Carroll v. Warren

Filing 14

OPINION and ORDER denying 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and denying certificate of appealability. Signed by District Judge George Caram Steeh (MBea)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MARIA CARROLL,
Case Number: 2:11-CV-10749

Petitioner,

HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH

v.
MILLICENT WARREN,
Respondent.
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OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS, AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Petitioner Maria Carroll filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254. Carroll is a state prisoner in the custody of the Michigan Department
of Corrections pursuant to convictions for possession with intent to deliver between 450
grams and 1,000 grams of cocaine, possession of a firearm in the commission of a
felony, and possession of marijuana. She argues that her conviction was obtained in
violation of her constitutional rights because she received ineffective assistance of trial
counsel and her sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Respondent
argues that the claims are meritless. The Court finds that habeas relief is not warranted
and denies the petition.
I. Background
Carroll’s convictions arise from the execution of a police search warrant of her
home in Pontiac. Following a joint trial with co-defendant Roy Portis before separate

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juries, she was convicted as set forth above. The Michigan Court of Appeals described
the circumstances leading to Carroll’s convictions as follows:
In the master bedroom, the officers found a digital scale with cocaine
residue, a corner tie plastic bag containing more than three grams of
marijuana, and a pipe on top of a dresser. A Metro PCS cellular
telephone was also on the dresser.1 The top drawer of the dresser
contained 14 loose nine-millimeter rounds, an empty nine-millimeter shell
box, and a Metro PCS receipt in the name of “William Sullivan” that
corresponded with the cellular telephone found on top of the dresser.2 In
the top drawer of a nightstand, the officers discovered 12 individually
wrapped rocks of cocaine. On top of another nightstand was an opened
Ajax false bottom can that contained two corner tie bags of crack cocaine;
one bag had one rock of cocaine and the other had 13 individually
wrapped rocks of crack cocaine. Inside that nightstand were several forms
of correspondence to defendants Portis and Carroll. “Just inside” the
bedroom closet, the officers found a nine-millimeter highpoint rifle with
eight rounds in the magazine that were consistent with ammunition found
in the dresser drawer. A brick of cocaine in a gallon-size Ziploc bag
wrapped in duct tape and a corner tie bag containing three individually
wrapped rocks of cocaine were also in the closet.
Large male clothing, along with size 13 male shoes, and petite female
clothing were found in the master bedroom. According to one of the
officers, the large male clothing was consistent with defendant Portis’s
quite larger physique and the petite female clothing was consistent with
defendant Carroll’s smaller size. In the pocket of a 5XL sweatshirt, the
officers found a corner tie of crack cocaine. A framed photo of defendant
Portis sat on top of one of the dressers.
People v. Carroll, No. 286422, 2009 WL 3837339, *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2009).

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An officer monitored the cellular telephone that was confiscated from
the master bedroom. When the telephone rang, the caller asked for “Jay”
and requested narcotics.
2

An officer explained that it is not difficult to obtain a Metro PCS cellular
telephone using a false name, because it can be paid for in cash and no
identification is required. The officer further explained that individuals
involved in drug trafficking often use this method to prevent their cellular
telephones from being traced back to them.
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Carroll filed a direct appeal of her conviction, raising these claims: (i) counsel
was ineffective in failing to object to admission of counsel-less inculpatory statement
and in questioning police witnesses regarding the statement; and (ii) sentence violates
the ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed
Petitioner’s conviction and sentences. Id.
Carroll filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court,
raising the same claims raised in the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan
Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Carroll, 779 N.W.2d 819 (Mich.
2010).
Carroll then filed the pending habeas petition. She raises these claims:
I.

Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial where
counsel failed to object to the admission of a counsel-less inculpatory
statement, brought out by counsel for the co-defendant, and then
questioned police witnesses extensively regarding the statement where
the defense presented was that the Petitioner was unaware of the codefendant’s criminal drug distribution enterprise.

II.

The 115 month to thirty year sentence, imposed pursuant to Petitioner’s
conviction of one count of possession with the intent to deliver between
450 and 1,000 grams of cocaine, to be served consecutive to the two year
sentence imposed pursuant to her conviction for possession of a firearm
in the commission of a felony, constitute a violation of the guarantee
against cruel and unusual punishment provided by the Michigan
Constitution.
II. Standard

Review of this case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner is entitled to a writ of
habeas corpus only if he can show that the state court’s adjudication of his claims –
(1)
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
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determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2)
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceedings.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law if it ‘applies a
rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]’ or if it
‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the
Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [this] precedent.’”
Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). “[T]he ‘unreasonable application’ prong of the statute
permits a federal habeas court to ‘grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts’ of petitioner’s case.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003)
(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). However, “[i]n order for a federal court find a state
court’s application of [Supreme Court] precedent ‘unreasonable,’ the state court’s
decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court’s
application must have been ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21
(citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. “A state court’s determination
that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists
could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, ––, 131 S. Ct. 770, 789 (2011), (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S.
652, 664 (2004). “Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard

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against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for
ordinary error correction through appeal. . . . As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus
from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the
claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an
error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786-87 (internal quotation omitted).
Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal habeas court’s review to a determination of
whether the state court’s decision comports with clearly established federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision. See
Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Section 2254(d) “does not require citation of [Supreme
Court] cases – indeed, it does not even require awareness of [Supreme Court] cases,
so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts
them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[W]hile the principles of “clearly
established law” are to be determined solely by resort to Supreme Court rulings, the
decisions of lower federal courts may be instructive in assessing the reasonableness of
a state court’s resolution of an issue.” Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir.
2007), citing Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 2003); Dickens v.
Jones, 203 F. Supp. 2d 354, 359 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
Lastly, a federal habeas court must presume the correctness of state court
factual determinations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this
presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358,
360-61 (6th Cir. 1998).

