Strobel v. Dillon et al

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM and ORDER granting 13 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Avern Cohn. (JOwe)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

STANLEY STROBEL,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 11-11684

ANDY DILLON, State Treasurer in his
official capacity as Treasurer of the
State of Michigan, BILL SCHUETTE, in
his official capacity as Attorney General
for the State of Michigan,

HON. AVERN COHN

Defendants.
____________________________________/
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(Doc. 13)1
I. Introduction
This is a case filed under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. Plaintiff Stanley Strobel is a state inmate currently
incarcerated at the West Shoreline Correctional Facility in Muskegon Heights, Michigan.
Plaintiff is also a former employee of General Motors Corporation (GM). Plaintiff retired
from GM with a monthly pension benefit in the amount of $3,160.002 which he receives
from Fidelity. As will be explained, the State Treasurer, a defendant in this case,
brought an action against plaintiff in state court under the State Correctional Facility
1

The Court deems this matter appropriate for decision without oral argument.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2).
2

There is a discrepancy in the record as to the amount of the pension benefit.
Plaintiff’s complaint states a monthly amount of $3,160.00. A document filed by the
State Treasurer in state court states a monthly amount of $2,835.37.

Reimbursement Act, (SCFRA), M.C.L. § 800.401, to recover the costs of his
incarceration which involved freezing his assets, including his pension benefit. While
the state court case was pending, on the day before a final judgment entered, plaintiff
filed suit in federal court, essentially claiming that the state’s attempt to recoup the costs
of incarceration via his pension violates ERISA. Plaintiff names as defendants Andy
Dillon, in his official capacity as State Treasurer, and Bill Schuette, Attorney General for
the State of Michigan, also in his official capacity. The two count complaint claims an
ERISA violation under count one and seeks injunctive relief based on ERISA under
count two.
As will also be explained, this is not the first attempt to challenge the SCFRA as
violative of ERISA. Both the Michigan Supreme Court and the Michigan Court of
Appeals have spoken on the issue, with only the Michigan Supreme Court speaking
more squarely to the situation in this case.
Before the Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.
Defendants cite the Eleventh Amendment, the doctrine under Ex parte Young,3 the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine,4 and res judicata in support of dismissal. In the end, the
Rooker-Feldman and res judicata arguments carry the day for defendants, making it
unnecessary to consider defendants’ other grounds for dismissal.
II. Background
In May 2010, plaintiff was sentenced to two to fifteen years incarceration

3

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

4

Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
2

following a conviction for involuntary manslaughter. In late 2010, the State Treasurer,
brought an action under SCFRA in Gladwin County Circuit Court seeking an ex parte
order to freeze plaintiff’s assets, including the bank account where plaintiff’s pension
check was being deposited, and to appoint a receiver. On November 5, 2010, the state
court entered a show cause order, giving plaintiff until January 25, 2011 to show cause
“why an order should not be entered appropriating and applying [plaintiff’s] assets to
reimburse the State of Michigan for the cost of his confinement in a state correctional
facility . . . and . . . show cause why he should not be ordered to notify General Motors
Corporation of his current legal address at the State correctional facility where he is
confined for purposes of receiving pension benefits.” The show cause order also stated
that
. . . If [plaintiff] objects to the State’s request for an order indicating his legal
address for purposes of receiving funds for deposit into his only legal bank
account, or to the State’s claim to 90% of his assets, then before the scheduled
hearing date he shall provide this Court and the Attorney General’s office with a
written response explaining te reasons for the objection.
The show cause hearing was adjourned several times, including one adjournment so
plaintiff could retain new counsel.
According to defendants, plaintiff’s new (and current) counsel asked the State
Treasurer to agree to remove the case to federal count to allow for review of whether
the pension benefits are protected from reach under ERISA. The State Treasurer
declined the request. A show cause hearing was eventually set for April 19, 2011.
On April 18, 2011, the day before the show cause hearing, plaintiff filed a
complaint in federal court, claiming that the State’s attempt to reach his pension benefits
under SCFRA violates ERISA.
3

