON THE JURY VERDICT; FINDING
MOOT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ON THE
JURY VERDICT [114], MOTION FOR TAXABLE COSTS [115], AND
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOT WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT [122];
AND REQUIRING THE FILING OF AMENDED MOTIONS FOR COSTS
Before the Court are Plaintiff Hill’s Motion for Entry of Judgment on the Jury
Verdict [114], Motion for Taxable Costs [115], and Motion for Judgment Not
Withstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, New Trial on Plaintiff’s Excessive
Force Claim [122].
Plaintiff was held in Oakland County Jail from April 4, 2009 to August 17,
2009, awaiting trial on criminal charges. On August 17, 2009, Plaintiff was acquitted
of all criminal charges in Oakland County Court. Rather than immediately releasing
Plaintiff from custody, Plaintiff was instead taken back to Oakland County Jail for
processing. On the same day, while being held in custody at Oakland County Jail,
Plaintiff and Defendant Hosington were involved in a physical altercation.

On January 27, 2011, Plaintiff commenced an action against Defendant in this
Court. Plaintiff’s Complaint [1] made several claims against Defendant arising from
this August 17, 2009 altercation.
A jury trial commenced in this matter on August 27, 2013. Before the jury were
Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force and battery. On August 30, 2013, the jury entered
its verdict finding that Defendant Hosington did not use excessive force, but that
Defendant did commit a battery against Plaintiff. The jury then found compensatory
damages of $5,000 and punitive damages of $37,500.
In the pleadings now before the Court, the parties dispute whether the jury erred
in finding in favor of Defendant as to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. It appears that
this dispute is at least in part based on the parties’ unsupported assumption that
punitive damages are not available for the state law intentional tort of battery,
rendering the jury verdict internally inconsistent.
The Court disagrees and now finds the jury verdict’s award of punitive damages
proper and consistent with the entirety of the jury verdict.
As is the case here, “[w]hen a tort action is brought in federal court []basing
liability on state law, the court must apply state law in regard to availability and
computation of damages.” Losey v. No. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 792 F.2d
58, 62 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,

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Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278 (1989). Therefore, Michigan law controls the issue of the
availability of punitive damages in this case. In ruling on damages as to a claim of
battery, the Michigan Supreme Court held that “an award of exemplary damages is
justifiable only where it is first shown that defendant's conduct was malicious, or so
willful and wanton as to demonstrate a reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights.”
Bailey v. Graves, 309 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Mich. 1981); see also Smith v. Ely, 683
N.W.2d 145 (Mich. 2004); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 46-48 & n.13 (1983).
In the case now before the Court, the jury’s instructions as to its finding of
punitive damages read:

If you find that the Defendant is liable for the Plaintiff's injuries, you
must award the Plaintiff the compensatory damages that he has proven.
You also may award punitive damages, if the Plaintiff has proved that
the Defendant acted with malice or willfulness or with callous and
reckless indifference to the safety or rights of others. One acts willfully
or with reckless indifference to the rights of others when he acts in
disregard of a high and excessive degree of danger about which he
knows or which would be apparent to a reasonable person in his
condition. They are awarded to punish a defendant for outrageous
conduct and to detour (sic) the Defendant and others from engaging in
similar conduct in the future.
If you determine that the Defendant's conduct was so shocking and
offensive as to justify an award of punitive damages, you may exercise
your discretion to award those damages. In making any award of
punitive damages, you should consider that the purpose of punitive
damages is to punish a defendant for shocking conduct, and to deter the
Defendant and others from engaging in similar conduct in the future. The
law does not require you to award punitive damages, however, if you
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decide to award punitive damages, you must use sound reason in setting
the amount of the damages. The amount of an award of punitive damages
must not reflect bias, prejudice, or sympathy toward any party. It should
be presumed a plaintiff has been made whole by compensatory damages,
so punitive damages should be awarded only if the Defendant's
misconduct, after having paid compensatory damages, is so
reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve
punishment or deterrence. You may consider the financial resources of
the defendant in fixing the amount of punitive damages.
These instructions as to punitive damages are clear in requiring malice, willful,
or reckless conduct. Given the jury’s finding that punitive damages were necessary,
based upon these instructions, the Court finds that under Michigan law the jury’s
award of punitive damages is proper and consistent with the entirety of the jury’s
verdict.
Separate and apart from this finding, the Court finds it necessary to state that
the undisputed facts in this case – in which Plaintiff was acquitted of all criminal
charges – support a finding that there was no probable cause to support Plaintiff’s
continued detention, and that as such, Plaintiff was unlawfully detained following his
acquittal. If not explicit, there is certainly an implicit protection against such a seizure.
See Jones v. Cochran, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20625 at *24 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8,
1994)(“[T]he detentions themselves were not constitutionally reasonable as these
individuals were acquittees, and there was no asserted reasonably particularized
suspicion to detain them in the first place.”); Jones v. Cochran, 1994 U.S. Dist.

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LEXIS 20625 at *17 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 1994)(“Without question an individual who
has not been charged with or convicted of a crime has a protected liberty interest in
remaining free.”); Cannon v. Macon County, 1 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1993)(“The
constitutional right to be free from continued detention after it was or should have
been known that the detainee was entitled to release has been recognized in other
circuits as well.”). Moreover, to the extent to which such an unlawful detention is
prohibited under the Fourth Amendment, any force used against Plaintiff may be
excessive. See Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1127 & n.23 (10th Cir. 2007).
Based upon this lack of probable cause, the proper post-acquittal procedure requires
the immediate release of a detainee following an acquittal, allowing for any possible
outprocessing to occur without continued or required detention.
Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that judgment is entered pursuant to the jury’s
verdict [111].
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Hill’s Motion for Entry of
Judgment on the Jury Verdict [114] is now MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Taxable Costs [115]
is now MOOT.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment Not
Withstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, New Trial on Plaintiff’s Excessive
Force Claim [122] is now MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff submit to the Court amended
motions for costs.
SO ORDERED.
s/Arthur J. Tarnow
ARTHUR J. TARNOW
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: July 1, 2014

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