Moore v. Walton et al
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER of Summary Dismissal, terminating as moot 5 Request to hold case in abeyance, and concluding that an appeal cannot be taken in good faith. Signed by District Judge Robert H. Cleland. (NHol)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TERRENCE MOORE,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 11-11146
PAUL T. WALTON and MICHAEL D. WARREN,
Defendants.
/
OPINION AND ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL,
TERMINATING AS MOOT REQUEST TO HOLD CASE IN ABEYANCE,
AND CONCLUDING THAT AN APPEAL CANNOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH
Pending before the court is Plaintiff Terrence Moore’s pro se civil rights complaint
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed his complaint on March 21, 2011. The court
has granted his application to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a).
Plaintiff is a state prisoner currently confined at the Lakeland Correctional Facility
in Coldwater, Michigan. In his complaint, he is challenging the constitutionality of his
state criminal proceedings, specifically stating that he was maliciously prosecuted. He
names Oakland County Prosecutor Paul T. Walton and Oakland County Circuit Court
Judge Michael D. Warren as Defendants in this action. Plaintiff is seeking monetary
damages.
On April 21, 2011, Plaintiff filed a request to hold this case in abeyance pending
the results of his habeas and civil rights actions that are presently before the Sixth
Circuit. See Moore v. Curtin, No. 10-2647 (6th Cir. filed Dec. 17, 2010) (appealing the
denial of his habeas petition); Moore v. Hartley, No. 11-1539 (6th Cir. filed Apr. 26,
2011) (a civil rights action involving an excessive force claim).
Having reviewed the complaint, the court will dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. Because the court will dismiss this case, the court will terminate as moot
Plaintiff’s request to hold this action in abeyance.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff has been granted in forma pauperis status. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (“PLRA”), the court is required
to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint sua sponte before service on a defendant if it
determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The court is similarly required to dismiss
a complaint seeking redress against governmental entities, officers, and employees
which it finds to be frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The court must read the plaintiff’s pro se complaint liberally, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept his allegations as true, unless
they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992).
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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was
deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or laws of
the United States, and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of
state law. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978); Brock v.
McWherter, 94 F.3d 242, 244 (6th Cir. 1996).
Taking fully into account the less stringent pleading standard regularly accorded
pro se plaintiffs, the court finds nonetheless that Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed.
B. No Claim Against State Court Judge Warren
First, the court notes that Defendant Oakland County Circuit Court Judge Michael
D. Warren is entitled to absolute immunity. Judges and judicial employees are entitled
to absolute judicial immunity on claims for damages. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,
9-10 (1991) (per curiam) (holding judge performing judicial functions is absolutely
immune from suit seeking monetary damages even if acting erroneously, corruptly, or in
excess of jurisdiction); Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 221 (6th Cir. 1996).
Allegations arising from Plaintiff’s state criminal proceedings involve the
performance of judicial duties. Judge Warren is absolutely immune from suit for such
conduct and the claims against him must be dismissed.
C. No Claim Against Prosecutor Walton
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Second, Plaintiff’s action against Oakland County Prosecutor Paul T. Walton
must be dismissed because prosecutors are immune from suit for actions taken during
the prosecution of Plaintiff.
“Absolute prosecutorial immunity, like absolute judicial immunity, is a common
law principle that shields a prosecutor from § 1983 liability.” Cooper v. Parrish, 203
F.3d 937, 946 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). A
prosecutor has absolute immunity for all acts “intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the criminal process,” such as “initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the
State’s case.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31. The Sixth Circuit has held:
Those acts that occur in the course of the prosecutor’s role as an
advocate for the state, e.g., acts taken to prepare for the initiation of
judicial proceedings or to prepare for trial, are protected by absolute
immunity. By contrast, a prosecutor who “performs the investigative
functions normally performed by a detective or police officer” such as
“searching for the clues and corroboration that might give him probable
cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested” is entitled only at most to
qualified immunity.
Cooper, 203 F.3d at 947 (citations omitted). As with judicial immunity, the motives of
the prosecutor are irrelevant for purposes of determining the applicability of immunity.
Eldridge v. Gibson, 332 F.3d 1019, 1021 (6th Cir. 2003).
In the present case, the decisions by Oakland County Prosecutor Walton to
prosecute Plaintiff, his advocacy in court, his communication with witnesses, and his
decisions regarding the disposition of the case are all part of his role as advocate for
which he is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. Therefore, the complaint must
be dismissed against Defendant Walton.
D. Criminal Conviction Claims Barred by Heck v. Humphrey
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Finally, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal because he is alleging that
defendants intentionally concealed exculpatory evidence in his trial court proceeding
and thus he was maliciously prosecuted. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants
concealed health and psychiatric records which would have demonstrated his mental
incapacities and that his confession was a result of force.
While a claim under § 1983 is an appropriate remedy for a state prisoner
challenging a condition of his imprisonment, see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
499 (1973), it cannot be used to contest the validity of his continued confinement. See
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (holding that a state prisoner does not
state a cognizable civil rights claim challenging his imprisonment if a ruling on his claim
would necessarily render his continuing confinement invalid, until and unless the reason
for his continued confinement has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called into question by
a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254). This
holds true regardless of the relief sought by the plaintiff. Id. at 487-89. Heck and other
Supreme Court cases, when “taken together, indicate that a state prisoner’s § 1983
action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or
equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to
conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily
demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S.
74, 81-82 (2005) (emphasis in original). If Plaintiff were to prevail on the claims arising
from his criminal proceedings, the validity of his continued confinement would be called
into question. Such claims are barred by Heck and must be dismissed.
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II. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the court determines that Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as to both Defendants.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the complaint [Dkt. # 1] is summarily
DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request to hold this case in abeyance
[Dkt. # 5] is TERMINATED AS MOOT.
The court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good
faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114
F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the court dismisses the
action, the court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal.
s/Robert H. Cleland
ROBERT H. CLELAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: May 6, 2011
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record
on this date, May 6, 2011, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Lisa Wagner
Case Manager and Deputy Clerk
(313) 234-5522
S:\Cleland\JUDGE'S DESK\C2 ORDERS\11-11146.MOORE.SummaryDismissal1983.JR.jmp.wpd
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