LR et al v. Corrigan et al

Filing 87

MEMORANDUM and ORDER Dismissing Count 1 for declaratory judgment. Signed by District Judge Avern Cohn. (CBet)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LEO RATTÉ, a minor by his Next Friend,
CLAIRE ZIMMERMAN; CLAIRE
ZIMMERMAN; and CHRISTOPHER
RATTÉ,
Plaintiffs,

Case No: 11-11190

vs.

HON. AVERN COHN

MAURA CORRIGAN; CITY OF DETROIT;
CELESTE REED; SCOTT HALL; RICHARD
KNOX; SUALYN HOLBROOK; CHERITA
TURNER-ROYSTER; and JUDY A.
HARTSFIELD,
Defendants.
_____________________________________/
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DISMISSING
COUNT I FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
I.
A.
This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The claims arise out of an
incident at Comerica Park where the plaintiff father inadvertently gave his 7-year-old
plaintiff son a “Mike’s Hard Lemonade,” an alcoholic beverage, at a Tiger game. A series
of events then took place which resulted in the plaintiff son being placed in foster care over
a weekend. The facts are explained in detail in the Court’s memorandum and order
denying defendant Judge Judy Hartsfield’s motion to dismiss, granting Sualyn Holbrook’s
and Cherita Turner-Royster’s motion for summary judgment, and severing count I for
declaratory judgment against defendant Maura Corrigan (Doc. 86). The facts will not be
repeated here.

This order addresses count I for declaratory relief against defendant Maura Corrigan
in her official capacity as the Director of the Michigan Department of Human Services. In
count I, plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that Mich. Comp. Laws 712A.14(1) and Mich.
Ct. R. 3.963(A) are unconstitutional.
B.
Count I is DISMISSED. Plaintiffs are not entitled to a declaratory judgment because
they lack standing to seek injunctive relief. In addition, even if the plaintiffs could establish
standing, the Court declines to exercise its discretion over the claim for declaratory relief.1
II.
The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), states in pertinent part:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not
further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and
effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
As the Sixth Circuit has explained, “Article III’s ‘case and controversy’ requirement
is not satisfied, and a court therefore has no jurisdiction, when the claimant lacks standing,
that is, ‘a sufficiently concrete and redressable interest in the dispute.’” Fieger v. Mich.
Supreme Court, 553 F.3d 955, 961 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In order for a plaintiff
to meet its burden in establishing standing, he or she must establish that:
(1) he or she has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and particularized
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed
to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. In
the context of a declaratory judgment action, allegations of past injury alone are not
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To the extent that count I seeking a declaratory judgment also applies to Hartsfield, it
is dismissed for the same reasons.
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sufficient to confer standing. The plaintiff must allege and/or demonstrate actual
present harm or a significant possibility of future harm.
Id. at 962 (quoting Fieger v. Ferry, 471 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2006)).
Ultimately, a court has discretion whether to exercise jurisdiction in a declaratory
judgment action. Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Roumph, 211 F.3d 964, 968 (6th Cir. 2000). A
court considers five factors when deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over a
declaratory judgment action:
(1) whether the judgment would settle the controversy;
(2) whether the declaratory judgment action would serve a useful purpose in
clarifying the legal relations at issue;
(3) whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of
“procedural fencing” or “to provide an arena for a race for res judicata”;
(4) whether the use of a declaratory action would increase the friction between our
federal and state courts and improperly encroach on state jurisdiction; and
(5) whether there is an alternative remedy that is better or more effective.
Id. (citations omitted).
III.
Plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment fails as a matter of law because they
do not have standing to seek such relief. The Court therefore lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain the request for declaratory judgment.
Plaintiffs have not alleged or demonstrated actual present harm or a significant
possibility of future harm. Instead, plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment based on
allegations of past injury alone. The events leading to Leo’s placement in foster care for
a weekend occurred in April 2008 when his father unknowingly gave him an alcoholic drink.
Plaintiffs have not alleged that, in the five (5) years that have passed since Leo was placed
in foster care, he has been placed in foster care again or has been the subject of
proceedings in family court triggering the application of Mich. Comp. Laws 712A.14(1) and
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Mich. Ct. R. 3.963(A). Nor have plaintiffs established that such proceedings are likely to
occur in the future. As the DHS defendants correctly state in their supplemental brief:
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they meet these requirement[s] because
for them, this case is [a] single occurrence that will not be repeated. They have
neither pleaded nor alluded to any threat that their child may again be removed from
their custody, or any other indication that they may again be subjected to the
purview of the challenged statute or court rule. They have provided no evidence
that they have been threatened with further or repeated removals of their child, or
future proceedings in family court. Without any evidence that they will again be
subject to the removal of their child or child protection proceedings, Plaintiffs are left
with no interest in the challenged statute and court rule greater than that of any
other person in Michigan.
(Doc. 85 at 5–6, DHS Defs.’ Supplemental Br.).
Indeed, plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment is a generalized grievance
seeking to assert the rights of Michigan parents and children in general, and not the rights
of parties presently before the Court.