Although the show cause order directed plaintiff to file a written response before
the hearing, plaintiff filed a written answer on the date of the hearing, April 19, 2011,
denying that the State was entitled to his pension benefits under ERISA. In the answer,
plaintiff also explained the filing of the federal complaint, as follows:
. . . [plaintiff] has sought to have this matter litigated in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan and have filed suit, entitled Strobel v.
Dillon, et al., being case number 2:11-cv-11684. This suit has been commenced
prior to any order(s) being entered in this case to prevent application of RookerFeldman doctrine.
On April 19, 2011, the state court issued a Final Order, stating in relevant part
that:
During the period of his incarceration [plaintiff’s] legal address is the
Michigan correctional facility in which he is currently confined, currently the West
Shoreline Correctional Facility.
Within one week of being served with a copy of this Order, [plaintiff] is
ordered to notify Fidelity that all pension benefits shall be mailed by check made
payable to him at he West Shoreline Correctional Facility, and within one week of
any transfer to a different facility, he shall notify Fidelity of his new prison
address.
The Final Order further provided that if plaintiff refused to comply with the notification
provision and directs that his pension payments be paid to his power of attorney, the
power of attorney is required to direct payment in the amount of 90% of the pension
payment to the correctional facility and 10% to plaintiff. The Final Order does not direct
GM to take any action whatsoever with regard to plaintiff’s pension payment; GM was
not a party to the state court action.
Under Michigan’s court rules, the state court’s Final Order became effective on
May 10, 2011, 21 days after its entry. See M.C.R. 2.614(A)(1). Plaintiff’s right to appeal
the Final Order expired on that same date. See M.C.R. 7.101(B)(1)(a). Plaintiff did not
4

appeal the Final Order.
Although plaintiff disclosed the filing of the federal complaint in his response to
the show cause order, he did not serve defendant with the complaint until July 6, 2011,
almost three months after entry of the Final Order.
III. Legal Standards
“A Rule 12(b)(1) motion can either attack the claim of jurisdiction on its face, in
which case all allegations of the plaintiff must be considered as true, or it can attack the
factual basis for jurisdiction, in which case the trial court must weigh the evidence and
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists.” DLX, Inc. v. Ky., 381
F.3d 511, 516 (6th Cir.2004). A district court has no subject matter jurisdiction over a
claim if that claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, res judicata, or by the
Eleventh Amendment. Id.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests
the sufficiency of a complaint. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
complaint's “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level on the assumption that all of the allegations in the complaint are true.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). See also Ass’n of Cleveland
Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir.2007). The court is
“not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Moreover, “[o]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief
survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. Thus, “a court considering a motion to dismiss can
choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
5

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.
When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity
and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. In
sum, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1949
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Summary judgment will be granted when the moving party demonstrates that
there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). There is no genuine issue of
material fact when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
The nonmoving party may not rest upon his pleadings; rather, the nonmoving
party’s response “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Showing that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts is not enough; “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of
the nonmoving party is not sufficient to show a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Rather, the nonmoving party must
present “significant probative evidence” in support of its opposition to the motion for
summary judgment in order to defeat the motion. Moore v. Philip Morris Co., 8 F.3d
335, 340 (6th Cir. 1993); see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50.
IV. Analysis
6

