51382 Gratiot Avenue Holdings, LLC v. Chesterfield Development Company, LLC
ORDER denying 62 Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order (Fed.R.Civ.P.30(b)(6)Deposition). Signed by District Judge Robert H. Cleland. (LWag)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
51382 GRATIOT AVENUE HOLDINGS,
Case No. 2:11-cv-12047
COMPANY, LLC and JOHN DAMICO,
MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL, INC.,
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S “MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
(FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6) DEPOSITION)”
Before the court is Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant’s (“Gratiot’s”) motion for a
protective order barring Defendants’ notice of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, filed on
September 21, 2011. On September 16, 2011, counsel for Defendants/CounterPlaintiffs (“Chesterfield”) noticed the deposition of Gratiot “through its designated
representative(s)” on September 26, 2011. (Pl.’s Mot. Protect. Order Ex. 1, at 2, Sept.
21, 2011.) The notice directed Gratiot’s counsel to “[p]lease designate one or more
officers, directors, managing agents or other persons to testify regarding the factual
allegations and other matters contained in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.” (Id.)
On September 19, 2011, Gratiot’s counsel sent a letter to Chesterfield’s counsel
objecting to the deposition notice, asserting that it “does not describe the matters for
examination with sufficient particularity as required by Rule 30(b)(6)” of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id. Ex. 2, at 1.) Chesterfield’s counsel responded via letter
on September 20, 2011, and limited the noticed deposition to testimony regarding
specific paragraphs of the Amended Complaint. (Id. Ex. 3, at 2.)
Gratiot then filed the instant motion, requesting the issuance of a protective order
barring Defendants’ deposition notice. Gratiot argues that, even as limited, the
deposition notice encompasses matters for examination that are too broad, “irrelevant[,]
or have already been admitted or agreed upon.” (Id. at 4.)
On September 21, 2011,
the court held a telephonic hearing on the motion. For the reasons articulated on the
record during the telephonic motion hearing, the court determines that the deposition
notice, as limited to specific paragraphs of the Amended Complaint, “describe[s] with
reasonable particularity the matters for examination” in accordance with Rule 30(b)(6).
Therefore, the court concludes that “good cause” does not exist to issue a protective
order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) (stating that district court “may, for good cause,
issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense”); Conti v. Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc., 326 F. App’x
900, 903-04 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he decision to issue a protective order is left to ‘the
broad discretion of the district court in managing the case.’” (quoting Lewelling v.
Farmers Ins. of Columbus, Inc., 879 F.2d 212, 218 (6th Cir. 1989))). Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Motion for Protective Order (Fed. R. Civ. P.
30(b)(6) Deposition)” [Dkt. # 62] is DENIED.
s/Robert H. Cleland
ROBERT H. CLELAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: September 22, 2011
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record
on this date, September 22, 2011, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
Case Manager and Deputy Clerk
S:\Cleland\JUDGE'S DESK\C2 ORDERS\11-12047.51382GRATIOTAVEHOLDINGS.DenMotProtOrder30b6Dep.set.wpd
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