In addition to the constitutional standing

requirements, a plaintiff must satisfy three prudential standing requirements: (1) a plaintiff
must “‘assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest [a] claim to relief on the
legal rights or interests of third parties’”; (2) “a plaintiff’s claim must be more than a
‘generalized grievance’ that is pervasively shared by a large class of citizens”; and (3) “in
statutory cases, the plaintiff’s claim must fall within the ‘zone of interests’ regulated by the
statute in question.” Coal Operators and Assocs., Inc. v. Babbitt, 291 F.3d 912, 916 (6th
Cir. 2002) (quoting Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 494 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal
citations omitted)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the prudential standing requirements.
Plaintiffs misplace their reliance on Hanas v. Inner City Christian Outreach, Inc., 542
F. Supp. 2d 683 (E.D. Mich. 2008) to argue that they have standing to seek a declaratory
judgment. In Hanas, after pleading guilty to possession with intent to deliver marijuana, the

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plaintiff was permitted to choose between going to prison or entering a faith-based
rehabilitation program run by Inner City Christian Outreach (ICCO). Id. at 688. The plaintiff
chose the ICCO program and, while he was at ICCO, the staff prevented the plaintiff from
practicing Catholicism and forced him to participate in worship services of the Pentecostal
tradition. Id. Plaintiff sued in federal district court seeking damages and sought a
declaratory judgment that referral to the ICCO was unconstitutional. The court stated:
Genesee County Drug Court stopped making referrals to Inner City Christian
Outreach. And Coleman testified at his 2006 deposition that he was no longer a
paid consultant of the Drug Court since 2004. Nevertheless, the court believes that
declaratory judgment is still appropriate, because, without putting the public on
notice by announcing declaratory relief, there is “some likelihood of the recurrence”
of these kinds of constitutional torts. Declaratory relief serves a useful purpose.
Furthermore, declaratory relief will settle the core of this § 1983 suit without
encroaching upon state court jurisdiction.
Id. at 692 (internal citations omitted).
Here, unlike the court found in Hanas, a declaratory judgment is not useful in this
case. Whether Hartsfield, now the sole defendant before the Court, is constitutionally liable
will be considered in relation to plaintiffs’ claims for damages. A declaratory judgment
seeks relief that would be better presented to the Michigan Legislature. Indeed, as the
Court noted in the companion decision, the Michigan Legislature has already amended the
statutory scheme as a direct result of this case. See (Doc. 86 at 20–21 n.8). Therefore,
even if plaintiffs could establish standing to seek a declaratory judgment, the Court declines
to exercise its jurisdiction in such regard.
For these reasons, Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1984), is also
inapposite. Plaintiff relies on Bilbrey for the proposition that a declaratory judgment may
be appropriate where the conduct complained of is complete. The Court agrees. In cases

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where the conduct complained of is complete but the plaintiff alleges actual present harm
or a significant possibility of future harm, a declaratory judgment may be appropriate.
However, this is not one of these cases. The conduct complained of by plaintiffs is
attenuated from relief by way of a declaratory judgment. As explained above, the Michigan
Legislature has already amended the statutory scheme as a direct consequence of this
case. In addition, plaintiffs have not alleged actual present harm or a significant possibility
of future harm.
IV.
For the reasons stated above, count I for declaratory judgment has been dismissed.
Plaintiffs lack standing to assert this claim against Corrigan and Hartsfield. All claims
against Corrigan are now DISMISSED. This case (counts II through IV) proceeds against
Hartsfield.
SO ORDERED.

s/Avern Cohn
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: November 26, 2013

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to the attorneys of record
on this date, November 26, 2013, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Carol Bethel for Sakne Chami
Case Manager, [phone]

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