Greater Lakes Ambulatory Surgical Center, PLLC, et al v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

Filing 16

ORDER denying 15 Motion to Consolidate Cases. Signed by District Judge David M. Lawson. (DTof)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
GREAT LAKES ANESTHESIA, PLLC,
SUMMIT MEDICAL GROUP, PLLC,
GREATER LAKES AMBULATORY
SURGICAL CENTER, PLLC, d/b/a
ENDOSURGICAL CENTER AT GREATER
LAKES,
Plaintiffs,

Case Number 11-10658
Honorable David M. Lawson

v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
_________________________________________/
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE CIVIL CASES
This matter is before the Court on the parties’ joint motion to consolidate the following cases
filed in the Eastern District of Michigan, all involving similar parties with the exception of the
addition of Michigan Institute of Pain and Headache, P.C. in case number 11-11003:
(1) this case;
(2) Greater Lakes Ambulatory Surgical Center, PLLC, Great Lakes Anesthesia,
PLLC, Michigan Institute of Pain and Headache, P.C. v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, case number 11-11003 (Hon. Robert Cleland);
(3) Greater Lakes Ambulatory Surgical Center, PLLC, Great Lakes Anesthesia,
PLLC, Summit Medical Group, PLLC v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, case number 11-11855 (Hon. Avern Cohn);
(4) Greater Lakes Ambulatory Surgical Center, PLLC, Greater Lakes Anesthesia,
PLLC, Summit Medical Group, PLLC v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, case number 11-12135 (Hon. David Lawson).

The parties seek to consolidate the cases because they are all suits brought under Michigan’s nofault insurance law by health-care providers seeking to recover reimbursement for medical services
allegedly rendered to individuals insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,
and the cases all involve determining whether the medical services rendered were reasonable and
necessary.
Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grants a court discretion to consolidate
actions “[i]f [the] actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 42(a). “Consolidation is permitted as a matter of convenience and economy in administration,
but does not merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights of the parties or make those
who are parties in one suit parties in another.” Kraft, Inc. v. Local Union 327, Teamsters, 683 F.2d
131, 133 (6th Cir. 1982) (quoting Johnson v. Manhattan Ry Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1933)).
Geared toward increasing the efficient allocation of judicial resources, consolidation is proper
especially when multiple proceedings “would be largely duplicative.” See Central States, Se. & Sw.
Area Pension Fund v. Smeltzer Enters, Inc., No. 08-50180, 2009 WL 3672120, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
Oct. 30, 2009).
The parties argue that all of the cases involve the “identical issues of whether the medical
services rendered were reasonable and necessary, whether the charges were reasonable, whether the
charges qualify as ‘allowable expenses,’ and other similar issues involving Michigan’s No-Fault
Act.” Mot. at 3. The commonality, however, is purely categorical. Although the medical providers
and the insurer may be the same entities, the insured patient is different in each case. Consequently,
the determination of the necessity of treatment and reasonableness of the charges requires an
individual assessment of the injuries and treatment for each of the injured parties. Evidence

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presented to support one insured’s claims would have absolutely no bearing on the outcome of the
other insureds’ claims. Under Michigan’s No-Fault Act, an insurer is liable only for expenses that
are reasonable, necessary, and incurred. Nasser v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 435 Mich. 33, 50, 457
N.W.2d 637, 645 (1990). To obtain relief, the plaintiffs will have to offer evidence, relevant to only
one particular case, of the nature of each insured’s injuries and the medical care each insured
received to establish that the care provided was reasonable and necessary.
The Court fails to see the judicial economy to be gained by consolidating the four cases. The
parties have not identified a common question of law, and the purportedly common factual questions
are not in fact common.
However, counsel for the parties — who are common in each of the four cases — have
suggested that discovery of the respective parties’ methods and procedures may overlap among the
cases. They state that economy would be served by consolidating the cases for discovery, at least
as to issues that do not require an assessment of the treatment actually provided to the individual
patients in the respective cases. Therefore, the Court will entertain the parties’ stipulation to
consolidate the cases for discovery only and permit the products of discovery in one case to apply
and be introduced in the other cases.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motion to consolidate cases [dkt. #15] is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that the parties may present a stipulation to consolidate the cases
for discovery only, as described above.
s/David M. Lawson
DAVID M. LAWSON
United States District Judge
Dated: June 22, 2011

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PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served
upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first
class U.S. mail on June 22, 2011.
s/Deborah R. Tofil
DEBORAH R. TOFIL

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