Nassar El v. Smith, et al

Filing 20

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS re 17 MOTION to Dismiss, 2 MOTION to Dismiss, 16 MOTION to Dismiss and Dismissing Claims against Defendant Marc D. Landau. Signed by District Judge Gerald E. Rosen. (RGun)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
AMARE ARI AMEN RA NASSAR EL,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 11-11957
Hon. Gerald E. Rosen

v.
VIRGIL C. SMITH, JR., et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
At a session of said Court, held in
the U.S. Courthouse, Detroit, Michigan
on
January 31, 2012
PRESENT: Honorable Gerald E. Rosen
Chief Judge, United States District Court
In the present suit, the pro se Plaintiff, Amare Ari Amen Ra Nassar El, has
asserted a variety of federal and state-law claims against eight Defendants — including
two state court judges, two state court clerks, the Wayne County Treasurer, the Wayne
County Sheriff, a Wayne County attorney, and a private attorney — with each of these
claims evidently arising from state court tax foreclosure and landlord/tenant proceedings
brought against Plaintiff and/or his property. Although Plaintiff’s complaint and
accompanying materials are far from clear — but, to the contrary, consist largely of a
hodge-podge of references to Plaintiff’s status as a “Moorish American,” cut-and-paste
snippets of case law, and citations to a panoply of laws, treaties, and legal doctrines — it

