COOPER v. Social Security, Commissioner of

Filing 24

ORDER Adopting Report and Recommendation Signed by District Judge Julian Abele Cook. (KDoa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

CAZELL R. COOPER
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 11-12201
Honorable Julian Abele Cook, Jr.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

ORDER
On May 20, 2011, the Plaintiff, Cazell R. Cooper, filed a complaint, seeking to obtain a
judicial review of the final decision by the Defendant, Commissioner of Social Security. The matter
was thereafter referred to a magistrate judge for, inter alia, a report regarding the merit, if any, of
Cooper’s quest for benefits.
On October 13, 2011, Cooper filed a motion, in which she sought to obtain a summary
judgment because, in her opinion, the now-challenged adverse administrative decision was not
supported by substantial evidence in the record. However, the Defendant, who had a different point
of view, opposed Cooper’s motion, and, in so doing, filed a similar request for dispositive relief.
On February 27, 2012, the magistrate judge submitted her report to the Court, in which she
recommended that (1) Cooper’s motion for summary judgment be denied, and (2) the
Commissioner’s dispositive request be granted.

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I.
The underlying cause in this case is based upon Cooper’s application for Disability Insurance
Benefits and Supplemental Security Income on April 14, 2008. In her initial request for benefits,
Cooper claimed that she was no longer able to work because of several disabling health issues.
When this application was rejected, Cooper obtained a de novo hearing before an administrative law
judge who determined that her claimed ailments did not warrant the requested relief. In the nowchallenged decision, the administrative law judge concluded that Cooper had retained the residual
function capacity to perform “a range of light exertional work activities as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except as restricted by the following: (a) the claimant should have the
option to sit or stand at will; (b) the claimant is limited to only occasional climbing of stairs,
balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, or crawling; and (c) the claimant should avoid even
moderate exposure to hazards such as moving industrial machinery and unprotected heights.” (Tr.
19)
Relying, in part, upon the testimony of a vocational expert witness, the administrative law
judge concluded that Cooper could satisfy the minimum requirements of “light, unskilled
occupations such as a cashier, an assembler or an inspector.” (Tr. 23). Feeling aggrieved by this
adverse determination, Cooper sought to obtain a review of this decision by the Commissioner - a
request that was ultimately denied. This lawsuit followed.
II.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), final decisions of the Social Security Administration can be
reviewed by a federal court. However, such a judicial review is limited, in that the reviewing court
“must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions absent a determination that the Commissioner has

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failed to apply the correct legal standard or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial
evidence in the record.” Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec, 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir.2005)
(internal quotations omitted). Substantial evidence has been defined as being something “more than
a scintilla of evidence but less than preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Rogers v.Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241
(6th Cir.2007) (internal quotations omitted). This review is limited in scope to an examination of
the record only. Thus, the court “does not review the evidence de novo, make credibility
determinations nor weigh the evidence.” Brainard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679,
681 (6th Cir.1989).
In her appeal, Cooper urges the Court to conclude that the now-challenged decision was
erroneous because the administrative law judge (1) had failed to give full consideration to her
medical difficulties involving fatigue, and (2) did not give controlling weight to the professional
opinions of her two treating physicians. However, the Court, following its review of the record,
disagrees with Cooper’s arguments which must be rejected for several reasons.
III.
Cooper contends that the magistrate judge erroneously declared that the administrative law
judge’s analysis of her residual functional capacity was based on substantial evidence. In support
of this position, Cooper asserts that her residual functional capacity assessment should have been
restricted in scope because of the impairments relating to her fatigue. However, the record in this
cause does not support Cooper’s argument. In fact, the administrative law judge, who found that
Cooper was capable of “light work” despite her struggles with fatigue, wrote that:
The claimant, after all, has alleged experiencing chronic, nearly constant pain and
fatigue which requires that she lay down for most of her waking hours and prevents
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her from engaging in even light housework on a regular basis. The record simply
does not indicate the presence of the sorts of clinical and diagnostic abnormalities
that would be expected to accompany the presence of such serious symptoms, and
there is little indication that the claimant has received the sort of treatment which
would generally be required by an individual with the levels of constant pain which
the claimant has alleged. (Tr. 20).
Hence, the objection by Cooper who maintains that the administrative law judge had failed to
consider the evidence regarding her fatigue is unfounded. In summary, the administrative law judge
did consider and account for the evidence regarding Cooper’s impairments.
Cooper also submits that neither the magistrate judge nor the administrative law judge
considered the evidence from her treating physicians, Drs. Dermot O’Brien and. Chidozie Ononuju.
In his report of October 9, 2007, Dr. O’Brien opined that Cooper could not engage in any
meaningful occupation because of her severe medical limitations. (Tr. 297). He noted that Cooper
was being treated with prescriptive seizure medicine and diagnosed her with chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease and hypertension. Id. However, the administrative law judge declined to assign
substantial weight to this opinion by Dr. O’Brien because it was neither supported by the medical
evidence of record nor the physician’s own treatment notes. Notwithstanding Cooper’s argument
to the contrary, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ultimate conclusion by the
administrative law judge. As an example, the treatment notes of Dr. O’Brien on December 27, 2007
state that (1) his patient’s seizure disorder is well-controlled by her medication, and (2) her chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease and hypertension problems are stable. (Tr. 262).The administrative
law judge did consider and evaluate Dr. O’Brien’s medical opinion, but rightfully discounted its
significance because it “[bore] little obvious relation to his treatment notes.” (Tr. 21).
In April 2008, Dr. Ononuju opined that Cooper could carry no weight, could not grasp
objects or reach repetitively, and was limited in sustained concentration due to depression and
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anxiety disorder. (Tr. 298-99). In her appellate papers, Cooper urges the Court to find that the
decision by the administrative law judge was legally flawed because it failed to give great weight
to this treating physician’s professional evaluation and conclusion. The administrative law judge
found that those limitations, which had been suggested by Dr. Ononuju, were not supported by the
record. The administrative law judge noted that, despite the extreme limitations which had been
cited by Dr. Ononuju, there were no referrals for physical therapy, pain specialists, or any other
significant treatment. In the final analysis, it appears that Dr. Ononuju’s opinions were based on
Cooper’s subjective complaints and are not based on objective medical evidence.
IV.
For the reasons that have been stated above, (1) the magistrate judge’s report is adopted in
its entirety (ECF 18); (2) Cooper’s motion for summary judgment is denied (ECF 11); (3) and the
Commissioner’s application for the entry of a summary judgement is granted. (ECF 12).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: May 1, 2012

s/Julian Abele Cook, Jr.
JULIAN ABELE COOK, JR.
U.S. District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing Order was served upon counsel of record via the Court's ECF System to their respective
email addresses or First Class U.S. mail to the non-ECF participants on May 1, 2012.
s/ Kay Doaks
Case Manager

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