A. SCFRA and Relevant Case Law
Before considering defendants’ arguments, some limited discussion of SCFRA
and relevant case law is appropriate. As an initial matter, Michigan Department of
Corrections security restrictions allow an inmate to have only one bank account—a
prison account—during incarceration, and they require that an inmate receive all funds
and conduct all financial transactions through the prison account. See Mich. Dep't of
Corrs. Policy Directive No. 04.02.105 (2004).
Michigan enacted SCFRA to reimburse the State for the costs of detaining and
providing for a prisoner. Under SCFRA, the attorney general may seek reimbursement
for expenses incurred during a prisoner's incarceration by filing a complaint against the
prisoner in the state trial court. M.C.L. Laws § 800.404(1). Under § 800.404(3), the
state court may order any person, corporation, or entity having custody of a prisoner's
assets to “appropriate and apply the assets or a portion thereof toward reimbursing the
state.” However, this provision of SCFRA is not applicable where, as here, a prisoner's
assets are held by a private pension plan. The State recognizes that application of §
800.404(3) in this situation would violate ERISA’s anti-alienation provision, which states
that each plan must “provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned
or alienated.” 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). Instead, in order to recover a prisoner's benefits
payable by a pension plan, the State utilizes SCFRA in conjunction with other Michigan
laws and MDOC prison directives.
The process begins, as it did here, with the State Treasurer, who files a
complaint in state court and obtains a judgment against the prisoner, which includes a
directive that the prisoner to inform his or her pension plan that any benefit payments
7

should be sent to the institutional address. If the prisoner does not comply, the warden
of the institution must send a copy of the court order to the pension plan. The order
serves to notify the pension plan of the prisoner's institutional address. Once payments
are received at the prison, they are automatically deposited into the prisoner's
institutional account and are then confiscated by the state.
The Michigan Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit have considered the
application of SCFRA and the anti-alienation provision of ERISA in decisions which, are
not necessarily conflicting but not harmonious. First, in State Treasurer v. Abbott, 468
Mich. 143, (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1112 (2004), the Michigan Supreme Court
addressed the interplay of SCFRA and ERISA in the context of a dispute between the
State Treasurer and an inmate involving a state court order that directed the inmate to
instruct his pension plan to send his pension benefits to his prison address, and that
further directed the warden then to divide the funds among the inmate, the inmate's wife
and the State. Id. at 716–717. That order is very similar to the Final Order in this case.
The Michigan Supreme Court also held that, if the inmate refused to instruct the pension
plan to send the proceeds to his prison address, the pension plan was nonetheless
required to do so. Id. at 717. As noted above, the Final Order in this case contains no
directive to the pension plan.
As to whether the state court's order directing the inmate to instruct the pension
plan to send his benefit payments to his prison address violated the anti-alienation
provision, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that no violation occurred. The
Michigan Supreme Court observed that the pertinent Treasury Regulation, 26 C.F.R. §
1.401(a)–13(c)(1), defined an alienation as an arrangement that contemplates the
8

transfer of an interest in plan benefits to a person other than the beneficiary. Id. at 718.
Yet, the Michigan Supreme Court held that ordering an inmate to direct a plan to send
his benefit payments to his prison address did not transfer an interest in the benefit
payment to another person. Id. at 718–719. The Michigan Supreme Court further
stated that the state court's order in the alternative, requiring the plan to send the
payments to the inmate's prison address if the inmate refused to notify the plan to do
so, did not violate the anti-alienation provision for the same reason. Id. at 720
(“Because [the prisoner] ... receives the funds, no assignment or alienation occurs.”).
After the decision in Abbott, the Sixth Circuit considered the interplay of SCFRA
and ERISA in DaimlerChrysler v. Cox, 447 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 551
U.S. 1130 (2007). In this case, the State Treasurer sought to recover pension benefit
payments that four inmates were receiving under the DaimlerChrysler
Corporation–UAW Pension Agreement (the “Plan”). DaimlerChrysler, 447 F.3d at 969.
The State Treasurer obtained a judgment under SCFRA in state court, awarding the
State a percentage of each inmate’s pension payments. Accordingly, to effectuate the
SCFRA award, the state court ordered each inmate to inform the Plan that benefit
payments should be sent to his institutional address. Each order further provided that, if
the inmate refused to give such notice, the warden was to serve on DaimlerChrysler
Corporation a copy of the court's order and a notice that the institutional address was
the legal address where the inmate should receive his pension benefits. Id. at 970.
Each order directed the warden to make distributions to the State from the inmate's
account in an amount equal to the court-ordered percentage of the inmates' pension
benefits. The state court further ordered that, when payments from the pension plan
9

