Freeman v. LNU et al

Filing 9

ORDER OF DISMISSAL, Signed by District Judge Arthur J. Tarnow. (CPic)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

EMERSON FREEMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 11-11606
HONORABLE ARTHUR J. TARNOW

BERTHA LNU, LARRY CLAYTON,
and WASHTENAW COUNTY JAIL
HEALTH DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
________________________________/
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Emerson Freeman is a state prisoner at Gus Harrison Correctional Facility in
Adrian, Michigan. He has filed a pro se civil complaint alleging that, on July 18, 2008, the
Ypsilanti Police Department arrested him and took him to the Washtenaw County Jail. Plaintiff
further alleges that he was given the wrong medication at the jail and went into an allergic shock,
which required hospitalization. Plaintiff claims that he has not fully recovered and that he is
currently undergoing treatment to subdue the effects of the medication erroneously administered
to him.
II. Standard of Review
Plaintiff has been permitted to proceed with this case without prepaying the filing fee.
The Court may dismiss an indigent prisoner’s civil rights complaint if the complaint (1) is
frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d

1032, 1036 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A). A complaint is
frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989), and only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief will survive. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, __ U.S. __, __, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). “So, to survive scrutiny under §§
1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), ‘a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d. 468, 471
(6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949).
A search of federal court records in this District reveals that Plaintiff sued the same
defendants and raised the same issue in a prior complaint. The Honorable Thomas L. Ludington
construed Plaintiff’s complaint in that case to allege a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Judge Ludington determined that Plaintiff’s statement of facts did not allege any conduct that
could be construed as demonstrating deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs and even
if the medication gave Plaintiff negative effects, such circumstances did not rise to the level of
an Eighth Amendment violation. Judge Ludington summarily dismissed Plaintiff’s prior
complaint with prejudice on the ground that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim for which relief
may be granted. See Freeman v. Clayton, et al., No. 10-12805 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 2, 2010)
(unpublished).
The complaint pending before this Court is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, which
encompasses claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892, 128
S. Ct. 2161, 2171, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008).
Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment forecloses “successive
litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises
the same issues as the earlier suit.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748,
121 S. Ct. 1808, 149 L. Ed. 2d 968 (2001). Issue preclusion, in contrast, bars
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“successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a
valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,” even if the issue recurs
in the context of a different claim. Id., at 748-749, 121 S. Ct. 1808. By
“preclud[ing] parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate,” these two doctrines protect against “the expense and
vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserv[e] judicial resources, and foste[r]
reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent
decisions.” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-154, 99 S. Ct. 970, 59
L. Ed. 2d 210 (1979).
Id., 553 U.S. at 892, 128 S. Ct. at 2171 (alterations in original).
Plaintiff is attempting to re-litigate the very same claim that he raised in his 2010 civil
rights complaint. Thus, his complaint is barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.
The issue is also barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion. For this doctrine to apply,
“1) the precise issue raised in the present case must have been raised and actually
litigated in the prior proceeding;
2) determination of the issue must have been necessary to the outcome of the
prior proceeding;
3) the prior proceeding must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and
4) the party against whom estoppel is sought must have had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.”
Bilali v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 470, 474 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Cinemark USA,
Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 583 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Aircraft Braking Sys. Corp. v. Local 856, Int’l
Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers, UAW, 97 F.3d 155, 161 (6th
Cir. 1996)).
All four factors are satisfied here. First, Plaintiff is raising the identical issue that he
raised and actually litigated in his 2010 lawsuit. Second, a determination of the issue was
necessary to the outcome of the 2010 lawsuit. Third, the 2010 lawsuit resulted in a final

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judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s claim. Fourth, Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate his claim in the 2010 case.
III. Conclusion
Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a plausible claim for which relief may be granted,
because it is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Accordingly, the complaint is summarily
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). An appeal from this decision
would be frivolous and could not be taken in good faith. Therefore, Plaintiff may not proceed in
forma pauperis on appeal if he chooses to appeal this decision. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3);
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601,
610-11 (6th Cir. 1997).

S/Arthur J. Tarnow
Arthur J. Tarnow
Senior United States District Judge
Dated: July 19, 2011
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon parties/counsel of record
on July 19, 2011, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/Catherine A. Pickles
Judicial Secretary

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