Prison Legal News v. Bezotte et al

Filing 296

ORDER Denying Plaintiff's Rule 54(b) Motion 246 . Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER,
d/b/a Prison Legal News,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 11-CV-13460
Honorable Denise Page Hood

v.
LIVINGSTON COUNTY SHERIFF BOB
BEZOTTE, individually and officially,
LIEUTENANT THOMAS CREMONTE,
individually and officially, and
LIVINGSTON COUNTY,
Defendants.

/
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
RULE 54(b) MOTION [Dkt. No. 246]
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff recently filed a Rule 54(b) Motion Seeking Relief from the Order

Granting Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. [Dkt. No. 246] Plaintiff
seeks reconsideration of the Court’s conclusion in its March 29, 2013 Order that
Plaintiff’s regarding the delivery of “legal mail” and visitation with clients were not
viable. Plaintiff’s Motion has been fully briefed, and the Court heard argument on the
Motion at a May 31, 2016 hearing.

II.

ANALYSIS
A.

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) states:
[A]ny order or other form of decision, however designated, which
adjudicates fewer than all of the claims ... shall not terminate the action
... and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
The Sixth Circuit has held that “[t]raditionally, courts will find justification for
reconsidering interlocutory orders when there is (1) an intervening change of
controlling law; (2) new evidence available; or (3) a need to correct a clear error or
prevent manifest injustice.” Rodriguez v. Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 89
F. App’x 949, 959 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Mallory v. Eyrich, 922 F.2d 1273, 1282
(6th Cir.1991) (“District courts have inherent power to reconsider interlocutory orders
and reopen any part of a case before entry of final judgment. A district court may
modify, or even rescind, such interlocutory orders.” (citations omitted)).
Plaintiff argues that, in this case, the Sixth Circuit’s holding in ACLU v.
Livingston County, 796 F.3d 636 (6th Cir. 2015), which was not available for the
Court’s consideration or Plaintiff’s argument that precipitated the Court’s decision,
constitutes an intervening change of controlling law. Plaintiff argues that the ACLU
v. Livingston County decision contravenes this Court’s findings on March 29, 2013
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that Plaintiff “has failed to state a claim for a constitutional violation as to Defendants’
failure to allow visitation of inmates or delivery of ‘legal mail’ not personal to an
individual inmate.” Dkt. No. 64, PgID 1994.
B.

Analysis

In its Motion and supporting brief, Plaintiff contends that:
In ACLU v. Livingston, the Sixth Circuit unequivocally stated that mail
from an attorney is “legal mail as a matter of law because ‘unimpaired,
confidential communication with an attorney is an integral component
of the judicial process.’” 796 F.3d at 643 (citing Sallier v. Brooks, 343
F.3d at 877); see also id. “all incoming mail from attorneys and from the
courts is to be treated as privileged mail” (citing Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1012
(6th Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original)). Accordingly, the first analysis must be
whether the correspondence on
i t s
face
establ
ished
that it
came
from a
licens
e
d
attorn
ey. In
ACLU
, the
Sixth
Circui
t
relied
o
n
severa
l
factor
3

s
includ
ing: 1)
notati
ons on
t h e
outsid
e of
t h e
envel
o p e
a n d
t h e
letter
identi
fying
it as
“legal
mail;”
2) the
name
of a
licens
e
d
attorn
e y ;
and 3)
t h e
name
of the
organi
zation
o
r
firm
affilia
t e d
with
t h e
4

attorn
e y .
7 9 6
F.3d
a
t
640.
While
t h e
Sixth
Circui
t
certai
n l y
d i d
n o t
intend
this to
be an
exhau
stive
list,
t h e
intent
w a s
clear
– the
j a i l
staff
receiv
i n g
t h e
corres
ponde
n c e
must
b
e
able
t
o
5