were received at the institutional address, they were to be deposited directly into the
inmate's institutional account, from which the warden was to make monthly distributions
to the State of 90% of the funds.
Only one of the inmates complied with the order to notify the Plan that benefits
should be sent to his institutional address, and DaimlerChrysler changed his address
accordingly. The other three inmates refused to provide notice to the Plan of their
institutional address, and their respective wardens sent change of address notices to
DaimlerChrysler as the state court had ordered.
DaimlerChrysler did not comply with the notices, but instead brought a
declaratory judgment action in this district, seeking a determination that (1) state
officials are precluded from enforcing the orders against the prisoners to the extent that
they contravene ERISA or the Pension Plan, and (2) the orders, requests for
reimbursement, and the notices issued pursuant to SCFRA are void to the extent that
they compel the prisoner, or require the warden, to direct DaimlerChrysler to make
payments to an account that is not voluntarily designated by the prisoner. The district
court granted DaimlerChrysler's request for a declaratory judgment, holding that the
orders and notices violated ERISA's anti-alienation provision to the extent that they
purported to require DaimlerChrysler to direct pension benefits to a place not
designated by the inmate. The district court, however, rejected DaimlerChrysler's
contention that the state court orders and notices were also preempted by ERISA's
general preemption provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). DaimlerChrysler appealed.

10

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's findings.5 The Sixth Circuit
observed that Treasury Regulation § 1.401(a)–13(c)(1) (26 C.F.R.) “define[s] the terms
‘assignment’ and ‘alienation’ [in ERISA's anti-alienation provision] as including ‘[a]ny
direct or indirect arrangement (whether revocable or irrevocable) whereby a party
acquires from a participant or beneficiary a right or interest enforceable against the plan
in, or to, all or any part of a plan benefit payment which is, or may become, payable to
the participant or beneficiary.’ ” Id. at 973; see Reorg. Plan No. 4 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. §
332 (1979) (Secretary of Treasury has authority to issue regulations under ERISA's
anti-alienation provision). The Sixth Circuit further observed that it, along with a majority
of the other circuits, had held that once benefit payments have been disbursed to a
beneficiary, creditors may encumber the proceeds, but that ERISA protects pension
plan benefits from alienation up to the point of payment to the beneficiary. Id. at 974.
The Sixth Circuit framed the issue as whether the wardens' notices encumbered the
benefit payments before the payments left plan control.
The Sixth Circuit concluded that “the SCFRA notices operate on plan benefits
before they are sent,” thus falling within ERISA's prohibition on alienation. Id.
Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that the notices were “void to the extent
that they direct DaimlerChysler to send benefits to an address not designated by a
beneficiary.” Id. at 975. Further, the Sixth Circuit said that the State could still reach
5

On appeal, DaimlerChrysler originally sought to void the state court orders with
respect to all four inmates. However, it later argued only that the orders and notices
were void to the extent that they purported to require the warden to direct funds to the
prison accounts without the inmates' cooperation. Accordingly, the issue of whether a
prohibited alienation occurs when a court orders an address change and the inmate
cooperates in directing the plan to change his address was not addressed on appeal.
11

benefit payments but must wait until the payments are received at the direction of the
inmate before encumbering them. Id. at 974 (citations omitted).
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in
Abbott, but found its reasoning “unpersuasive.” Id. at 976. However, the court of
appeals specifically did not decide whether ERISA’s anti-alienation provision would be
violated if Michigan sought to require an inmate to send an address change to his
pension plan, precise issue addressed in Abbott. The Sixth Circuit stated:
We are not passing, however, on the question of whether state officials
can compel prisoners to send their address changes to the Pension Plan
because that issue is not before us.6
Id.
Meanwhile, before the Sixth Circuit decided DaimlerChrysler, Thomas Abbott,
who was a plaintiff in the state court Abbott case discussed above, along with other
prisoners, filed a complaint in federal court, contending that the state converted their
pension assets in violation of ERISA, due process, and state law. Abbott v. Michigan,
05-72793 (E.D. Mich. 2005). The district court dismissed the case on grounds of
Rooker-Feldman and res judicata, noting that plaintiffs had the ability to challenge the
state court orders in state court. See Abbott v. Michigan, 2006 WL 250255 (E.D. Mich.
Jan. 31, 2006). Plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the
prisoner’s claims were barred by either Rooker-Feldman or res judicata. Abbott v.