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III. Discussion
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
To establish that she received ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner
must show, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient and, second, that counsel’s
deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). A petitioner may show that counsel’s performance was deficient by
establishing that counsel’s performance was “outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance.” Id. at 689. This “requires a showing that counsel made errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment.” Id. at 687.
To satisfy the prejudice prong, a petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. A court’s review of counsel’s
performance must be “highly deferential.” Id. at 689. Habeas relief may be granted
only if the state-court decision unreasonably applied the standard for evaluating
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims established by Strickland. Knowles v.
Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122-23 (2009). “The question is not whether a federal court
believes the state court’s determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but
whether that determination was unreasonable – a substantially higher threshold.” Id. at
123 (internal quotation omitted).
Carroll argues that her attorney rendered ineffective assistance in his handling of

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a statement she made to police when they executed the search warrant. According to
police officers Charles Janczarek and Daniel Main, Carroll directed the police to the
drugs and gun in the master bedroom. The officer did not include this statement in his
police report or to the prosecutor until just before trial. Defense counsel, therefore,
sought to exclude the statement for all purposes, including rebuttal. The trial court held
that the statement was not admissible as substantive evidence of Carroll’s guilt, but
could be used for impeachment purposes.
During the prosecution’s case-in-chief, counsel for co-defendant Portis asked
Officer Janczarek about Carroll’s statement, his failure to include it in the police report,
and whether he had failed to disclose other relevant information. Carroll’s defense
attorney did not object to this line of questioning. The Michigan Court of Appeals held
that defense counsel’s failure to object was part of a reasonable trial strategy. The
state court held that it was clear that Carroll intended to testify in her own defense and
deny any knowledge of the drugs and gun. Therefore, the statement would have been
admissible for impeachment purposes. The state court reasoned:
Given that defendant Carroll intended to testify, thereby opening the door
to the admission of the challenged statement as impeachment evidence,
attacking the reliability of the statement became a crucial part of the
defense strategy. Defense counsel attempted to use the facts
surrounding the statement to discredit the police officers and their
investigation, thereby raising questions about their claim that defendant
Carroll told them about the drugs and gun. Thus, defense counsel’s
decision to discuss the statement in this context, during the officers’
testimony, had a purpose of both removing the sting of the statement and
of undermining the reliability of the police investigation. See, e.g., People
v. Rodgers, 248 Mich. App. 702, 715-716, 645 N.W.2d 294 (2001). Under
the circumstances, defense counsel’s strategy was not unreasonable.
This Court will not second-guess counsel in matters of trial strategy.
People v. Stewart, 219 Mich. App. 38, 42, 555 N.W.2d 715 (1996). The
fact that the strategy chosen by defense counsel did not work does not
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constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
Carroll, 2009 WL 3837339 at *3.
The Supreme Court has stated that there are “countless ways to provide
effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would
not defend a particular client in the same way.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Here,
although another attorney may have proceeded differently, counsel’s decision to attack
the accuracy of the officers testimony and discredit their investigation was a sound one.
Carroll is unable to overcome the strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate
assistance and “made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Habeas relief is denied.
B. Sentencing Claim
In her second claim, Carroll argues that her sentence of 115 months to 30 years’
imprisonment for the possession with intent to deliver more than 450 grams of cocaine
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
The Supreme Court has held that “the Eighth Amendment does not require strict
proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences
that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
1001 (1991), quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983). Courts reviewing
Eighth Amendment proportionality must remain highly deferential to the legislatures in
determining the appropriate punishments for crimes. United States v. Layne, 324 F.3d
464, 473-74 (6th Cir. 2003), citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999. “In implementing this
‘narrow proportionality principle,’ the Sixth Circuit has recognized that ‘only an extreme

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disparity between crime and sentence offends the Eighth Amendment.’” Cowherd v.
Million, 260 F. App’x 781, 785 (6th Cir. 2008), quoting United States v. Marks, 209 F.3d
577, 583 (6th Cir. 2000). As long as the sentence remains within the statutory limits,
trial courts have historically been given wide discretion in determining “the type and
extent of punishment for convicted defendants.” Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
245 (1949).
Carroll’s sentence is not grossly disproportionate to the crime committed. The
sentence falls within the statutory maximum; therefore, this Court defers to the decision
of the state court. See Austin v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 298, 302 (6th Cir. 2000) (“A
sentence within the statutory maximum . . . generally does not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.”) (internal quotation omitted). In addition, to the extent that Carroll
argues that her sentence violates the Michigan Constitution, this claim is not cognizable
on habeas review because habeas review is limited to alleged violations of the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68
(1991).
IV. Certificate of Appealability
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 provides that an appeal may not
proceed unless a certificate of appealability (COA) is issued under 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings requires that the Court
“must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to
the applicant.”

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A COA may be issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). A petitioner must show “that
reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition
should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484 (2000) (citation omitted). In this case, the Court concludes that reasonable
jurists would not debate the conclusion that the petition fails to state a claim upon which
habeas corpus relief should be granted. Therefore, the Court will deny a certificate of
appealability.
V. Conclusion
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
DENIED and the matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
Dated: February 12, 2015
s/George Caram Steeh
GEORGE CARAM STEEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
February 12, 2015, by electronic and/or ordinary mail and also
on Maria Carroll #686339, Huron Valley Complex - Womens,
3201 Bemis Road, Ypsilanti, MI 48197.
s/Barbara Radke
Deputy Clerk

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