appears that Plaintiff seeks to challenge the unfavorable outcomes of the two abovereferenced state court proceedings. Through the three motions presently pending before
the Court, all but one of the Defendants seek the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint on
various grounds.1 For the reasons stated briefly below, the Court finds that these motions
should be granted and Plaintiff’s complaint dismissed in its entirety.
First, the moving Defendants correctly observe that most or all of Plaintiff’s claims
are subject to dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and principles of res judicata.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review
claims which have been litigated and finally decided in state court. See Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521-22
(2005); Leach v. Manning, 105 F. Supp.2d 707, 713 (E.D. Mich. 2000). Similarly, the
doctrine of res judicata — also known as claim preclusion — prevents a party from
relitigating claims that were previously litigated before the state courts, as well as any
claims arising out of the same underlying transactions that could have been raised in the
state court proceedings but were not. See Adair v. State of Michigan, 470 Mich. 105, 680
N.W.2d 386, 396 (2004); Leach, 105 F. Supp.2d at 712-13.
Although Plaintiff’s claims in this case are difficult to discern, they apparently rest
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The private attorney named in Plaintiff’s complaint, Marc D. Landau, has yet to file an
answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiff’s complaint. It is doubtful whether Defendant Landau
has been properly served, as the record reflects that Plaintiff sent a copy of the complaint by
certified mail to Mr. Landau’s place of business, which does not qualify as personal service on
an individual. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e); see also Abel v. Harp, No. 03-4474, 122 F. App’x 248,
250-51 (6th Cir. Feb. 16, 2005). In any event, the claims against Defendant Landau are subject
to dismissal on many of the same grounds advanced in the remaining Defendants’ motions.
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in large part, if not exclusively, on the premise that the state courts ruled incorrectly in the
course of the tax foreclosure and landlord/tenant proceedings referenced in the complaint.
(See, e.g., Complaint at ¶¶ 18, 56.) Indeed, the bulk of the complaint’s allegations are
directed at events that transpired during the state court proceedings. Yet, to the extent
that Plaintiff was dissatisfied with the state courts’ rulings, his recourse was to the
Michigan appellate courts. There is no indication in the record that Plaintiff has pursued
any such avenues of appeal. Rather, it appears that the state court proceedings have
concluded, and the judgments of the state courts are now final. Under these
circumstances, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiff from, in effect, seeking to
appeal the adverse state court rulings before a federal district court. See Leach, 105 F.
Supp.2d at 713; see also Anderson v. County of Wayne, No. 10-13708, 2011 WL
2470467, at *4-*5 (E.D. Mich. June 20, 2011) (finding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
barred the plaintiff’s challenge to adverse rulings in a state court tax foreclosure suit);
Vuaai El v. Mortgage Electronic Registry System, No. 08-14190, 2009 WL 2705819, at
*8-*9 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 2009) (dismissing on Rooker-Feldman grounds a challenge to
a judgment of possession issued in state court eviction proceedings). Similarly, under
principles of res judicata, this Court must give full effect to the final judgments of the
Michigan courts, and Plaintiff cannot relitigate any claims that were actually litigated in
the state court proceedings, nor may he advance claims arising out of the same underlying
transactions that he could have pursued in those proceedings. See Anderson, 2011 WL
2470467, at *6; Luckett v. US Bank National Ass’n, No. 08-14285, 2009 WL 22858, at *4
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(E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2009).
Next, the Wayne County Defendants — including the Wayne County Treasurer,
the Wayne County Sheriff, and a Wayne County attorney, Richard Stanley — point out
that most or all of Plaintiff’s claims arising out of the state court tax foreclosure suit are
barred by the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Under the TIA, a federal
district court may not “enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of
any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the
courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. As observed in Anderson, 2011 WL 2470467, at
*7, “the TIA bars claims challenging the manner in which tax foreclosures are carried
out.” Because the plaintiffs in that case “had several options” and “remedies were
available under Michigan state law,” the court held that the plaintiffs’ various claims
challenging the tax foreclosures on their homes were barred by the TIA. Anderson, 2011
WL 2470467, at *7. Likewise, in this case, Plaintiff’s complaint is replete with
allegations of purported unfairness and defects in the state court tax foreclosure
proceedings. (See Complaint at ¶¶ 1-30.) Because there were available avenues under
Michigan law for raising these challenges and objections — as evidenced by the
complaint’s allegations that Plaintiff did, in fact, advance these challenges and objections
in the course of the state court proceedings — the TIA precludes this Court from
entertaining Plaintiff’s various claims arising from alleged unfairness and defects in the
state court tax foreclosure proceedings.
Next, the two state court judges named in Plaintiff’s complaint correctly observe
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that they enjoy absolute immunity from federal suits for damages arising from acts they
performed in their judicial capacities. See Stern v. Mascio, 262 F.3d 600, 606-07 (6th
Cir. 2001); Kircher v. City of Ypsilianti, 458 F. Supp.2d 439, 446 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
Although this immunity does not extend to “nonjudicial actions” or actions “taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction,” Stern, 262 F.3d at 607 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted), nothing in the allegations of the complaint would suggest that Plaintiff’s
claims against the two Defendant judges fit within either of these two limited exceptions
to absolute judicial immunity. Rather, the complaint’s allegations concerning these two
Defendants rest solely and exclusively upon actions they allegedly took and rulings they
issued in the course of the state court proceedings, acts that plainly were undertaken in a
judicial capacity. Likewise, the two state court clerks named in Plaintiff’s complaint are
protected by quasi-judicial immunity to the extent that they “perform[] tasks so integral or
intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the
judicial officer who is immune.” Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994); see
also Yarbrough v. Garrett, 579 F. Supp.2d 856, 860 (E.D. Mich. 2008). Again, because
the complaint’s allegations concerning these individuals focus solely upon actions they
allegedly took in the course of the state court proceedings, rather than actions independent
from those proceedings, the two Defendant court clerks enjoy quasi-judicial immunity
from the claims for damages asserted against them in this case.
Finally, in addition to these various jurisdictional and immunity-based grounds for
dismissal, the moving Defendants contend more generally that Plaintiff’s complaint fails
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to state any viable claims upon which relief can be granted. Even under the lenient
standards governing pro se pleadings, Plaintiff’s complaint in this case is an
incomprehensible grab-bag of disjointed references to various statutes, treaties, legal
doctrines, judicial rulings, and the like. Similarly, Plaintiff has eschewed any sort of
straightforward response to Defendants’ motions, and instead has submitted over 70
pages of documents bearing such captions as “affidavit of fact,” “writ in the nature of
discovery,” and “legal notice of removal.” The Court appreciates that the legal system
can be difficult for a layperson to navigate, but the rules of pleading are designed to
facilitate access to the courts by pro se litigants without the need for specialized legal
training or expertise, requiring only a “short and plain statement” of the grounds for
relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff has made no effort to satisfy this standard,
but instead appears intent on obscuring the nature of and factual basis for his claims in
this case. Moreover, he cites a litany of state and federal laws — e.g., criminal statutes
that do not confer a private right of action — without any attempt to allege facts that
might forge a link between these laws and a viable cause of action.
Under this record, no amount of liberal construction of Plaintiff’s pro se
submissions can rescue this suit from dismissal. While it is evident that Plaintiff is
dissatisfied with the outcome of the state court tax foreclosure and landlord/tenant
proceedings, it is far less clear how he proposes to forge a link between this
dissatisfaction and a viable cause of action that lies within this Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. Instead, for the reasons identified in Defendants’ motions and discussed
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above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed.
For these reasons,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the June 28, 2011 motion
to dismiss brought by Defendants Donald Coleman and Cynthia Russ (docket #2) is
GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the July 5, 2011 motion to dismiss
brought by Defendants Raymond J. Wojtowicz, the Wayne County Sheriff, and Richard
Stanley (docket #16) also is GRANTED. Next, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the
August 16, 2011 motion to dismiss brought by Defendants Virgil C. Smith, Jr. and Sheryl
Redmond (docket #17) also is GRANTED. Finally, for the reasons stated above, IT IS
FURTHER ORDERED that the claims against Defendant Marc D. Landau also are
DISMISSED.

s/Gerald E. Rosen
Chief Judge, United States District Court
Dated: January 31, 2012
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record
on February 1, 2012, by electronic mail and upon Amare Ari Amen Ra Nassar El, 12812
Mettetal Street, Detroit, MI 48227by ordinary mail.
s/Ruth A. Gunther
Case Manager

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