6

Plaintiff argues that there is a question of fact as to the holding in
DaimlerChrysler as it relates to the issue in this case. Putting aside that the scope of a
holding is a question of law, not fact, the Sixth Circuit quite plainly stated it was not
addressing the issue of whether an inmate can be compelled to change their address
for purposes of directing a pension benefit–the precise issue in this case.
12

Michigan, 474 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2007). In so doing, the Sixth Circuit noted that its
decision in DaimlerChrysler was “in tension with” the Michigan Supreme Court’s
decision in Abbott. Id. at 327 n. 3.
Against this backdrop, the Court will consider defendants’ motion.
B. Rooker-Feldman
While defendants raise several grounds for dismissal, based on the above
discussion, it seems appropriate to first consider whether Rooker-Feldman and/or res
judicata apply. “[T]he threshold question in every federal case,” is whether the court
has the power to entertain the suit. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197,
45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests all federal district courts
of subject matter jurisdiction to review state court judgments. See generally Rooker v.
Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462 (1983). The doctrine reflects the principle set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1257 that
the United States Supreme Court is the exclusive federal court with jurisdiction to review
state court decisions. Accordingly, the doctrine prevents district courts from entertaining
challenges to state court decisions, “even if those challenges allege that the state
court's action was unconstitutional.” Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486. The Rooker–Feldman
doctrine holds that federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over “cases
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). “[T]he pertinent inquiry ... is whether the ‘source of the
injury’ upon which plaintiff bases his federal claim is the state court judgment.”
13

Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting McCormick v.
Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 394–95 (6th Cir. 2006)). “If there is some other source of
injury, such as a third party's actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent claim.”
McCormick, 451 F.3d at 393. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits both direct
attacks on the substance of the state court decision, and a challenge to the procedures
used by the state court in arriving at its decision. Anderson v. Charter Township of
Ypsilanti, 266 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because he
filed this lawsuit before the entry of any state court order. Indeed, plaintiff explained to
the state court in responding to the show cause order that this federal lawsuit was filed
at a time to prevent the application of the doctrine. The Court is not convinced that
plaintiff’s creative timing, by one day, saves his case. Plainly, this lawsuit invites review
of the state court’s Final Order. Plaintiff’s requested relief is to have this court undo the
state court’s Final Order regarding pension payments. Plaintiff also knew the outcome
of the state court’s decision before the Final Order was entered, as the state court was
clearly bound by the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Abbott which permits the
State Treasurer to take the action it did and which was found not to violate ERISA. The
filing of the complaint in federal court is merely an attempt to avoid, and void, the state
court’s Final Order. Rooker-Feldman does not allow for this Court to overturn the Final
Order. While plaintiff contends otherwise, the injury of which he complains is clearly the
Final Order. There is no other source of his injury. Indeed, as explained in defendants’
papers, the defendants can only reach a plaintiff’s pension benefit through a state court
order issued after bringing an action under SCFRA. As the Sixth Circuit explained in
14