deter
mine
that
t h e
letter
came
from
a
n
attorn
ey.
Dkt. No. 246, PgID 6404. Plaintiff then contends that, because correspondences to
Livingston County Jail inmates clearly labeled as coming from attorney Daniel
Manville were not processed to prisoners, Defendants’ actions contravened the law
“announced” in ACLU v. Livingston County. See id. at PgID 6408-15.
Defendant argues, and the Court agrees, that Plaintiff’s argument regarding mail
sent to Livingston County Jail inmates by attorney Daniel Manville is not persuasive
or relevant. Plaintiff does not dispute that: (1) the issue of correspondence from
attorney Daniel Manville was not identified in the motions underlying the Court’s
March 29, 2013 Order; and (2) the Court did not address the issue of correspondence
from Daniel Manville in the March 29, 2013 Order. Plaintiff also does not dispute
that it withdrew, prior to any action by the Court, the proposed pleadings Plaintiff later
sought leave to file regarding attorney Daniel Manville’s correspondence with inmates
at Livingston County Jail. See Dkt. Nos. 122 and 147. The Court never considered
previously, and the Court concludes that it does not need to consider now for purposes
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of deciding Plaintiff’s Rule 54(b) Motion, the envelopes or letters that constitute the
correspondence from attorney Daniel Manville to inmates at Livingston County Jail.
In footnote 4 of Plaintiff’s brief in support of the Rule 54(b) Motion and in
Plaintiff’s reply brief, Plaintiff presents an argument that Plaintiff is not simply a
publisher but that it advocates and litigates on prisoner rights issues nationwide.
Although that may be true, there is no evidence, or even any argument, that the
correspondence Plaintiff sent to the Livingston County Jail inmates was for the
purpose of providing legal counsel to the inmates. The absence of intent to provide
legal counsel was recognized by the Court when it issued the March 29, 2013 Order,1
and Plaintiff’s arguments in its Rule 54(b) motion continue to demonstrate that
Plaintiff’s motivation behind the present cause of action is to pursue Plaintiff’s rights,
not to provide legal counsel or representation to inmates at Livingston County Jail.
See, e.g., Dkt. No. 246, PgID 6413 (“[Plaintiff] has third-party standing to assert the
rights of other organizations and individuals who correspond with prisoners at the
Livingston County Jail, . . .” (emphasis added)).
Plaintiff also asks the Court to reconsider its ruling in the March 29, 2013 Order

1

See Dkt. No. 64, PgID 1991 (“Here, [Plaintiff] is a publication and not a legal aid
organization. Although the distribution of its publication will ultimately inform
inmates of their legal rights, . . . [Plaintiff] is not attempting to provide legal
representation to the inmates. . . . The purpose of the conversation is . . . to gather
more information on the alleged wrong committed against [Plaintiff].”).
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that Plaintiff’s attorneys did not have a right to visit with inmates. The Court first
notes that, as Plaintiff implicitly acknowledges in its briefs, ACLU v. Livingston
County did not address or make a ruling regarding the issue of whether an attorney has
a right to visit with a prisoner where (as here) no attorney-client relationship exists.
The Court also finds Plaintiff’s argument unpersuasive for the same reasons stated
above regarding correspondence with Livingston County Jail inmates. Again,
Plaintiff was not acting as legal counsel to the inmates but instead was seeking to
further its own cause of action.2
For the reasons stated above, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Rule 54(b) Motion.
III.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Rule 54(b) Motion Seeking Relief from the

Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 246] is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

2

See Dkt. No. 64, PgID 1992 (“[Plaintiff] is a publication and not an organization
seeking to offer legal services to inmates. Informing inmates of their legal rights is
ancillary. The primary objective in talking to inmates is to allow [Plaintiff] to
better assert its own legal interests so that [Plaintiff] will be able to distribute its
publications. Here, [Plaintiff] is not attempting to talk with inmates as an act of
expression. Rather, [Plaintiff] is talking to inmates [a]s part of discovery.”).
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S/Denise Page Hood
Denise Page Hood
Chief Judge, United States District Court
Dated: March 31, 2017
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record on March 31, 2017, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/LaShawn R. Saulsberry
Case Manager

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