Abbott:
the plaintiffs are ostensibly complaining of injuries caused by the actions
of third parties-the conversion of their pension benefits by state
officials-but those actions were the direct and immediate products of the
state-court SCFRA judgments. The plaintiffs' claims and arguments make
this clear: They assert that the state courts erred in issuing the SCFRA
judgments and do not claim that the defendants have injured them in any
way except by strictly executing those judgments. Accordingly, the
plaintiffs' claims of specific injuries that they have suffered are actually
challenges to the state-court SCFRA judgments and are barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Abbott, 474 F.3d at 329.
Plaintiff also argues that Rooker-Feldman does not apply because he did not
have a reasonable opportunity to raise his claims in state court, citing Wood v. Orange
County, 715 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating that the doctrine applies “only to
issues that the plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to raise”), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1210, 104 S.Ct. 2398, 81 L.Ed.2d 355 (1984). Plaintiff says he was denied a
reasonable opportunity to litigate his ERISA claims during the SCFRA proceedings
because their assets were frozen and their incarceration made it difficult to travel, hire
counsel, or otherwise prepare a defense.
The Sixth Circuit addressed this same argument in Abbott and rejected the
notion that the state court proceeding did not allow an opportunity to raise an ERISA
claim. The Sixth Circuit explained:
We believe that the Supreme Court's recent decisions do not support the
plaintiffs' asserted “reasonable opportunity” exception to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Such an exception has been applied by various courts of appeals at
one time or another, see, e.g., Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548,
559-60 (7th Cir.1999); Whiteford v. Reed, 155 F.3d 671, 674 (3d Cir.1998);
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1985), vacated on other
grounds, 477 U.S. 902, 106 S.Ct. 3269, 91 L.Ed.2d 560 (1986); Wood, 715 F.2d
at 1547-48, including this one, see Johns v. Bonnyman, 109 Fed.Appx. 19, 21
15

(6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished order). However, these cases were decided during
a period of time in which “many circuits, including this one, gave an expansive
definition” of the scope of the doctrine. McCormick, 451 F.3d at 391.
More recently, the Supreme Court has emphasized the doctrine's narrow
reach: “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine ... is confined to cases of the kind from
which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct.
1517. Thus, in the limited circumstances in which a plaintiff complains of an
injury directly caused by a state-court judgment, if the plaintiff believes that the
trial court did not give him or her a reasonable opportunity to pursue a claim, the
proper course of action is to appeal the judgment through the state-court system
and then to seek review by writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court. Cf.
Postma v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan of Sioux City, 74 F.3d 160, 162 n. 3 (8th Cir.
1996) (collecting cases and concluding that “there is no procedural due process
exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine”). However, if the plaintiff has a claim
that is in any way independent of the state-court judgment, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine will not bar a federal court from exercising jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs' claims of particular injuries that they have suffered arise as a
direct result of prior state-court judgments. Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over their
challenges to SCFRA seeking to overturn the state-court judgments. As
explained above, however, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not prevent lower
federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over their general challenge to the
validity of SCFRA.
Abbott v. Michigan, 474 F.3d 324, 330 (footnotes omitted).
Here, like the plaintiffs in the federal case of Abbott, the actions of defendants
are grounded in SCFRA, the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Abbott, and the
Final Order. To grant the relief plaintiff seeks is impossible without having to decide that
the Final Order is violative of ERISA. Rooker-Feldman prevents the Court from having
jurisdiction to make such a decision. Rather, the United States Supreme Court is the
only federal court with jurisdiction to review state court judgments. Notably, the
Supreme Court has denied certiorari from both the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision
in Abbott and the Sixth Circuit’s decision in DaimlerChrysler.
16

C. Res Judicata
Additionally, even if Rooker-Feldman did not apply, the doctrine of res judicata
bars plaintiff’s case. Res judicata may bar any claims over which the federal courts
have jurisdiction, including both claims of injuries caused by state-court judgments and
general challenges to state statutes. Federal courts must give the same preclusive
effect to a state-court judgment as that judgment receives in the rendering state. 28
U.S.C. § 1738. Michigan recognizes two preclusion doctrines: res judicata, or claim
preclusion; and collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion. Claim preclusion “bars a
second, subsequent action when (1) the prior action was decided on the merits, (2) both
actions involve the same parties or their privies, and (3) the matter in the second case
was, or could have been, resolved in the first.” Adair v. State, 470 Mich. 105, 680
N.W.2d 386, 396 (Mich. 2004). Claim preclusion “bars not only claims already litigated,
but also every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties, exercising
reasonable diligence, could have raised but did not.” Id. “[T]he burden of proving the
applicability of the doctrine of res judicata is on the party asserting it.” Baraga County v.
State Tax Comm'n, 466 Mich. 264, 645 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Mich. 2002).
The Supreme Court has held, however, that as a matter of federal law, “res
judicata principles do not apply ‘where the party against whom an earlier decision is
asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or issue decided by
the first court.’ ” Fellowship of Christ Church v. Thorburn, 758 F.2d 1140, 1144 (6th
Cir.1985) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980)). As a constitutional
minimum, the state-court proceedings must “satisfy the applicable requirements of the
Due Process Clause” in order for their decisions to warrant preclusive effect. Kremer v.
17

Chem. Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482 (1982). Due process generally requires “notice
and an opportunity to respond.” Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546
(1985).
The Sixth Circuit in Abbott already considered whether res judicata applies to the
circumstances of this case, explaining:
This case satisfies all three prongs of the Michigan Supreme Court's test to
determine claim preclusion: the prior state-court decisions at issue were decided
on the merits and involved the same parties, and any due process, ERISA, or
state-law arguments were or could have been resolved in those actions. The
plaintiffs generally asserted in the federal district court that the SCFRA actions
did not satisfy due process requirements because of the litigation difficulties that
the plaintiffs faced due to their incarceration and the freezing of their assets.
However, the defendants moved for summary judgment on this issue. Under the
familiar standard, summary judgment is proper if the evidence, taken in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there are no genuine issues
of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106
S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The defendants
submitted to the district court copies of the state-court orders and cited the
applicable statutory provisions. Because the orders themselves and the statutory
provisions by which SCFRA proceedings are governed show that SCFRA
proceedings generally provide prisoners a full and fair opportunity to litigate any
of their claims, the plaintiffs were required to come forth with evidence that they
did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate their claims in their particular
cases. They provided none, instead relying on unsupported assertions in their
brief, and thus summary judgment for the defendants was proper.
Abbott, 474 F.3d at 331-32.
Plaintiff provides no reasoned argument as to why the same result should not
obtain here. Indeed, as in Abbott, all four requirements for res judicata are met: 1) the
state SCFRA proceedings were decided on the merits; 2) the resultant SCFRA order
was a final decision; 3) plaintiff’s ERISA claim was capable of resolution in the state

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proceedings;7 and 4) both actions involved the same parties. Plaintiff’s ERISA claim
arises from the same transaction, facts, and evidence in the state court proceedings,
because it is based on the Final Order which essentially requires plaintiff to redirect his
pension benefit check to his prison address. Because the test is whether the claims
raised in subsequent litigation could have been resolved in the first suit, plaintiff’s claim
is barred. Plaintiff could have raised an ERISA claim, as well as any other challenges to
the constitutionality of the state law, during the SCFRA proceedings.
V. Conclusion
Because, as explained above, plaintiff’s ERISA claim is precluded by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and res judicata, the remaining grounds for dismissal raised
by defendants need not be addressed.
Accordingly, defendants’ motion is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 14, 2011

S/Avern Cohn
AVERN COHN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to the attorneys of
record on this date, November 14, 2011, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

S/Julie Owens
Case Manager, [phone]
7

See Walters v. Cox, 342 F. Supp. 2d 670, 671 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (noting that
state courts have jurisdiction to decide issues under ERISA, even if ERISA is raised as
a defense). Moreover, it is clear that plaintiff could not have removed the state court
action to federal court by asserting ERISA as a defense. See State Treasurer v.
Pennington, 2011 WL 3440761, *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 5, 2011) (stating that “the SCFRA
calim brought by the State Treasurer arises solely under state law and [the plaintiff’s]
asserted defenses cannot turn this case into one arising under federal law”).
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